Community, Power, and Colonialism : The U.S. Army in Southern Arizona and New Mexico, 1866-1886 by Lahti, Janne
  
   
 
 
                     
 
 
 
Community, Power, and Colonialism  
-The U.S. Army in Southern Arizona and New Mexico, 
1866-1886 
 
    Janne Lahti 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Academic dissertation to be publicly discussed, by due permission of the Faculty of 
Arts at the University of Helsinki in auditorium XIV, on the 3 rd of April, 2009 at 12 
o’clock
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright 2009 Janne Lahti 
ISBN 978-952-92-5179-7 (print) 
ISBN 978-952-10-5311-5 (pdf) 
http://ethesis.helsinki.fi 
 
Helsinki University Print 
Helsinki 2009 
 
 iii
Contents 
Contents     iii 
List of Illustrations     vi 
Abstract     vii 
Acknowledgments     viii 
 
Part I Introduction 
1. A Colonizer Community in the Southwest   1 
1.1 The Argument    1 
1.2 Postcolonialism as Research Paradigm  7 
1.3 Whiteness and Class    12 
1.4 Army History, Western Expansion, and Colonialism 13 
1.5 Chapters     18 
1.6 Sources     19 
2. From Apacheria to U.S. Southwest: A Short History of A Place Facing  
Colonialism     22 
2.1 The Spaniards and Apache Power   23  
2.2 U.S. Army and Continental Conquest   27 
2.3 U.S.-Apache Wars    30 
2.4 The U.S. Colonial Regime   36 
 
Part II The Colony 
3. Journey to the “Outside”: The Army on the Road to the Southwest  42 
3.1 Transient Conquerors      45 
3.2 Travel Routes and Transports   50 
3.3 Class and Travel    55 
3.4 Representations of the Journey   63 
Conclusion: Penetrating the Wilderness   69 
4. Apaches in White Army Minds    72 
4.1 Constructing Apaches as the Enemy of Whiteness  74 
  4.1.1 Apache Society   76 
  4.1.2 Apache Rule   81 
  4.1.3 The Apache Way of War  85 
  4.1.4 Fear of the Colonized  89 
 iv 
4.2 Representing the Akimel O’odham   92 
4.3 Violence: “Apaches Deserve Punishment”  94 
4.4 Imagining Apache Futures   103 
  4.4.1 Reservation Regeneration  105 
  4.4.2 Abducting Apache Children  111   
4.5 Colonial Knowledge and Apache History  113    
Conclusion:  The Racial Other    118 
5. “The Devil’s Garden” or “Our Great Western Empire”: White Army  
Men and Women and the Place Facing Colonialism  121 
5.1 “Lost in Apacheria”: The Landscapes   124 
5.2 Borderlands Society    133 
  5.2.1 Mexicans   133 
  5.2.2 Whites    137 
  5.2.3 Settlements   143 
5.3 “Inhospitable Wasteland”   148 
5.4 “Our Great Western Empire”   155  
5.5 Representing the Army’s Mission   162 
Conclusion: Wretched Present, Thriving Future   166 
 
Part III The Community  
6. The Army Village as White Middle-Class Living Space  170 
6.1 Village Locations and Public Space   172 
6.2 Domestic Space    178 
6.3 Domestic Life    185 
Conclusion: Imperfect Islands of Civilization   191 
7. Manual Labor, Leisure, and the Construction of Social Order in the  
Army Villages     193 
7.1 Labor     194 
  7.1.1 The Army Elite and Labor  194 
  7.1.2 Enlisted Men’s Labor Tasks  198 
7.2 Resistance and Leisure in the Enlisted Ranks  207 
  7.2.1 Resistance at Work   209 
  7.2.2 Desertion   209 
  7.2.3 Leisure and Class Consciousness  213 
 v 
7.3 Leisure as Middle-Class Privilege   218 
7.3.1 Life of Leisure   219 
7.3.2 Social Control and Disharmony  229 
Conclusion: Two Worlds    233 
8. Colonized Labor: Apaches as Army Workers   235 
8.1 Army Work as Colonial Resistance   239 
8.2 Apaches at Work    244 
8.3 A Precarious Labor System   252 
8.4 White Army Personnel and the Search for Authority over  
the Colonized Workforce    262 
Conclusion: A Race-Based Labor System   267 
Conclusion. An Empire of Denial, Difference, and Frustration 270 
Sources      275 
 vi 
 
List of Illustrations 
 
Map of Apacheria    x 
Map of Arizona army villages   169 
   
 
 
 
 
 vii
Abstract 
Empire is central to U.S. history. As the U.S. projects its influence on a global 
scale in today’s world, it is important to understand that U.S. empire has had a long 
history. This dissertation offers a case study of colonialism and U.S. empire by 
discussing the social worlds, labor regimes, and culture of the U.S. Army during the 
conquest of southern Arizona and New Mexico (1866-1886). It highlights some of the 
defining principles, mentalities, and characteristics of U.S. imperialism and shows how 
U.S. forces have in years past constructed their power and represented themselves, their 
missions, and the places and peoples that faced U.S. imperialism/colonialism. Using 
insights from postcolonial studies and whiteness studies, this work balances its attention 
between discursive representations (army stories) and social experience (army actions), 
pays attention to silences in the process of historical production, and focuses on 
collective group mentalities and identities. In the end the army experience reveals an 
empire in denial constructed on the rule of difference and marked by frustration. White 
officers, their wives, and the white enlisted men not only wanted the monopoly of 
violence for the U.S. regime but also colonial (mental/cultural) authority and power, and 
constructed their identity, authority, and power in discourse and in the social contexts of 
the everyday through difference. Engaged in warfare against the Apaches, they did not 
recognize their actions as harmful or acknowledge the U.S. invasion as the bloody 
colonial conquest it was. White army personnel painted themselves and the army as 
liberators, represented colonial peoples as racial inferiors, approached colonial terrain in 
terms of struggle, and claimed that the region was a terrible periphery with little value 
before the arrival of white “civilization.” Officers and wives also wanted to place 
themselves at the top of colonial hierarchies as the refined and respectable class who led 
the regeneration of the colony by example: they tried to turn army villages into islands 
of civilization and made journeys, leisure, and domestic life to showcase their class 
sensibilities and level of sophistication. Often, however, their efforts failed, resulting in 
frustration and bitterness. Many blamed the colony and its peoples for their failures. The 
army itself was divided by race and class. All soldiers were treated as laborers unfit for 
self-government. White enlisted men, frustrated by their failures in colonial warfare and 
by constant manual labor, constructed worlds of resistance, whereas indigenous soldiers 
sought to negotiate the effects of colonialism by working in the army. As colonized 
labor their position was defined by tension between integration and exclusion and 
between freedom and colonial control.
 viii
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Part I INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 1  
A Colonizer Community in the Southwest 
 
“In the colonies it is the policeman and the soldier who are the 
official, instituted go-betweens, the spokesmen of the settler and 
his rule of oppression…The intermediary does not lighten the 
oppression, nor seek to hide the domination; he shows them up 
and puts them into practice with the clear conscience of an 
upholder of the peace; yet he is the bringer of violence into the 
home and into the mind of the native.”1 -Frantz Fanon 
 
“Truths are illusions about which one has forgotten that this is 
what they are.”2 -Friedrich Nietzsche 
 
1.1 The Argument 
This dissertation offers perspective on the structures of power, identity, and 
community and on the significances and meanings of whiteness and class in nineteenth-
century colonial encounters by discussing the United States Army in southern Arizona 
and New Mexico during the post-Civil War era of military conquest (1866-1886). It is a 
critical interrogation of the ways power, privilege, and difference that lay at the heart of 
colonialism were constructed, managed, and contested by one group of white colonizers 
during a particular project of U.S. empire-building.3  
                                                 
1
 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (1961; reprint, New York: Penguin, 2001), 29. 
2
 Friedrich Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense,” in Walter Kaufmann, ed. and trans., 
The Portable Nietzsche (New York: Viking Press, 1954), 46-47. 
3
 Historian Partha Chatterjee claims that at the heart of colonialism is the rule of difference. However, the 
meanings of difference, historian Frederick Cooper writes, are always contested and rarely stable. Partha 
Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1993), 14-34, especially 16; Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory, 
Knowledge, History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 23. Colonialism can be defined as 
the coercive incorporation of people into an expansionist state and invidious distinction, or as the 
conquest and control of other peoples’ land and goods - including the appropriation of material resources, 
exploitation of labor, and interference with political and cultural structures. In the common understanding 
colonialism is usually associated with aggression, conquest, economic exploitation, and dominance over 
indigenous peoples by whites, ethnically Europeans. Colonialism, as an integral part of modern capitalist 
development, was not an identical process in different parts of the world, but everywhere it locked the 
original inhabitants and the newcomers into the most complex and traumatic relationships in human 
history. Empire can be defined as a political unit that is large, expansionist, and which reproduces 
differentiation and inequality among people it incorporates. The relationship between colonialism and 
imperialism is sometimes confusing and often interpenetrating. Imperialism can be seen as a global 
system, or as something that originates from the metropolis, whereas colonialism is the takeover of 
territory and what happens locally in a colony. See Ania Loomba, Colonialism/Postcolonialism (New 
York: Routledge, 1998), 2-7, 20; Nicholas Thomas, Colonialism’s Culture: Anthropology, Travel, and 
Government (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), 2-3; Robert J.C. Young, Postcolonialism: An Historical 
Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), 5-6, 15-43; Cooper, Colonialism in Question, 26-28. 
 2 
This work is founded on a premise that conquest and colonialism should be seen 
as processes where understanding the white colonizers conscience, mentality, and 
identity are as crucial as capturing the colonized (subaltern) voice or narrating the 
battles fought and dispossessions enacted. It not only places the spotlight on white 
officers, their wives, and the white enlisted men, and pays less attention to black troops, 
but also declines to see officers and soldiers primarily as “men of action,” as has been 
common in most historiography.4 Instead it approaches white army people as a group of 
colonizers who constructed identity and authority in discourse and in the social contexts 
of the everyday through difference.5 White army people, especially officers and wives, 
not only wanted military power - the monopoly of violence for the U.S. regime - but 
also colonial (intellectual/mental/social/cultural) authority and power. To achieve it they 
constructed colonial knowledge, hierarchies, and otherness using race and class as 
sorting techniques and markers of difference. 
Like elsewhere in the post-Civil War trans-Mississippi West, the U.S. Army in 
southern Arizona and New Mexico represented an intruder on indigenous lands, 
executing the expansion of an empire and waging a ruthless offensive against 
indigenous tribes (mainly Apaches and also Yavapais). Scattered across southern 
Arizona and New Mexico, numerous army villages, officially called forts or camps, 
formed distinctive colonizer-islands.6 They were imagined social entities and living 
                                                 
4
 This work offers some comparisons on the status and social life of white and black troops when 
applicable. The choice to focus on white army people is logical also because there already exists several 
good social histories of black soldiers in the West and because no black troops served in Arizona until 
1885, the very end of the period under investigation here. While New Mexico had more black soldiers 
their presence was still irregular: some black infantry units were stationed in New Mexico right after the 
Civil War and one black cavalry regiment served there from 1876 to 1881. For black soldiers, see James 
N. Leiker, Racial Borders: Black Soldiers Along the Rio Grande (College Station: Texas A&M 
University Press, 2002); Charles L. Kenner, Buffalo Soldiers and Officers of the Ninth Cavalry, 1867-
1898: Black & White Together (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999); William A. Dobak & 
Thomas D. Phillips, The Black Regulars, 1866-1898 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2001); 
Monroe Lee Billington, New Mexico’s Buffalo Soldiers, 1866-1900 (Niwot, CO: University Press of 
Colorado, 1991).   
5
 I use “white army people” or “white army personnel” when referring to officers, their wives, and white 
soldiers as a whole. Discourse can be understood as a spoken or written treatment of a subject in which it 
is treated and handled at length. It is collectively produced, surrounding and constituting a particular 
matter. It rests on a notion that language constructs the subject and thus no human utterance is innocent. 
Also, there exists no rigid demarcation between event and representation. All ideas are ordered through 
some material medium. This ordering imposes a pattern on them: a pattern which Michel Foucault calls 
“discourse.” The concept of discourse is meant to uncover the interrelation between the ideological and 
the material. Discourse can be understood as a domain within which language is used in particular ways. 
This domain is rooted in human practices, institutions, and actions. Loomba, 
Colonialism/Postcolonialism, 36-39, 55. 
6
 I use both “camp” and “fort” when referring to individual army villages. The official designation of each 
village varied over time. For instance, Fort Bowie, Arizona, was originally called a fort after its 
 3 
spaces where the life strategies and visions of the army elite of officers and their wives 
and the working-class enlisted men defined community culture and dynamics.7 Army 
villages were sites where difference and identity were established, displayed, and 
guarded both in discourse and in daily lives. Army people were bound together by 
membership in the same institution of violence and by shared living environment, but 
torn apart (divided) by class and race. In some ways the army’s social and racial 
makeup represented a microcosm of the U.S. society. White, mostly native-born, 
officers and their wives originating from the East sought to transplant eastern middle-
class values and practices and to turn army villages into “islands of civilization.” 
Officers and their wives made journeys, leisure, and domestic life showcase their class 
sensibilities and level of sophistication and they wanted to claim genteel identity and to 
place themselves at the top of colonial hierarchies as the refined and privileged class, 
the social and cultural cream of white middle-class who embodied respectability, 
progress, and civilization. White soldiers were mainly urban workers from the East or 
recent immigrants from Europe. In the army they and the recently emancipated black 
soldiers were reduced into working-class laborers and servants whose success in 
colonial warfare was often poor. The army made locally hired indigenous soldiers 
colonized labor, a special workforce characterized by constant tension between 
integration and exclusion and between indigenous freedom and colonial control. All 
soldiers regardless of race were treated as laborers unfit for self-government. Enlisted 
men constructed worlds of resistance and boundaries against the arrogant army elite, 
while indigenous soldiers sought to negotiate the impacts of colonialism by working in 
the army. 
In their search for colonial authority and power white army people engaged in a 
process this work calls imperial meaning-making. When army men and women 
represented their own role and the colonial landscapes, societies, peoples, and events, 
they assigned certain meaning and value to all and evaluated and categorized everything 
in relation to their norms, imperial agendas, and ideas of progress and civilization (or 
modernity). This meaning-making was not only about labeling, or making colonial 
places and peoples understandable, but about their control, reordering, and 
incorporation. Army discourses purportedly produced the “truth,” which in turn meant 
                                                                                                                                                                  
establishment in 1862, then designated as camp, and again changed to fort on April 1879. Robert W. 
Frazer, Forts of the West (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1965), 4. 
7
 For communities as imagined, see Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the 
Origin and Spread of Nationalism (New York: Verso, 1991). 
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colonial authority and power to those constructing the discourses. As was the case with 
other white colonizers around the world, in reality the product of army people’s 
writings, their “truth,” was nothing more than subjective colonial knowledge, or what 
one might call “white mythologies,” to borrow a term from the postcolonial theorist 
Robert J.C. Young.8 The goal of army’s imperial meaning-making was to gain a sense 
of purpose and justification for the U.S. invasion on other peoples’ land, legitimize 
army presence and actions, and make the army important not only in the context of 
southern Arizona and New Mexico, but in terms of nation/empire-building. Army 
stories tried to make colonial warfare, the “othering” of peoples, the establishment of 
exploitative labor systems, and the reordering and regeneration of the supposedly 
“peripheral” colonized region to better suit the national model seem right and normal, 
even necessary. In the end, army representations would ideally make colonialism look 
more like liberation and subjugation like betterment. Army members would produce an 
illusion that instead of establishing a racial social hierarchy grounded on white middle-
class supremacy, crushing indigenous peoples and cultures, and starting a massive 
exploitation of natural resources fueled by outside investments, the U.S. regime was 
mainly about spreading civilization and progress to the Southwest. 
This study does not offer an all encompassing chronological story of the military 
actions of the U.S. Army in post-Civil War Arizona and New Mexico. Neither is it 
meant to provide a definitive word on U.S. colonization of the Southwest, although it 
more than touches on this matter as well. Nor is this a story of U.S.-Apache interactions, 
or a history of the people outsiders have called Apaches, or of any other indigenous 
group. It is also not a study of the army institution, but rather of the people who formed 
the army community. It is a critical description of the social worlds, labor regimes, and 
culture of a group of colonizers, a case study of colonialism and U.S. imperialism that 
seeks to understand the dynamics and reasons that shaped the actions and the authority-, 
community-, and identity-building of a particular body of white colonizers. It discusses 
how white army members positioned themselves in relation to the different peoples they 
encountered and towards the place facing colonialism. What factors, concepts, and 
                                                 
8
 Robert J.C. Young, White Mythologies: Writing History and the West, 2nd edition (New York: 
Routledge, 2004). For Young “white mythologies” means “the West’s greatest myth -History.” See page 
2. Although relatively few scholars have studied the practice, officers, as well as their wives and the 
common soldiers, in other colonial armies around the world undoubtedly also produced colonial 
knowledge. In his recent article, historian Douglas M. Peers recognized that educated and resourceful 
British officers generated colonial knowledge and certain readings of Indian society through their literary, 
scientific, and artistic activities. Douglas M. Peers, ”Colonial Knowledge and the Military in India, 1780-
1860,” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 33 (May 2005), 157-180.  
 5 
categories they used when producing class identity and racial difference? Who qualified 
as white in army minds? This study goes beyond mere description to unravel the 
motives and purposes, to ask why white army people constructed identity, community, 
and colonial knowledge the way they did? It exposes army claims of difference and 
subjects them to scrutiny. It asks what was the point in army representations and 
actions, and what motives did they serve?  
When applying the postcolonial method, which involves taking a critical stance, 
adopting a close but suspicious reading of sources, and recognizing that knowledge is 
connected to operations of power, this study seeks to balance attention between 
discursive representations (army stories) and the material realities of social experience 
(army actions) and to map the connections between the two. It hopes to understand the 
experiences of past persons, but also to describe the construction of identities and 
relations in discourse and the changes in the representations of persons, things, and 
events. This study also pays notice to silences in the process of historical production, 
seeing silencing as an activity in the arsenal of the colonizers seeking colonial power.9 
Furthermore, this investigation focuses on collective group formations, identities, 
representations, social relations, and machinations of exclusion and inclusion. It rests on 
the belief that a person was a representative of his or her race, class, gender, nation, or 
some other socially constructed collective first, and an individual only second. This 
method of partially subduing individuality for group collectives allows for discussions 
of power between, and within, social structures - communities and the world that 
surrounded them - and social reading of representations, thus providing structure for the 
investigation of the army experience and a way to understand the general mentality of 
the white army members.10 
                                                 
9
 According to historian Michel-Rolph Trouillot, history means both the facts of the matter and a narrative 
of those facts, both “what happened” and “that which is said to have happened.” The production of traces, 
Trouillot continues, is always also the creation of silences. Some peoples and occurrences are noted from 
the start, others remain absent in history. Silence means an active and transitive process: one engages in 
the practice of silencing. Mentions and silences are thus active, dialectical counterparts of which is history 
is the synthesis. Silences enter the process of historical production at four crucial moments: the moment 
of fact creation (the making of sources); the moment of fact assembly (the making of archives); the 
moment of fact retrieval (the making of narratives); and the moment of retrospective significance (the 
making of history in the final instance). Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Silencing the Past: Power and the 
Production of History (Boston: Beacon Press, 1995), especially 2, 26, 29, 48-49. 
10
 The downside of this method is that it appears to hide individual dissent. It may come out at times as if 
white army people had only one voice, one will, or one point of view, which, of course, was not the case. 
My intention, however, has not been to reveal every opinion that some army member at some point 
expressed, but to study the collective and discuss the general mentality, while still recognizing that 
diversity, dissent, and disharmony existed. 
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This work has several analytical aims. First, it sets out to connect and reenergize 
the academically peripheral post-Civil War U.S. Army history with currents of modern 
scholarship, proving that the army not only offers an excellent laboratory for studies of 
social history, like the historian Sherry L. Smith has acknowledged, but also for labor 
history and cultural history of colonialism.11 When treating all soldiers regardless of 
race as workers and soldiering as work, this study hopes to widen the boundaries of 
what counts as work and who as workers in U.S. history. Second, this work tries to 
bridge the gap between two scholarly fields by using insights from postcolonial studies 
to discuss the history of the U.S. West. Third, this study will contribute to the current 
debates concerning the predominance of race, whiteness, and class as factors explaining 
social formation and identities in U.S. society during the late 1800s. It refuses to see 
whiteness as normative and racially unmarked, but treats it as a socially constructed 
colonial signifier of difference.  
Fourth, by seeing America’s westward expansion as imperialism/colonialism, this 
work makes the nineteenth-century conquest of the trans-Mississippi West a phase in 
the building of a global superpower, the U.S. empire that continues to define itself today 
in Iraq, Afghanistan, and all over the world. In an age when the U.S. projects its 
influence on a global scale, it is illuminating to examine how U.S. power has been 
constructed historically, how U.S. forces have in years past represented themselves, 
their missions, and the places and peoples that faced U.S. imperialism/colonialism. 
Traditionally only a few scholars wrote of the United States as an empire. Although that 
has begun to change during recent times, many of those who acknowledge that the U.S. 
was or is an empire have usually either omitted the nineteenth-century conquest of the 
trans-Mississippi West, paid little attention to it, or approached it as an “internal affair,” 
thus not fully confronting the real nature of what was a conquest of other peoples’ 
lands.12 While there are some western historians who approach United States’ westward 
                                                 
11
 Sherry L. Smith, “Lost Soldiers: Re-searching the Army in the American West,” Western Historical 
Quarterly 29 (Summer 1998), 150-163. Military history in general pursues a broad and sophisticated 
research agenda today. In a recent review essay historian Robert M. Citino divides military historians into 
three major groupings. There are the traditional operational historians, the war and society scholars, and a 
new cadre of historians who emphasize culture and the history of memory. Robert M. Citino, “Military 
Histories Old and New: A Reintroduction,” American Historical Review 112 (October 2007), 1070-1090. 
12
 Those who do not focus on the trans-Mississippi West but recognize that the U.S. was an empire 
already during the nineteenth-century westward expansion include Thomas Bender, A Nation Among 
Nations: America’s Place in World History (New York: Hill and Wang, 2006) and Niall Ferguson, 
Colossus: The Price of America’s Empire (New York: Penguin, 2004). For the new wave of empire 
studies, see especially Amy Kaplan and Donald F. Pease, eds., Cultures of United States Imperialism 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1993). For an older classic, see William Appleman Williams, Empire as 
 7 
expansion as an imperial project, the majority of historians, especially those who are not 
experts of the U.S. West, still rather commonly date the beginning of U.S. imperialism 
to the occupation of the Philippines and the Spanish-American War in 1898.13 This 
work begs to argue otherwise. It demonstrates that the nineteenth-century conquest of 
the West is an ideal place to begin making visible the long history of U.S. empire and 
for understanding some of the defining “principles,” mentalities, and characteristics of 
U.S. imperialism. The U.S. West not only provides an example of colonialism that 
needs to be explained in the framework of U.S. empire, but an important theater in the 
transnational process of settler and extractive colonialism which brought much of the 
world under the domination of western powers and market capitalism. Even in our 
current post-decolonization era, the U.S. West offers an example of colonialism that has 
proven permanent and “successful” from the colonizers perspective. 
 
1.2 Postcolonialism as Research Paradigm 
Postcolonial studies questions the European narrative of progress and modernity 
and the assumption that the western male or female point of view is normative and 
objective.14 This study applies certain insights from postcolonial studies and its critics to 
guide its investigation of the army. In other words, this dissertation situates the 
nineteenth-century U.S. Army, and thus also the conquest of the trans-Mississippi West, 
in the debates and currents of postcolonial studies.  
First, this dissertation adopts the basic postcolonial premise that knowledge is not 
innocent but connected to operations of power and in service of colonial conquest. 
Postcolonial theorists, most notably Edward W. Said, have claimed that the power of 
the colonizers was bound to, created, and sustained by the discourses of colonial 
                                                                                                                                                                  
a Way of Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980). Because of its rise in today’s world, U.S. empire 
and its history has recently gained a more visible place in the research agenda of postcolonial scholars. 
See Ania Loomba, Suvir Kaul, Matti Bunzl, Antoinette Burton, and Jed Esty, eds., Postcolonial Studies 
and Beyond (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005). 
13
 For one such recent work, see Paul T. McCartney, Power and Progress: American National Identity, 
the War of 1898, and the Rise of American Imperialism (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
2006). In his classic study The Age of Empire, Eric Hobsbawm ignores continental conquest and argues 
that between 1876 and 1915 the Americas remained unaffected by the process of partition where the 
world was divided between western powers. He writes that “the Americas in 1914 were what they had 
been…in the 1820s.” The United States’ “only direct annexations were limited to Puerto Rico…and a 
narrow strip along the new Panama Canal.” Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire, 1875-1914 (1987; 
reprint, London: Abacus, 2003), 57-59, see also 67.  
14
 Other terms used to describe the “field” include postcolonial theory, postcolonialism, postcolonial 
scholarship, or critical colonial studies. Although not a uniform theory, postcolonial studies offers a 
flexible thematic network that influences research themes, approaches, strategies, and how evidence is 
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postcolonial present.  
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peoples, places, and projects that colonizers themselves constructed and imposed on the 
minds of the colonizer and colonized alike. Importantly, the discourses, Said writes, 
could “create not only knowledge but also the very reality they appear to describe.” The 
colonizer groups, like the white army people in southern Arizona and New Mexico, 
gained in strength and identity when establishing their “truth,” a vision of reality that 
promoted the difference, often in fact the binary opposition, between the familiar “us” 
and the strange “them.” Identity was constructed through opposition to others and white 
army men and women decided who they were by reference to who they were not. 
Opposition and difference were crucial to colonizers self-conception and to the 
workings of colonial power; if the colonized were irrational, barbaric, wild, lazy, and 
static, the colonizers were rational, civilized, moral, hard working, and progressive. 
What structured and enabled the discourses, Said continues, was “the idea of European 
identity as a superior one in comparison with all the non-European peoples and 
cultures.” Colonizers depended on a notion of flexible positional superiority, which put 
the colonizers in a whole series of possible relationships with the colonized without ever 
losing them the relative upper hand.15 
Second, this investigation firmly believes that colonialism needs to be explained 
as a place- and time-specific phenomenon. Acknowledging that postcolonial studies 
have challenged conservative histories and invigorated historical research, historians 
such as Dane Kennedy and Frederick Cooper have criticized postcolonial theorists for 
favoring ahistorical analysis of literature over thorough understanding of historical 
contexts. Postcolonial studies often produce a too static and abstract generic 
colonialism, Kennedy and Cooper point out, thus obscuring the complexity and 
particularism involved in colonial projects.16 Analysis of representations should not 
replace all discussion of events and material reality or ignore change over time. Also, 
investigations of colonial relations and identities need to acknowledge that the 
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colonizers’ texts reflected the historical contexts in which they were produced and were 
shaped by the agendas and motivations of the specific people who produced them. In 
short, studies need to be grounded on specific historical cases and contexts. As the 
historian Gregory Mann writes, colonial histories require a sense of place.17 Only then 
can scholars, in the words of historian and anthropologist Ann Laura Stoler, fully strive 
“to understand how the macrodynamics of colonial rule worked through interventions in 
the microenvironments of both subjugated and colonizing populations and through the 
distinctions of privilege and opportunity made and managed between.”18  
In the history of the U.S. West the emphasis on place has been one of the central 
themes at least since the New Western History began to expand the field some two 
decades ago. New Western History not only directed focus on gender, race, the 20th 
century West, the everyday history of everyday peoples, and environmental history, but 
defined the U.S. West as the trans-Mississippi region. Scholars such as Patricia 
Limerick saw the U.S. West as a “place undergoing conquest and never escaping its 
consequences” or as “one of the great meeting zones of the planet.” Place is “the center, 
not the edge” of New Western History.19 Still, while scholars have exhaustively debated 
the distinctiveness of the West as a region in the contexts of the United States, they have 
rarely pursued transnational comparisons or adapted research agendas, approaches, and 
structures from postcolonial studies.20 It is almost as if the two fields have been kept 
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apart by an invisible barrier. While colonial studies could use New Western History’s 
thorough focus on place, putting the U.S. West in colonial/imperial perspective widens 
the frame of reference, making the region and its history part of the global story of 
European settler and extractive colonialism, and also brings New Western History new 
intellectual context that stresses the relationship between knowledge and power and the 
subjective representational nature of history.  
This study has sought to keep in mind New Western History’s ideas of place and 
the complex nature of colonialism that Said, Kennedy, Cooper, and others advocate. It 
not only strives for a balance between events and representations, but narrows its 
description of identity and power to a specific colonial arena and time, thus underlining 
the significance of place. It also follows another trend of postcolonial studies that 
emphasizes the vulnerable and contested nature of colonizer projects, identity, and 
community, and stresses the importance of the everyday and the domestic sphere. 
Although postcolonial studies, especially the Subaltern Studies school represented by 
such scholars as Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak and Homi Bhabha, has placed much effort 
on discovering the (perhaps undiscoverable) agency of the colonized, many postcolonial 
scholars have at the same time often treated the colonizers as a harmonious and unified 
mass or as all-powerful machines who produced successful hegemonic projects. In 
reality the success of any colonial enterprise, including the army’s in the Southwest, 
was always partial and relative. Colonial power was never total and the colonizers could 
never fully transplant the social practices and norms of the metropole. This led to 
insecurity and frustration, which was only further intensified by the fact that the 
colonizer groups were not only often in competition with each other but riddled with 
inner rivalries and contests. Communities were vulnerable and disharmonious entities 
that needed to be created, maintained, and guarded. As a consequence of the limitations 
of power and all the uncertainty colonizer identities were never stable, but riddled with 
doubt, fear, and confusion. Scholars such as Ann Laura Stoler write that identity was so 
vulnerable that even the distinction between the colonizer and the colonized had to be 
continually affirmed and reproduced. Furthermore, private lives and the management of 
the household played an important function in creating and securing the colonizer 
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comparative studies of the U.S. West and other colonial areas is James O. Gump, The Dust Rose Like 
Smoke: The Subjugation of the Zulu and the Sioux (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994).  
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community and in defining its boundaries and membership criteria. It was far from 
irrelevant how one lived and traveled, what one ate, how one consumed, or spent leisure 
time.21  
Finally, it was Said’s ideas that brought colonialism from distant places to the 
heart of European culture as he demonstrated how Europe constructed itself and its 
others in relation to each other. Europe had no meaning apart from “the other,” or the 
colonizer apart from the colonized. In recent years scholars like Stoler, Antoinette 
Burton, and Catherine Hall have demonstrated how colonialism was a process where the 
metropole and the colonies made each other, the links between them being relations of 
power.22 This work seeks to demonstrate that the army people built their identity and 
power in relation to the colony and the metropole (Eastern United States). What 
happened in the Southwest, the construction of colonial knowledge, race, and class, was 
not confined to the Southwest but connected to the imperial center. When army men and 
women moved back and forth between the colony and the metropole, their ideas and the 
colonial knowledge they produced moved with them. They offer an example of how 
white America encountered other peoples and distant lands. In many ways the national 
character of the United States and the identity of white America was, and still is, 
constructed through perceptions of different peoples and places throughout the world.  
In sum, my study of the U.S. Army in southern Arizona and New Mexico not 
only sees U.S. history as imperialism/colonialism, but argues that the army people 
constructed their power in both discourses and in everyday lives. It also sees that 
colonialism, as a multidimensional global project, can be approached through the local 
while keeping in mind that the colony and the metropole were always connected. In 
conjunction, it holds that colonizer projects were imperfect, colonizers’ power far from 
complete, and their communities fragile entities where the private sphere formed an 
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important venue for defining and displaying the criteria and boundaries of community 
and identity. 
 
1.3 Whiteness and Class 
Although both New Western Historians and postcolonial scholars have stressed 
the importance of race, they have too often relied on a racial logic where the colonizers 
represent the normative whiteness and the colonized the complex dark other struggling 
against white supremacy.23 Omitting any discussion of the contested and constructed 
meanings of whiteness equals naturalizing it, treating it as the silent omnipotent norm 
against which everything is juxtaposed. 
Whiteness studies, the “new history of race in America,” as historian Peter 
Kolchin dubbed the field, sees race firmly as a social construction; a public fiction. 
Whites are not born, they are somehow made, and this making is class-, time-, and 
place-specific.24 Not only do whiteness and class need to be analyzed together, by 
treating them as interpenetrating factors, but whiteness can also be understood as a 
contested hierarchy of white ethnicities. In his influential Whiteness of a Different 
Color, historian Mathew Frye Jacobson claims that during the mid-1800s whiteness was 
rethought throughout the United States. Massive immigration of “undesirable” 
Europeans fractured all-inclusive formulations of Anglo-Saxon superiority and shifted 
the emphasis on degrees of difference among various white ethnicities. This hierarchical 
whiteness reflected the perceived supremacy of the native-born Anglo-Saxons, while 
questioning the whiteness of many white ethnic groups, especially the Irish and the 
Jews. Only when whites encountered people they considered alien from themselves in 
the trans-Mississippi West and later overseas, Jacobson continues, their fear of imperial 
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contamination, decline of white power, and white poverty led to a construction of a new 
nation-wide pan-white racial identity.25  
For Jacobson, as soon as whiteness was confronted by the realities of conquest in 
the West it again turned uniform and unproblematic. This claim is worth a closer 
investigation. Relatively few studies of the U.S. West have, however, discussed how 
whiteness was constructed differently by different people, or what whiteness meant in 
the many areas and various contexts of the post-Civil War West. Our understanding of 
the changing and subjective notions of whiteness in the West remains partial. This 
dissertation hopes to contribute to the discussion on the character of whiteness in the 
West by investigating how, why, and if one group of white colonizers saw whiteness 
and class as meaningful when constructing their identity, power, and relations to others. 
Whereas Jacobson advocates recasting the history of European immigration and 
assimilation into the United States as a racial odyssey, this work hopes to introduce 
more accurate ways of seeing race, whiteness, and class in the U.S. conquest of the 
trans-Mississippi West and to regroup army history as journeys in the making of race 
and class within the frameworks of colonialism.26 
 
1.4 Army History, Western Expansion, and Colonialism 
As the historian Michael L. Tate has pointed out, top-down stories with 
association to conservative politics, outdated methodologies, and avoidance of the 
dominant paradigms of modern social history have often been synonymous with the 
historiography of the post-Civil War U.S. Army. Many innovative scholars see army 
history as peripheral in academic scholarship, a direct outcome of the shortage of good 
monographs, a proliferation of unfair generalizations, and almost an outright 
banishment of the army as an element in the history of the U.S. West.27 
The situation is unfortunate, although it does not mean that historical scholarship 
of the army in the West does not exist. Fairly good, although often uncritical, studies 
chronicle the army campaigns (especially on the Plains and the Pacific Northwest), the 
army’s role in government’s Indian Policy, its non-combat role in enabling the 
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settlement of the West, architecture of the army villages, army officers perceptions of 
Indians, and the lives of key army commanders.28 Several army historians have also 
touched on army-civilian relations in the West. Their approaches have been, however, 
very different from this study. Following the example set by Robert Frazer and Darlis 
Miller, some have discussed the army’ role in regional economics while others have 
limited their interest to the socio-economic relations between one army village and its 
nearby civilian settlements.29 
In army scholarship the lack of modern social history, especially studies 
concentrating on white troops and officers, and labor history is obvious. For instance, 
although some historians have recognized that manual labor took most of the soldiers’ 
time, they, unlike this dissertation, have failed to approach soldiers’ lives through the 
medium of labor, discuss soldiering as work, or treat soldiers regardless of race as 
workers.30 In social history, studies of black soldiers have been in the forefront, opening 
the discussion on race and the army.31 While black soldiers have received welcome 
scholarly attention, the social history of white soldiers and officers remains much less 
studied. There exists no proper monograph focusing exclusively on the social worlds 
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and identities of the post-Civil War army officers. For social history of white army 
personnel one has to turn to Edward Coffman’s massive general work The Old Army, 
which covers the army from its initiation to 1898. Other options include Don Rickey’s 
over forty-year-old history of enlisted men, Forty Miles a Day on Beans and Hay, and 
Patricia Y. Stallard’s thirty-year-old thesis on army wives, Glittering Misery. Both 
Rickey and Stallard’s studies still prove informative but outdated and celebrative of 
U.S. conquest.32   
This lack of social history is peculiar, because as Sherry L. Smith wrote a decade 
ago, the army ”offers an especially rich source of materials regarding the everyday life 
of everyday people” and therefore “is a particularly useful laboratory for testing all 
kinds of theories and for raising questions about social interactions between people of 
different classes and ethnic groups.”33 The lack of scholarly attention to whiteness and 
the army is particularly notable. Perhaps it serves as an indication of the army historians 
continuing tendency to see whiteness as the unproblematic and unexplained norm. 
Otherwise it is difficult to explain why the varied aspects of whiteness, class, and 
manhood remain largely unexplored, especially when one considers that the army offers 
such a natural field for that kind of work.  
Furthermore, army discourses remain understudied. Arguably, some studies 
discuss, usually rather superficially, the perceptions and opinions that (usually high-
ranking) officers voiced regarding certain regions or indigenous groups. Sherry Smith 
has even written an entire book on army officers’ perceptions of Indians in general.34 
Still, no study has approached the army’s relationship to a certain region or indigenous 
group or the army’s inner dynamics from the perspective of meaning-making, authority-
building, and identity-construction. No student of the army has stressed how army 
representations and texts produced colonial knowledge and functioned as sites in the 
production of army authority and power; how white army people’s discourses and 
actions enabled each other. Nor has anyone seriously investigated the motives, agendas, 
and logic behind army discourses. In short, army scholarship has failed to connect the 
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army to the currents of postcolonial scholarship, especially to ideas that stress the 
relationship between discourses and power. 
Like much of army history, the history of the Apaches or the U.S.-Apache wars 
has been mainly top-heavy, descriptive, oriented towards answering what happened and 
where, instead of why and why does it matter. They might provide entertaining reads, 
but leave out discussions of social history, labor regimes, and also colonialism in their 
hurry to simplify the story and stay simultaneously superficial in analysis but very 
detailed on descriptive chronology of battles and military campaigns. Many studies 
repeat a standard and selective set of Apache “outbreaks,” military campaigns, and 
actions or inactions of army commanders and Apache leaders; a chronological “Apache 
war” narrative.35  
A fundamental problem has been the tendency of scholars to side with the white 
army personnel, especially with the officers and their wives. Historians have adopted 
the point of view of army people, accepted their representations at face value, treated 
their opinions as the “truth,” and even uncritically adopted the army’s racialized 
terminology. It seems that in their admiration for the army many scholars have not fully 
realized how the writings of army men and women represent only subjective opinions, a 
narrow view serving the agendas of the army people, not objective facts. For instance, 
in several works the Southwest is categorized as a “hostile,” “brutal,” “unattractive,” 
and “mean” land just like the army people often represented it.36 Also, when historians 
have had something to say on labor and leisure in the army posts they have reproduced 
the categorizations of officers and shown little sympathy for the workers. They have, for 
instance, regarded enlisted men’s leisure activities like drinking and gambling as “major 
problems” which “plagued” the army, or as “constant scourges for which the army 
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never found a remedy.” Some have divided enlisted leisure activities to “licit” and 
“illicit” spheres.37  
The recycling of army terminology is painfully obvious in the many works where 
free Apaches continue to be labeled “hostile.”38 Historians have also universally called 
the U.S.-Apache wars “Apache wars,” a selective term that denies and downplays U.S. 
aggression and in fact hides their whole participation.39 Moreover, several historians 
have painted the army’s mission as a “defense” of a western frontier, or claimed that the 
army introduced a “lasting peace” rather than waged an unnecessary and ruthless war 
that contributed to the creation of a race-based colonial regime.40 Even in a recent 
article it is still the Apaches who raid, plunder, and take advantage to ambush weak, 
tired white travelers and poorly defended merchants, while the army occupies “a slender 
network of defensive posts,” from which it “slowly eroded Indian resistance.”41 Some 
historians like to claim that the army was nothing more than a constabulary force, 
making colonialism appear rather faultily as a domestic police issue.42 In these histories, 
the indigenous peoples, whose homelands were being invaded and life-ways crushed, 
remain the aggressors. Scholars have failed to assess the destructive effects of 
colonialism, or question what rights the army had in an area where indigenous peoples 
lived and ruled. They have avoided the fact that the army was an intruder engaged in a 
ruthless offensive aimed at geopolitical power. This has led to a situation where the 
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army’s offensive character as part of the colonial conquest and invasion of other 
peoples’ lands has been belittled, obscured, and almost denied. 
 
1.5 Chapters 
This work is divided into three parts and eight main chapters. Chapter 2 sets the 
historical context through a (re)interpretation of U.S. colonialism in the Southwest. It 
places the region and its power struggles at the center of discussion, emphasizing the 
geopolitical power of the Apaches and seeing the U.S. as an invader on other peoples’ 
lands. 
 Part II has three chapters that discuss how officers, wives, and white soldiers 
produced certain “truths” of the landscapes, peoples, and settlements they encountered 
on their mission to southern Arizona and New Mexico. Chapter 3 investigates army 
journeys: travel methods and routes, the significance of class, and army representations 
of the journey. It argues that journeys functioned as sites in the production of colonizer 
power. The next chapter turns the spotlight on army relationship with the Apaches. It 
investigates how and why white army people made the Apaches the colonized other, the 
principle enemy of the U.S. regime. It also discusses the relationship between colonial 
knowledge (army stories of Apaches) and government (army’s acts of violence and 
reservation management targeting the Apaches). Chapter 5 charts army discourses of the 
Southwest landscapes and Hispanic and white peoples and settlements. It pays attention 
to how army people produced the region as a whole and as a living space, and how they 
represented the region’s past, present, and futures and constructed their own mission 
and importance. 
Part III shifts the discussion to the contested dynamics and intimate social fabrics 
within the army community. In chapter 6, the focus is on the army elite’s identity and 
the orchestration and representation of public and domestic space in the army villages. 
Chapter 7 looks to life in the army villages through the lenses of labor and leisure. The 
principal aim is not to describe or list all types of labor and leisure activities, nor to 
count their prevalence on a monthly or yearly basis, but rather to discuss how labor and 
leisure structured the army community and helped define the collective identities and 
differing cultures of the white elite and white enlisted men. The last chapter discusses 
what it meant that the white army people’s “main enemy,” the Apaches, became 
workers in the multiracial army. It not only tackles the workers story, but also 
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demonstrates how the white army people partially integrated and valued the indigenous 
workforce, but still excluded and othered them as colonized labor.  
Displaying less emphasis on chronological narrative, the whole work is mainly 
thematic, the chapters exploring the diverse facets and change over time in army 
representations and actions. Each chapter functions like a window offering a view into a 
house that is the white army colonizers experience in southern Arizona and New 
Mexico. Ultimately, these chapters describe structures of thought and human interaction 
and the workings of power. 
 
1.6 Sources 
Published memoirs, journal pieces, official reports, and the diaries, letters, and 
papers of white army men and women constitute the backbone of this study. Army 
officers were among the first white Americans with college-level training to enter the 
Southwest. Sherry L. Smith has noted that officers and their wives “realized they were a 
part of historically significant events and often kept personal documents regarding their 
experiences.”43 A substantial number of the army elite expected to write memoirs and 
many did, although not all published their writings. Many private reminiscences, letters, 
and diaries have been edited for publication later. Although the best known army 
memoirs by Captain John G. Bourke, Lieutenant Britton Davis, Lieutenant Thomas 
Cruse, and Martha Summerhayes, a captain’s wife, proved helpful, many less familiar 
reminiscences were of equal value. Among others they included the writings of Ellen 
McGowan Biddle, Frances Boyd, Fanny Corbusier, Eveline Alexander, and Julia Davis, 
all officers’ wives, and those of officers such as Frederick Phelps, Anson Mills, Joseph 
Sladen, William Corbusier, and W.H. Carter. On one level memoirs could function as a 
way to preserve family history, but they often displayed other importance as well. Many 
army people, not only the high-ranking officers like generals George Crook, Oliver 
Howard, and Nelson Miles, turned their writings into manifestos of personal and 
collective importance.  
In addition, officers and their wives engaged in extensive personal 
correspondence with relatives and friends back East and contributed to professional 
journals and various local and national papers. For example, Lieutenant John Bigelow 
wrote a field journal of the 1886 “Geronimo campaign” to the Outing Magazine, while 
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Lieutenant Frank Upham had his Southwest experiences published in The Overland 
Monthly. Others published articles and private letters in papers as varied as the 
Milwaukee Sentinel, Harper’s Weekly, Cosmopolitan, The Great Divide, The Atlantic 
Monthly, Altoona Morning Tribune (Pennsylvania) and the Los Angeles Star. Many of 
these have been included in Peter Cozzens’ Eyewitnesses to the Indian Wars, a valuable 
collection of numerous primary accounts by officers and soldiers (and one by an army 
wife), many of them difficult to find anywhere else.44  
Although less frequently, some enlisted men also published stories of their 
experiences. For example, the memoirs of Sergeant John Spring first appeared in serial 
form in The National Tribune.45 Besides Spring, the texts by Anton Mazzanovich, 
Clarence Chrisman, Will C. Barnes, E.A. Bode, William Jett, George H. Cranston, Fred 
Platten, Harry Wright, William Neifert, “Gashuntz,” and Neil Erickson constitute the 
core of soldiers’ primary accounts. For understanding Apache responses to colonialism, 
especially as colonized labor, this study consulted the oral histories and studies by 
anthropologists, ethnologists, and historians such as Morris Opler, Grenville Goodwin, 
Eve Ball, and Keith Basso. 
The Arizona Historical Society in Tucson contains many valuable collections of 
unpublished army letters, diaries, and manuscripts used in this work. The papers of Will 
Barnes, Clarence Chrisman, Joseph Widney, and Anton Mazzanovich, to mention just 
some, offered rich avenues of research, as did the selection of materials found at 
University of Arizona, Special Collections. Annual Report’s of the Secretary of War 
hold not only reports by officers, but interesting data on army movements, desertions, 
reenlistments, and social characteristics of army villages. Also of help was the 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln microfilm copy of the Yale Collection of Western 
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America, which includes several rare published works.46 Census data and Constance 
Wynn Altshuler’s encyclopedic collection of army biographies Cavalry Yellow, Infantry 
Blue supplemented these discoveries as did War Department’s Circular no. 8, which 
has information on the structures of the army villages.  
Overall, the primary source base contains a rich selection of materials that bring 
out the white army voices and demonstrate that army personnel, especially the elite, 
actively expressed and circulated their “truth.” In this work, sources were used to reveal 
experiences of past persons, to understand the construction of knowledge, identities, 
mentalities, and relations in discourse, and for detecting the changes in the images and 
representations of places, peoples, and processes. Sources were interrogated to uncover 
no absolute truths, but to illustrate subjective experiences and tendencies. They told 
about the character of the army community, its experiences, identities, mentalities, 
relations, representations, divisions, hierarchies, and group formations - the visible and 
hidden manifestations of power among a certain colonizer body. 
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Chapter 2 
From Apacheria to U.S. Southwest: A Short History of A Place Facing Colonialism 
 
This chapter sets the historical contexts for the investigation of the U.S. Army 
community. It tells the history of transition from Apacheria to U.S. Southwest from a 
regional perspective, making the place facing colonialism the center of historical 
investigation not the peripheral edge buried under the tide of U.S. expansion. During the 
second half of the nineteenth-century the United States became a continental empire 
when invading much of the western half of North America. When building its empire 
the United States purchased (Louisiana, Alaska, and southern Arizona), negotiated 
(Oregon), or fought short one-sided wars of aggression against European rivals, their 
offspring states, and indigenous powers. Following in the footsteps of the Apaches and 
the Spanish, in 1846 the U.S. was the latest invader entering a historically contested 
region known today as the American Southwest. Intoxicated by a vision that it was 
destined to dominate the continent relying on market capitalism and white supremacy 
camouflaged as Manifest Destiny, U.S. took lands stretching from Texas to the Pacific 
from Mexico in an aggressive war in 1846-1848. Ending the war, the Treaty of 
Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848 and the Gadsden Purchase in 1853 brought New Mexico 
and Arizona under nominal U.S. rule.1 To control southern Arizona and New Mexico, 
however, the U.S. was forced to fight two wars, not one. Although historians often only 
count the U.S.-Mexican War as a “real” war, the second war of conquest the U.S. fought 
against the Apaches. The present work argues that the Apaches, not Mexico, 
represented the leading power in the region during the time of U.S. arrival. Although 
driven out of the Plains in the 1700s by the Comanches, the Apaches regrouped and 
reoriented their trading-raiding power against the line of Spanish-indigenous forces in 
the Southwest. Until 1886, when the remnants of the Apaches’ geopolitical power were 
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crushed by the U.S. and Mexican forces, Euro-American powers remained fragile and 
contested by the Apaches whom they could not dictate, control, or ignore.  
 
2.1 The Spaniards and Apache Power 
The government led Spanish colonization in North America rested on a 
combination of aggression, trade, and conversion. The Spanish aimed to find riches, 
incorporate subjects to the crown and to the Catholic Church, and increase Spain’s 
geopolitical power in relation to European rivals. The Spanish introduced horses, sheep, 
and cattle; firearms, metal tools, and the printed word; typhoid, measles, and smallpox, 
transforming the Southwest. They also established colonial bureaucracy, a formal set of 
living spaces (plaza-centered towns and missions), a social class system, and the 
Catholic faith.2 Spanish colonies California, Arizona (Pimeria Alta), New Mexico, and 
Texas were established at different times for different purposes, and never developed 
regional identity, or lines of communication with each other, but being largely self-
sufficient held strong local character. Until Mexican independence in 1821 ended the 
Spanish era, Spanish colonization remained plagued by a shortage of European 
colonists, troubled economics, peripheral position in the empire, concern over the 
increased power of other European empires, mainly the French who had established 
presence in Louisiana, and, perhaps most importantly, by powerful and expansionist 
indigenous neighbors.3   
The Spanish first entered New Mexico in the 1500s, imposing themselves on the 
sedentary Pueblo Indians. Suffering from diseases, burdened by tributes in food, 
blankets, and labor, and subjected to forced conversion to Catholicism, the Pueblos 
revolted in 1680 and threw the Spanish out. Twelve years later the Spanish returned and 
established stronger ties with the Pueblos by keeping out of their religious matters and 
lands. Still the Spanish society remained weak and precarious, confined to a narrow 
strip along the upper Rio Grande around Santa Fe and Taos in north-central New 
Mexico. Relying principally on agriculture, sheep herding and trade, the Spanish 
communities were populated by a mix of Europeans, Africans, and Native Americans 
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from Central America, the Pueblo villages, and surrounding bands.4 The Spanish never 
gained a foothold between their El Paso base and the upper Rio Grande settlements, 
which meant that New Mexico was isolated from rest of the empire. Whereas the 
Apaches were all over New Mexico’s Spanish settlements, the Utes and the Navajos 
flanked Santa Fe from the north and the west and the Comanche empire stretched east 
all the way to the Texas plains. Spaniards discovered that they were often unable to 
impose the rules but had to form alliances and use gift giving, trade exchanges, and 
incorporation of indigenous peoples in relations with their neighbors.5 
The Apaches not only cut off New Mexico from connections to the south, but 
also stopped Spanish advancement north in Sonora, thus keeping the Spanish mostly out 
from the area that today is Arizona. What little was gained by the Spanish in Arizona 
was almost all lost after Mexican independence. Hamlets such as Sopori, Canoa, even 
Calabazas with its rich mines were abandoned. In 1849, Apaches forced the 
abandonment of Tubac and Mexicans remained only in Tucson. Even Tucson, with its 
population of 465 Mexicans and 486 Manso (“tamed”) Apaches in 1831, was as much 
an Apache community as it was Mexican.6 
The fragmented and multilayered Apache society consisted of extended families, 
bands, clans, and tribes who shared similar culture and language, and an interconnected 
living space, but no political authority or common social sphere. In the mid-1800s the 
main divisions (from east to west) included the Jicarillas, Mescaleros, Chiricahuas, and 
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the Western Apaches.7 During the 1600s the nucleus of Apache power had been located 
on the southern plains of New Mexico and Texas, their influence reaching from Sonora 
all the way to what today is Nebraska. In the 1700s, the expansionist Comanches 
contested the Apaches on the Plains for the control of crucial natural resources, New 
Mexico’s markets, and the flourishing trade routes between the Pueblos and the 
horticultural prairie villages in the east. The Comanches pushed Apaches out of the 
Plains in three distinctive sequences, beginning in the upper Arkansas basin between 
1700 and 1727, continuing on the Llano Estacado in the 1730s and 1750s, and 
culminating in west Texas in the 1750s and early 1760s.8 During the wars some Apache 
bands vanished altogether, while others saw their numbers rapidly decline. For example, 
the once powerful Lipan Apaches challenged Comanche and Spanish presence in west 
Texas. Overwhelmed, the Lipans weakened quickly. Many relocated westward merging 
with other Apaches groups or into the Spanish settlements, while others ended up as 
captives. In the 1800s only a handful of Lipans were left.9 
Not only devastating defeats in battles but slave raids took a toll on Apache 
manpower and jeopardized their capacity to wage war successfully. Human captives 
functioned as the keys to power in the borderlands, the central currency used to 
purchase guns and horses. French, Spanish, and Comanches used captives also as a 
labor force and some were adopted by their captor society. In Spanish communities, 
indigenous captives, among them the Apaches, became a special group of domestic 
servants and laborers called genizaros. Many were also sold to labor camps located all 
over Mexico’s mining and farming regions. Some Apaches found themselves as far 
away as Cuba. Masses of Apaches died in captivity because of poor treatment and 
horrendous living conditions. The younger children were often sent to missions for 
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conversion. For instance, New Mexican parish records between 1700 and 1760 display 
the baptisms of nearly eight hundred Apache women and children.10 
Other factors contributed to the Apache defeat. Unlike the Comanches, the 
Apaches never fully embraced equestrianism, which handicapped their mobility. Their 
semi-sedentary life made Apaches vulnerable to cavalry attacks and guerilla warfare. 
Apaches were also chronically short on allies. Old rivalries and the fear of the 
Comanches guaranteed that allies were not forthcoming. Realizing the power of the 
Comanches, even the Spanish usually shied away from backing the Apaches. 
Furthermore, Apaches were increasingly shut out from trade exchanges. As a result they 
lacked access to modern weapons, which the Comanches got in numbers from the 
east.11  
In the 1700s southern New Mexico and Arizona became the new heartlands of 
Apacheria. The western edge of Apacheria was set against the Yavapais, Akimel 
O’odham (Pimas) and Tohono O’odham (Papagos) in and around the area where the 
Gila and Salt Rivers meet. From there the Apache rim extended via northern Sonora and 
Chihuahua to west Texas and all the way to northeastern New Mexico. While Apacheria 
shrank and was exposed in the east and the north, it continued to expand to the south 
and the southwest. As the Apaches refocused their trading-raiding power southwards 
between the 1750s and 1770s, the Spanish losses, according to anthropologist Ana 
Maria Alonso, included thousands of deaths, abandonment of settlements, huge losses 
in livestock, paralysis of the mining industry, and the decline of commerce.12 Often 
operating in small independent cells Apaches constructed complex, changing, and 
fragile relations with their semi-sedentary neighbors and Spanish/Mexican settlements 
that were geographically specific and changed through time. From the people around 
them Apaches wanted horses, crops, cattle, manufactured goods, and captives. Some 
Apache groups, becoming more dependent on Euro-American trade goods, relied 
heavily on raiding and trading, but several also mainly sought their subsistence from 
farming, hunting, and gathering.  
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In the late 1700s the Spanish authorities sought to hold back the Apache pressure 
by paying and giving food to the Apaches so that they would leave Spanish property 
alone. Mexico, however, could not afford to pay, and when Sonora offered bounties for 
Apache scalps the wars again escalated in the 1830s. While they depopulated much of 
Sonoran countryside, the Apaches also suffered heavy losses and saw their trade and 
wealth decrease.13 When U.S. forces arrived to Santa Fe, the Apaches, continuing to 
expand their influence southwards, remained vulnerable masters of the territory ranging 
from the Pecos River in New Mexico to the junctions of Salt and Gila rivers in Arizona, 
and from north-central Sonora and Chihuahua to central Arizona and New Mexico. 
 
2.2 U.S. Army and Continental Conquest 
Historian Michael L. Tate has labeled the nineteenth-century U.S. Army in the 
West as a “multipurpose” army. All the army’s “purposes,” however, were connected to 
empire-building. “It is significant,” historian Richard White writes, “that the first strong 
federal presence in the West arrived in the form of conquering armies.”14 This testifies 
to the violent nature of U.S. expansion. The army not only represented the federal 
government in the West, but in many instances it functioned as the engine of U.S. 
expansion. For one thing, the army was actively involved in the exploration of “new” 
areas, thus contributing to expansion early on.15 Some historians claim that the army 
was also heavily and systematically involved in the near destruction of the buffalo, 
which greatly helped U.S. conquest of the Plains. At times the army aided civilian 
authorities in law enforcement in the colonizer communities.16 The army was also called 
on to provide relief for white migrants and to build roads and telegraph lines. It was not 
rare that the army also secured economic interests, guarding railroad construction and 
offering protection for mines and ranches. The military also promoted the spread of 
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white settlement by other methods. It went to places whites had not reached, trusting 
that the army’s presence would lure in settlers who saw profitable business 
opportunities in the needs of the army. Most notably, however, the army waged war to 
gain the monopoly of violence for the U.S. regime. It fought against any group who 
refused to submit and hand over their lands to the U.S. Much of continental conquest 
was accomplished by disease, railroads, and the sheer force and numbers of white 
colonizers who took the lands and used them to support settler societies and extractive 
industries, but the army made certain that the U.S. had no competition for sovereignty in 
the various regions of the continent the Americans desired. Army presence made it 
known to any indigenous group, European power, or white secessionist that the U.S. 
reigned, or would seek to reign sovereign. During colonization, the army not only made 
sure indigenous peoples were pushed to the margins but that they stayed in their place. 
As the enforcer of colonial order it was the army, not the local militia or police, whose 
job was to use force against indigenous peoples if they left their prison camp-like 
reservations where the army had first concentrated the survivors during the U.S.-
indigenous wars.   
Throughout its history the United States has in fact had two armies, the volunteer 
citizen army, variably called militia, National Guard, or Organized Reserves, and the 
regular U.S. Army. Although the institution likes to trace its roots to the Continental 
Army formed in 1775 to fight in the American Revolutionary War, the regular army 
was reluctantly created by Congress on June 1784. During the decades following 
independence the army’s status remained uncertain. Many influential parties, among 
them President Thomas Jefferson, were indifferent towards the army institution and 
considered the military profession as altogether unnecessary. They believed the United 
States was an unmilitary country where a regular army was highly inappropriate and in 
fact stood against the principles of the republic. The army purportedly represented a 
threat to democracy as it was feared that professional soldiers without loyalties to local 
citizenry could easily become politicized. Many thought it best to rely exclusively on 
the citizen militia. The common people, especially outside the conflict zones, rarely 
demonstrated their support for the army. In fact, the public rather preferred to forget that 
the nation even had an army. Ignoring the lack of enthusiasm for the army, the federal 
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government nevertheless wanted its own troops to represent federal interests in the West 
and to handle Indian affairs. This is why the unpopular army continued to exist.17 
Prior to the Civil War the army strength varied from a few thousand men to little 
over ten thousand. When the army was reorganized in 1866 after the Civil War, 
Congress fixed its size to 54,000 men. Reductions soon followed as the army continued 
to be unpopular especially among southern representatives resentful over 
Reconstruction in the defeated South. In 1869 army strength was limited to little over 
30,000 soldiers and by 1874 the army numbered 25,000 enlisted men and 2,000 officers. 
The army was divided into regiments, which were further partitioned into 
companies/troops. Geographically the troops were assigned to one of the three military 
divisions: the Atlantic, the Missouri and the Pacific. The divisions contained various 
military departments, such as the Department of Arizona, separated from the 
Department of California in 1871 and part of the Division of the Pacific. Departments 
were further divided into districts and sub-districts. New Mexico was a district in the 
Department of the Missouri, which belonged to the division of the same name. The 
department commander was the key link in the army’s command chain. Ideally he was 
high enough to be able to gain perspective without losing focus on local conditions. The 
army was administrated under a coordinate system between the Commanding General 
and the Secretary of War. In theory, the Commanding General was in ”command” of the 
army. However, the War Department, headed by the Secretary of War and aided by the 
many powerful staff bureaus, like the Pay Department and the Adjutant General’s 
Office, which controlled many of the army’s daily routines, remained resolutely outside 
the Commanding General’s control. At the head of the army hierarchy was the President 
of the Unites States, whose authority was unchallenged. He could with his prestige and 
power of appointments set the tone for overall military policies and guidelines. The 
power of the Congress was also substantial because it decided the army budget through 
annual allotments.18 
Until the 1890 massacre at Wounded Knee, South Dakota, the army was kept 
busy with wars against indigenous peoples. After the War of 1812 that gave the U.S. 
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control of the Ohio-Indiana region, the major wars revolved around the government’s 
removal policy. This policy aimed to relocate eastern tribes into a permanent Indian 
Territory established west of the Mississippi River. Usually it was the army’s job to 
execute the removal, forcing reluctant tribes, such as the Creeks and the Cherokees, to 
move. From 1850s the army’s main engagements were against the Apaches, the loose 
Lakota-Cheyenne-Arapaho alliance on the northern Plains and the Comanches, Kiowas, 
and Cheyennes on the southern Plains. While the battle at Summit Spings in 1869 and 
the Red River War in 1873-1874 ended armed confrontation on the southern Plains, the 
Great Sioux War of 1876-1877 and Wounded Knee broke the power of the tribes in the 
north. In the Pacific Northwest the army also confronted the Modocs and the Nez Perce 
trying to hold on to their land base and political sovereignty in the face of American 
aggression. While proving “successful,” the army’s campaigns often amounted to cruel 
and indiscriminate total war where the commissary, villages, and non-combatants and 
combatants alike became targets.19 
 
2.3 U.S.-Apache Wars 
The United States began to penetrate Apacheria after Mexico in 1821 abolished 
Spanish restrictions against foreign trade and residents. Stretching between New 
Mexico and Missouri, Santa Fe Trail became the main avenue for U.S. commerce and 
economic conquest, reorienting the region towards the U.S. According to historian 
Andres Resendez, the economies of Mexico and the United States “were as different as 
night and day during the first half of the nineteenth century.” Between 1800 and 1860, 
Mexico’s total income declined 10.5 percent, whereas that of the U.S. rose 1,270.4 
percent. U.S., enjoying a string of economic booms, experienced revolutions in industry 
and transportation. Demographically, Mexico remained at 6 million people, while to 
U.S. moved from 5 to 32 million. When the U.S.-Mexican War in 1846 broke out 
Mexico’s north was in practice already incorporated into the fast-growing and dynamic 
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U.S. economy. American merchants had gained control of the region’s markets, being 
able to supply New Mexico with products unavailable from other sources.20  
From the Apache perspective American traders at first represented an interesting 
opportunity, not a challenge to Apache power. Americans offered a plethora of 
manufactured items, including new and more efficient weapons. Even the army looked 
like a potential ally (the Apaches still lacked allies) in the struggle against Mexico. 
When more Americans arrived and set up permanent bases (overland trail stations, army 
villages, mining camps, and towns) the Apaches realized that they faced invasion and 
occupation: the Americans were determined to steal their lands and strip them of their 
power. Already in the 1850s U.S. authorities in New Mexico tried to convince the 
Apaches that they should move into segregated and oppressive livings spaces called 
reservations. American activity brought clashes and disrupted Apache patterns of 
gathering and hunting, thus increasing the importance of raiding for subsistence, which 
in turn made Apaches targets for U.S. aggression.  
In 1860, miners assaulted the band of perhaps the most influential Apache leader, 
Mangas Coloradas. Three years later Mangas was captured by volunteer soldiers during 
negotiations. Soldiers taunted him and burned his feet, and when Mangas responded he 
was shot down and killed, his body thrown in a ditch after being decapitated for 
“scientific purposes.” Afterwards military reports fabricated a story of an escape 
attempt. In 1861 another important Chiricahua Apache leader, Cochise, made a narrow 
escape. Army lieutenant George Bascom first invited him and several of his relatives for 
a parley and then arrested them, thinking, wrongly, that the Apaches had stolen some 
cattle and kidnapped a young boy. Cochise claimed innocence, but while he managed to 
get away his relatives were not so lucky. The army executed them after negotiations 
with Cochise, who had captured some whites after escaping, did not materialize.21  
Historians often represent that until 1871 the Apaches held the initiative, the 
army heroically “defending the frontier” and struggling to respond in the face of a 
general Apache “menace.”22 This viewpoint is flawed in many ways. For instance, it 
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confuses the invaders and the invaded, making the Apaches the aggressors and the main 
cause for violence. Furthermore, it gives the picture that all Apaches took part in the 
wars as a cohesive force. In reality, there never existed any united Apache front. Many 
just wanted to be left alone and stay out of the Americans reach. Others fought to 
maintain their geopolitical power and freedom, some simply to survive in the face of 
colonial violence. Also, the army was not so much passive as it was unsuccessful in 
negating the Apaches independence and military power. Projecting military force onto a 
colony that lacked infrastructure, railroad connections, and large masses of white 
American colonizers, and offered a terrain and adversary unlike the white soldiers had 
ever encountered, was easier said than done. To complicate the situation for the 
invaders the Apaches were not similarly vulnerable to any particular life-source as were 
the equestrian buffalo hunters of the Plains who faced a catastrophe when the buffalo 
herds were nearly exterminated and when whites occupied key spots of nutritious 
grasslands and river bottoms necessary for the tribes’ large horse herds. The elimination 
of the mainstay of indigenous life was considerably more difficult with the Apaches 
who relied on a combination of gathering, hunting, agriculture, trading, and raiding. 
Some Americans were concerned that the Apaches would block the routes 
connecting California to the east and keep Arizona and New Mexico permanently 
unsettled and unused. Warfare turned increasingly vicious in a climate filled with racial 
antagonism and desire for vengeance. Often the colonizers proved unable, unwilling, or 
too indifferent to identify Apache groups correctly. Thus any group thought to be 
Apaches often became legitimate targets for aggression. For instance, in 1871 a joint 
force of Hispanics, whites, and Tohono O’odham Indians from Tucson ambushed and 
slaughtered an Apache encampment near Camp Grant. Many Apache children were also 
taken captives, never to be seen again by their families. The survivors were heartbroken 
and angry in part because they had camped near Grant under military protection.23  
In the early 1870s, partly frustrated that all Apaches had not submitted to U.S. 
control, and partly appalled by outrages like the massacre at Camp Grant, the federal 
government planned new initiatives in Apacheria. First, in 1871 and 1872 government’s 
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peace emissaries Vincent Colyer and General Oliver O. Howard toured the region and 
made reservation pacts with various groups. Pressured by war and dwindling resources, 
Cochise’s Chiricahuas accepted a reservation on the Mexican border. The White 
Mountain (San Carlos) Reservation was to become the home for the Western Apaches, 
while the Mescaleros got a reservation in New Mexico. Second, targeting those Western 
Apaches and Yavapais, a tribe the army usually erroneously counted as Apaches, who 
chose not to come to the reservation (or did not know they were supposed to come in) 
the army launched the Tonto Basin offensive. Arizona’s military commander George 
Crook deployed several small converging detachments, which combined regulars and 
indigenous enlisted men and were supplied by mobile mule pack trains. As the military 
targeted villages, fields and other food sources, horses, and all material property, the 
campaign devastated numerous Apache and Yavapai groups, totally exterminated some, 
and drove others into armed confrontation or reservation confinement. In 1874 there 
were few if any free Apaches left on U.S. soil. Apacheria was fast turning into an 
occupied homeland, the U.S. Southwest. Only some Chiricahuas still remained free in 
the Sierra Madre Mountains in Mexico. The remote reaches of the Sierra Madre 
represented the small patch that remained of the once extensive sub-continental empire, 
Apacheria. 
Having seemingly won the war, the federal government advocated concentration. 
The Chiricahua reservation was terminated, and Western Apaches and Chiricahuas from 
Arizona and New Mexico driven to San Carlos. This proved a disastrous policy. Many 
refused to go, while others escaped across the border the first chance they got, thinking 
the government had betrayed them. San Carlos proved a terrible living space. Not only 
did bands and tribes who detested each other have to live in close proximity, but the soil 
was often inadequate for subsistence, rations short, and agents corrupt. In addition, the 
government subjected Apaches to various “civilizing” policies that aimed to dismantle 
Apache identity and culture.24 One disillusioned Apache leader was Victorio. He 
detested San Carlos and tried to persuade the government to allow his band to live near 
their homes in the Ojo Caliente area in New Mexico or with the Mescalero Apaches in 
their New Mexico reservation. The government stubbornly refused and ordered Victorio 
to return to San Carlos. He could not live there, but instead started a guerrilla campaign 
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that shocked the borderlands. Thousands of troops from both sides of the border chased 
Victorio’s outfit, usually gaining minimal results. It was the Mexicans who finally 
destroyed Victorio and most of his group in a battle at Tres Castillos on October 1880.25  
On San Carlos further unrest soon arose when a messianic Ghost Dance 
movement led by Noch-ay-del-klinne, a Western Apache shaman, worried federal 
officials. They imagined that the shaman was preaching a call to arms against all whites, 
and decided to solve the matter by arresting him. On August 1881 a column of cavalry 
from Fort Apache set out for the shaman’s village on Cibecue Creek. On their way back 
with Noch-ay-del-klinne in custody a fight erupted between the white troops and the 
shaman’s Apache followers. Soon a fear of a general uprising swept across the region 
and the army overreacted with a show of force as troops from all directions poured into 
the Southwest. Many terrified and suspicious Chiricahuas fled the reservation, while 
some Western Apaches refused to surrender and hid in the Tonto Basin country. In the 
summer of 1882 the army crushed the latter in the Battle of Big Dry Wash.26   
During the 1880s the military’s aggressive hunts became increasingly ineffective 
against small Apache groups who, in their quest to live outside white control, often 
made rapid raids to U.S. soil to capture Apache women from the reservation, or to 
obtain guns, ammunition, supplies, and horses, and then hid in the Sierra Madre. For 
instance, during the summer of 1881 the remnants of Victorio’s group led by Nana rode 
a thousand miles in southern New Mexico and Arizona. According to historian Dan 
Thrapp, Nana’s group killed fifty Americans, captured hundreds of horses and mules, 
fought several skirmishes with the soldiers - winning most of them - and eluded over 
one thousand soldiers and civilians chasing them before returning to the Sierra Madre.27 
Similar dashing strikes followed in 1883 and 1885. While the army was almost 
powerless to stop the Apaches, white settlers grew even more angry, frightened, and 
puzzled by the Apaches speed, skill, and determination. To rid the region of Apaches 
many whites advocated extermination or removal. 
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  In army eyes, all free Apaches, even if living most of the time on Mexican soil, 
represented a danger to U.S. security and had to be hunted down or brought under U.S. 
control. Although the Apaches in the Sierra Madre made sporadic campaigns because 
their trade connections were becoming increasingly limited, there is little to suggest that 
this relatively small and war-fatigued hybrid group, which included mostly Chiricahuas, 
but also some Mescaleros, Navajos, and Comanches, planned by 1883 to abandon the 
Sierra Madre and reclaim residence in their now occupied southern Arizona or New 
Mexico homelands. At this time the Apaches held the Sierra Madre as a sanctuary: it 
had trees, grass, game, one’s friends and relatives, safety, and happy, normal life outside 
colonial control.28 The Apaches search for freedom did not last. In 1883 the army 
invaded the Sierra Madre. Caught off guard, the Apaches agreed to try reservation life 
once more.29 
By 1885, however, the circumstances at San Carlos, further worsened by the 
conflict between the civilian and military branches of the federal government over 
reservation management, had turned the reservation into a hotbed of rumors, 
accusations, and cliques swirling around Chiricahua war leader and shaman Geronimo. 
Dissatisfied with what he saw was meaningless reservation life and fearing that the 
army would sent him to the Alcatraz penitentiary or, worse, turn him over to local 
civilian authorities all too eager to hang him, Geronimo and his followers fled. The 
army went after them, but gained few results. Only in early 1886 did a column of 
Apache soldiers manage to convince Geronimo that it was in his best interest to talk 
with the region’s military commander. While the March 1886 peace conference at 
Canyon de Los Embudos convinced most Chiricahuas to surrender and face two years 
imprisonment in Florida, Geronimo had second thoughts and bailed out. Following a 
fruitless campaign, where 5,000 soldiers chased approximately forty Apaches, of whom 
little more than ten were men, the army resorted to a peace overture by sending two 
Chiricahuas, Ki-e-ta and Martine, accompanied by Lieutenant Charles Gatewood, to 
negotiate with Geronimo in Mexico. They convinced Geronimo to surrender on 
September 4, 1886. The army removed Geronimo’s band, and in fact all those Apaches 
the army labeled Chiricahuas, to Florida as prisoners of war. Relocated first to Alabama 
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and then to Oklahoma their imprisonment lasted for twenty-seven years. After 
Geronimo’s surrender, only few individual Apache “outlaws” concerned the military. 
Large operations were over and organized Apache military power crushed. In 1886, 
forty years after the U.S.-Mexican War, the U.S. had gained the monopoly of violence 
in the Southwest.30 
 
2.4 The U.S. Colonial Regime  
Throughout the territorial period (1850-1912) Americans imagined the 
Southwest’s potential for extractive industries and settler societies, and through mining, 
farming, ranching, town building, and railroad construction the newcomers started to 
establish their dominance. However at first it seemed that nobody was coming. The 
majority of the millions of European immigrants who sailed to the eastern seaports of 
the United States never reached the border region. Not only was the journey from 
eastern cities to the border area a chancy and costly endeavor, but the “remote” 
Southwest, lacking manufacturing and industrial foundation, offered little immediate 
economic promise. When the news of the California Gold Rush spread in 1849 
thousands of white American invaders rushed to California. Approximately 50,000 of 
them traveled through southern New Mexico and Arizona but only a few stopped.31 In 
years to come small mining booms in Arizona and New Mexico tended to be 
overshadowed by richer findings not only in California but in Colorado, Nevada, Idaho, 
and Montana. The first real mining boom in Arizona started in 1858 on the Gila River. 
New placers were opened up north of Yuma where the mining towns of Ehrenberg and 
La Paz sprang up. Gold was discovered at Pinos Altos, New Mexico, and both silver 
and gold were also discovered near Prescott and Wickenburg, Arizona. Still, fewer 
miners and little capital usually followed the initial enthusiasm. Fear of indigenous 
power, poor transportation connections, and the long distance from markets kept the 
mining in its infancy. According to a classic mining history, the potentially rich veins in 
                                                 
30
 For Geronimo and the “Geronimo campaign,” see Odie B. Faulk, The Geronimo Campaign (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1969); Angie Debo, Geronimo: The Man, His Time, His Place (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1976); Louis Kraft, Gatewood & Geronimo (Albuquerque: University of 
New Mexico Press, 2000); L.G. Moses, “Geronimo: The Last Renegade,” in Etulain & Riley, Chiefs & 
Generals, 85-104. 
31
 Sheridan, Arizona, 52-53. The population of New Mexico at the 1850 Census was 61,547 and in 1860 
93,516 people. Most were still concentrated in the Santa Fe area and the percentage who lived either in 
southern New Mexico or in Arizona was minimal. The first Arizona Census (1860) shows Arizona with 
only 6,482 inhabitants, of whom 2,421 were listed as “white.” Census Office, Statistics of the Population 
of the United States at the Tenth Census (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1883), 49, 72, 
380. 
 37 
Arizona and New Mexico seemed to remain an ever promising, but usually elusive 
attraction.32  
Many of the white settlers often surged forward in search of good living and 
profits following the military. For instance, the modern metropolis Phoenix came into 
existence to supply the markets at Fort McDowell. 33 White colonizers occupied 
selected islands of supposed wealth whereas the majority of land remained in the 
control of indigenous tribes. According to historian Thomas Sheridan, “prospectors 
descended like locusts on one strike after another, stripping away the nuggets and 
surface veins, and leaving behind their sluice boxes and shacks.”34 This aggressive, 
extortive settlement pattern left many ghost towns in its wake. In the Southwest the 
civilian conquest was in fact often an urban spread, although popular myths liked to cast 
it as an agrarian expansion.35 Pre-railroad Arizona had a diverse, yet small, assortment 
of white colonizers, including a contingent of Mormons. Many of the early arrivals 
tended to originate from the South, advocate slavery, and show at least sympathy for the 
Confederate cause. Following the confusion of the Civil War, when the Southwest was 
briefly invaded by Confederate forces, few mines managed to stay in operation but a 
bigger boom had to wait until the late 1870s. Then, in 1878, rich silver findings created 
the town of Tombstone. The finding attracted thousands of people into southeastern 
Arizona and produced tens of millions of dollars worth of silver.36 
In New Mexico, many newcomers formed strategic alliances by marrying into 
Hispanic families. After the Civil War, the Irish and the Germans formed the largest 
immigrant groups and German Jews gained prominence as merchants and creditors. 
Already during the Mexican period U.S. commerce had only widened the gap between 
the rich and the poor. According to historian Deena Gonzalez, the American rule 
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impoverished the majority of residents in population centers like Santa Fe and much of 
the region, stealing the Hispanic land base through legal and extralegal maneuverings 
and reducing the Hispanics to marginalized wage earners with lowly valued and paid 
jobs controlled by whites. Those Hispanics who defended their rights, families, or lands 
became easily labeled as “bandits” or troublemakers. The newcomers quickly controlled 
New Mexico’s new railroad and mining, its law firms and banks, and the largest 
newspapers. Whites led both political parties and constituted virtually all federally 
appointed officials.37  
The racial split widened throughout the years and by the end of the century, some 
historians argue, a racial fault line between Hispanics and Anglos, not class or wealth, 
defined one’s place in the Southwest.38 Thomas Sheridan writes that in Arizona an 
economic pecking order was organized largely along racial lines. At the top were the 
owners and managers of the railroads, copper mines, and land-and-cattle companies, all 
of whom were Anglos. In the middle were businessmen, ranchers, and farmers, mostly 
Anglo but also a few prominent Mexicans. At the bottom were people who had only 
their own labor to sell. Anglos dominated most skilled labor positions in the mines and 
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on the railroads, while Mexicans occupied the unskilled positions. They laid track, ran 
cattle, picked cotton, and hauled ore.39 
In the early 1880s, transcontinental railroads instigated a cultural and economic 
revolution in the Southwest, breaking the grip of distance. According to one scholar, 
“the railroad ushered in the trappings of eastern society.” In Santa Fe gaslight appeared 
in 1880, followed by waterworks two years later and electricity in 1891. Rail lines 
boomed established centers and brought whole towns into existence. More whites were 
coming and going with increasing speed. Also, while manufactured goods and luxuries 
were brought in, large quantities of extractive produce, most notably copper and cattle, 
were shipped out.40  
Industrialization increased copper demand exponentially in the late 1800s and 
southern Arizona developed quickly into one of the world’s leading copper regions. By 
1900 mines in Clifton, Morenci, Jerome, Bisbee, and Globe-Miami produced tens of 
millions of pounds of copper every year and employed thousands of workers.41 Copper 
towns turned into miniature colonies where workers arrived from established mining 
areas in Germany, Scotland, Ireland, and Cornwall. Many Mexicans, Italians, Spaniards, 
Czechs, Serbs, Montenegrans, and Bohemians also flocked to the copper mining 
communities. By the 1880s other mining communities also attracted men from different 
European countries. For example, the silver mining town Tombstone had significant 
Irish, German, and Jewish minorities.42 
Stocking the Great Plains and the Southwest, more than five million heads of 
cattle were sent out from Texas after the Civil War. In Mexican times, drought, lack of 
markets, and natural predators had kept the number of cattle relatively low in New 
Mexico and Arizona, while during the 1850s and 1860s most cattle passed through to 
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California. Only during the 1880s did cattle fever, spurred by railroad development, 
sweep across the territories. While Anglo ranchers took control of New Mexico’s 
eastern plains and Arizona’s ranges, outsider investments multiplied and cattle poured 
into the region. The violent decline caused by drought, blizzards, and overgrazing that 
hit the Plains only increased the momentum and rapidly every source of permanent 
water in the borderlands was taken. In the early 1890s as many as two million head of 
cattle and sheep occupied the grasslands in Arizona, whereas in New Mexico the 
number of cattle reported in 1890 was more than 1.6 million, a dramatic increase to the 
347, 000 heads in 1880 and 57,000 in 1870. The range could not take the pressure that 
such a number of stock caused. The market became glutted when nervous owners tried 
to sell their herds as prices plunged. After the widespread bust the cattle industry 
regrouped. In Arizona sheep spilled over from California combined with Mormon and 
Navajo sheep expanded to the shrinking domain of the cattle. New Mexico had been the 
heartland of sheep ranches all along with nearly five million heads in the late 1880s.43 
According to historian William Robbins, the trans-Mississippi West, including 
Arizona and New Mexico, was “the great natural-resource reservoir and the investment 
arena for eastern U.S. and western European capital.” At first the newcomers extracted 
beaver and bison skins, followed by timber, crops, and cattle, and also gold, silver, 
copper, oil, coal, and, eventually, uranium. The West and its raw materials in part 
transformed modern living.44 To gain control over Apacheria the U.S. employed a 
militarized form of colonial expansion, where the government sent its troops and 
representatives to conduct expeditions, build infrastructure, protect white colonizers and 
the interests of capital, and wage wars to subdue those indigenous peoples the state 
imagined as a threat to its colonial venture. The establishment of the U.S. regime, 
secured by the end of the U.S.-Apache wars in 1886 and cemented by Arizona and New 
Mexico’s statehood in 1912, created a new order of life in Apacheria: a social, 
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economic, cultural, and political reorganization of the whole area. The U.S. subjected 
the region to forced integration into the nation and the world economy, while also 
creating a race-based hierarchy that privileged whites, displaced and marginalized most 
Hispanics, and through destructive conquest excluded and subjugated the region’s 
powerful indigenous groups.  
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Part II THE COLONY 
Chapter 3 
Journey to the “Outside”: The Army on the Road to the Southwest 
 
“The regiment…was ordered to Arizona, that dreaded and then 
unknown land, and the uncertain future was before me.”1 –
Martha Summerhayes, officer’s wife 
   
In 1869, Julia Davis, having just returned from a year-long honeymoon in 
Europe, hoped that her husband, a U.S. Army officer, would get assigned to a pleasant 
station somewhere near their Oakland, California, home, where they could safely raise 
their infant son. When the orders finally arrived, they brought the worst option 
imaginable. Captain Murray Davis was to take charge of a body of troops crossing the 
desert to Arizona. “I thought of my husband going down and the dangers of Indian 
warfare, and being perhaps killed by savages, whilst I was far away, and I could not 
bear it,” Julia Davis wrote. Feeling uncertain about the journey and their destination, her 
husband insisted that she should stay in California. Julia Davis, however, decided 
otherwise. She packed hastily, took along her son and a nurse, and caught her husband 
en route in San Diego. “All my friends of course cried out I was mad. I should die of 
hardship and fatigue, and my husband would have to bury me in the desert,” she 
remembered. After some heated arguments with her husband, Julia Davis joined 
Company A, Eight Cavalry, numbering twenty-four enlisted men and two officers, for 
the journey of forty-one days and approximately six hundred miles to Camp McDowell, 
Arizona Territory. Seeking to ease their anxiety concerning the journey and trying to 
make sure that time spent on the road would be as pleasant as possible, Davis secured 
travel facilities and accommodations of the highest quality available, brought along 
servants, and stocked wagons with an abundance of material comforts.2  
This chapter describes U.S. Army journeys to southern Arizona and New Mexico 
during the two post-Civil War decades. The spotlight is on the army experience on the 
road, before white army men and women reached their Southwest stations. The 
discussion is divided into four sections. First evaluates the army’s position in post-Civil 
War U.S. society and the transient nature of army life. Second deals with travel routes 
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and methods. The third part investigates the significance of class in shaping the travel 
experiences of army people. While few scholars, most notably Kevin Adams, have 
written of the class division which divided the officers and their wives from the enlisted 
ranks, they have not fully discussed how class was played out in the context of army 
journeys.3 By discussing class and army journeys it is possible to gain a fuller 
understanding of the main social division which separated the white army people. The 
army’s caste system did not structure life only inside the army posts, but class identity 
and the learning of place were also produced on the road to colonial stations.  
Finally, this chapter discusses how white army men and women represented their 
journeys and the places through which they traveled. What did the army people make of 
the journey? How did they define their relationship to their surroundings or take control 
over them? How did travel methods shape army representations? Approaching army 
texts as travel writings, this work links the texts army men and women produced to a 
complex and multifaceted genre. It argues that in colonial context travel was much more 
than movement across space, and that journeys in fact functioned as sites in the 
production of colonizer identity and power. They were domains where the superiority 
and difference of the colonizers was established in relation to the colonial terrain they 
had come to invade. According to anthropologist Mary Louise Pratt, travel writings 
were an important means in producing “Europe’s differentiated conception of itself in 
relation to something it became possible to call ‘the rest of the world.’”4 Travel writings 
can be categorized as one form of imperial meaning-making where the travelers 
produced a certain subjective story assigning specific meanings to themselves, the 
journey process, and to the landscapes, peoples, and settlements they saw. They judged 
the suitability of the travel region for the purposes of the colonial regime, defined the 
region’s value, and produced certain images, categorized as “truths,” for the western 
world.  
For years historians of the U.S. West have been fascinated by a specific form of 
travel: overland migration. They have traditionally approached it as a heroic endeavor 
where determined white men and women faced overwhelming odds and dangerous 
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nature. Some scholars have also discussed European visitors like Sir Richard Burton, 
the famous British explorer, in the West. Despite the interest in the genre, the army 
remains absent in most descriptions of travel in the West. For example, Martin Padget’s 
recent work, Indian Country, which focuses on travels in the Southwest between 1840 
and 1935, ignores the vast amount of army texts pertaining to the subject and includes 
only one army narrative.5 Arguably, army explorers form an exception. The exploits of 
men like John Fremont, a member of the Army Corps of Topographical Engineers, have 
been aptly covered in many works.6 However, while some histories of military 
campaigns pay attention to “travel” conditions and experiences in the field and a few 
studies briefly notice army wives travels, the journeys of line officers, their wives, and 
enlisted men have in general received limited scholarly interest. In most works the army 
is always somehow readily present in the West, there is no journey or travel writings. It 
seems as if army members did not have anything to say about how they got to different 
locations.7 This all is rather unfortunate because white army men and women traveled 
from one region to the next often and wrote plenty of the journeys they made.  
Those few historians who have described the travels of army wives have usually 
rather uncritically celebrated the wives “bravery” in the face of “primitive conditions” 
and “terrible hardships,” thus failing to subject the wives’ writings to critical 
interrogation as subjective colonial discourses.8 One could say that this kind of 
approach is rather symptomatic of the histories of overland emigration in general. Most 
works do not connect travels in the West to colonialism, approach travel as a domain 
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where the travelers produced their identity and constructed their power, or critically 
question the motives and agendas that shaped the travel texts. Even a recent work like 
Padget’s, which deals with representations of travel and sees travel writings as a means 
used in the incorporation of the Southwest to the United States, is still more inclined to 
discuss how travel texts produced the cultural geography of the region rather than how 
travel writings were made to increase the power and importance of their producers, or 
how they established colonial hierarchies and relations of domination.9  
The discussion of army journeys and the investigation of army narratives as 
colonial travel writings not only opens a previously little discussed side of army history 
to critical interrogation, but links army writings to the establishment of colonial power 
and identity. It also allows us to see how a group of colonizers who were the official 
representatives of the colonial regime, and specialists in violence directly responsible 
for military conquest, produced their entrance to a region they had come to take control 
of. Because of its mission of conquest, the army is an especially valuable group for 
understanding the relationship between travel narratives and colonial power. 
 
3.1 Transient Conquerors 
In the Southwest the army represented a congregation of foreigners. Apart from 
the indigenous soldiers, all army people originated from other regions, even continents. 
Those white enlisted men who did not come from the urban workers of eastern cities 
usually arrived straight from Europe, being most often Irish or Germans. For instance, 
in 1886 the enlisted ranks had 11,377 native-born and 10,163 foreign-born whites. Of 
the latter 3,640 were German and 3,518 Irish.10 As a rule, the army did not enlist white 
enlisted men from the small local population in the Southwest. The federal government 
deemed the supply of possible recruits insufficient both in quantity and quality. Most 
recruiting was instead conducted in the more populous eastern states such as New York, 
Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania. In the East, as historian Edward Coffman argues, 
soldiering was in general viewed as a low status occupation. Popular beliefs reflecting 
the anti-army atmosphere of the nation held that enlisted men were of questionable 
character and unfit to work in real and meaningful occupations. In public discussion 
soldier often was used as a synonym for all that was degrading and low. “Soldier! Will 
you work? No, sir-ee; I’ll sell my shirt first” was a saying that reveals the popular 
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attitude towards soldiers in the East, Coffman writes. Contrary to the popular image, 
however, it was fairly difficult to get accepted into the army. In the 1880s, only 28% of 
the applicants proved successful. Loathed by the general public, the man who 
volunteered as a common soldier ventured West in search of better life and new 
opportunities. Many enlisted to find a steady job, especially important in times of 
economic uncertainty, while others wanted adventure. There were also those who saw 
the army as a way to escape their troubled past, while several immigrants joined to ease 
their transition in a new land.11 Although scholars like Coffman do not emphasize it, 
undoubtedly there were also many who wanted to make their lives more important and 
meaningful, and imagined that participating in western conquest and nation/empire-
building was a way to do it. 
Officers and their wives represented a different social class and white ethnicity 
than the enlisted men. Of the 2,140 officers in the army only 176 were foreign-born in 
1886. As a group the officers claimed a native-born established background. For 
instance, of men who served in the Southwest, Lieutenant William Carter declared 
himself a seventh-generation native-born, while Major Adna Chaffee made it known 
that he was eight-generation native-born of English ancestry.12 Army wives came from 
alike backgrounds. For instance, Eveline Alexander was born in Utica, New York, and 
raised in the comfortable surroundings of her family’s large country estate on the shores 
of Lake Oswego near Auburn. Educated by private tutors and also attending an elite 
school, she was related to many of the “first” families of New York and customary to 
mingling among the society in New York and Washington D.C. Alice Kirk Grierson 
was born into a prosperous upper class merchant family in Ohio. She attended first-class 
schools and became a school teacher before marrying into the military. Still another 
army wife who went to Arizona, and who supposedly descended from Oliver Cromwell, 
was from a distinguished Pennsylvania family, her father being a prominent lawyer and 
judge.13 Many also wanted to emphasize that they came from a long line of army 
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officers who had helped to make the nation great in the past. One army wife noted that 
her great-great-grandfather already served his country, while his father was in the army 
for fifty years, and his husband, brother, and son all also served.14  
After the Civil War almost 40% of officers came from New York, Pennsylvania, 
and Ohio alone. Geographically and culturally the officers were northerners, or 
“Yankees,” and a southern officer proved a rarity. In the East, the prospects for an 
average army officer looked rather dismal after the Civil War. Many officers were 
veterans of the war that had been their highlight in the public eye. When the struggle 
ended people were tired of the fighting, anxious to forget its horrors and continue their 
lives in pursuit of peaceful endeavors. Industrialization, historian Robert Utley writes, 
made many think that war had become a thing of the past. War was considered so 
destructive to economic productivity and material well-being as to be unthinkable. 
Furthermore, there was no very strong constituency or interest group in the East that 
would have depended on the army or spoken for its welfare. Quite the opposite, many 
southern democrats were antagonistic towards the army because of Reconstruction. 
When army size was drastically reduced and most of the remaining troops sent either 
west of the Mississippi River, or to supervise Reconstruction, army presence and 
influence disappeared from the everyday lives of peoples in the East. As a consequence, 
the public and the established element soon forgot that the nation even had an army. 
When an eastern society lady was introduced to a colonel of the army in 1885, she 
responded that “I supposed the Army was all disbanded at the close of the war!”15 
Unnecessary and unwanted in the East, army officers and their dependants could 
identify with other middle-class people who saw their position decline and opportunities 
disappear in the increasingly industrial post-war society. Historian Brenda Jackson 
notes that many middle-class whites short on their luck moved west in search of wealth 
and social prominence.16 While declining business opportunities forced members of 
established merchant and farming families to relocate, army officers moved because 
conquest called them west. Many tried to make the most of the opportunities expansion 
brought. Although few officers were obsessed with the glorious days of the Civil War 
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and looked back to the war when constructing their identities, most, especially of the 
younger generation, built their identity in the framework of continental conquest.17  
In the West officers and their wives, a group with uncertain national status, 
constructed new opportunities for making themselves important. Those in southern 
Arizona and New Mexico liked to cast themselves as a unique group of magnificent 
men and women; honorable, brave, refined, and thoroughly American. Their collective 
identity was founded not only on ancestry, but even more so on notions of character. 
Character was what made the officers and their wives in their own eyes. More than 
white ethnicity it was character that defined their whiteness and secured their class 
status. It helped them set themselves apart from all others, to think that they were better 
than the rest. In their own writings officers were “fine men,” educated and intelligent 
gentlemen, while their wives and daughters were “ladies,” cultured and gentle, and 
together they formed a society refined in tone. They claimed they had a high moral 
sense, great integrity and a generally recognized high standard of honor which made 
them “exemplary citizens” deserving the admiration of all respectable and reasonable 
people.18 This idealized collective sense of self was established, elaborated, displayed, 
maintained, and guarded in discourse and in daily lives as the army entered, lived, and 
operated in the colonial terrain of southern Arizona and New Mexico. 
Officers and soldiers did not live permanently in one army village or in a single 
territory/state. Rather they constituted a community of transient conquerors, moving 
from one place to the next, crisscrossing the continent in irregular intervals. The army as 
a rule limited the term of service in regions considered remote and unhealthy from two 
to four years. Only a few exceptions occurred to this general pattern. One was the Sixth 
Cavalry that spent a decade and a half in the Southwest. However, even the Sixth 
changed territories during its stay, being in Arizona from 1875 to 1884, and then in New 
Mexico until 1890. The situation was rather similar for the Eight Cavalry that was 
stationed for almost a decade in Arizona and New Mexico. Overall, however, the 
turnover of army units in the Southwest was high as regiments routinely, yet in random 
intervals, changed places. In all, between 1868 and 1886 Arizona or New Mexico had 
                                                 
17
 For the army looking backwards, see Paul Andrew Hutton, Phil Sheridan and His Army (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1985), especially 144-146.  
18
 Nelson A. Miles, Personal Recollections and Observations of General Nelson A. Miles, 2 vol. (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1992), 62; Frank D. Reeve, ed., “Frederick E. Phelps: A Soldier’s 
Memoirs,” New Mexico Historical Review 25 (1950), 51; ARSW, 1875, 123; Biddle, Reminiscences, 164. 
For officers sense of self during the post-Civil War period, see also Adams, “Common People;” Hutton, 
Phil Sheridan and His Army, 142. 
 49 
soldiers from all of the army’s ten cavalry regiments except the seventh. Furthermore, in 
Arizona served men from eight different infantry regiments and in New Mexico from 
six.19  
In addition to changes of army units, a stream of discharged men, deserters, and 
new recruits created plenty of army traffic to and from the Southwest. The turnover for 
enlisted men was high as the army replaced an estimated twenty-five to forty percent of 
the approximately 3,000 men stationed in Arizona and New Mexico each year.20 The 
officers likewise moved frequently. For instance, Frances Boyd, born and raised in New 
York City, was on the move almost constantly since marrying Orsemus Bronson Boyd 
fresh out of the military academy at West Point in 1867. In a period of six years the 
couple lived in Nevada and then moved to Arizona where they resided at Whipple 
Barracks and Camp Date Creek. From there they continued to New Mexico, living in 
Fort Stanton and Fort Union before entering Fort Bayard in 1873.21 Not all officers 
moved as much as the Boyds and most stayed in their designed stations as long as their 
units did. Still, although the whole Sixth Cavalry was stationed in Arizona in 1878, 2 
out of 7 staff officers and 10 of 36 field officers were outside the territory. In the 
Twelfth Infantry, also serving in Arizona, 3 of 5 staff officers and 7 of 27 field officers 
were not in the Territory. Most of the absentees were either on leave in the East, on 
temporary detached service, or en route to join their command, and thus bound to enter 
the Territory sooner or later.22 
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In all the army established a considerable presence in the rather thinly populated 
Southwest. Of the 6,834 white, including Hispanic, males residing in Arizona in 1870, 
1,885 were white soldiers. In 1880, the situation had changed considerably with the 
influx of Anglo civilians, but still the 1,581 white soldiers were probably the largest 
occupational group in the society of 35,160 Anglo and Hispanic whites of both sexes. 
Furthermore, the number of soldiers increased throughout the 1880s as the army poured 
manpower to end the U.S.-Apache wars. In 1885, Arizona had 2,235 soldiers. New 
Mexico had a much larger “white” population all along due to a long history of 
Spanish/Mexican settlement. In 1850, when New Mexico became a U.S. territory, it had 
at least 57,000 Hispanic and roughly 2,000 Anglo residents. The number of Anglos 
increased only gradually. When railroad tracks reached the proximity of Santa Fe in 
1880, the Anglo population remained at little more than 10,000, while the white and 
black soldiers numbered 1,207. Well into the twentieth-century the majority of New 
Mexicans were of Spanish/Mexican origin. It should also be noted that most of the 
civilians lived in the north-central section of the Territory along the Rio Grande, while 
the majority of army camps, with the exception of forts Wingate, Marcy, and Union, 
were located in the Apache-dominated southern New Mexico.23 
 
3.2 Travel Routes and Transports 
The thousands of soldiers who traveled to the borderlands could not rely on 
engine power alone to reach their destinations. Indeed, in 1866-1867 when the regular 
army returned to the Southwest from the Civil War no transcontinental railroad 
traversed the region and no water routes, except on the lower Colorado River, 
penetrated it. Incoming and outgoing troops were forced to use a mixture of boats, 
wagons, stage coaches, mules and horses to reach their destinations. Many of the 
enlisted ranks also walked. Later, train travel figured in the mix. For instance, when 
Will C. Barnes, a soldier in the U.S. Army Signal Corps, was ordered to Arizona in 
1880 he first used the transcontinental railroads to reach San Francisco and then sailed 
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on a steamer to San Diego. From there he took the stage to Yuma on the Colorado River 
and then continued by rail to its terminus, which at this time was some 135 miles 
distant. After waiting two days for a vacant seat on a stage coach he journeyed onward 
to Tucson. There, after finally receiving orders for his destination, Fort Apache, Barnes 
took the eastbound stage coach, changed to a two-seated open buckboard after a ride of 
125 miles, and got to Fort Grant via roads, he wrote, “just as nature made them: a foot 
deep in dust in dry weather, and often bottomless mud in wet weather.” Again spending 
a few days waiting, his journey continued by buckboard to Fort Thomas, where, 
following another delay of four days, Barnes wrote that he faced a “solemn-faced old 
government mule,” which was to serve as his transport for the rest of the way. Traveling 
onwards on a rough, steep, and “perfectly awful” trail for several days, and following a 
small skirmish with the Indians, the party Barnes had joined reached its goal, Fort 
Apache. Following weeks of traveling by ocean steamer, train, stage coach, buckboards, 
and finally on mule-back, and via several stop-over stations, few towns, and a number 
of army posts, Barnes finally made it to his new military home.24 
While Barnes traveled alone, the majority of soldiers and many of the officers 
and their wives, like Julia Davis, arrived in sizable army columns. The army penetrated 
the region both from the east and the west. Usually soldiers assigned to New Mexico 
moved in large columns overland either via Fort Union and Santa Fe in the northeast or, 
more rarely, El Paso, Texas, in the south.25 To reach Arizona army personnel and their 
families often ventured by way of Pacific Ocean and California. If departing from 
eastern U.S., the first step was a sea voyage via the Panama Isthmus to the Pacific 
seaports. After 1869, the traveler might take a transcontinental rail trip to San Francisco, 
which took approximately nine days from New York.26 From San Francisco army 
travelers continued, often by boat, southwards either to Drum Barracks, outside Los 
Angeles, or to San Diego. Since the early 1870s both supplies and troops were 
increasingly transported from southern California by steamboats around Cape San 
Lucas to the mouth of the Colorado River and then up the river by small steamers to 
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forts Yuma and Mojave, and the village of Ehrenberg, which functioned as entry points 
into Arizona. The army argued that this water travel offered greater dispatch and 
economy, and better conditions for both humans and materiel than did the overland 
route through the Sierra Nevada and the Mojave Desert. To make water transportation 
more feasible, the army had in fact begun establishing steamboat traffic on the Colorado 
River first in the 1850s, and this water route played a significant transportation function 
until the railroads reached the river in 1877. For its part, the overland route involved 
few alternatives. One could take the route across the desert from Drum Barracks to 
Ehrenberg or Fort Mojave, approximately 285 miles, or from San Diego to Fort Yuma, 
200 miles. The major drawback of the whole ordeal was that at worst as much as half of 
the capacity of wagons had to be preserved for water and forage. From Mojave, 
Ehrenberg, and Yuma onwards overland travel was the only alternative. From Mojave 
the main routes lead further inland towards Prescott, while Yuma roads went in the 
direction of Tucson, the two towns functioning as main gateways in the movement of 
military troops and supplies to the Arizona inland.27  
With the army came an abundance of animals, manufactured goods, and a wide 
array of other belongings. Although the army wanted to encourage the use of local 
products to supply the troops and posts, in practice much was imported. As late as 1877, 
the eve of the railroads, Arizona ranchers could not produce enough animals to feed 
local army villages and Indian reservations. Supplies mostly arrived from the same 
direction as peoples, the way from California having the monopoly in Arizona, with the 
exception of Fort Apache that was at least occasionally supplied from the east, and New 
Mexico being penetrated from its northeastern and southeastern corners. For instance, in 
1877 contractors operated nineteen routes from California and one from Colorado to 
reach Arizona posts, while army villages in New Mexico were maintained by eight 
routes from the East.28 
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During the 1860s and the 1870s wagons led by mule and ox teams functioned as 
the only mode of supply transportation overland. With plenty of heat and dust, the lack 
of grass and water endemic, and the roads too few, lengthy, and in uncertain condition, 
the movement of supplies was expensive, slow, uncertain, and irregular at best. In 
addition, army posts were widely scattered, some distant from the main roads, and 
therefore hard to reach. At worst, even roads passable by wagons did not exist when 
posts were established, but had to be made by military labor. Problems piled up as 
wagons fell to pieces, mules became unserviceable, and materials arrived in insufficient 
quantity and poor quality. Sometimes a post even ran out of supplies and had to be 
aided by others.29 
Whether the troops started their journey towards the Southwest from the Great 
Plains, the Pacific Northwest, or east of the Mississippi River, the distances traveled 
proved immense. While the companies of the Third Cavalry marched 1,190 miles on 
average from Wyoming to Arizona, the First Infantry and Tenth Cavalry from Texas 
averaged 489 miles. Even longer journeys awaited the Twelfth Infantry when sent from 
Arizona to the east, with trips averaging 2,602 miles.30 Not the distances alone, but the 
fact that travel overland was conducted in often massive columns made the journeys 
time-consuming, slow, and cumbersome before the railroads crossed the Southwest. 
When the Fifth Cavalry left the Southwest in 1875 and was replaced by the Sixth from 
Colorado, Indian Territory, and Kansas, half a regiment, approximately 300 to 500 men, 
moved at a time. Similarly, when the Eight Cavalry departed New Mexico and 
exchanged places with the Ninth from Texas the transfer was conducted entirely by 
overland marches half a regiment at a time. The army columns, which consumed vast 
amounts of water, food, and forage, appeared like moving clouds of dust when looked 
upon from distance. It was not uncommon that the transfers took several months to 
complete. For instance, the men and women of the Eight Cavalry spent anywhere from 
eight weeks to three or four months on the road.31 It was altogether impossible for any 
army traveler to reach the borderlands in just few days. Even the relatively “short” trip 
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between San Diego and Fort Apache took six weeks, and from Fort Smith, Arkansas, to 
Fort Union, New Mexico, troops in 1866 marched 68 days.32 
In the 1880s the transcontinental railroad changed the methods and time the army 
spent traveling to and from the borderlands. From the west the Southern Pacific 
Railroad arrived at Yuma in 1877, and in 1880, the year Will Barnes used it, the lines 
reached New Mexico. A year later the railroad crossed both territories. The second line 
to achieve this was the Atlantic & Pacific Railroad that branched from the Atchison, 
Topeka, & Santa Fe Railroad and built west from Albuquerque in 1880 joining the 
Southern Pacific on the Colorado River near Fort Mojave in 1883. Entering New 
Mexico from the north, the Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe built southward, connecting 
with the Southern Pacific and Texas & Pacific near El Paso at the extreme western 
corner of Texas in 1881.33 No longer were all troops forced to march most of their way. 
For example, in 1882 one cavalry company returning from Fort Huachuca, Arizona, to 
the Pacific coast marched only approximately 200 of its almost 1,600 travel miles. In 
another instance an infantry unit from Fort Gibson, Indian Territory, rushing to join the 
Victorio campaign in southern New Mexico was able to do most of its journey by rail. 
The rail trip of 1,081 miles took only five days.34 It is easy to see that the effect of the 
railroads on travel speed was phenomenal. For instance, one military surgeon journeyed 
by rail from New York to Bowie Station in southeastern Arizona in 6 days in 1884, 
while twelve years earlier his much shorter trip from northern Nevada to a central 
Arizona post had lasted 51 days.35  
The overall impact of the railroad on army’s travel methods was still limited. 
First, although long overland marches and boat trips became a thing of the past, in troop 
movements between the two territories, or from Texas, marching continued as a viable 
option. When in 1883 the Fourth and Sixth Cavalry exchanged places between New 
Mexico and Arizona most of the units made the whole way by marching. One of the 
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troops spent 27 days on the 440 miles from Fort Stanton, New Mexico, to Fort 
Huachuca.36 Interestingly, the units of the Tenth Cavalry marched from Texas to 
Arizona in 1885 following the Southern Pacific rail lines. Only some of the officers and 
their wives were allowed to make use of the comforts of train travel.37 Second, most 
Southwest army villages were not located in the proximity of the first rail lines. Thus 
reaching them by rails alone was impossible. After the Southern Pacific and Atchison, 
Topeka, & Santa Fe joined with the Texas & Pacific only just one, Fort Craig, of the 
three southern New Mexico posts was along their routes, forts Bayard and Stanton 
being distant. The military soon reoccupied both forts Cummings and Selden, which 
had been abandoned few years earlier but were now conveniently located near the 
railroad. The situation was similar in Arizona. When the first transcontinental line 
crossed the territory, forts Huachuca, Bowie, Grant, McDowell, Mojave, and Thomas 
were all within 65 miles of the rail lines, but Apache, Verde, and Whipple Barracks, the 
location of department headquarters, were approximately 100 miles from rails. Only 
Fort Yuma had a railroad stop, and Fort Lowell was within a very short distance of one 
in Tucson.38 In all, marching, riding, or wagon transportation never became totally 
irrelevant during the period of U.S.-indigenous wars, although railroads by the early 
1880s had made the journeys much faster and brought convenient stops within Arizona 
and New Mexico for those army travelers able to utilize the trains. 
 
3.3 Class and Travel 
The preconceptions held by white army personnel varied from ignorance to fear. 
In theory by 1866 the Southwest was not a totally unknown place for white Americans. 
Merchants, trappers, miners, and explorers had traversed the area decades earlier, as had 
American armies during the U.S.-Mexican war and the pre-Civil War years. While early 
nineteenth-century explorers such as Stephen Long and Zebulon Pike gave the West 
little chance of permanent white settlement, constructing an image of the Plains and 
beyond as the “Great American Desert,” in the 1840s and 1850s another famous 
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explorer John Fremont proved a great publicist for expansion. His reports served as 
popular literature and were read as adventures and as tracts urging western settlement.39 
Still, in 1866 not many Anglos actually lived in southern Arizona and New Mexico. 
Farming, ranching, and mining had not boomed yet and most pre-Civil War merchants 
preferred Santa Fe over Tucson. Also, the majority of white explorers had not included 
southern Arizona or New Mexico in their routes. Thus the knowledge of the area and its 
terrain remained incomplete. Before leaving the region to the hands of volunteers during 
the Civil War years, the regular army had established its presence in southern Arizona 
and New Mexico, but it is unclear how much the post-Civil War generation of army 
men and women knew of these earlier portraits. Probably some did, but many seemed 
unaware of what awaited them. According to Martha Summerhayes, an officer’s wife, 
“old campaigners…knew a thing or two about Arizona,” but the younger generation 
whom she belonged to “did not know.” “We had never heard much about this part of 
our country,” she wrote.40 In the late 1870s and early 1880s many continued to claim 
that they had limited knowledge of southern Arizona and New Mexico and did not 
know exactly what to expect. When receiving orders to travel to Arizona, Will Barnes 
noted in his diary that in his mind Arizona “seemed like a fairyland so far away was it.” 
An officer felt that he was about to enter a truly unknown region of which “civilized 
people” knew little about. There were those for whom the region was entirely off the 
known world and some could not even locate it on the map.41 There were also still those 
who were frightened by rumors and tales. Entering Arizona in the 1880s an army wife 
wrote that “We did not much relish the prospect of going to Arizona, for many and lurid 
were the tales that were told of the dreadful heat, the sand storms, the Gila monsters, 
centipedes, tarantulas etc., but when Uncle Sam said ‘March,’ we marched.”42 
Regardless of one’s expectations, army officers and their wives’ class 
sensibilities and image of themselves demanded that they try to maintain certain 
lifestyle and level of refinement during their journeys. Ideally, they hoped to arrange 
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leisurely journeys which would allow them to display their status and claim genteel 
identity. In reality, during the pre-railroad era many travelers proved unable to organize 
the kind of journeys they wanted. Many a traveler grew frustrated and disappointed. The 
trip proved too long and arduous, and the exposure to the elements too real and painful. 
Journeys became exhausting struggles against heat, dust, and exhaustion for the 
unprepared and overconfident travelers who discovered that they did not enjoy their 
time on the road. 
To guarantee a successful journey, servants, either civilians or soldiers, were 
thought highly necessary and the officers and their wives tried to make sure that they 
had maids, body servants, nurses, and other lower class workers to accompany them, do 
much of the work, and provide for comforts.43 It was also important that 
accommodations in boats and wagons were as comfortable as possible and reflected the 
travelers’ sense of self, their ideas of proper style and taste. In boats officers and their 
wives preferred to reside in what they referred as “very comfortable” staterooms. 
Books, singing, conversations, and games ideally made the days pass quickly. While 
officers and their families sought to enjoy cheerful leisure in the company of 
“respectable” people, servants made their beds, hauled travel trunks back and forth from 
the vessel’s hold, and served drinks and meals.44 For the overland journey many spent 
much money and effort in making their wagons more refined. It is probable that they 
utilized servant labor for that purpose. One couple had their wagon fixed with white 
canvas, “elegant green blanket to line the top to keep off the heat and protect the eyes,” 
curtains for ventilation and privacy, removable seats that made room for bed, and little 
pockets inside the wagon to put small articles in. The owner of the wagon saw it as 
“convenient and elegant a thing as one could imagine.” She was certain that “a queen 
might be proud to ride in it.” To further enhance their class sensibilities, many insisted 
that they should not have to drive the wagons themselves, but that hired teamsters or 
assigned drivers from the enlisted ranks were suitable for that purpose.45 
Officers and wives also relied on material abundance for making their time on the 
road more pleasant. They took along a large supply of different goods, including bags, 
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books, cases, linen, sewing materials, china, silver, fresh and canned fruits, candles, 
chairs, mattresses, and matting for the floors. Much of this the army people categorized 
as necessary for “survival” en route, the rest was for their new homes in the army 
posts.46 Julia Davis stuffed her baggage wagon with “linen, books, a bed, pictures, 
curtains-everything I could think of for house-keeping.” Under the assumption that 
nothing could be obtained along the route, she tried to take with her as much as 
possible.47 It is telling of the officers and their wives dependence and trust on material 
goods that many complained they were unable to take all they wanted. In general, three 
large army chests, or approximately 1,000 pounds consisted the limit of package 
allowed for one officer, and for the delivery of excess materials he had to pay extra. 
Many who regarded these limits as ridiculously small for survival became furious, while 
others resorted to apathy. Some who had plenty of surplus materials insisted that they 
“must take it” all, or otherwise they “could not exist.” When told to pack, others 
managed only a paralyzed stare on all their belongings. They felt unable to decide what 
to take and what to leave out. The actual packing the officers and their wives left to their 
servants, not wanting or sometimes even knowing how to pack themselves. One 
officer’s wife, for example, confessed that she was utterly helpless in packing all the 
materials as she simply did not know what to do.48 
On the road certain events, like meals, also allowed officers and wives to display 
their sense of style and sophistication and to strengthen their status. On one wagon 
journey, some managed to enjoy a menu of coffee, eggs, bacon, bread and butter, 
condensed milk, and hard bread for breakfast and canned meat, vegetables, bread and 
butter, coffee, and canned fruits for dinner. More important than what was eaten was 
how the meals were organized. They were conducted rather elegantly on a red and white 
tablecloth spread on the ground, the participants sitting on boxes with their tin plates, 
cups, knives, forks, spoons, and napkins. Another traveling party had brought for their 
dining pleasure a special tent furnished with a board floor.49 Again the servants played a 
crucial role by usually both preparing and serving the meals. All the materials and the 
fact that the meals were set in the manner they were despite the outdoor venue on the 
road demonstrate how officers and wives cherished a certain way of life, making an 
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effort of trying not to allow travel conditions to alter acceptable conventions or 
standards too much.  
Dress was another important symbol of class status. For her overland journey, 
Julia Davis wore a blue serge dress, no hoops or extra skirts, hair braided in one long 
tail, and a hat large enough to hide her almost entirely. She wrote that she had adjusted 
her appearance, thinking she was ready to meet the demands of the journey.50 Others 
came less prepared, demonstrating in their appearance and dress that they were prepared 
“to suit 5th Avenue” than a 600 miles ride in army ambulance, as one observant army 
wife wrote.51 There existed those who traveled even without any bedding or tents, 
thinking ignorantly that they would sleep at ranches. When this proved impossible they 
were forced to spend their nights in the wagons or rely on the kindness of others who let 
them in their tents.52  
Disappointment, however, proved more general and widespread. For one thing, 
travel accommodations were often judged as improper. When Julia Davis started her 
journey overland towards the Colorado River, she felt rather inadequate that her white 
topped wagon pulled by four horses had only a simple mattress laid in it. “In this we 
were to live, sleep, and travel,” she wrote in a somewhat sour tone.53 Many army wives 
quickly found out that all their material abundance did not make them immune to the 
presence of heat, sand, and dust. Often the circumstances caused their appearance to 
crumble and entertainments to fail. For instance, one wife became disgusted with her 
“rather fagged and seedy” dress, feeling remorseful that she had not brought along 
enough “thin wash-bodices” to battle the dust which covered her from head to toe. 
Another wife regretted that the expected entertainment of playing cards every evening 
did not materialize because all were too exhausted to play after a day of traveling in the 
intense heat.54 In addition, fires, wagons rolled over, and other accidents occasionally 
caused material disasters and mental stress, especially damaging because many were 
certain that the Southwest did not offer the kinds of clothes and other belongings they 
would consider purchasing. Anything destroyed was only compensated for by lending 
from others or by ordering materials from the eastern United States.55  
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On boats, circumstances also often interfered and spoiled the enjoyment. Intense 
heat alone could increase discomfort in the ship space to a point where no one had the 
energy to keep up the conversations or entertainments. Troubled by the presence of 
racial strangers, some felt their journeys suffered because the river streamer crews on 
the Colorado River composed mostly of “savage” Indians. Lack of service, amenities, or 
companionship also made the trips arduous at times. Some fell seasick and grumbled 
that “cooking was about as bad as it could be.” Those who had the opportunity went 
ashore at ports in search of better food and refreshments. “I mustered what Spanish I 
knew, and told…I would pay…any price for a cup of coffee with fresh milk,” one 
desperate army wife wrote. Luckily she possessed an ample supply of dollars that 
bought not only coffee with milk, but coconuts, fresh butter, chicken, and creamy 
biscuits, thus filling her needs and compensating the supply on the boat.56 In general, 
officers and wives could easily afford to improve their travel diet by purchasing food at 
high cost wherever it was available. In another instance, an officer and his wife were 
able to invest eighteen dollars - more than a month’s salary for an enlisted soldier - for 
apples, lemons, and oranges to refresh their otherwise tedious journey.57 
The common soldier did not worry exceedingly about entertainment or his 
clothing style, nor did he travel in staterooms or rode in wagons, unless his strength 
gave out. Enlisted men came in a flatboat towed by the steamer where the officers were 
and went ashore to the river banks to sleep their nights. Traveling by rail, one soldier 
remembered that when the officers chose to ride in a caboose the enlisted men had to 
crawl into box cars. Also, when the officers enjoyed the Pullman cars, the soldiers 
journeyed in day-coach.58 When the officers rode in their wagons, the enlisted men, not 
belonging to the “happy favored” class, as one of them sarcastically remarked, marched. 
In the long columns many soldiers felt that they were choking from the dust. Whatever 
the mode of travel, the class division between enlisted men and the elite persisted. Many 
enlisted men had difficulties accepting the situation and resorted to bitter irony in their 
writings. Soldiers, for instance, wrote that “after a march of 268 miles we reached this 
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corner of the human garden, Fort Yuma, California, upon which, I can safely say, ‘the 
eyes of Heaven shed but few tears.’ Yes, here we are, shirtless, shoeless, and I might 
with propriety add brainless.” This man obviously felt that the marching they had just 
done had been a foolish ordeal conducted in terrible surroundings and circumstances. 
However, rest periods usually proved short and an early breakfast, or what one soldier 
dubbed “supper, so barely did the time escape being twelve o’clock midnight,” 
consisted the usual routine on the road.59  
To the amazement of the enlisted men, officers sometimes left them to struggle 
by themselves. For example, one enlisted man recollected that when his unit marched 
from Drum Barracks to Yuma officers found the trip “somewhat tedious” in their 
ambulances and therefore left the columns in charge of non-commissioned officers and 
rode ahead as quickly as possible to the next resting place. One nightly sand storm not 
only blinded and sickened this group of enlisted men who traveled without their 
officers, but made them take the wrong path. Not realizing their folly until after many 
miles and knowing absolutely nothing about the nature of the country they were in, they 
continued hoping to reach Yuma. Utterly helpless in what to them was “terra 
incognito,” soldiers grew angry and desperate, their ranking sergeant deserting and the 
next in rank being placed in arrest. The low point was reached when one soldier 
perished and was buried in the sand. The party was rescued only by Mexican teamsters 
who took them to a stage station following three nights and days of desperate 
wanderings in the desert. Finally, after two more days of marching, they reached Yuma 
with blistered feet, burnt skin, and clothes in tatters. The ranking sergeant who had 
deserted was found wandering about by the Yuma Indians. According to one of the 
soldiers, the sergeant was physically and mentally a wreck. It is unclear if he ever fully 
recovered.60 
When officers and their wives carried along as much as they could or were 
allowed, enlisted men had very few materials for transporting. At one instance, a party 
of three officers, two wives, and their two children, accompanied by six soldiers filled 
as much as four army wagons and one ambulance with all their belongings. Despite the 
fact that the women and children traveled in the ambulance, the party had plenty of 
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space for the material abundance of each adult, when compared to another group of 
approximately seventy soldiers and three officers who had only six wagons and one 
ambulance. That the latter party, consisting of a large number of enlisted men, had just 
little more baggage space as the former shows how material abundance was divided 
within the military.61  
Enlisted men also lacked the means to ease and refresh themselves on their 
journeys like the officers did. They had no servants to take care of them, few personal 
luxury items, or much money to supplement their poor rations by purchases from 
civilians. Fresh meat was a rarity and fresh vegetables almost never seen. It was a 
combination of bacon, beans, beef, hardtack, and coffee that kept the enlisted men 
going. Under stress, some were forced to resort to stealing and selling government 
property to purchase food or beer and alcohol from civilians.62 Although some officers 
realized that common soldiers were worse off than they were, the enlisted men were still 
expected to serve the needs of the elite, to cook and serve their food, make their beds, 
and construct their tents. One veteran army wife gave the following advice to a 
newcomer: “You must never try to do any cooking at the camp-fire. The soldiers are 
there for that work, and they know lots more about it than any of us do.”63 When 
enlisted men or other servants were not available, officers’ wives disliked the situation 
immensely. One wife recollected that during one journey she personally had “for the 
first time in my life, and under the greatest disadvantages, to cook an entire meal.” She 
learned to make coffee and grill bacon, “but never to enjoy cooking over a camp-fire.”64 
As a rule, the needs and desires of officers and their wives always superceded any 
considerations of enlisted men. When officers and their wives tried to make sure they 
would travel in relative comfort, seeking to isolate themselves from the conditions, to 
avoid physical exhaustion, and ensure that they were surrounded by servants, the 
enlisted men sweated their way into the borderlands. The only occasion they saw first 
class travel space or any luxury items was when serving the officers and their wives. 
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3.4 Representations of the Journey 
During the pre-railroad era army men and women wrote most of the western 
route to Arizona. The way from California to Arizona clearly captivated their 
imagination and stirred their emotions. In general, what the army people had to say of 
their journey, and of the landscapes, settlements, and peoples they saw, did not amount 
to a flattering description. Army travelers made their voyage to southern Arizona and 
New Mexico a journey to “the outside,” a perilous descent, a contest, and a struggle 
from the civilized world into a foreign and remote wilderness.65 Journeys became sites 
that tested the army people’s resilience and character and established their superiority in 
relation to the colonial terrain. 
The beginning of the journey the army often represented as “normal” civilized 
traveling, a quiet prelude to upcoming challenges. One army wife traveling overland 
wrote that during the first days after Los Angeles she saw the most beautiful country 
imaginable. Roads were good and nights were spent at people’s homes enjoying good 
food and comfortable beds. Everybody felt happy and confident. On the fifth day, she 
wrote, things changed. Then, she claimed, her party left the known world behind them 
and entered the endless track of sand and terrifying heat of the California desert.66 As 
they crept closer to the California-Arizona border, army travelers’ discourses turned 
increasingly sour. Described by one traveler as “a true Sahara,” the section in and 
around Yuma appeared as an intensively scorching and desolate dump of sandy and 
rocky wastelands with little water and furnace-like winds. The illusions of army 
travelers, if they had any, were quickly shattered. They could not understand or much 
less value the place they had come to. Even the Colorado River brought little relief. 
Instead, some described it very unfavorably as a mighty, untamed and even savage 
river, while for others it was shockingly “nearly half sand.”67 Also, the military post on 
the Colorado River, Fort Yuma, the army dubbed “the hottest place that ever existed.” It 
is telling of their take on the place that almost all travelers repeated a well-circulated 
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army legend which told that a soldier who had died at Yuma after a while returned to 
beg for his blankets, having found hell too cold a place for his tastes.68 
While white army people were shocked and disgusted with the kind of 
environment and landscapes they encountered, they did not like the people any better. 
According to officers and their wives, the Colorado River area was occupied mostly by 
racially inferior strangers: “very poor class” Mexicans, “lazy, more than half-naked 
Indians,” or half-breeds. These people, the army represented, were nothing but 
“savages” and lower class robbers and murderers who could not establish control over 
nature or build a prosperous and moral society anywhere, let alone in such a taxing 
environment. For that purpose, army people implied, a better class of (white) men and 
women were needed. That there lived only a handful of white people and few or no 
middle-class whites only proved in army eyes that the area lacked “proper” society and 
was “foreign” and “inferior.” Army narratives also claim that the few settlements in the 
area were of poor quality and inferior, thus proving the backward and decadent nature 
of the whole society. Gila City, once a boom town for silver, the army represented as a 
miserable one adobe house town on the verge of disappearance. One army observer 
stopping over commented that the town was “not exactly a city, to be sure,” but rather a 
sight of “a few old adobe houses and the usual saloon.” Settlements like Arizona City or 
Ehrenberg on the Colorado River the army categorized as “entirely isolated from the 
world,” “far out of the world,” or, alternatively, “the home of the bad man.” Arizona 
City was described as “quite a town, balls and shootings being the order of the day.” 
Some painted it as “a distinguished village” consisting of two rows of adobe huts along 
a wide street, with no walk but where the foot sinks in the sand ankle-deep, with plenty 
of villainous dens, and “indeed little else.” “One might travel a long way before seeing a 
more God-forsaken looking city,” one officer said of Arizona City.69 
Adding to the distress of the incomers were the troops leaving the region. “From 
the great joy manifested by them all, I drew my conclusions as to what lay before us, in 
the dry and desolate country we were about to enter…When we departed, I felt, 
somehow, as though we were saying good-bye to the world and civilization,” one army 
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wife recalled.70 Those getting out felt liberated and few expressed any regrets. Getting 
away from “the outside” meant a much expected return to civilization and to the true 
United States. One officer recollected that “so disgusted with our Arizona experience 
were all the officers [of three companies] that when the boat pulled out of Yuma, we 
took off our shoes and beat the dust of Arizona over the rail, at the same time cursing 
the land.”71  
Army men and women had labeled the Indians near the Colorado River as 
harmless naked savages, ignorant wretches who lived a stone-age existence.72 However, 
as the travelers left the Colorado River behind them their take on the area’s indigenous 
peoples changed dramatically. East of Yuma army people traveled in areas occupied by 
Maricopas or Tohono O’odham, and further to the north they entered Yavapai or Pai 
territory. Still, although not yet nowhere near the heartland of Apacheria, and thus 
unlikely to encounter any Apaches, the fear of Apaches led to a siege mentality where 
many army people saw Apaches everywhere. They not only confused Yavapais for 
Apaches but imagined that behind every rock was an Apache ready to attack at any 
moment. Images of all-powerful, ever-looming, and cunning Apaches who purportedly 
desired white peoples blood haunted army men and women’s minds.73 In their 
discourses some recounted vivid tales of past atrocities they had heard from some more 
or less reliable source. Others pointed old “massacre” sites along the route, where 
“helpless” white pioneers or soldiers had in years past fallen victim to Indians’ cruelty. 
“This whole land is red with murder and massacre,” was the typical army message.74 
The travelers felt they needed numerous lookouts and guards to increase their sense of 
control and security. According to one officer’s wife, units stuck close together 
allowing no stragglers, because “we knew the Indians were watching us, and we never 
knew when they might attack.” Although many were certain they were in harms way, no 
Indians usually attacked. This, the army people explained, was because the troops 
moved in large numbers and the cowardly Apaches did not dare to confront them.75  
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The “Apache threat” which shadowed many army journeys was a useful device 
for the colonizers. For one thing, surviving to tell the tales of “massacres” and 
“savages” turned journeys into struggles that tested the army people and made them 
heroic, increasing their sense of self-worth and superiority. Also, the writings of 
murderous savages camouflaged and validated the army’s mission of conquest: it was 
right and human to try to bring order and civilization to this kind section marked by 
chaos. Army stories sought to establish the inferior character of the area and to make it 
empty of civilization. In army stories the area between the Colorado River and Tucson, 
Prescott, or some army village, was void of almost all society excepting those 
dangerous Indians. Only few isolated spots of habitation characterized this “Indian 
country.” Some wrote that “after passing Fort Yuma, we were in the Indian country and 
had quite left all civilization behind.” Others pointed out that the area was described by 
total emptiness. “As far as the eye could reach not a sign of life could be seen; we 
seemed to be the only living people on the planet.” One wife was stunned “that such a 
forlorn district was comprised within the limits of the United States.”76  
After the Colorado River, army narratives explain, travel conditions only further 
deteriorated. Roads were labeled nonexistent or barely passable. One officer described 
the principal road from Yuma towards New Mexico as “a dreary, sandy waste of quite 
four hundred miles.”77 Rest stops along the route army people considered “primitive to 
the extreme,” with purportedly unsanitary washing conditions and inadequate eating 
facilities. For instance, one soldier was stunned when, in the heat of 110 degrees, he 
dined under a brush shelter accompanied by myriads of hungry flies that wanted their 
share of the food, waited on by a Yuma Indian woman naked from the waist up, 
wearing only a breech-clout. For him the situation bordered on the unbearable and 
unfathomable, and certainly was dislikable.78  
Julia Davis was utterly disappointed with the conditions. “Not a tree…not a green 
thing of any kind…the monotony only broken by rocks…You cannot fancy such a 
country!” She continued that “Every day the sun came up fierce, unclouded, into the 
dazzling sky, and burned over our heads, and grew hotter and hotter, and the alkali 
sands scorched our eyes, and choked us until we gasped for breath, and the heat from 
the ground seemed greater even than the heat from the sun.” Revealing her ignorance of 
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the region, Davis confessed that before the journey she “had dreamt of a tropical 
vegetation, and forests and prairies,” but found “a desert - great bare purple rocks, and 
still more bare tracks of sand.” For Davis and many others, nights seemed almost 
unbearable, at least during the summer months, and many people unable to sleep grew 
totally exhausted. Adding to the distress was the uncertainty of water. When found it 
was often undrinkable, strongly impregnated with sulfur and alkali, so that children got 
sick and even horses turned away with disgust.79 Some represented that for them the 
shock of their travel surroundings had become almost too much to bear. According to 
one army wife, “From the cold, bracing climate of Oregon we found ourselves in a few 
weeks on the arid deserts of Arizona, breathing and almost stifling in the dust that was 
thrown into the ambulance by the wind that always seemed to blow in the wrong 
direction.”80 
In most army discourses the journey became represented as a struggle against an 
environment that was “hostile” overall. The army made it seem that it was at the mercy 
of an uncontrollable nature. It was as if the travelers were plagued by an entire arsenal 
of dangers and hardships the dreadful region subjected them to. In addition to heat, lack 
of water, and dust already discussed, the voluminous sand could spur into “lively 
activity” in “dreadful” storms that terrified, “blinded and choked the men and mules.”81 
Even rain, although rare, was considered dangerous. Torrents soaked the travelers and 
destroyed their belongings as well as the roads.82 Quicksand and whirlpools in the 
Colorado River awaited any soldier unlucky to fall overboard. Furthermore, all 
vegetation and animals seemingly had thorns and prongs. Disgusted, one private 
recollected that from Yuma to Tucson there was “just one stream of snakes,” the 
soldiers killing from five to thirty per day.83 Mirages also added to misery. Images of 
ships at sea, cities, and lakes nourished false hopes and sudden joys, only to disappoint. 
Those heavenly mirages only “made the heat hotter, and the desert drier, and the sand 
more choking than ever,” army people remembered.84 Only cool nights and star-filled 
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sky offered a pleasant diversion to some. “There seemed to me thousands more stars 
visible than I ever saw before, and so intensely vivid, so clear, and yet so far off.”85 If 
not troubled by fears of snakes and other creatures, officers at times found pleasant 
enough places for taking leisure pauses for sightseeing the mountain landscapes. These 
encounters were filled with gentlemanly naturalizing, description of the “strange” flora 
and fauna from the outsider perspective, everything judged in terms of elegance, utility, 
strangeness, and ugliness.86 
For many the journey retained its pessimistic nature to the end. After weeks of 
traveling on desert trails and roads, there waited one final disappointment for Julia 
Davis. She wrote that “Then came the exclamation, ‘There it is. This is Camp Mac 
Dowel. We have reached our destination!’ I looked in vain. I could see nothing! There 
were the same scorched mountains, the same uncouth rocks, the same dazzling sand, the 
same glare and drought; but where was the Camp, the dwellings, the home of which I 
had been dreaming. Those low mounds, which looked only like hillocks, as we drew 
near were, I discovered, the dwellings.” Devastated by her first impressions of the army 
fort, Julia Davis must have seriously questioned whether the taxing journey had been 
worth it.87 
The railroads that traversed southern Arizona and New Mexico in the 1880s had a 
profound impact on army travelers’ representations of the journey. Historian David 
Wrobel writes that in their texts many civilian emigrants in the West drew a stark 
juxtaposition between overland travels and Pullman Palace Car traveling, contrasting 
the demands of the past with luxuries of present.88 The same happened with army 
travelers. In army minds railroads symbolized progress and practical travel comfort but 
also final conquest over what they claimed was a hostile terrain. The railroads made the 
trip faster and much more comfortable, and also isolated the army people from the 
unpleasant surroundings they so eagerly wrote about. In trains, officers and their wives 
had a better chance to rest, relax, and enjoy pleasant socializing and leisure. As a result, 
journeys lost most of their exoticism and “shock value” and travel to the borderlands 
became “normal,” “ordinary,” and “uninteresting.” Travel became something not many 
army men or women wrote about anymore or paid much attention to. Those who did 
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write liked to compare the ease and comfort of the railroad era with the unpleasantness 
and hardship of the past. One army wife wrote that “remembering the days, weeks, and 
even months spent in traveling on the river, or marching through the deserts, I could not 
make the Pullman cars seem a reality.” An officer voiced a similar opinion: “When I 
hear others carelessly mention a trip by rail…as a journey of few days…a momentary 
feeling akin to envy or anger comes over me, and it is difficult to realize that it has been 
possible for even steam and the locomotive to accomplish such results-to have 
apparently annihilated the absolute waste and desolation through which we passed so 
wearily.”89 
 
Conclusion: Penetrating the Wilderness 
The U.S. Army created constant traffic to and from southern Arizona and New 
Mexico during the post-Civil War years as thousands of men and massive amounts of 
supplies traversed between the states and the Southwest. Before the 1880s and the 
transcontinental railroads the journey was a time-consuming and complicated 
experience that took weeks or months to complete as army people had to use a variety 
of travel methods to reach their destinations. Most army officers and their wives did not 
exactly know what to expect, but were still often hesitant about the long journey 
beforehand. It seems that while few actually wanted to go to Arizona or New Mexico, 
there were several who simply awaited leisurely journeys. Officers and their wives 
generally shared a desire to ensure that the journeys would fulfill certain class standards 
and levels of refinement. They placed much effort and money in trying to make their 
trips as enjoyable as possible. They sought to secure elegant travel accommodations, an 
abundant supply of material comforts, and the help of lower class servants. In sharp 
contrast, enlisted men often marched or occupied second-class facilities on boats and 
trains while being simultaneously reduced to servant status by the dominant officers and 
wives. Soldiers journeyed almost empty-handed and lacked the means and the power in 
the army hierarchy to make their journeys more enjoyable or luxurious. 
The journeys of officers and their wives ideally displayed their class sensibilities 
and level of sophistication. Often the attempts and ambitions, however, clashed with the 
realities of travel. Weeks and months on the road took their toll. Upholding personal 
appearance and proper social activities became difficult as travelers grew weary and 
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exhausted. First-class accommodations in boats and elegantly decorated wagons 
inadequately sheltered from the heat and dust. Material wealth or the attention of 
servants poorly compensated when the food and water supply was judged poor and 
uncertain, resting places miserable, or when traveling in the “barren” desert surrounded 
by purportedly dangerous Apaches and vicious rattlesnakes, or when one was seasick 
and stuck for days in a boat hit by crushing heat. Also, much to their disgust officers 
and their wives could not haul all the luxury items they would have wanted, which 
made them more bitter and miserable. Furthermore, encounters with ecstatic army men 
and women who were on their way out of the Southwest also dampened the spirits of 
many. 
The failure to travel in the style and comfort one wanted and thought one’s class 
position demanded, a result of the gap between ambitious standards and the realities of 
travel circumstances and methods, contributed to a growing aggravation, disgust 
towards travel surroundings, and to a feeling of resentment over the whole journey. On 
the other hand, the journeys functioned as sites in the production of army power. By 
making the journey a struggle that tested the travelers and made them (successfully) 
face “savage Indian danger” and “hostile environment,” and also by representing their 
travel surroundings as inferior, odd, and uncivilized, white army people sought to 
establish their own superiority in relation to the colonial space they had to penetrate and 
take control of. In a way the journey functioned much like a rite of passage, a test that 
celebrated the officers and their wives’ character and perseverance as superior beings 
who pushed through all the obstacles. Army representations made it clear that the 
colonial society or even the purportedly “hostile” environment along the travel routes 
proved no match for them. Army people gained in authority and identity when 
establishing a vision of reality that promoted the difference, or even binary opposition, 
between them and the environment, settlements, and peoples they encountered. In 
army’s “imperial eyes” the sections traveled through were foreign and weird, unsuitable 
for civilized tastes and peoples and offering only uncontrolled and unused nature, an 
occasional desolated and stagnated village, and vast emptiness.90 In many ways, army 
discourses made the journeys seem as if they were a transition from the known world to 
the unknown, a descent into a region outside the nation and civilization in its current 
condition. Stories of inferior and empty places were one way to make U.S. conquest 
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seem right and legitimate. They hid the true nature of army journeys as harmful and 
unjust invasions into other people’s lands. As lands void of proper civilization, the 
places through which the army traveled became represented ripe for the taking and 
readily available for civilization.  
Unwanted and irrelevant in the East, white army people tried to make themselves 
important by claiming to be superior in relation to the colony and by penetrating 
“hostile” regions and opening them to “civilization” and “progress.” When in the 1880s 
the army was able to travel all the way to Arizona and New Mexico in the comfort 
provided by trains, the journey lost its struggle aspect and in consequence most of its 
bitterness and exotic qualities, and, paradoxically, appeal. Travel to southern Arizona 
and New Mexico became “normal,” or uninteresting. Journeys were quick and 
comfortable, and the travel region, the army claimed, increasingly tamed by forces of 
civilization.
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Chapter 4  
Apaches in White Army Minds  
 
“The territories of Arizona and New Mexico have been raided 
by bands of hostile Apaches. Many citizens have been murdered 
and much stock stolen. To the old settlers the terrible atrocities 
committed by these red demons are not new, as Cochise, 
Victorio…and Geronimo have in years past broken from their 
reservations and, defying the troops, have murdered, robbed, 
and mutilated the miners and settlers who ventured unprotected 
in this region.”1-James S. Pettit, Lieutenant, U.S. Army 
 
“The Apaches are the lowest type of human nature known on 
our continent. They live in utter poverty and wretchedness, 
having no clothing and no property…They are very cowardly 
until brought to bay where they fight with the utmost 
desperation, knowing no such thing as quarter.”2-Andrew J. 
Alexander, Major, U.S. Army 
 
During a late Spring evening in 1885 in Cloverdale, near the Mexican border, a 
group of army officers had the opportunity to indulge themselves in a banquet of fine 
dining, Cuban cigars, and costly liquids, compliments of a large cattle company. They 
exchanged “blood-curdling tales of Indian warfare,” as one newspaperman in 
attendance remembered, when a sudden and alarming commotion occurred. Rifle shots 
and “the heart-chilling war whoop” made one officer jump “for his sabre, yelling 
‘Apaches, by God!’” The order “to arms” was shouted from a dozen different throats 
and in few minutes time the troops advanced “against the enemy.” What they found 
were frantic U.S. Army indigenous soldiers. After coming across bears these soldiers 
had fired the shots and made the noises, and now they tried to “convey the intelligence 
to the officers” that “their exertions were unnecessary,” the newspaperman wrote. 
Discovering their error, the disappointed officers slowly and silently returned. Having 
anticipated a fight with the Apaches they were so utterly upset and ashamed that all 
“exacted a promise of absolute silence in the matter.” Although the newspaperman 
considered it just a “ludicrous incident” of army life, this episode highlights the white 
army mentality towards the Apaches. It demonstrates how officers and soldiers not only 
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regarded Apaches as their enemy but also proves how their mindset was occupied by 
fear, frustration, embarrassment, and the desire to use force.3 
This chapter continues to map white army people’s imperial meaning-making by 
examining the strategies and reasons behind their construction of the Apaches as the 
colonized other; the antithesis of whiteness and the main enemy of the U.S. regime in 
the Southwest. It is interested in why and how army people singled out the Apaches and 
created certain regimes of truth about them; what was the nature of those “truths,” and 
what imperial agendas did they serve? Furthermore, in order to demonstrate how 
Apaches were made special in army discourses, this piece applies a comparative 
framework by discussing army representations of the Akimel O’odham, a Southwest 
indigenous group known to nineteenth-century white colonizers as the Pimas. Third, the 
chapter tackles the connections between army’s making of Apaches and acts of 
governing (war of “pacification” and reservation management) targeted against the 
Apaches. Many studies of colonialism have shown a direct linkage between the 
construction of knowledge about subject peoples and the imposition of control over 
them.4 Often knowledge and actions evolved in a symbiotic relationship feeding each 
other. The experiences and practices in governing fueled certain types of 
representations, whereas colonizers’ stories revealed what was imaginable in terms of 
colonial policy, what actions were seen as possible and logical, and what were 
disqualified from the realm of possibility.  
Since this chapter deals with representations and images and their relationship 
with acts of colonial violence and government, it mainly concerns white army men and 
women and not the Apaches. In fact, army discourses pretty much bury Apache side of 
the story in colonial imagination, from which its recapture can be a difficult task. Still, 
in many ways Apache viewpoints and activities, the subaltern voice, function as 
sobering and critical counter-images to the colonial production of the other, and thus 
deserve some attention even in a piece that is about colonizers discourses and 
government.  
 
                                                 
3
 For the Cloverdale episode, see Michael M. Rice, ”Across Apache Land,” in Cozzens, Eyewitnesses, 
504-506. 
4
 See, for instance, Tim Rowse, White Flour, White Power: From Rations to Citizenship in Central 
Australia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
 74 
4.1 Constructing Apaches as the Enemy of Whiteness 
When reading army texts it quickly becomes evident that white army people 
considered Apaches important. Although, in general, officers’ wives wrote more of 
housing, domestic life, and leisure, for most officers and enlisted men the Apaches 
proved their most popular topic. It seems that everyone pretended to be an expert in 
Apache affairs. The titles of professional or newspaper articles and even memoirs the 
army people wrote confirm the preoccupation with the Apaches.5 No other Southwest 
indigenous tribe came close to receiving the same amount of army attention. Neither did 
the white or Hispanic residents. In fact, officers and enlisted men did not write nearly as 
much of each other than they did of the Apaches. It tells volumes of the level of their 
interest that some army men, and a few women, became so obsessed with Apaches that 
they saw some where there were not any. They, for instance, rather commonly labeled 
Yavapais as Apaches.6  
The reasons why no other group captured so much space in army texts or held 
such a prominent role in army imagination as did the Apaches are linked to struggles for 
geopolitical power. Clearly, army men’s attention was on conquest and warfare. After 
all, the army’s principal mission was to achieve the monopoly of violence in southern 
Arizona and New Mexico for the U.S. regime. Apaches, in army minds, represented 
competition. Although, as several historians have noted, indigenous peoples never 
posed a serious threat to national security and the United States never needed to mount a 
full-scale war by calling up millions of volunteers, the situation looked less evident, and 
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more frustrating for the army, at the local level.7 Army personnel believed that it was 
the Apaches who in fact ruled the borderlands, having already stalled the advance of 
one European regime, the Spanish, and now possessing the potential to deter another 
empire. If not for the U.S. Army, some of its men imagined, the Southwest would 
forever remain in Apache hands.8  
In order to replace them as the dominant group, white army people sought to strip 
the Apaches of all their authority. They constructed categories of difference that 
undermined everything about the Apaches, their personal character, culture, and way of 
life. Army discourses of Apaches should be read as army’s efforts to establish the 
Apaches difference and as attempts to increase the army’s power over people 
categorized as “Apaches.” White army people hoped to identify Apaches as a separate 
warrior race with particular moral, cultural, and physical attributes. They sought to 
produce Apache society as rootless, backward, and oppressive towards women, and 
Apache appearance as uncivilized. They also tried to depict Apache character as lowly 
and predatory, Apache reign as illegitimate and destructive, and Apache way of war as 
unmanly and abnormal. Army people’s goal was to make U.S. conquest appear less 
violent and more right and desirable. They wanted to produce an image of themselves as 
righteous liberators, or saviors of the Southwest, by casting the blame for colonial 
violence on the Apaches. As the military subjugation of the Apaches turned out to be a 
prolonged task that lasted for decades, and as white army men grew to realize their own 
limitations in colonial warfare, their representations became more sour and vicious, so 
that in the end the army represented Apaches as almost sub-human racial enemy; the 
enemy of whiteness.  
It needs to be noted that army actions and thinking were not straitjacketed by any 
strict federal policies. Indeed, as historian Robert Wooster discovered, the army and the 
government conspicuously failed to formulate an overall policy for dealing with the 
Indians during the post-Civil War era. The army’s commanders were busy with inner 
rivalries and uninterested in indigenous conflicts which they rarely regarded as “real” 
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wars (understood as conflicts against and between European powers).9 Thus officers at 
the local level not only enjoyed considerable leverage in how they orchestrated army 
campaigns and colonial violence but also had the freedom to imagine the character of 
their enemy. Furthermore, it is obvious that the military did not invent the Apaches 
anew, but that the borderlands had a long tradition of hating the Apaches. A cycle of 
trading and raiding had made the indigenous and Spanish/Mexican peoples not only 
familiar with each other but often also suspicious and hateful. Spanish/Mexicans 
throughout the region often viewed the Apaches as their enemy, as did many of the 
Pueblos, Akimel O’odham, Tohono O’odham, and others.10 However, it is almost 
impossible to assess how much the army people knew or cared of these traditions, many 
circulated by non-English speaking peoples. Many white civilians also advocated the 
subjugation (some even the extermination) of all Apaches. Although army men and 
women realized this, many of them despised the civilians and thus did not necessarily 
hold the civilian opinion in high value. In all, when examining army representations it is 
good to keep in mind that the Apaches, as the most powerful of the region’s inhabitants, 
had long caused others to fear and hate them. It is this tradition that the white army 
people, consciously or not, continued and rewrote. 
 
4.1.1 Apache Society 
Conquest usually demands that the invaders pay some attention to the enemy 
society. In the Apache case most white army people often had few opportunities to 
observe the life of free Apaches. Only those stationed in or near reservations could gain 
some knowledge of the Apache society in its captive state. Others often relied on a 
combination of rumors, hearsay, and imagination. Still, the army story is surprisingly 
coherent. Seeking to affirm their own identity as “civilized people,” white army people 
stressed how different, uncivilized, and backward the Apache society was, how it 
differed from white middle-class tastes and standards. One strategy army people applied 
was to represent Apaches as nomads and vagabonds who aimlessly wandered the 
Southwest. Army texts used phrases like “roamed around” to describe Apache 
existence. They also referred to Apaches as gypsies of the Southwest, “Arabs of 
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Arizona,” and “the vagrants among Indians.”11 While choosing to emphasize nomadism, 
army people built on an established Euro-American colonial tradition. By the 1800s, 
historian John Noyes writes, labeling peoples as nomads functioned as a global vehicle 
for differentiation; for creating, managing, dislocating, and dispossessing indigenous 
peoples and legitimizing control over space. As nomadism signified unmediated 
response to land by people occupying a barbaric limit of civilization, characterizing 
Apaches as nomads made them uncivilized people whose rights for their land could be 
simply ignored because they did not use the land “properly.”12  
Importantly, to qualify as nomads Apaches were not supposed to farm, establish 
“proper homes,” or, most significantly, show signs of attachment to any particular 
place. Thus, for example, Apache farming is strongly de-emphasized and often omitted 
in military narratives even when officers personally saw or destroyed Apache fields.13 
In army minds Apaches might have “favorite haunts,” but no specific area they would 
call home. Furthermore, in army texts Apache villages amounted to rude and disorderly 
congregations of brush shelters covered with leaves and grass. Called “wicky-ups,” 
these dwellings supposedly failed to reach the standards of proper homes. To prove 
their point that Apache life was rootless and crude some wrote that the Apaches lived 
like wild animals in their “holes in the ground.”14 In reality, many Apaches, though not 
all, combined farming with hunting and gathering. Some even raised a surplus of corn 
and wheat which they traded with the Yavapais who did not farm.15 Apache homes, 
both the circular dome-shaped “wickyups” and the more rare conical tepees, were often 
practical and well-built centers of Apache life, suited for the climate and terrain. 
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Apaches, living in small kin-based groups, spent most of their time in restricted areas 
moving relatively short distances according to seasonal food sources and temperature 
changes in the lowlands and the mountains. They left their homes only for larger 
meetings and some ceremonies, trading, and raiding/war. Emotionally Apaches were 
strongly connected to their home areas, which often held spiritual meaning for them. 
Apaches certainly were no restless wanderers and the notion of Apaches aimless 
nomadism should be understood as a product of the army imagination, a vehicle in the 
army’s effort to establish the Apaches otherness.16  
In addition to nomadism, army people used personal appearance as a vehicle in 
the construction of difference. While nomadism supposedly symbolized undeveloped 
connection to the land, appearance in part revealed the Apaches primitive state and taste 
and their brutal character. Apache body painting was collectively condemned and feared 
by army people who made it a symbol of radical animal-like otherness. For instance, 
one army wife dubbed the Apaches as “horrible” men “painted to look uglier than 
nature made them, with their dreadful sheaves of arrows on their cruel faces.”17 In a 
letter home one army surgeon wrote that “I hate them [Apaches] already, they are a 
mean vicious set, I know by their looks they are not to be trusted.”18 Apache styles, 
which defied Euro-American taste, confused and repulsed army people. For example, 
when Apache men combined necklaces of bright beads or silver coins and little shells 
with shawls wrapped around their heads like turbans, skins, moccasins, cast-off military 
drawers, and shirts, of which some were worn like a blouse, it all proved a too weird a 
mix for white army people to make sense of. Moreover, “Apache nakedness,” which 
usually meant a limited use of Euro-American type of clothing, signified primitiveness 
and danger in troubled army minds.19  
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Depictions of Apache gender roles also served to justify U.S. conquest. In a 
typical army view Apache society relied on women’s constant laboring because the men 
were supposedly naturally inclined to avoid “real work.” Army people made the Apache 
gender roles the exact opposite of the late nineteenth-century white middle-class ideals, 
which valued men’s work outside the home and defined women’s life to the domestic 
sphere where the “fragile ladies” were ideally aided by servants. In army discourses, 
Apache men, in possession of “tyrannical” domestic powers, forced their women to 
build and maintain camps, chop and carry wood, get water, cook, tan hides, take care of 
the children, and to produce textiles, while men themselves only “loafed around.” 
According to one officer, every day for an Apache woman “is a life of toil and 
drudgery, and woe to the woman who refuses to perform her appointed task” as she will 
meet the fury of her husband.20 Furthermore, the army wrote that the perverse Apache 
society degraded women not only as laborers but as commodities that the men could 
purchase for the price of few horses. When adding that Apache men’s “uncontrolled” 
sexual drive also subjected the women to the “unnatural” practice of polygamy army 
people depicted Apache men as the sole cause for what was wrong with Apache gender 
roles.21 In reality, Apache society was matrilineal, and women owned the homes, 
controlled much of the property, and held great influence in the household. When a man 
married he often moved to live with the family of his wife and was expected to be 
respectful and work hard for his new in-laws. Lazy men were not tolerated. Also, 
polygamy was the exception, oftentimes resorted to by men of high status or forced by 
warfare which caused a shortage of men. Even then the men usually could not choose 
their brides but had to marry their first wife’s sister.22 
Although army men portrayed Apache women as hapless victims who yearned, 
perhaps unconsciously, for civilization to rescue them, army men were also careful to 
protect their own status and whiteness by keeping Apache women at arm’s length. In a 
region short on white women, and army villages abounding with bachelors, most 
enlisted men and officers remained silent on the sexual attractiveness of Apache 
women. It was obviously a taboo subject. Those who discussed the matter resorted to 
various representational strategies for establishing the sexual undesirability or 
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unavailability of Apache women. Some wrote them off as born murderers who hated the 
whites and thus could not be approached or trusted, while others emphasized Apache 
women’s unavailability by writing of their chastity and the absence of prostitution and 
adultery in Apache society.23 Still others represented all Apache women as hideous 
creatures. For instance, one army paymaster noted that the vast majority of Apache 
women he met did not make “a second look necessary or desirable.” Some of them, the 
paymaster continued, might present a little attraction to “a backwoodsman, a Mexican 
greaser,” or a post cattle herder, but never to a civilized middle-class man.24  
Like in many colonial settings, in the case of army men and Apache women the 
true nature of intimate relations remains difficult to uncover. What is known is that 
some Apache women served the officers and their wives as housekeepers or nursemaids 
and that sometimes officers and soldiers mingled with Apache women in dances and 
other social events. According to one officer’s wife, in these events young lieutenants 
could express interest in “the prettiest” Apache women, trying to offer them trinkets, 
beads, mirrors, and boxes of soap to “gain their favors.” She thought the women cared 
more for Apache men although they accepted the presents given by the officers.25 Also, 
it was rather common at some locales where the government had concentrated Apaches 
that both Apache men and women visited the nearby army villages and sometimes even 
the households of officers. Some army wives, for instance, complained that their 
privacy was invaded by the unwelcome intruders. One nervous woman wrote that 
whenever Apaches stared through her windows “I would move away at once, out of 
range of their wondering eyes. I could not endure to be watched so curiously.” An 
officer thought that the army villages seemed to present never-ending attraction for 
Apaches, who “hang about all day, picking up anything that is thrown to them, will 
shovel snow, bring wood, or hay, or any such work, a whole day for a pint of corn, and 
seem perfectly satisfied with that.” Obviously, if poverty drove Apaches to perform all 
these odd jobs in army villages for a small amount of corn, the possibility that some 
white army men exploited Apache women by offering them money, food, or other 
rewards in exchange for sex should not be excluded. In some places, all Apaches were 
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required to vacate the army villages and stay outside their limits from dusk till dawn.26 
Perhaps this was a safety measure against violence but also against possible sexual 
encounters. Whatever the reason, the opportunity for sexual encounters definitely 
existed between army people and the Apaches, although army discourses liked to paint 
Apaches as unsuitable partners for “civilized” white people. 
 
4.1.2 Apache Rule 
“What part of the country was not occupied by the reptiles and cactus seemed to 
be…well held down by the ubiquitous and perniciously active Apache,” one officer 
wrote in the late 1860s.27 In army narratives southern Arizona and New Mexico was an 
“Apache paradise,” but Apache rule was supposedly nothing but a “reign of terror.” 
Army texts portrayed the Apache regime as the opposite of what they thought the U.S. 
rule stood for. Apache reign was represented as a dreadful nightmare that had lasted for 
centuries ruining every interest for the development of the country. Apaches, army 
people continued, had not established anything worthwhile. They had built no 
monuments to celebrate their control, nor kept any records “except those written in the 
blood of many people,” an officer wrote. In army minds the main reason for the 
dreadful nature of the Apaches time in power was the character of Apache men who 
were purportedly nothing but “savages,” “murderers,” or “red-handed thugs, marauders, 
and assassins.” It seems as if most white army people felt the same way, so similar is 
their message. Free Apaches symbolized murder and mayhem, uncontrollable rage and 
cruelty. Some army men claimed that Apache men were consumed by hatred, others 
defined them as “cruel, crafty, and wary,” “absolutely wild,” famous for “treachery and 
cruelty,” or people who delighted “in lying and deception.” One army man was certain 
that “truth was not in them [Apaches].”28 
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Thus, while white soldiers and the officers and their wives all made the Apaches 
the dominant force in the Southwest, they also not only represented Apache rule as a 
destructive form of government, but made Apache men colonial villains. In army 
narratives Apache men were rarely individuals or rational actors but rather a uniform 
mass of treacherous, deceiving, hateful, and cruel murderers. They represented 
humanity in its most vicious, dangerous, and unpredictable state. Apache men were 
incapable of creating any sort of civilization and unfit to govern anything, the army 
claimed. They were the white army people’s other, their binary opposite and the 
antithesis of white manliness and civilization. When producing this kind of discourses 
army men claimed honesty, rationality, and fairness as the sole possession of whites, 
unattainable by the free Apaches.  
In their effort to distance the Apaches to the lowest rungs in the colonial 
hierarchies some white army people went even further. One strategy they applied was to 
represent Apache men not just as any murderers but as a distinct warrior race whose 
love of strife and bloodshed was inborn and instinctive. First of all, in these narratives 
aimless and brutal warfare stood out as the sole and “natural” purpose of Apache life, its 
only meaning and goal. Apaches’ “position towards any outsiders” was “constant 
unrelenting war,” was the opinion of some army men, while others added that “war was 
his [Apache’s] business, his life and victory his dream.” Still another officer wrote that 
it was “difficult to realize that there could be any of the Apache tribe who were friendly 
to anybody.”29 If, in army eyes, the army did not seek to harm anyone who “did not 
deserve it,” then the Apaches were again its opposite, a group whose instincts and 
impulses made them wage constant war against all mankind. Importantly, army 
discourses produced the Apaches as a racial enemy, “the natural and hereditary enemies 
of the whites,” as one officer wrote.30 
 Furthermore, as a distinct warrior race, a number of army people asserted, the 
Apaches belonged to the realm of nature. Some army men tried to argue that Apaches 
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were so different that they hardly qualified as humans anymore. In their thinking 
Apaches behaved like animals and possessed powers and abilities that did not belong to 
men but to animals. Apaches were supposedly able to, for instance, sneak, hide, and 
vanish from the face of the earth, or turn indistinguishable from the color of the rocks. 
Some compared Apaches to snakes, both being supposedly always ready to strike.31 
Others asserted that Apaches “stalked” their prey, “the unsuspecting and innocent” 
white settlers, travelers, or miners, like “wild beasts.”32 Still others believed that the 
Apaches could “scent danger,” be “tireless” when pursued, or unaffected by change 
from snow-covered mountains to parched sand deserts, and able to travel from fifty to 
seventy miles on foot on any day.33 When white army people portrayed Apaches as 
more animal than human they also used expressions such as “bucks” or “wolves” to 
describe Apache men.34 Some did not hesitate to call Apaches “bestial savages” and 
“brutal beasts.” White army people ended up representing the Apaches as an enemy 
who had lowered themselves to the level of their surroundings, becoming a part of 
nature. Whites, on the contrary, were supposedly above nature, seeking to control and 
use it. Therefore, in army reasoning, the power of the Apaches ultimately equaled that 
of wolves or bison, and could be nullified for the sake of a higher civilization and a 
superior white race.  
Although many of the white army community recognized few differences 
between the various Apache groups, and constructed a monolithic image of Apache 
murderers and beasts, some singled out the Chiricahua Apaches, the last to resist the 
U.S. in the 1880s, as the “elite” of the Apaches. Army cast the Chiricahuas as better 
warriors than the others, more independent and skilled at operating in the borderlands 
environment. These army narratives did not see the Chiricahuas as a more honest, fair, 
or honorable Apache tribe, however, but dubbed them as “the wildest and fiercest,” and 
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“the most bloodthirsty of all the Indian tribes,” so “savage and brutal by instinct” that 
they “hesitated no more at taking human life, when excited by passion, than in killing a 
rabbit.” Thus in army logic the “best” Apaches were the worst human beings. When 
ranking its enemy, the army made its purportedly most formidable and skilful adversary 
the “worst of the worst,” the “tigers of the human race,” as one officer called the 
Chiricahuas.35 With a sense of irony one Chiricahua wrote of white attitudes towards his 
people: “We were described as being as dangerous men as the world had ever 
produced.”36 
If the Chiricahuas were a “special group” for some army men, select Apache 
leaders like Cochise, the Chokonen (Chiricahua) Apache, also captured a formidable 
place in the army imagination. Cochise in army texts was both a man of high quality, 
“every inch a man,” and “very much like any statesman,” and a “wily, cruel, and 
bloodthirsty” murderer, a wild and desperate warrior who had “waged a relentless war 
upon all whites.” For some, Cochise represented the ultimate savage. One army wife 
saw that Cochise was the “more savage chief” of “the savage Apaches.”37 After 
Cochise, who died on his reservation in 1874, Victorio and Geronimo, both also 
Chiricahuas, received most attention in army writings. Like Cochise, Victorio was 
viewed as a murdering statesman. He allegedly “ran a bloody trail across” Arizona and 
New Mexico and “treachery, cunning, and cruelty seemed stamped upon his face.” Then 
again, some army men described Victorio as “a good man who was troubled for his 
people,” a man of great personal courage, and a superb tactician in war.38 However, it 
was Geronimo who personified the Apache warlord for a number of army people. 
Geronimo was hated by officers who painted him as a “ruthless marauder” guided by 
“warlike instinct.” Geronimo supposedly saw all whites as enemies and “left a trail of 
blood behind” him wherever he went. Although he died as an old man in captivity in 
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1909, for many Geronimo remained a cruel beast to the end. “Until death stilled the 
heart of that savage breast, his black, beady eyes still flashed hatred for the white 
people,” one soldier claimed.39 
In general, officers produced highly subjective representations of Apache leaders, 
as they did of Apaches in general, to strengthen their own perceived superiority. While 
army narratives gave men like Victorio, Cochise, and Geronimo certain status, they also 
made them cruel predators and thus much like all other Apache men. Unlike the Apache 
masses, however, in army narratives Cochise, Victorio, and Geronimo were marked as 
the parties most responsible for the nature of Apache rule, and thus cast in the role of 
main villains in the play that was U.S. colonialism. For example, many army men 
blamed Cochise personally for a decade of warfare, whereas close to 5,000 army men 
projected all their anger and bitterness towards Geronimo in the mid-1880s when 
chasing him and his small group across the borderlands. Moreover, although it is logical 
that the army men wrote most of Apaches who for years warred against the U.S., it is 
still notable that in comparison almost nothing was written of men of equal stature who 
did not fight the U.S. The lives of Cochise, Victorio, and Geronimo, and thus the whole 
Apache leadership the army cared to register, often seemed to have any meaning only 
when set against U.S. expansion.40 
 
4.1.3 The Apache Way of War 
Like their representations of Apache society, rule, and character, the white army 
people’s portrayals of the Apache way of war were primarily about creating and 
maintaining distance between the white army society and the Apaches. Frustrated by 
their own shortcomings in colonial warfare and needing further assurance of their own 
superiority and that it was right to take the Apaches land, white army people set out to 
prove that the Apache way of war was at its core an abnormal and even unmanly 
practice that stood against “civilized” principles. For one thing, the Apaches supposedly 
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did not have “proper” war aims and motives. For some army men the overall Apache 
objective was stealing, while others saw general destruction as the Apaches’ only goal; 
the burning of houses, killing of stock, and ”slaughter of everything human.”41 As a rule 
army men failed to publicly recognize that the Apaches in reality resorted to armed 
violence to preserve their geopolitical power and self-government, to defend their 
homes, families, and lands, to battle starvation, and to gain freedom from persecution. 
As far as the army was concerned the Apaches also did not fight “right,” but their 
methods equaled mere murder, ambush, and assassination. There supposedly was 
nothing honorable or courageous in their conduct. Apaches gave no quarter nor fought 
“bravely” in the open, but “would prefer to skulk like the coyote for hours and then kill 
his enemy, or capture his herd,” an officer claimed. According to another officer, the 
Apache “mode of warfare was peculiarly his own…His creed was ‘fight and run away, 
live to fight another day.’ To fight soldiers merely in defense of his country, he 
considered height of folly; and he never committed that folly if he could avoid it.” Still 
another officer thought that when compared to Apaches, even the Plains Indians were 
“knightly” in their warfare.42  
What most annoyed white army men, however, was not the seemingly 
unorthodox fighting methods or lack of “civilized” war aims but the fact that the 
Apaches made the army men look bad. The main problem from the white soldiers or 
officers’ perspective was that the Apaches moved too quickly: they seemed to be always 
fleeing and never stopping to fight it out. ”When they fought, they struck and ran, hid 
and struck and ran again. The band closely pursued scattered like quail, and like quail 
they had only to drop to the ground to disappear,” an officer wrote.43 Describing a 
common turn of events, one enlisted soldier complained that the Apaches “lead us a 
merry chase for two weeks or more, doubling and twisting along the backbone of the 
various mountains, occasionally descending into valleys to make a killing of some 
defenseless Mexican miner or rancher, and to kill a beef and to steal fresh horses…At 
                                                 
41
 Davis, Truth about Geronimo, 7. See also Parker, Old Army, 154-156, 165; Loring, “Report,” 185; 
Howard, Famous Indian Chiefs, 115; Sweeney, Making Peace, 31; Reeve, “Soldier’s Memoirs,” 116, 
124; Ellen McGowan Biddle, Reminiscences of a Soldier’s Wife (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 
1907), 155-156; Splitter, ”Tour in Arizona,” 80, 81, 83; Gustafson, John Spring’s, 104; Bigelow, On the 
Bloody Trail, 14; Howard, Famous Indian Chiefs, 114. 
42
 Davis, Truth about Geronimo, 74; Carter, From Yorktown, 252-253; John G. Bourke, An Apache 
Campaign in the Sierra Madre (1886; reprint, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1987), 34-36. 
43
 Cruse, Apache Days, 187. See also Davis, Truth about Geronimo, 53, 76; Forsyth, Thrilling Days, 80; 
Leonard Wood, Chasing Geronimo: The Journal of Leonard Wood, May-September 1886, Jack Lane ed. 
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1970), 59; Reeve, “Soldier’s Memoirs,” 113.  
 87 
times we were so close to them that we found their camp fires still burning; again they 
would lead us by a considerable number of miles. There was no way of heading them, 
as their direction and destination were unknown; all we had to do was to patiently 
follow on the signs they left in their wake.”44  
In circumstances like these white soldiers engaged in numerous futile chases, 
often only embarrassing and exhausting themselves. They frequently could not even 
locate the enemy let alone force the Apaches to fight. Apache warfare, a soldier wrote, 
turned out to be “like hunting for the proverbial ‘needle in a haystack.’”45 Even when 
they caught the enemy there was a great possibility that the soldiers either ran into an 
ambush or were powerless to prevent the Apaches from escaping at will. While officers 
liked to claim that standing battles would destroy the Apaches, the large majority of 
actual engagements between the troops and the Apaches were quick skirmishes, which, 
according to one captain, consisted of ”a few seconds of hot, blasting, exciting work, 
rapid shots and shouts, a rush of terrified squaws, a whiz of two or three wildly aimed 
arrows, a dash through the huts and a firing chase into the ravine beyond, in which we 
were soon left hopelessly behind, shots of pursuers and pursued gradually dying 
away.”46   
White officers and soldiers were poorly prepared for warfare in the Southwest. 
Upon graduating officers trained in the military academy at West Point knew little of 
the field army, the West, and even less about fighting indigenous tribes. Training at the 
academy had a technical base, with a smattering of the liberal arts, but very little tactics 
or strategy and practically nothing on colonial warfare. Officers were expected to learn 
their trade in the field.47 White enlisted men were also unprepared for warfare in the 
West. Their backgrounds - many were working class urban dwellers or recent 
immigrants - did not make them ideal fighters in the colonial terrain. Also, after 
recruiting, soldiers received hardly any training but had to learn to fight the hard way: in 
the field in Apacheria.  
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One historian argues that the officers’ sympathy for the terrible plight of the 
Indians made them think that warfare against them lacked all glory.48 It seems that in 
the U.S.-Apache wars poor performances in the field rather than any sympathy for the 
Apaches led the officers to this conclusion. When facing the Apaches the confidence of 
white soldiers slowly eroded. Army men, many of whom regarded the battles and 
armies of the Civil War as the standard, complained that the chasing, waiting, hiding, 
and ambushing of U.S.-Apache wars was degrading and mere brutal banditry. The 
whole business lacked easily understandable concentrations of troops, front lines, clear 
divisions between combatants and “civilians,” open confrontations, or strict European-
style tactics and strategies. Instead, colonial war in the Southwest proved a dismal 
succession of inglorious days devoted either to futile searches or to guarding of strategic 
water holes and mountain passes. During the latter, whiskey, not Apaches, proved often 
the most formidable enemy, as one scholar noted. The whole affair seemingly had little 
or nothing to recommend it. One enlisted soldier judged the conflict to be far from a 
civilized war, whereas for an officer it all was “a wild, vigorous experience-less like 
soldiering than any service I ever encountered.”49 Others doubted if there was any glory 
to be won in this “savage” warfare. Many of the army might have agreed with an 
enlisted man who stated that “it was not a war to be proud of. Neither officers or men 
were very happy over it.”50 
Several officers grew to dislike field service, wanting to have nothing to do with 
it. For example, one officer declared that he desired “post duty & a chance to study,” 
rather than spend futile days campaigning.51 There were those soldiers who became 
complacent about the whole deal, not giving much effort or placing much importance in 
catching any Apaches. “We are out on what is supposed to be a scouting expedition, 
but…we are not going to put ourselves out of the way much to hunt for them 
                                                 
48
 Paul Andrew Hutton, Phil Sheridan and His Army (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1985), 145-
146. 
49
 E.A. Bode, A Dose of Frontier Soldiering The Memoirs of Corporal E.A. Bode, Frontier Regular 
Infantry, 1877-1882, Thomas T. Smith ed. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), 145; King, “On 
Campaign,” 163; Kim Allen Scott, “’Whiskey is the Most Formidable Enemy in this Campaign,’ Capt. 
Gustavus Cheney Doane’s Fight with Boredom and Vice during the Geronimo Pursuit,” Journal of 
Arizona History 48 (Spring 2007), 31-52. See also Leighton Finley papers, 1885 notebook, UASP; 
Chrisman papers, ASHS; Bigelow, On the Bloody Trail. According to one officer, the so called Victorio 
campaigns in 1879-1881 “resemble the operations of the cowboys and other bands of robbers on the 
frontier, or the parties of train-robbers in Missouri.” ARSW, 1881, 118. 
50
 ARSW, 1875, 122; Barnes, Apaches & Longhorns, 87. 
51
 James Worthington letters, ASHS. On officers’ frustrations, see also Bourke, Diaries, 81-82; Cruse, 
Apache Days, 128; Bigelow, On the Bloody Trail, especially 103; Pettit, “Apache Campaign Notes,” 532; 
Adna Chaffee papers, ASHS; Marian E. Valputic & Harold H. Longfellow, eds., ”The Fight at Chiricahua 
Pass in 1869,” Arizona and the West 13 (Winter 1971), 374, see also 378.  
 89 
[Apaches],” one enlisted man wrote. An officer who failed to find any signs of Apaches 
dryly noted that “I was so little surprised at the result of our search that I was scarcely 
annoyed at it.”52 Some white army people even dared publicly to question the 
competence of white soldiers in colonial warfare. They voiced what most army men 
already knew but did not care to emphasize: the Apaches were making a mockery of 
white troops. Some wrote that the troops “do not seem to be accomplishing anything,” 
others recognized that in their mode of warfare the Apaches were “more than equal to 
white men, and it would be practically impossible with white soldiers to subdue the 
Chiricahuas in their own haunts.” The officer who wrote the latter statement saw that 
regular white and black troops were helpless in pursuing the Apaches: “we cannot 
afford to fight them; we are too culpable, as a nation, for the existing condition of 
affairs.”53 This kind of thinking had the potential to place the superiority and privilege 
of whiteness in question. As self-doubt and frustration crept into army narratives, it 
proved a serious matter in a colonial system grounded on the rule of difference and the 
supposed superiority of the white colonizers. Most white army people did not go this 
far. They could not risk losing the sense of superiority they had constructed in relation 
to the enemy. Instead, they hurried to claim that statements questioning the overall 
competence of white manliness in colonial warfare were mere “bad rumors.” Many felt 
certain that as civilized men white soldiers and officers would in the end compel the 
“inferior” Apaches to submit. “As for Apaches or other Indians out-shooting, out-
marching, or out-stripping our men in the long race, I do not believe it,” one general 
wrote.54 
 
4.1.4 Fear of the Colonized 
Warfare against the Apaches made many white army men and women nervous 
and fearful. As one scholar of colonial culture and history has observed, colonial rule 
was frequently haunted by a sense of insecurity, terrified by the obscurity of native 
mentality and overwhelmed by indigenous societies’ apparent intractability in the face 
of government. Colonizers felt their power to be severely limited and inadequate, and 
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thus fear and paranoia guided their representations.55 Showing their nervousness troops 
in the field could start shooting at random against anything thought to be an Apache. 
Officers mistakenly shot their soldiers, different commands sometimes fired at one 
another, and some troops gunned wildlife or shadows and echoes in canyons thinking it 
was the Apaches.56 Moreover, the purportedly uncontrolled potency of Apache men was 
imagined as a serious threat for white army women. The army elite represented that 
sexual slavery, “fates worse that death,” awaited white women captured by Apache 
men. As a precaution some wives, when outside the army villages, carried weapons to 
defend themselves and to prevent the possibility of captivity. When their husbands were 
in the field some officers’ wives at the posts fell into a state of terror, fearing that 
Apaches would kill their husbands and then come for them.57 Some soldiers and officers 
also acknowledged that they were often afraid when having to engage the Apaches. “If 
you saw the Indian, you were probably in no great danger, whereas if you did not see 
them, you might be in the greatest danger,” one officer thought.58 Duties that included 
close supervision of Apaches were often described as the most dangerous work 
imaginable. There were those who were startled by the prospect of encountering large 
numbers of Apaches alone. For example, one soldier who drove a supply wagon 
between a field camp and a military post admitted that “I was terribly afraid to die.” He 
felt very much alone, especially at night, fearing that the Apaches would attack him.59  
Interestingly, army men and women did not feel safe in the army villages but 
feared a general Apache revolt. They imagined that Apache groups planned a large-
scale uprising that would bring together all the Apaches and perhaps also the Navajos 
and others.60 Although any general uprising was a real possibility only in the feverish 
army minds, the army people might have not realized this and in their discourses they 
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placed themselves on fragile ground, isolated, outnumbered, and destined for possible 
annihilation. Rumors that Apaches had left their reservation unauthorized, or had been 
seen in the vicinity of army villages led to insecurity, often causing a peculiar siege 
mentality. It was not uncommon, an army man told, that people did not dare “to go 
away from the Post half a mile. The Indians are all around and are liable to pop out from 
behind a stump or rock and shoot you at any moment. At some of the posts here they 
have a guard accompany the officers to the water closet [outhouse].” According to 
officer’s wife, “there might at any time be Indians lurking around, and it was not 
safe…Oh, those dreadful Indians. You know they were always lying-in-wait.” Later she 
confessed that “we never were attacked really, though we had more than one alarm. We 
were too cautious for them.” An enlisted man remembered that he and others in his 
company took “no chances with the Indians” and slept with their six guns fastened to 
their belts and carbines under their heads. They were so cautious that they even wore 
revolvers when going to the privy.61  
Touring the region in 1871, an army paymaster traveled from what he saw as one 
vulnerable army village to the next. For him the situation was especially serious at 
Camp Grant, where “one small company” of infantry, about 25 men was surrounded by 
900 Indians “full of treachery” and liable to “massacre the garrison at any moment.” 
The post was “at the mercy of the Apaches,” he wrote.62 In reality, although at times 
Apaches, or somebody thought to be Apaches, stole cattle near posts and fired scattered 
shots toward one, they almost never actually attacked. Probably the only attack 
happened during the 1881 Cibecue clashes against Fort Apache. So there were few 
precedents or facts to support this level of army anxiety.63 
It is significant that the very one-sided images of the Apaches the army produced, 
where the Apaches were constantly dehumanized and made some sort of monsters, 
brought the fractured army community closer together. Officers and their wives and the 
white enlisted men held similar views or constituted a united front. The common 
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Apache enemy functioned as a vehicle for cohesion among white army people divided 
by class lines. It is revealing that both the officers and white enlisted men liked to 
represent that the Apaches considered all whites, regardless of class, ethnicity, and 
gender, as their enemies. The Apaches were purportedly filled with such vicious racial 
hatred towards whites that they wanted to kill everyone they came across. “Once having 
shed the blood of a white man” the Apaches developed “an unquenchable desire” for 
murder and “wild craving for the blood of the whites,” some army men argued.64 
It is quite plausible that army people intentionally exaggerated the danger to 
emphasize the lowly character of Apaches and their own courage when facing 
“stressful” and “dangerous” circumstances. Producing discourses of fear would not only 
make the army people seem exceptionally brave, but the Apaches that much more 
horrendous, thus making their “punishment” more legitimate. On the other hand, self-
doubt could have made white army people so insecure that they really felt they had 
much to fear. No matter which reasoning holds more relevance, or if both do, what 
appears certain is that white impotence in colonial war, the difficulty of subduing the 
Apaches militarily, poisoned army discourses and made army men angry. That the 
Apaches refused to fight in the open and waged war so “unfairly” that “civilized” 
persons could not know when and where they executed their “cowardly” murders and 
assassinations made army people despise the colonized and created a strong desire to 
“teach the Apaches a lesson.” When army people established their “truth” of Apache 
society as backward and oppressive, made Apache character treacherous and cruel, 
Apache rule brutal terror, and way of war cowardly and uncivilized, it became possible 
for white army people to feel free and justified to use any amount of force against the 
Apaches. Because of the kind of imagery they had produced, white army men no longer 
had to treat Apaches as humans. They had made Apaches free game, blurring the 
Apaches humanity and masking the U.S. role as the aggressor. Frustrated by repeated 
failures in the field and by their fear of the colonized, white army men were ready to kill 
when they got the chance. 
 
4.2 Representing the Akimel O’odham  
For the army, the Apaches were special and unlike the other tribes they 
encountered in the Southwest. A short discussion of army representations of another 
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central Arizona tribe, the Akimel O’odham, or Pimas, demonstrates what in fact was 
special in army views of Apaches. It also highlights the impact failures and frustrations 
in warfare had on the mentalities of white army men and on the nature of discourses 
they produced. 
First, army writings of the Pimas, which amount to a mere fraction of the volume 
of text produced of the Apaches, constructed the Pima relationship with the whites 
through the medium of friendship and submission - not hostility, power, and savage 
brutality as was the Apache case. Army texts made Pimas a “non-hostile” and “friendly” 
tribe, who represented no competition for the U.S. regime. For instance, one officer 
declared that the Pimas were “our firm and trusty friends.” Others characterized the 
Pimas as the most respectable, intelligent, and hospitable people ready to assist anyone 
wearing the army uniform. An often repeated military narrative even claimed that the 
Pimas were most proud of the fact that they had never killed any whites. Whether true 
or not this comforting message was what defined the Pimas in the eyes of white army 
people.65  
Unlike the Apaches, the Pimas were represented as “semi-civilized.” They not 
only lived in “adequate” houses and were “agriculturalists” practicing sedentary 
farming, but were also “well dressed,” “fine looking,” honest, and well behaving. It was 
also important for the army narratives to cast the Pimas as victims of Apache cruelty 
and to portray Apaches and Pimas as “hereditary enemies.” This strategy was not meant 
to indicate similarity between the whites and the Pimas but to cement the universally 
wicked composition of the Apaches. It can be argued that on the hierarchies of racial 
and cultural difference army people viewed the Pimas as having a position somewhere 
between themselves and the Apaches. The army often represented the Pimas as 
unimportant, harmless, degenerate, and simple savages, easily controllable and 
permanently inferior to whites. Perhaps the Pimas were capable of integrating 
themselves into the lower levels of Hispanic or white society; but more likely, army 
people felt, they would vanish. As one army man put it, “Pima wants are simple, their 
hopes and ambition limited. Having practically reached their stage of advancement, 
passively waiting for the preordained degree, which will obliterate them from the 
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country, from which they have done almost nothing to develop, and in which they will 
leave no trace, or even rude monument as a record of their existence.”66 
In the end, Pimas served the army’s imaginative geography for two main 
purposes. As anti-Apaches, Pimas offered an example of Indians “welcoming” the 
Americans, recognizing their superiority and thus never resorting to violence, instead 
keeping out of the way. As victims of the Apaches, Pimas brought a sense of authority 
and righteousness to the army’s “othering” of the Apaches as the enemy of mankind.  
 
4.3 Violence: “Apaches Deserve Punishment” 
“Our officers are zealous and ambitious, and our men willing 
and courageous. It is only a question of time; the result is 
certain. Many times in the history of the world have small, 
determined bodies of men defied great nations, as did the pirates 
of the Mediterranean in the great Roman Empire, but all have 
met the same fate, and let us hope that in the end there may not 
be a single Chiricahua left in Arizona to perpetuate the 
memories of these bloody tragedies, or to incite other tribes to 
the butchery of the citizens who bring their lives and fortunes to 
swell the growth and prosperity of our great West.”67  
 
As the above text produced by a junior lieutenant demonstrates, army men not 
only believed in the use of force and in their own superiority, or represented victory 
certain in the end, but, when comparing Apaches to pirates, wanted to assure everybody 
that Apaches were the aggressors, who in their allegedly deep and vicious hatred of all 
white people foolishly defied “a great nation.” White army people claimed that the 
Apaches were the cause for violence, a threat and danger to all decent people and thus 
deserved and needed to be militarily subjugated. According to this army “truth,” the 
invading U.S. Army represented the aggressed (or the victims) and stood for peace and 
the righteous cause. Somehow the army completely forgot that they were invaders on 
Apaches’ land. 
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In army minds the Apaches had supposedly brought violence on themselves.68 
Apache aggression, the army claimed, had led to a situation where the life and property 
of white colonizers would never be safe and peace never possible as long as an Apache 
remained free. Apaches, the army logic went, would not accept peace if not compelled 
by force. Therefore the army created a fantasy that force alone would make the region 
and the Apaches peaceful: to establish peace, the army simply “had” to subjugate the 
Apaches. Army policy was, as one historian wrote, “to destroy off-reservation 
Apaches.”69 Few army men openly acknowledged that this was in any way wrong. In 
army thinking, violence against the Apaches was a necessity as Apaches needed to learn 
to know their place in the colonial hierarchies and to appreciate the strength and 
superiority of the whites. According to one officer, “the murderous devilish Indians 
would be cornered for the whipping they needed.” Apaches required “a lesson,” 
“chastisement,” or “punishment” to correct their “insubordination,” other officers 
claimed.70 What was needed, the army believed, was not simply to occupy certain areas, 
but to permanently paralyze the Apache capacity for military action and to prevent their 
free access to their homelands. A few officers reasoned that even the extermination of 
Apaches was a plausible option when “every other means fail to protect our people.”71  
To cement the distinction between the army and the Apaches and to further hide 
the army’s role as the invader and the aggressor, army discourses applied a specific 
rhetoric for describing Apache activity. In army texts Apaches engaged in “murderous 
raids,” in “outbreaks,” or went to “warpath,” while the army on the other hand always 
conducted more neutral “expeditions,” “operations,” “pursuits” or “campaigns.” Army 
also “hurried to the field,” set out “guard” or to “give protection” to some specific place, 
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and went “to capture” Apaches.72 The message is simple and easily detectable: Apaches 
equaled danger and savage aggression while army was in the right. Tellingly, to hide 
their guilt and even participation, the army people never spoke of U.S.-Apache wars, 
but instead wrote of “Apache problem,” or “Apache troubles.”73  
Furthermore, Apaches supposedly posed such a threat that all not living under 
U.S. supervision were categorized as “hostiles” in army writings.74 In practice, an 
Apache became a “hostile” the minute he or she was outside the reservation boundaries, 
except when working for the Americans. Apaches were so threatening and 
uncontrollable from the army’s perspective that even an infant or an elderly qualified 
for being labeled “hostile.” It is clear that Apache freedom is what “hostile” was all 
about when any free Apache was automatically “hostile” in white army eyes. The 
phrase “hostile Apaches” abounds in many army writings. Also, it is rather common 
that army texts leave out the word “Apaches” entirely and use only the term “hostiles” 
when referring to free Apaches. By labeling Apaches “hostiles” white army people 
criminalized and othered an entire people. They did this to further prove their point that 
war was the Apaches fault and to obscure the true horror of colonialism in which white 
colonizers were engaged. “Hostile” proved a useful vehicle when the army wanted to 
distribute guilt and validate its own actions and innocence. 
In their narratives white soldiers could criticize themselves for not killing enough 
Apaches. They could also claim that the destruction of a few Apaches was a great 
“success,” and the annihilation of whole Apache groups a cause for general rejoicing. 
One soldier, for instance, proudly wrote that an Apache “band simply ceased to exist” 
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after his troop completely “smashed” them.75 Upon hearing that a command had killed 
twenty-five Apaches, an officer wrote in his diary that “such good news served to 
enliven us all.”76 The army’s mentality reduced the Apaches to a status of free game. In 
his official report one general “encouraged the troops to capture and root out the Apache 
by every means, and to hunt them as they would wild animals.” Thinking that a warring 
Apache was nothing but “madness personified,” another officer, still blaming the 
Apaches, wrote that “exasperated, our senses blunted by Indian atrocities, we hunted 
them [Apaches] and killed them as we hunted and killed wolves.”77 In a peculiar 
manner some army writings turned violence into a good-spirited sport. Many enlisted 
men made it seem as if “hunting Apaches” was ideally something of a grand adventure, 
not the reality of frustrating chasing and skirmishing it often was. These “Apache 
hunts” ideally offered plenty of excitement for the “racially superior” whites. For 
example, one enlisted man remarked that his troop was “prepared for a little fun with 
the redskins, everybody being in anguish for an engagement.” Another man wrote that 
his “soul was thrilled at the prospect” of fighting the Apaches: “What were a few 
Indians as against the white man…here’s the real adventure at last.”78  
Blind to their own brutality, some officers and enlisted soldiers collected or 
purchased Apache scalps as souvenirs to be mailed back east or made into decorative 
articles such as lamp covers.79 Some even went after dead Apache bodies, seeing them 
as market commodities or as collectibles. One enlisted soldier told that when three 
Apache soldiers were hanged for taking part in “a mutiny,” he and two of his comrades 
tried to obtain their bodies, but found the graves empty. Two years later a post doctor 
revealed to this soldier the three skeletons he had missed. All were “neatly mounted” in 
the doctor’s cabinet. The doctor confessed that he had paid three soldiers $25 each for 
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digging the grave. “We enjoyed a good laugh over the incident after I recounted my part 
of the story,” the soldier wrote.80 Moreover, another soldier who had found a skeleton of 
an Indian in a cave some miles from a post, kept the skull in the telegraph office as a 
trophy, whereas a sergeant delivered the body of a dead Apache to a mercantile business 
in Prescott. While he received sixty dollars, which for him equaled several months 
wages, the corpse was placed on display in the store window.81 
Ultimately, the army’s greatness was measured by its capacity to destroy, 
although this destruction was camouflaged as the only way to counter the actions of a 
supposedly ferocious enemy and as a necessity for the advancement of freedom, 
prosperity, and civilization. This mentality that celebrated violence and the use of force 
ranged from the common enlisted soldier to junior officers and local commanders, and 
eventually all the way to Washington D.C. For instance, in 1881, the Commanding 
General William T. Sherman telegraphed to Arizona that “sooner or later some 
considerable number of these Apaches will have to be killed by bullets.”82 Soldiers 
directed their frustrations at whomever they could catch as long as they could be 
thought to fit the category of “Apache.” Often they caught nobody, but many times 
some unsuspecting Apache fell victim to army aggression. For example, at one time a 
lonely Apache women tending her stock was seized by a group of enlisted men. After 
two dismounted men “attacked her, front and rear” but were unable to capture her, 
another soldier threw a rope around the woman and dragged her behind his horse, 
shouting in his frenzy that “I’ll kill this one.” A noncommissioned officer, who saved 
the woman’s life, wrote that “the men were furious at the interruption to their sport. She 
was nearly dead. Her face was gashed; her arms were full of cuts, and her body was 
terribly bruised.” The woman was taken to the nearest post as a prisoner, her condition 
“explained as due to a fall.”83 An Apache informant tells a story of a Mescalero man 
who went into Fort Stanton on a promise of security. He was caught by the soldiers 
butchering hogs. Having a big kettle of boiling water, the soldiers threw the Apache into 
it. Apache narratives also tell stories where the soldiers directed their hatred towards 
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Apache babies by taking them by the heels and crashing their heads against wagon 
wheels.84 
During major army campaigns the troops who managed to engage the enemy 
were not shy at attacking sleeping villages, fields and other food sources, horses, and all 
material property. For example, the Tonto Basin offensive and its aftermath in 1872-74 
against Western Apaches and Yavapais held the characteristics of an indiscriminate 
genocidal war devastating numerous indigenous bands. Historian Timothy Braatz has 
accurately noted that the Tonto Basin campaigns “were one-sided, murderous 
onslaughts, carried out by well-armed and organized soldiers against scattered bands of 
malnourished and poorly armed families; the expeditions were not heroic, romantic, or 
admirable.”85 Murder and mayhem measured the success of these “killing expeditions,” 
as one army surgeon admitted they were.86 Another participant remembered that “as we 
entered Tonto Basin, no hunting was allowed, except for hostile Indians.” “Night 
marches were made to surprise the occupants about the break of day, when the killings 
were usually made. Women could not be distinguished from men at long range and 
especially when they had bow and arrow to take part in the fight.”87 In his diary of the 
campaign one officer spoke openly of the “extermination of hostile Apaches.” While 
being “afraid” to “miss much of the fun” if other commands found the enemy “earlier 
than we,” this officer hoped “to inflict upon the hitherto incorrigible Apaches a 
chastisement from the effects of which they can never recover.” He explained that “by 
sneaking upon them [Apaches] in the night we can, by good luck, make our attacks at 
day-dawn and kill their warriors whilst asleep” Looking forward to “big killings,” he 
also entertained the idea that “if we clean out the Tonto [a Western Apache group] this 
winter we shall give Cocheis [Cochise and his Chiricahua Apaches] hell in the 
spring.”88  
The most (in)famous episode of the Tonto Basin operation saw a group of 
Yavapai men, women, and children, mistaken by the army as Apaches, caught 
defenseless in a cave where they fell victims to an indiscriminate slaughter by the 
troops. “Never have I seen such a hellish spot as was the narrow little space in which 
the hostile Indians were now crowded…the bullets striking against the mouth of the 
                                                 
84
 Eve Ball, with Nora Henn and Lynda Sanchez, Indeh: An Apache Odyssey (Provo: Brigham Young 
University Press, 1980), 201. 
85
 Braatz, Surviving Conquest, 137. 
86
 Gressley, ”Soldier with Crook,” 40.  
87
 Corbusier, Soldier, 79. 
88
 Bourke, Diaries, 34, 37, 45-46. See also Crook, His Autobiography, 174-183. 
 100 
cave seemed like drops of rain pattering upon the surface of a lake,” one officer wrote at 
the scene. Approximately seventy-six Yavapais were killed in this Salt River Cave 
Massacre.89 Tellingly, troops universally celebrated this great slaughter, and 
characterized the event as “an important contribution” during which the army had 
delivered, in the words of one participant, “the most signal blow ever received by the 
Apaches in Arizona.” For one soldier the massacre represented “a fair sample of the 
work done by this Fifth Cavalry during their three and one-half years in Arizona.”90 
White army people had become so blinded by the vicious Apache imagery they had 
produced that they could not only inflict violence indiscriminately but also see Apaches 
where there were none. As said already, the troops present at the Salt River cave wrote 
and many historians since have believed them that they fought Apaches, whereas they 
in fact had engaged a group of Yavapais.91  
As in other occasions, the army refused to take the blame and made the killing of 
Apaches (and Yavapais) during the Tonto Basin campaign the fault of the Apaches: 
“Not one of the Apaches had been killed except through his own folly; they had refused 
to…come in; and consequently there had been nothing else to do but to go out and kill 
them until they changed their minds.”92 Army rhetoric claimed that the army had 
inflicted only “prompt chastisement” on the Apaches or that they had been “forced to 
submit to authority,” thus becoming “lately-hostile Apaches.” The army’s actions 
supposedly made “the condition of Arizona…more hopeful than at any former 
period.”93 
Officers and soldiers were so caught up in punishing the Apaches that they at 
times thought that the Apaches should be made to beg for peace, preferably to ask for it 
on their knees.94 During the Tonto Basin offensive some Apaches who wanted to 
surrender were not allowed access to reservations until they were considered thoroughly 
subjugated. One group was bullied into delivering the heads of some of their leaders to 
prove their “peaceful intentions.” The deal was that if the Apaches would kill their 
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leaders, then the “common Indians” of the band would be allowed to live. If not, all 
would be declared outlaws and never again permitted to surrender. As a result of this 
coercion, several decapitated heads were brought in, for which the army paid a bounty. 
Then the army placed the heads on display as trophies. In their narratives officers 
justified their actions by claiming they had wanted to avoid turning reservations into “a 
refuge for criminals” and thus had in fact acted to further the cause of peace and justice. 
From the army perspective, these Apaches were “wretches” with whom the military 
dealt justly. The Annual Report made the decapitated men into criminals who “after 
long careers of crime, met the fate they so richly deserved.” The report also assured that 
“there was no other way but to secure these outlaws at any price.”95 
White soldiers rarely admitted that their actions caused unjustified suffering to 
the Apaches. On the contrary, as seen, army people usually chose to emphasize Apache 
cruelties, omitting their own. For instance, one army wife wrote that “Arizona seemed 
to me a very burying-ground-a huge cemetery-for men and women killed by Indians.”96 
However, some army people pointed out that white greed, “the almighty dollar,” and 
desire for land or reservation mismanagement by civilian agents had contributed and 
increased the violence. Others saw that white civilians sometimes too easily blamed 
crimes committed by whites or Mexicans on the Apaches. “All the murders that 
occurred were attributed to the Apaches. A man could wear moccasins, kill his 
neighbor, and succeed in laying the blame on the dreaded Apaches.”97 Offering a very 
rare critical view, one enlisted soldier questioned the army’s actions. He saw that the 
“Indians got a raw deal” from the government who hunted them down and starved them 
on reservations. Obviously feeling guilty of what had happened, he protested that he 
should “have deserted the United States army and gone with the Apaches.”98 
From Apache perspectives the army acted at times like an indiscriminate killing 
machine seeking Apache extinction. Historical data seems to support the Apache case. 
Even the army’s own statistics demonstrate that the government killed 1,965 Indians 
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[mostly Apaches and Yavapais] in Arizona and New Mexico between 1866 and 1886. 
In comparison, only 127 enlisted men, some of them indigenous soldiers, and 10 
officers were killed by the indigenous forces. According to data collected from local 
newspapers, between 1866 and 1878 altogether 1,759 Apaches were killed in Arizona 
compared to 493 non-Apaches.99 While the numbers vary somewhat, the overall pattern 
is evident. Relatively few soldiers were killed by Apaches or other indigenous groups, 
whereas the Apaches, who probably numbered approximately ten thousand people in 
the mid-1800s, experienced massive devastation at the hands of the colonizers. The 
same happened to the Yavapais. In twelve years between 1863 and 1875 they lost all 
their territory in central Arizona and half of their total population.100 It is no wonder that 
some Apaches felt the intention of whites was genocide. Normal life for Apaches 
became filled with constant fear of attacks and killings. According to one Mescalero 
Apache, “Apache mothers quieted their children by telling them that the soldiers would 
find and kill them if they were noisy.” In these circumstances, “even babies dared not 
cry.”101 A close reading of army texts also shows how the alerted and suspicious free 
Apaches typically wanted to avoid all contacts with the white troops. They had good 
reason to suspect that the troops would want to hurt them.102  
Many Apaches were driven to violence by the colonial intrusion, by whites’ 
“mistaken” attacks against them, by the depletion of game and declining trading 
opportunities, or by indiscriminate war and reservation imprisonment. When a group of 
Apaches stole some cattle or supplies to cope with hunger caused by the U.S. invasion, 
the army, or the civilians, often retaliated against any group thought to be Apaches. The 
army also conducted “pre-emptive” strikes against those Apaches it imagined 
represented a threat to its power. All this enraged many Apache groups and shattered 
any trust they had in peaceful cooperation.103 For some Apaches submitting to colonial 
authority became an unthinkable option. If not destroyed by U.S. aggression, they saw 
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that what awaited them was a culturally destructive, dehumanizing, and poverty stricken 
existence on the reservations where outsiders increasingly controlled their lives. Often 
Apache parties who refused to live on the reservations had high percentages of women 
and children. For example, those Chiricahuas who left San Carlos on May 1885 had 92 
women and children and only 34 men.104 However, this gender imbalance did not 
prevent the whites from creating images of these parties as congregations of vicious, 
blood-hungry outlaws who had to be hunted like dangerous animals. The Annual Report 
in 1886 confirmed that “the chief object of the troops will be to capture or destroy any 
band of hostile Apache Indians found.”105 According to one Chiricahua, those who left 
the reservations regarded themselves dead already. They knew they were “doomed, but 
some preferred death to slavery and imprisonment.” Others felt more optimistic. “We’ll 
not be killed. We’ll be free. What is life if we are imprisoned like cattle in a corral. We 
have been a wild, free people, free to come and go as we wished. How can we be 
caged?”106 However, after 1886 there were practically no free Apaches left, all had been 
killed or “caged.” 
The army’s subjugation of free Apaches was linked to the vicious Apache 
imagery white army people had produced in their discourses. The army’s imagery of 
Apaches made it easier for them to not only use violence but to celebrate it. It made 
them feel justified in trying to crush all persons identified as free Apaches. This use of 
force, on the other hand, required the army to dehumanize their enemy, make them evil 
and deserving of violence. This vicious cycle, the army’s search for colonial power, 
devastated many Apache lives and ended their existence as free peoples. 
  
4.4 Imagining Apache Futures 
Following the use of force, some army personnel began to imagine futures for the 
“subjugated” Apaches living in captivity. Some white army people imagined that the 
Apache survivors, now that they had been “tamed” by violence, could possibly be 
“civilized.” This, they felt, would require the help and guidance of whites. As the 
military debated the future of Apache lives in their private and public writings, 
reflecting on the possibilities and pace of Apache progress towards modernity, they 
determined what was to be the normative life for the colonized Apaches. The basis of 
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this Apache “regeneration” was the premise that white American culture superseded all 
others and possessed inherent privilege.  
At first it must be pointed out that many white army men and women did not care 
much about Apache futures. Indeed, the majority of army writings pay no or only 
passing attention to this subject, and usually only the most high-ranking officers seemed 
to have much to say. This is interesting when one remembers that most army texts, 
especially those produced by men, contain ample discussions of Apache character and 
acts of war. Seemingly, the majority of the white army community lost interest after the 
Apaches ceased to be seen as a military threat. When stripped of their freedom and 
geopolitical power, the Apaches, in army eyes, seemed to belong to the Southwest’s 
inglorious and uncivilized past. Thus, concerning oneself with Apache futures would 
amount to a little more than a waste of time.  
Among those army people who wrote of Apache futures there were those doubted 
how wise it was to “civilize” the Apaches. They thought it best that the Apaches should 
remain cut off from the American society. Some justified their stance by claiming it was 
a waste of government money to try to “civilize” such a distinct race through forced 
alterations of their habits and lifestyles. “The Indians may possibly be civilized and 
Christianized in some measure, but they will all die in the process, as so many tribes of 
the human race before them,” wrote one general. Apaches supposedly simply lacked the 
ability to reach the levels of “civilization.” “They are savages, pure and simple,” an 
army man wrote. Even the more careful estimates warned that the process would take a 
long time and the army should not hurry.107  
Those who believed that “civilizing” Apaches was not only possible but the 
“right” thing to do often employed an ambivalent desire to justify conquest and 
colonization by seeing it as a civilizing mission offering backward peoples the benefits 
of the dynamic American culture. By utilizing concepts like primitiveness, 
backwardness, and underdevelopment some members of the army saw Apache present 
as white past. The question was how could the Apaches somehow gain momentum and 
reach the white present? All this makes the concept of time a vehicle of power, and 
Apache “liberation” a procession towards modernity. Somehow, the army divided 
Apache life into a native sphere, which consisted of Apaches’ “own” backward customs 
and practices and was something that should be erased once and for all, and a civilized 
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sphere, where logic and rationality introduced by the white colonizers replaced the 
indigenous order of things and directed Apache lives towards a more progressive future. 
 
4.4.1 Reservation Regeneration 
As segregated spaces, reservations functioned as the primary setting for Apache 
regeneration, which the army thought should be attempted through new forced regimes 
of work, leisure, worship, and celebration. Although reservation administration usually 
rested on the civilian agents of the Interior Department, army officers still controlled 
Apache reservations from time to time and thus had opportunities to put their visions 
into practice. Even when proclaiming, as one officer did, that the army’s guiding 
principle in Apache government was “justice to all,” it was the army leaders who 
dictated what this “justice” actually meant. As a rule, army personnel reserved agency 
and the capacity for rational action for themselves, while Apaches remained passive 
recipients guided by instincts. Apaches were “wards of the nation,” unfit for self-
government and unable to represent themselves. Their “regeneration,” the army 
planned, would result in time, and by most patient watchfulness and care.108 One officer 
wrote that because the Apaches had never been “domesticated” like the blacks and do 
not speak “our language” and are “ignorant of our manner of life,” they must be 
segregated and taught so that their interests become identical with the whites. After that 
they should get land in severalty and eventually the ballot, so that they might become 
politically equal.109 Most did not think that far ahead. They rather concerned that the 
Apaches immediately needed firm rules and authoritarian rulers who would dismantle 
their existing power hierarchies, cultivate a spirit of subordination through severe 
sentences and punishments, and exercise control over every sphere of life, thus making 
regeneration possible.  
In general, the officers knew nothing more suitable for strengthening the 
Apaches’ moral fiber and backbone than manual labor. According to one officer, 
“idleness was the source of all evils, and work was the only cure.”110 Even if officers 
themselves disliked manual labor intensely, it seems that they viewed it necessary for 
men of lower classes and inferior races. They not only wanted to make the Apaches 
work but also the white and black soldiers, as a later chapter of this study will 
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demonstrate. In officers’ thinking, manual labor was beneficial because it allowed the 
lower elements to learn their rightful place in the society. If not working in the army, 
Apaches usually engaged in agricultural work. They collected hay or raised crops, 
oftentimes under close white supervision. The big plan was to recast the Apache 
division of labor by placing men in farm work and women in the domestic sphere in 
accordance with the late nineteenth-century white middle-class ideals, and to encourage 
Apache participation in the market with their new produce. Many officers were absolute 
that Apache men “must be made to work” in order to become “industrious” and “hard 
working” individuals. According to one officer, work will ensure that Apache men “will 
drop from the list of worthless idlers and relieve the Government from the responsibility 
of caring for” them. The best way to get Apache men interested, officers imagined, was 
to offer them money and opportunities to spend it so they could see the benefits of their 
efforts.111 Although some Apaches had experience in raising crops, white military 
people ignored that knowledge as backward and obsolete when making farming a 
vehicle for their colonial vision.  
In addition to acquiring industrious habits, army people represented that the 
Apaches were to be taught reading and reason, to wear proper clothes, and to keep 
themselves clean. Ideally the Apache village was to be transformed from “chaotic and 
rude” to “orderly” by providing, an army man wrote, Apaches houses and beds to sleep 
in.112 Army officers in charge of Apaches thought they owned the Apaches time. They 
tried to regularize and reorder the everyday by deciding when Apaches were to work, 
when to receive rations, and how their public and private life was orchestrated. On the 
San Carlos reservation in the 1870s the Apaches were made to live in villages with 
regular streets. Every morning at seven, these villages were policed with the greatest 
care. The streets “were cleanly swept” and every Sunday there was an inspection to see 
that no garbage had accumulated and that the elevated beds and blankets were clean. 
Apaches were ordered to work details each morning, laboring in the fields or making 
adobe. Among other things the Apaches “planted fifty acres of land and made an 
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irrigating ditch five miles long to bring the water to their fields.” An officer wrote that 
the Apaches worked under best discipline, were “very happy and well behaved.” The 
officer was especially proud that his Apaches even learned to “always uncover the head 
when saluting a stranger.” Army men represented that the Apaches desired more work, 
wanting nothing so much than to work like the whites.113 To make this reorganization of 
Apache time and life function smoothly each Apache man at San Carlos was numbered 
and had to carry with him, day and night, his metal check, with the number and 
designation of his tribe stamped thereon. The officer in charge then had a corresponding 
record with the number of members in each family and a personal description of every 
man. This was the way the army controlled what every Apache did or did not do.114 
Besides work, army narratives focused heavily on two Apache customs that 
purportedly demonstrated the backward nature of Apaches’ life-ways: the practice of 
cutting the noses of adulterous wives and the brewing of indigenous “beer” called 
tiswin. In army texts, the nose cutting received no understanding and was ferociously 
attacked as “a mutilation,” “inhuman custom,” and a “cruel practice.” The military was 
“determined to put an end to” it by sentencing the perpetrators to the guardhouse. For 
army people nose cutting symbolized the supposedly despotic powers of Apache men 
over women. By putting an end to it army people hoped to curtail male domestic 
authority and win over the sympathies of Apache women, to convert the latter for the 
colonizers’ cause. What the army men ended up doing was getting themselves mixed in 
Apaches domestic disputes and insulting and infuriating Apache men who could not 
stand to be treated like children.115  
Tiswin manufacture the army also considered forbidden and detachments of 
troops again and again searched Apache camps and destroyed the supply, once again 
maddening many Apache men. Rising out of fear, the effort to terminate tiswin brewing 
was tightly connected to white prejudices against the indigenous consumption of 
alcohol. Army people widely believed that the Apaches would turn troublesome and 
uncontrollable at the moment they touched anything stronger than water. “Indians when 
sober may be managed, but with Indians drunk no one can predict the consequences,” 
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an officer stated.116 In their discourses army men made tiswin “a frightful intoxicant” 
and “a fearful sort of whiskey,” which supposedly produced “a drunk from which they 
[Apaches] scarcely recover in five days.” Army imagined that if allowed, the Apaches 
would “part with anything he may possess” to get tiswin and organize “drunken orgies” 
that would only result in fights and killings. Clearly, army men did not trust the 
Apaches to exercise self-control.117 Being oftentimes heavy drinkers themselves, army 
men forced temperance on the Apaches. Army’s logic held that it was necessary for the 
Apaches to refrain from drinking so that they might be able to rise in the hierarchies of 
civilization. In all, whites barely camouflaged their fears in the rhetoric of sobriety. 
Many recognized tiswin was merely a mildly intoxicating “light beer” that had to be 
consumed in excessive amounts to have any effect. Yet, for the officers it was the root 
of all evil, simply intolerable.  
Rationing, much like the reorganizing of village space and the regulation of labor 
and cultural practices such as nose cutting and tiswin manufacture, functioned as 
another colonial instrument designed to alter Apache behavior. As Tim Rowse has 
suggested in his study of colonialism in Australia, rationing was a vehicle for surveying 
and controlling colonized peoples. The different goods and the ways they were 
distributed, Rowse writes, formed the relationship through which the forging of social 
regularities and routines often took place.118 As a rule, it was the Apaches who had to 
make the effort and arrive at the agency to receive the white man’s food. Apaches had 
to live close to the points of distribution to make the symbolic crossing to the military, 
wait where told, proceed in an order dictated by whites, and receive with gratitude what 
was given, after which they were allowed to disperse in the proximity of the rationing 
place. For example, rationing at Fort Apache in the early 1870s started in the morning 
as the Apaches had to gather near the post from all sections, each band seating 
themselves separately, men generally distinct from the women. Their appearance was 
still of their own choosing, perhaps reflecting conscious resistance to this colonial 
ordering. Officers counted each band and then distributed ration tickets, after which the 
1,500 people present were admitted, in a line, to a small stockade where they received 
“their ration of corn in their blankets as it was scooped out to them” and a piece of beef. 
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Each Apache seemingly protested with remarks of “most obscene character” that they 
wanted more, and snatched any morsel they could put their hands on. In three hours all 
was over, and the people dispersed, the next rationing taking place in five days time.119 
On another occasion, an officer wrote that at the intervals of four days he was “to watch, 
feed, and regularly muster and count” the Apaches. Thus the Apaches were closely 
watched and made to perform the same rituals in intervals of few days. It was all ideally 
very official and rigid, which probably made it even more irritating an ordeal for the 
Apaches. The officer added that his “duty was conscientiously performed and duly 
certified to by official witnesses.”120 
Some officers even strove to control how the Apaches used their rations. They 
suspected, for instance, that the Apaches used all their corn to make alcohol. Others felt 
that when reservation Apaches received “government bounty,” or, in other words, were 
fed by the expense of whites, they should be grateful and obedient.121 Apaches were 
also forced to use a ration card, which functioned both as a form of surveillance and a 
symbol of status because one could not get food without it. The card was in fact the key 
to survival in the colonial world. When the Chiricahua leader Victorio was refused 
rations after patiently waiting in line, he confronted the reservation agent who had 
promised him food but failed to mention that he needed a ration card. The agent was 
persistent that the card was required, and that it would take a month to process it. When 
Victorio complained that a month is a long time without food, the agent refused to 
continue the conversation and ignored the Apache leader.122 
As in other, more recent, imperial missions, American invaders in the Southwest 
could not comprehend that someone would refuse to be “liberated.” To army minds the 
new regimes in the reservation and white tutelage meant the “liberation” of Apaches 
from their old habits and culture. The Apaches, army people felt, should show the army 
proper appreciation and gratitude. When the Apaches did not openly embrace this 
forced liberation, army people saw that it was the Apaches inherent “worthless” 
character that most hindered their progress, making stealing and war more congenial to 
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their natural instincts than farming or living in peace.123 Some argued that the Apaches 
remained “docile” only because of the heavy military presence. “Were the military 
removed they would immediately resume their well-known hostility to the whites,” one 
officer wrote.124 Logically, army people’s remedy for what they recognized as “Apache 
stubbornness” included tighter discipline, increased industry, and swift punishment for 
any Apache thought to resist white authority. Those Apaches who did not follow suit 
faced time in the guardhouse or something worse, like imprisonment outside the 
Southwest. For instance, Kaytennae, a Chihenne (Chiricahua) Apache, who, refusing to 
accept the new reservation order was labeled a troublemaker by the military. He faced a 
speedy sentencing to Alcatraz, a federal penitentiary outside San Francisco. 
Interestingly, when the army released Kaytennae after less than two years in the prison 
the officers represented his “reformation” as ideal. According to a high-ranking officer, 
Kaytennae, ”who less than two years ago was the worst Chiricahua of the whole lot, is 
now perfectly subdued…thoroughly reconstructed, [and] has rendered valuable 
assistance…His stay at Alcatraz has worked a complete reformation in his character. I 
have not a doubt that similar treatment will produce same results with the whole 
band.”125  
Some officers thought that continued conflicts with the Apaches during the late 
1870s and early 1880s were the result of Apaches being given too much freedom on the 
reservations. White supervision had been purportedly too lenient.126 The blame 
supposedly rested on civilian agents. Army people characterized the best of the agents 
as ignorant men who did not understand their work or the Apaches and quickly grew 
disheartened, while the worst purportedly cheated, stole, abused, and starved the 
Apaches, and thus damaged all military efforts.127 Officers contemplated that the 
Apaches “innate desire to slay, pillage, steal, and create havoc generally” was only 
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further abetted by the robbery and mismanagement of the agents.128 Embittered and 
cynical, officers claimed that the entire government in Washington and the civilian 
population was ignorant about the Apaches.129 In this way members of the army tried to 
claim the right to manage the Apaches. They would have everybody to believe that only 
they knew the Apaches, and nobody else should interfere. Ambitious and often 
overzealous officers refused to listen to anybody else, including the Apaches, or to 
acknowledge that their actions might be insensitive or racist and damage Apache lives. 
Officers insisted that they were in the right when it came to defining the Apaches, or to 
fighting and governing them.  
 
4.4.2 Abducting Apache Children 
An even more direct method than reservation government for Apache 
“regeneration” was the abduction of Apache children. In a region where captivity 
raiding, exchange, and adoption had fundamentally shaped cross-cultural interactions 
for centuries, the army reinvented an established tradition.130 Although never large-
scale, army people captured a number of Apache children. For instance, following a 
battle in 1868, Major Andrew Alexander took a teenage Apache girl to Camp 
McDowell. “She was a pretty little squaw so I sent down to the guard house and had her 
brought up, and she looked so intelligent that I concluded to keep her,” the major’s 
wife, Eveline Alexander, wrote. Immediately, Eveline started vigorously “civilizing” 
the frightened and confused girl, whose life had been turned upside down. She was 
taught to eat with knife and fork, to sew, and her hair was shingled to “improve her 
appearance.” Eveline bathed her personally so she might become a nurse for the 
Alexanders’ infant baby. Writing to her parents, who earlier had expressed great 
concern about the infant “falling into the hands of the Apaches,” Eveline declared that 
now the baby was “being rocked to sleep by a bona fide wild Apachee, who a week ago 
was roaming the mountains, guiltless of any other covering but her ‘maiden modesty.’” 
Eveline renamed the girl Patty, a “short for Apachee,” she explained, and trained her to 
become the family servant. Harsh discipline kept the girl in line. She “must learn to 
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obey me,” Eveline insisted, contemplating at one time the possibility of starving her to 
submission but eventually resorting to threats about sending her into the guardhouse. 
Apparently, the girl both accepted her new part in the colonial world and harbored silent 
resistance, as she later not only accompanied the Alexanders’ as “part of the family” to 
their estate in Willowbrook, New York, but rebelled against her captors by running off 
to marry a black soldier, much to Eveline’s dismay.131 
Sometimes Apache children captured at skirmishes were made army troop’s 
“pets,” like one officer called them. He wrote that the 9 and 10 years old Apache 
youngsters that had been “adopted” by the troops at one army village were “never given 
any dinner until they had each first shot an arrow into the neck of an olive-bottle 
inserted into one of the adobe walls of the quartermaster’s corral.”132 In another case, an 
Apache boy first lived with the soldiers of the Sixth Cavalry, before at the age of 
fourteen he became a valet for two bachelor lieutenants. After they left the region, his 
new “owner” was the family of Major Biddle. The Biddles’ dressed the boy in white 
man’s clothes and made him work as the family’s house servant, until he enlisted as a 
“scout.” To the Biddles’ disappointment, the boy soon ran away, but made one final 
appearance at the family’s quarters, this time his face painted, hair matted with mud, 
and blanket around his shoulders. “He was just as much Indian as the others, who had 
never lived in a house or been with civilized people…There are too many generations of 
Indians back of them, and the few years of civilization are soon forgotten,” Mrs. Biddle 
bitterly wrote.133 
 
Army visions called for the death of the warlike predator Apache army men and 
women had been so eager to imagine and the birth of new cloned-like copies of white 
people. Usually army people did not want to learn anything from the Apaches. Nor did 
they think the Apaches themselves knew what was best for them. Instead, being 
stubbornly captivated by their productions of Apache character as illogical, irrational, 
non-industrious, and incapable of self-government, white army people thought only 
they knew how to orchestrate Apache futures. Also, army people were convinced that 
modernization of Apache lives had to be forced on the Apaches if necessary. In the end, 
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Apaches did much more than just survive this colonial “regeneration” or “liberation.” 
Like the Biddle’s Apache boy or Eveline Alexander’s servant girl, they orchestrated a 
multifaceted and viable resistance, seeking ways to retain their identity as Apaches and 
refusing to transform themselves into poor clones of the whites. On the reservations, 
Apaches could, for example, avoid work imposed upon them, work slowly or carelessly, 
try to disrupt the rationing process, or drink tiswin in secret. They carved space in the 
limited opportunities of the reservation, distancing themselves from white 
administrators, and silently rejected colonial policies even when nominally accepting 
their premises when, for example, converting to Christianity or laboring in the colonial 
army. The many modes of colonial resistance went largely unnoticed by whites. They 
only saw the cutting of noses of adulterous wives, tiswin drunks, and open vocal 
defiance to white authority.134 In the end, colonial government was unable to fully 
penetrate and destroy Apache identity and desire for self-rule; their cultural traditions 
and ceremonies, language, social norms, and economic cycles reformed and retained 
validity to the twentieth-century and beyond. 
 
4.5 Colonial Knowledge and Apache History 
In the 1970s, almost one hundred years after the military panicked at Cloverdale, 
a noted historian Donald E. Worcester wrote the following: “Life was a daily battle for 
survival, a grim contest with a hostile environment and savage predators both animal 
and human. Rugged mountains and endless desert, this was Apacheland, and the 
Apache were truly products of their brutal environment…completely at home in any 
part of that tortured land: they suffered hunger and thirst and extremes of heat and cold 
without complaint. They saw an enemy in every stranger; they trusted no one outside 
the band…A warrior people, Apaches were born and reared for combat.”135 Worcester’s 
one-dimensional description of Apaches is not by any means exceptional among 
scholarly texts. In fact, a closer examination makes it seem rather typical. For example, 
a history of New Mexico written also in the 1970s insists that “nomadism was in their 
[Apaches] blood, and once they acquired the horse and a new mobility, soft words of 
missionaries or the feeble efforts of Spain’s scant soldierly could do little to check their 
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predatory ways.”136 Also, in what is regarded as a classic study of the Southwest, 
historian Howard Lamar explains that the Apaches represented a “permanent, hostile 
Indian population” and an “Indian problem.” From the days of first Spanish arrivals, 
Lamar writes, Apaches had made “every generation of settlers” know “the fear, or the 
harassment, of savage Indian warfare.” Lamar also refers to the Apaches as “natural 
raiders” and “a constant terror to white colonists.”137 The eminent historian of U.S.-
Apache wars, Dan L. Thrapp, saw that “the tribes of Apacheria were a product of their 
habitat, harsh, cruel, and pitiless.” Even a more current work by historian Edwin 
Sweeney still claims that “the Apaches were a warlike and nomadic people who roamed 
the Southwest.”138 
The above quotes from standard works on Southwest and Apache history written 
between the 1960s and 1990s show how terribly one-sided, and obviously flawed, 
western understanding of the Apaches remains. The studies also demonstrate how 
Apache images are still firmly connected to the knowledge the colonizers produced in 
the 1800s. In fact it seems as if generations of historians have constructed their histories 
of Apaches and U.S.-Apache wars by uncritically copying and recycling white army 
people’s representations of the Apaches, accepting subjective army writings as the truth. 
There at least is no shortage of similarities between army texts and historical studies. 
For instance, in both army writings and scholarship the Apaches aimlessly “roam” as 
nomads and, importantly, hold the role of the aggressors. Although some scholars, like 
army men, recognize white greed and rivalries between federal branches, they still often 
place the blame for the U.S.-Apache wars on the warlike character of the Apaches. The 
stereotypical Apache in much of scholarship remains a guerrilla warrior; cunning, cruel, 
and almost animal-like savage naturally inclined to war and violence just like the white 
army people portrayed him. In most works Apaches come out as predators and as 
perpetrators of constant terror. Furthermore, like white army men, some historians 
single out the Chiricahuas, labeling them as “the fiercest” and most “warlike” of the 
Apache tribes.139  
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Even the best biographies of Apache leaders that aim for a “balanced 
perspective” tend to echo the premises of colonial knowledge. For instance, in his 
portrayal of Cochise, Edwin Sweeney makes the Chiricahua leader a war machine 
whose life was defined by constant raiding and pillaging, and little else. For Sweeney, 
Cochise appears more as the aggressor than the aggressed. Sweeney also depicts 
Cochise as the supreme “fighting Apache,” courageous and wise, but also as a man who 
possessed “uncompromising” and “fierce and abiding hatred” towards whites and 
Mexicans. Cochise, Sweeney maintains, “showed no mercy to his enemies, who, if 
captured, were tortured to death in a slow, painful, and inhumane way.” Sweeney even 
states that Cohise “hated Americans…more fanatically than any other Apache. It 
mattered little that only a few whites had actually wronged him; he hated them all.” 
There seems to be little historical evidence to support these kinds of broad 
generalizations. War was definitely intense and harsh sometimes, but the Apaches were, 
for instance, also known to spare their enemies and take captives. It is also known that 
some whites rode among the Chiricahuas. Also, in Sweeney’s account the big picture, 
the U.S. aggression on other people’s lands, gets overshadowed by the seemingly 
constant Apache raiding.140 It is also interesting to note that those Apaches exhibiting 
leadership on the reservations or seeking peaceful alliances with the Americans have 
never inspired much interest in historical studies or from the army people. Western 
interest does not seem to reach Apaches at peace.141  
Overall, it is painfully obvious that many historians, consciously or not, seem to 
have sided with the army, approaching the U.S.-Apache wars from the perspective of 
the colonizers. One standard work makes the brutal Tonto basin campaign a great 
success and praises it as “classic in conception, almost flawless in execution, and 
decisive in results.” Elsewhere in the same study the author seems to regret that the 
soldiers in the late 1860s were not able to inflict enough damage on the Apaches.142 
Timothy Braatz accurately noted: “when the military historians are critical of the 
soldiering, it is often for not being brutal enough.” One historian, for instance, scolded 
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officers “for wasting their time” while their subordinates “showed commendable zeal” 
in killing “savages.”143  
Furthermore, historians have adopted the army’s racialized vocabulary. Much of 
the terminology scholars have used to describe the army, the Apaches and their 
activities continues to be taken directly from the army texts. Historians, for instance, 
discuss the “Apache problem” or the “Apache threat” when referring to U.S. conquest 
of the Southwest.144 However, there is no “army problem” in these studies. Scholars 
also write that the Apaches “pillaged and murdered,” “terrorized,” and “rampaged,” or 
that they “were elusive and cunning,” “vicious,” and “a menace” “spreading terror and 
destruction.” Some claim that the Apaches “engaged in wild and tenacious rebellion.” In 
many studies the Apaches also go “on the warpath.”145 On the other hand, in the same 
studies the army is treated very differently. It never “terrorized” or was a “menace.” 
Instead, the army “made campaigns,” “went into action,” or “achieved triumphant 
military success.” The army also had “punitive commands,” “expeditions,” or “efforts,” 
and “exhausting chases,” where it “hunted the renegades,” or “operated” against the 
Apaches.146 It is also regrettable that the term “hostile,” applied by white army people to 
describe all Apaches not succumbing to U.S. control, abounds in historical scholarship. 
Some of the older studies, especially, apply the term frequently when referring to free 
Apaches, but it is sometimes used in more recent works as well. For example, 
Sweeney’s biography of Cochise, published in 1991, repeatedly refers to Cochise and 
his group as “hostiles.” Sweeney also divides the Apaches into the “incorrigible,” 
“unpacified” and “wild” and the “tame” and “friendly.” From these historians one could 
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first of all ask “hostile to whom?” How can one label a group of people “hostile” and 
pretend to write a balanced and unbiased history of them? When using the term 
“hostile” to describe free Apaches historians not only repeat colonial rhetoric but take 
the side of the colonizers. It is telling that no historical study describes white Americans 
as “hostile” towards the indigenous peoples, not to mention labels whites as “hostiles” 
as a people.147  
Because of their uncritical use of colonial knowledge historians have shied away 
from seeing the Apaches as fully human. It seems as if only a few scholars who have 
written of U.S.-indigenous wars in Arizona and New Mexico, most notably Timothy 
Braatz, Chip Colwell-Chanthaphonh, and Victoria Smith, try to understand the 
indigenous perspective and question what right the United States had in occupying other 
people’s lands in the Southwest. Colwell-Chanthaphonh is also among the few who are 
critical towards how Apache history has been constructed.148 For more balanced 
scholarship historians need to try to understand the Apache perspectives and 
motivations and stop recycling the knowledge and terminology produced by the 
colonizers. Scholars must place the colonizers’ texts under critical scrutiny and 
interrogate them as time-, place-, race-, and class-specific subjective colonial 
knowledge. They must also try to recover the subaltern voice. Apache men and women 
were active decision-makers, with a full range of emotions and motivations. This should 
be evident to all historians, but too often seems not to be. Apaches came from a rich and 
complex culture, cared deeply for their homes and families, and envisioned geopolitical 
and economic strategies while trying to maintain their power and survive in the face of 
U.S. invasion. Historians must move beyond colonial knowledge in order to avoid 
repeating the stereotypical Apache in one form or another. To make this all possible 
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historians must at first demonstrate a willingness to understand the U.S. invasion of the 
Southwest “as the imperialist conquest that it was.”149  
 
Conclusion: The Racial Other 
The army’s making of the Apaches can be viewed as part of the global process of 
pushing indigenous peoples to the margins so that western capitalistic dominance of the 
world can be established. Army representations and actions provide an example of how 
enemies were made and dealt with during long-lasting colonial wars. They also show 
how a group of colonizers hammered out their visions of humanity in a particular 
colonial setting; how the colonizers established and categorized difference between 
themselves and those people they regarded as the enemy in order to gain colonial 
authority. Through both their discourses and actions white army people sought colonial 
authority over the Apaches; they wanted to gain military power and, in conjunction, also 
the power to determine what the Apaches were all about.  
The army’s central mission in the Southwest was to gain the monopoly of 
violence for the U.S. regime and in army people’s minds the Apaches represented 
competition. On one level white army people seemed confident that Apaches 
represented an inferior uncivilized foe destined to step aside in front of a supposedly 
more advanced white civilization. On the other hand, however, white army people often 
viewed the Apaches as a dangerous threat. Whites not only feared the Apaches but 
recognized that they had the potential to question the white soldiers’ honor and 
masculinity and make the whites seem militarily impotent. Difficulties in colonial 
warfare increased the frustration, hatred, and fear among white officers and soldiers, 
which in turn contributed to the viciousness of the Apache-imagery they produced. 
Army discourses of the “submissive” and “friendly” Akimel O’odham certainly prove 
how white army people represented very differently those indigenous groups whom 
they did not fear or view as a threat. In contrast to Akimel O’odham, Apache men in 
army texts were as a rule predatory and inclined for murder, cruelty, and treachery, and 
Apache women were undesirable victims of their men’s tyranny. Army men and women 
recognized few individual differences, but treated Apaches as a mass of inferiors with 
unflattering traits and characteristics. As racial and cultural others, binary opposites of 
whiteness and civilization, Apaches were represented as a distinct and inferior race who 
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hated the whites and had constructed a reign of terror. All free Apaches the army 
labeled “hostiles,” which made them nineteenth-century “terrorists” and colonial 
villains. In army eyes, the Apaches constituted a constant threat to civilization and 
freedom, and supposedly listened only to force and deserved to be punished. Eventually 
army discourses and actions undermined not only Apache rule, but also their humanity. 
Army visions of Apaches showed very little respect for Apache culture or lives, no 
desire to listen to or understand Apache motivations. Most white army people 
represented that the Apaches murdered and pillaged because it was in their nature. It is 
difficult to detect in army narratives any notion that the Apaches were fully human, 
active choice-makers basing their actions on particular geopolitical and social realities 
or strategies that reflected specific cultural or individual motivations.  
“The most crucial development” of conquest, according to historian David G. 
Gutierrez, was the “construction of elaborate set of rationales which are designed to 
explain why one group has conquered another.”150 When making the Apaches inferior 
and brutal bloodthirsty extremists, white army people wanted to justify army actions 
and establish why the Apaches’ geopolitical rule rested on horrendous foundations. 
Army texts made it appear that because of the nature of Apache rule and the character of 
the Apaches the U.S. invasion was neither unjust or harmful but honorable and right, 
that colonial aggression and dominance was in fact liberation and betterment, a 
necessity where the whole region, eventually even the Apache survivors, were saved 
from the darkness of a destructive Apache rule. In army texts Apaches became the 
group against which the “innocence” and “good intentions” of white army people could 
be contrasted. White army people made colonial aggression appear more justifiable, 
intelligible, less shameful, and fundamentally less violent than it in reality was. In the 
end, the legitimacy of army actions, whether armed violence or reservation 
“regeneration,” rested on the artificial distinctiveness of Apaches the army’s subjective 
discourses had produced. In reality, the colonial knowledge army men and women 
produced of the Apaches amounted to little more than colonial fiction, or fevered 
imaginations, woven together to justify the colonization of free Apaches and their lands. 
In hindsight the Apache case seems to confirm that the knowledge produced by the 
colonizers continues to hold a strong influence even today. The ahistorical stereotype of 
the Apaches is one of the legacies of conquest. The Apaches, perhaps more than any 
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other indigenous group in North America, still symbolize the “wildness,” “fierceness,” 
and “cunning” of indigenous peoples. 
For the army community the Apache enemy proved important in terms of 
identity-production. It is notable that even if not all white military people built exactly 
similar stories of the Apaches, the differences tended to be minor. By representing 
Apaches as the racial other, all white army people hoped to strengthen their own 
position and the status of whiteness in the colonial hierarchies, reducing the Apaches to 
the lowest rungs and making whiteness signify superiority and privilege. A common 
enemy also brought cohesion and unity inside the army community. As they all chose to 
single out the Apaches as a distinct race by producing similar discourses, white army 
people emphasized their own collective unity and downplayed class difference. 
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Chapter 5  
“The Devil’s Garden” or “Our Great Western Empire”: White Army Men and 
Women and the Place Facing Colonialism 
 
“One part of the desert…is called ‘The Devil’s Garden,’ from its 
denser growth of all thorny varieties of the cactus and other 
prickly shrubs, making it difficult to pass. We begin to think the 
name might be applied with much propriety to almost the whole 
territory.”1 -“Sabre,” Paymaster, U.S. Army 
 
“Arizona was then [1875] out of the world and was thought to 
be a country fit only for the Apache to live in. The Almighty 
made it last and didn’t have much material left.”2-Fanny 
Corbusier, officer’s wife 
 
Visiting Clifton, an Arizona mining town, Lieutenant John Bigelow seriously 
pondered whether he should go without supper when his only choice to get one was to 
enter “a typical mining town amusement hall.” Bigelow felt most uncomfortable dining 
in such an establishment filled with Mexicans, Americans, Irish, Germans, and others 
gathered principally around the bar, playing billiards, engaged in heated conversations, 
or enjoying the square and round dances with themselves or in the company of lewd 
women. “I took in the animated scene,” he wrote nervously, still harboring a quick exit. 
Luckily Bigelow was shortly introduced to “a couple of well-dressed gentlemen” of 
which one was the governor of the territory. That eased his nervousness, the restaurant 
having not only customers from the respectable white middle-class but also a separate 
space reserved for them. “I had no further concern as to the propriety of my situation,” 
Bigelow concluded, being now able to enjoy his evening in the company of respectable 
men.3 
Not far from Clifton, the recently established Southern Pacific Railroad 
whistlestop and cattle shipping center Maley, Arizona, was renamed in 1880 in honor of 
Brevet Major-General Orlando B. Willcox, the commander of U.S. troops in Arizona. 
Celebrating the first white child born in town Willcox had sent a silver cup with his 
initials to the parents in hopes that the boy be named after him. As a result not only the 
boy but the whole town got the general’s name. On board the first train to Willcox the 
                                                 
1
 Henry Winfred Splitter, ed., ”Tour in Arizona: Footprints of an Army Officer,” Journal of the West 1 
(July 1962), 78. 
2
 Fanny Dunbar Corbusier, Recollections of Her Army Life, 1869-1908, Patricia Y. Stallard ed. (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 2003), 66. 
3
 John Bigelow, Jr., On the Bloody Trail of Geronimo (Tucson: Westernlore Press, 1986), 75-76. 
 122 
general received a standing ovation from an enthusiastic crowd, who shouted the town’s 
new name “Willcox, Willcox!” Although all the attention undoubtedly nourished the 
general’s self-esteem and his sense of status, it was still a rather dubious honor that a 
town like Maley was named after him. After all, at this time Maley, like Clifton, was no 
town for white middle-class tastes. For one thing, although recently penetrated by the 
railroad, it was still seemingly at the mercy of an inhospitable and uncontrollable 
environment and thus poorly reflected civilization’s triumph over nature. Not only did 
hard winds cover the town’s streets and houses with alkali and dust, but at times, the 
violent wind could all of a sudden turn into an equally aggressive cloudburst, after 
which, a soldier wrote, “it was water, water, everywhere” as the usually dry 
surroundings turned into a veritable lake. Not only this, but, as in Clifton, the social 
scene was not yet controlled by middle-class rules and values. Anton Mazzanovich, an 
Austrian-born enlisted man, explained that Willcox was filled with gambling joints, 
saloons, and dance halls that were regularly packed with Chinese, white cowboys, 
Mexicans, Indians, and black and white soldiers. Unlike the officers, soldiers like 
Mazzanovich seemed to enjoy the atmosphere. “Here was the real thing,” Mazzanovich 
wrote of the vibrant, free, and fun-loving town where enlisted men could indulge in 
gambling and the enjoyment of “tarantula juice” free from the restraints of white 
middle-class control so pervasive inside the army villages.4 
Concentrating on the patterns of representations and knowledge production, this 
chapter continues to chart white army people’s imperial meaning-making and 
relationship to the colonial terrain outside the army villages. It investigates how 
officers, their wives, and white soldiers represented southern Arizona and New Mexico 
past, present, and futures; how they made the region fit their norms and agendas. First, 
the discussion centers on how army men and women produced the Southwest 
landscapes. How did they experience the colonial environment, represent it, adjust to its 
demands, and claim control and superiority over it? The second part describes how the 
army people classified and described the white and Hispanic peoples and settlements. 
How they assessed the region’s social makeup in relation to incorporation? The third 
and forth part turn to the images army men and women produced of the region as a 
whole? Had the place potential for white colonization? The final section analyzes how 
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army people represented their own role in enabling the possible futures of the 
Southwest. How they constructed their own mission and its meaning and value, and 
built collective self-importance. All along the purpose is to gain a fuller understanding 
of white army people’s identity and relationship to the place facing colonialism. This 
connection was fundamentally about power and difference manifested through class and 
race. It was also of the ability to claim the historical truth for the discourses produced by 
the army. White army people did not set out to write booster literature or to enhance any 
myth of the West. Like in their travel writings or when discussing the Apaches, they 
strived to establish the truth and their own importance. 
In western history investigations of image-production have applied terms such as 
myth-making, boosterism, or the invention of tradition to describe the practice. Myth-
making is often connected to popular culture and representations of the West in shows, 
arts, movies, and literary fiction. Boosterism sold promises of prosperous places and 
futures and was usually guided by economic motives. In a narrow sense it applies to 
efforts of literature that sought to promote a specific place in order to attract people - 
settlers or tourists - and/or investments into that area. Invention of tradition is linked 
with cultural traditions, the creation of common stories and unifying heritage for certain 
nation, region, or ethnic group. These traditions get often performed and enforced 
through public or private remembering and celebrations.5 Imperial meaning-making is a 
connected genre, another narrative of historical facts used for subjective purposes that 
tries to establish the character of a place and people, and to say what has happened and 
is happening, and what it all means.  Meaning-making can be seen as an attempt of 
direct access to colonial authority and power by the people somehow involved in the 
enforcement or execution of the colonial invasion. It was the way the colonizers 
produced themselves and the places and peoples they encountered with the needs of the 
colonizers in mind. Whereas myths, boosterism and invention of tradition celebrated 
certain “real” or “invented” aspects of a place or cultural heritage, and tended to be 
positive (often overtly so) in tone, meaning-making was harsh, condemning, and critical 
if that suited the agendas of the colonizers who produced the stories and images. For 
example, in booster literature the landscape, wherever it happened to be, was 
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incomparably good, but never foreign or unusual.6 In meaning-making this was not the 
case as the investigation of the army texts proves.  
Historians of the Southwest have usually concentrated on how during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth-century certain images and stories of north-central New 
Mexico (especially Santa Fe and the Pueblos) produced a specific regional multicultural 
narrative designed, in part, to attract settlers and tourists.7 Promotion and image-making 
pertaining to southern Arizona and New Mexico has received less scholarly attention. 
Also, army men and women have rarely been considered as a group of image-makers. 
Scholars probably still erroneously cling to perceptions of officers and soldiers as men 
of “action” engaged solely in Indian warfare and isolated from the western society, not 
having anything to say about it.8 
 
5.1 “Lost in Apacheria”: The Landscapes 
Army men familiarized themselves with southern Arizona and New Mexico 
landscapes most intimately when engaged in military patrolling and campaigns 
demanded by army’s mission of conquest. Expected to wrestle the monopoly of 
violence for the U.S. regime, army men could not remain secluded in their own villages, 
but had to establish presence in the “wilderness” by taking the war to the home ground 
of the indigenous people. “In the field” army people often judged and evaluated the land 
not only in terms of practical movement but also possible future use. As discussed in 
previous chapters, the search for the enemy and travel to southern Arizona and New 
Mexico proved difficult and unpleasant for the unaccustomed invaders. It was the same 
with movement in general. White army men often found themselves loathing the 
landscapes, uncertain of the way, and mentally alienated from their surroundings. They 
were lost in Apacheria. 
In 1871, Arizona’s new military commander Lieutenant-Colonel George Crook 
and his party toured Arizona. On their way from Camp Apache to Camp Verde they lost 
the trail, which they had been assured existed, in the Mogollon Rim. They experienced 
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severe difficulties in a country cut up by ridges and canyons. Luckily a thunderstorm 
solved their water problem and eventually the outfit managed to stumble on a trail. 
After some further off-road traveling, they located their destination exhausted and 
bewildered by the landscapes of their new colonial home.9 Although the route was soon 
dubbed “Crook’s Trail” as a statement to army’s symbolic conquest and possession of 
the wilderness, another army group going the opposite direction three years later 
nevertheless experienced some difficulties. This time one lieutenant failed to return to 
camp after being out shooting turkeys. A frantic hunt was organized for the missing 
officer, but when search party after another returned with no news the situation began to 
look desperate. Luckily the lieutenant was finally found. Unaccustomed to the country 
he had carelessly walked directly over the edge of a chasm and fallen into a ravine 
twisting his ankle. Having only one shot left in his rifle, exhausted and hurt, he had laid 
“helpless in the wild fastnesses of the mountains,” as Martha Summerhayes, an officer’s 
wife who was with the party, wrote. She felt it had been a very precarious situation as 
the place was so “extremely dangerous.”10 
Army people dubbed different places in southern Arizona and New Mexico as 
“dangerous” in part because they lacked “signs of civilized regions,” meaning mainly 
roads the army could judge as “proper.” Maps, the army claimed, also either did not 
exist or they all proved wrong. Writing of the situation in the early 1880s, Lieutenant 
Thomas Cruse states that there was still, in the era of railroads, hundreds of miles 
“hitherto absolutely unknown.” Cruse dubbed those sections “wild” and “almost terra 
incognita to any but the Indians. A few important points, such as springs and water 
holes and peaks, were known to a few hardy frontiersmen and Army men, but often 
their situation was conjectural, indefinite.” Cruse also complained that sometimes when 
enemy movement was reported near some ranch or creek, there was absolutely nothing 
to show where such places were or how the troops would get there.11  
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In general, the two parties on “Crook’s Trail” and Lieutenant Cruse were no 
exceptions. In fact it was rather common that situations arose when officers had to 
acknowledge that “no one knew anything about the country we were in.”12 Of course 
not all army patrols were lost all the time, but it is evident that white army people’s 
knowledge of the terrain remained imperfect and partial at best all the way the 1880s. 
The result was that the army could not locate the places it sought and frequently lost its 
way. This maddened many and evidently shaped the nature and tone of their 
representations. Not only was movement in practice burdensome but many realized it 
was difficult to establish army control over the colonial landscapes or to claim 
superiority over their surroundings when the soldiers obviously had difficulties in just 
moving about. Although some scholars claim otherwise, white army men often did not 
adjust to the demands of the natural geography of the Southwest.13 Instead, to mask 
their unfamiliarity and occasional sheer helplessness, they represented that the territory 
not only lacked proper maps or roads and was thus an “unknown country,” but that the 
landscapes were profoundly inhospitable, dangerous, wild, and treacherous as to be 
completely unsuitable for the civilized campaigner. Thus, in army eyes “the problem” 
was with the landscapes not with the army. Marking the landscapes abnormal and 
uncivilized, a terrain defined by absence and difficulties, helped army people to gain 
symbolic superiority over them. Like during their journeys to the Southwest, the army 
again approached the landscapes increasingly in terms of confrontation and contest. 
Army men made themselves the “victims” who had entered a treacherous terrain of 
extremes. In a situation where any movement was portrayed as an ordeal, a test of 
strength, endurance, and character, successful army movement in itself became to 
signify civilization’s conquest of the savage wilderness.  
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“We had struck into the wilderness, and with no trails or roads to follow, we took 
our way guided by the distant mountains, or by the points of the compass,” wrote 
Captain Joseph Sladen when on his way to negotiations with the Chiricahua Apaches in 
1872. Sladen’s commanding officer referred the paths they had to take as “ugly and 
often fear-inspiring.”14 Others agreed. Army men and women liked to write about their 
trials on the rough off-road paths as they pushed through the “uncivilized” landscapes. 
They encountered “woods and thickets” and “prickly shrubs,” canyons “wild, jagged, 
and precipitous,” or lava boulders and volcanic rock with keen and sharp edges. Some 
negotiated crumbling alkali flats where clouds of choking dust surrounded everyone 
foolish enough to enter. Others claimed to struggle through “almost impassable” trails 
among “numberless” buttes and “rugged” mountain crags, while still others were forced 
to climb up and down dangerous high mesas, hills, and mountains for several nights, 
battered, bruised, and thirsty. As movement amounted to a heroic ordeal, a typical day 
was something like an “interminable, heart-breaking, rock-climbing struggle,” in the 
words of an officer.15  
When the landscapes in army discourses offered an entire arsenal of rough, 
dangerous, and difficult terrain, and little else, it is easy to see that in army eyes the 
colony was not yet subject to human control. Army stories convey a clear message: 
southern Arizona and New Mexico looked rather unpromising for white futures in their 
present condition. What was especially worrisome was that the region seemed destitute 
of water, which was important not only in terms of personal survival but also for 
building civilization. No water equaled no civilization. The necessity to find water, 
rather than best roads, enemy signs, or rumors of enemy activity, many times 
determined the phase and direction of military movement. Tellingly, when stumbling on 
water, accidentally or not, soldiers often preferred to stay put until at least the next 
morning rather than continue. One soldier proclaimed that “All I care for is water. If we 
have plenty of that I am all right.”16 Not only was it difficult to find, often not being 
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where the soldiers expected, but water found was also usually categorized as of inferior 
quality, “dirty” and undrinkable, filled with alkali and sulphur.17 
For the army, water, like the landscapes in general, proved uncontrollable. Some 
troops were forced to dig for water while others had to buy it from civilians. Thirsty 
soldiers could offer a month’s pay or all they had for just one swallow.18 It was not 
unheard of that army columns had to go without water from twenty-four to thirty-eight 
hours. According to one witness, there were “terrible marches where men maddened 
with thirst would open their own veins and drink their own blood.”19 One time a column 
traversing the edge of the Florida Mountains in New Mexico in search of Apaches was 
forced to skip rest after coming upon an empty water source. Continuing onwards, the 
troop examined every ravine and canon, but found nothing. After a while things began 
to get bad. Men’s lips cracked and blood oozed out, some became unable to articulate, 
turning delirious, and throwing themselves on the ground. There were those who tried to 
find shade by sticking their heads under small bushes. The men in best condition 
traveled ahead in search of water, but returned empty handed. Discipline and order was 
now gone as men started to collapse and wander out on their own. Then, one soldier 
luckily struck water, which saved the column from exhaustion and death.20 All were not 
as lucky as this troop, as men sometimes perished from lack of water. For example, 
while chasing a group of Mescalero Apaches, one lieutenant became lost and wandered 
for more than 40 hours without water. He was found alive but died soon afterward.21  
In army texts, southern Arizona and New Mexico was also marked by exotic and 
supposedly vicious wildlife: the landscapes were represented as the domain of tarantula, 
scorpions, centipedes, Gila monsters, and rattlesnakes. Again the army saw things 
through the specters of danger and struggle, and again it seems that the army tried to 
convince everybody that the colonial environment truly was utterly dangerous and thus 
worthless in its present state. A common trend in army discourses is to represent insects 
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and reptiles violating army people’s personal sphere, entering their blankets on the 
ground or threatening their bodies suddenly and without warning. Rattlesnakes 
especially were used as symbols of the repulsive and treacherous nature of the colonial 
environment.22 In one case, an army wife on her way from Camp Thomas to a camping 
site in the mountains witnessed harmless rabbits, goats, quail by the hundreds, horned 
frogs, and a hedge hog, but gave most attention to dangerous tarantulas and rattlesnakes. 
The latter caused commotion as they invaded the road “to resist,” she wrote, the party’s 
advancement. Against the rattlesnakes “we had a regular fight,” she concluded.23  
In army stories the sun itself got portrayed as uncontrollable and dangerous. It 
was “pitiless,” and the heat it caused “frightful” and “insufferable.” Sun made the days 
“intensively hot,” “boiling hot,” or “frightfully hot,” army men and women wrote.24 The 
sun’s heat, only further establishing the unpleasant and unwelcoming character of the 
region, became one of the central symbols of the area and the subject of countless 
stories. For instance, one army surgeon wrote that the heat was such that men could not 
touch stones if exposed to the sun, or chisels or anything of steel to open ammunition 
boxes, and so had to open the boxes by dropping them on sharp rocks.25 
Numerous army people wanted nothing to do with the Southwest. In a letter back 
home, one army surgeon complained that getting around in the Southwest proved “the 
roughest life I ever saw, and as soon as I can get out of it, I think I will…I have always 
had a desire to see frontier life, to see the great west-to see the Indians and the Indian 
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fights. I have seen the west and all the frontier life I care to see, but the chances are that 
I will see more before I leave Arizona.” Resorting to irony, this officer also suggested 
an alternative for the Southwest landscapes: “I would much prefer a feather bed.”26 
Trying also to approach the situation with humor one captain remarked that because of 
the tough landscapes the Cavalry in the Southwest was reduced to a corps “in which you 
walk, have the privilege of helping your horse, he in turn carrying your saddle.”27 
Others found the situation less funny. They wrote that it was usual that men “cursed the 
land” when traversing forward.28 For some, movement was to be avoided if possible. 
Inside this region “one passes from one extreme to the other but would prefer rather to 
remain in the worst than encounter the torture of a journey over the miles on miles of 
confused and jumbled masses of rocky mountain peaks to reach the better,” one officer 
wrote.29 In an effort to win sympathy and to further differentiate the region both the 
officers and enlisted men characterized their challenges so extraordinary that no 
outsider could understand them. “Those who have never traveled through this region, 
with its high mountain ranges, deep rocky canyons, and wide sandy plains, will fail to 
comprehend the trials, hardships, and annoyances which the troops are required to 
undergo.” Army personnel were convinced that people “in the states” could not believe 
that such mountains even existed or that they were in any way passable.30  
As seen, in army discourses southern Arizona and New Mexico was a wild 
landscape unaltered by human hand. Although a few observers pointed out that some 
sections could be suitable for farming or ranching, especially if irrigated, many army 
people were not too optimistic that the Southwest landscapes in their present condition 
would prove attractive for agriculture or other “civilized” industries, excepting perhaps 
mining. The quantity and quality of trees canceled out forestry in army minds. It was the 
“inferior cacti, low mesquite bushes, and similar shrubs,” the only things “hard enough 
to survive” that dominated the purportedly unforgiving environment.31 Not only did the 
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trees and grasses lack economic potential in army texts, but their everyday use was 
presented as difficult at best. The Mesquite was unconquerable for axes but not to 
crowbars, whereas “no fire could burn” the Palo Verde, the army argued. The Galleta 
grass was always mowed with a heavy hoe instead of a scythe, and its “thorns wreaked 
havoc” on animals and men. In fact, everything growing on the ground seemingly had 
uninviting long thorns, as sharp as needles.32  
In addition, army people seldom praised the fertility of the soil. Instead, all flat 
land was represented as nothing but sand plains plagued by “terrible sandstorms” and 
almost destitute of water.33 The region’s rivers the army represented as either empty 
dried stretches of sand, and thus of no use, or as extremely uncontrollable and 
treacherous “raging torrents,” with swift currents and rapidly rising surfaces. One 
observer saw the Rio Grande as a strange, treacherous, and fearful river.34 Irrigation 
could prove difficult and rainfall in itself was far from ideal for farming. Rain was not 
only scarce, but violent. Lieutenant Frederick Phelps was stunned to discover that the 
whole cemetery at Fort Union vanished after a cloudburst sent waves of water into the 
valley where it was located. The water caused a hillside to slide into the valley, and the 
graves, including the family of Phelps, were buried under twelve feet of sand and 
rock.35 
Some became convinced the landscapes were in fact cursed. One officer’s wife 
remarked that the country she was in “was as silent as the sentinel. There was 
something appalling in the grandeur of the scenery…a sea of mighty mountains…Every 
thing was of a somber hue. It seemed as if the Creator had cursed the country. Even the 
lizards and horned toads, the only living creatures, were like the country gray and 
bloodless.”36 Another observer considered the whole region “a ‘hell of a country’ in the 
truest sense of the word,” while an army paymaster traversing from one army village to 
                                                 
32
 Nickerson, ”Major General,” 14; Carr, ”Days of the Empire,” 25. 
33
 Dinges ”New York Private,” 57. For sandstorms, see Mills, My Story, 189; Grierson, “Journal,” 35. 
34
 For Rio Grande, see Mrs. Orsemus Bronson Boyd, Cavalry Life in Tent and Field (Lincoln: University 
of Nebraska Press, 1982), 160-161. For other rivers, see Carter, From Yorktown, 197-199; Wood, 
Chasing Geronimo, 83; Grierson, “Journal,” 12; Corbusier, Recollections, 55-56.  
35
 Reeve, “Soldier’s Memoirs,” 187-188. For an incident when an officer’s wife and child were swept 
away during a storm, see Boyd, Cavalry Life, 197. For aggressive cloudbursts, see John G. Bourke, On 
the Border with Crook (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1891), 41-42; Ellen McGowan Biddle, 
Reminiscences of a Soldier’s Wife (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1907), 204-205; Wood, 
Chasing Geronimo, 80, 93; Walker, “Reluctant Corporal,” 11. 
36
 Cochran, Posie, 61. 
 132 
the next dubbed Arizona as the “Devil’s Garden,” and an army surgeon’s wife was 
certain that “the Almighty made” the region “last and didn’t have much material left.”37 
Rarely did white army people paint southern Arizona and New Mexico 
landscapes as worthy living environments for whites. Although some wrote of the 
region’s tremendous variation in climate in a positive light, admired some heavily 
wooded mountain streams, dark pine forests, or isolated fertile valleys, or mentioned 
“the peculiar and strange” beauty of the desert, they always remained a small minority 
in army texts.38 Captain John G. Bourke offers a good example how ambiguous even 
the more “positive” writers were. In his diary Bourke wrote that he had witnessed “with 
varying sensations of pleasure or discomfort…much scenery, good, bad and indifferent, 
plain, mountain, fruitful field and arid desert, bubbling spring of crystal freshness and 
stagnant pool of slime and alkali.” However, even when Bourke saw beauty and awe-
inspiring landscapes, he still easily resorted to the prevalent army stereotype of the 
Southwest landscapes as “asperous mountains,” “profound canyons,” and parched 
flanks filled with thorny and leafless vegetation. Bourke was still an exception as for 
him the landscapes offered a combination of the scenic and awesome and the weird and 
terrible. Yet, southern Arizona and New Mexico landscapes were never “normal” or 
“promising” for Bourke either.39 
In sum, officers and their wives and the white enlisted men in general approached 
the landscapes in terms of absence, struggle and confrontation. All paid attention to 
similar issues, told relatively similar stories, drew parallel conclusions, and thus 
displayed a relatively united front. In army minds, southern Arizona and New Mexico 
landscapes stood for vast emptiness, rough and treacherous canons, broken and almost 
impassable mountain chains, deadly desert plains of sandy waste, dangerous wildlife, 
heat, and lack of water and proper trees.40 White army people, who obviously regarded 
their homes in the East or in Europe as the norm, could not identify with the Southwest 
landscapes, found little of value in them, and had difficulties adjusting, and therefore 
distanced the landscapes into the realm of the extreme, exotic, and perilous. However, 
army discourses did not deny the landscapes’ hidden potential for alteration by people 
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representing a superior culture capable of controlling and shaping nature. A purportedly 
vacant area, southern Arizona and New Mexico, in army minds, needed civilized people 
to make it prosper. 
As in their writings of the Apaches, some scholars have adopted the army’s 
language uncritically when describing the region. For example, one well-known history 
of the Southwest speaks of the “cactus-studded wastes of Arizona,” while a standard 
monograph on Apache history describes the land as “hostile,” “brutal,” and “tortured.”41 
Historian Howard Lamar claims that the environment in the Southwest was “hostile” 
and that the “nature remained mean and unproductive.” He also speaks of “this 
unattractive region” Even in a recent study historian Louis Kraft refers to the “burning 
temperatures and hostile terrain of the Southwest.” Another new study on the Santa Fe 
Trail employs descriptions like “hostile terrain,” “a far land,” or “harrowing country” to 
mark the region.42 When scholars use colonizers’ narratives as normative truths they 
enter a treacherous terrain validating the colonizers subjective discourses and ignoring 
all the biases, contexts of colonial power struggles, and hidden agendas of imperial 
meaning-making that made the narratives the way they were. In the process scholars 
also continue to hold the environment of Western Europe or northeastern United States 
as the norm, against which everything else gets measured and valued. 
 
5.2 Borderlands Society    
5.2.1 Mexicans 
Often ignoring all class differences among the Mexicans, officers and their wives 
in southern Arizona and New Mexico generated a stereotype of Mexicans as backward 
and ignorant inferiors who lacked in civilization and did not fit the Anglo-Saxon 
framework of whiteness, thus constituting a foreign element on U.S. soil. The army 
used perceptions of lifestyle and intelligence as vehicles when typecasting Mexicans 
and differentiating them from “real” whites. For one thing, in army eyes the Mexicans 
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were completely distanced from modernity, lacking all ambition. They purportedly did 
not even know how to use money and wanted always to avoid work, thus being unable 
to create anything of any significance. In the words of one army wife, “a long line of 
idle ancestry, together with every tendency of climate, surroundings, and viciousness, 
had so developed indolence in the natives as to utterly incapacitate them for any serious 
employment.” Mexicans liked to bask in the sun, she wrote, but all heavier tasks “were 
left for more energetic hands.”43 As “idle loafers” Mexicans were judged to have little 
intelligence and live much like animals. The typical Mexican, an officer stated, was “the 
commonest sort, the sort that sits on a mud floor in preference to sitting on a chair, and 
is used to the companionship of pigs and chickens.”44 In a very paternalistic and racist 
manner, some members of the army interpreted Mexicans as ignorant and impoverished 
people who recognized whites as their superiors, mentors, and protectors, much liked 
parents were to their children.45 
Furthermore, officers stressed the Mexicans mixed-race status and their close 
association with the Indians, representing these as signs of contaminated whiteness. 
That the Apaches and the Mexicans were purportedly “cousins” had resulted in the 
reduction of Spanish culture and character in army eyes. “The primitive life” of the 
“Mexicans is but little better than that of the surrounding Indians, with whom they 
associate and mix as if of the same race,” one officer told. Others were convinced that 
when the Spanish and the Indians had amalgamated into the Mexican they had produced 
“a vicious man,” no longer properly white either in culture, character, or physical 
appearance.46 Visiting Tucson one army surgeon wrote that the extensive “intermingling 
and mixing with Indian blood” had made the countenance of Mexicans heavy and dull. 
For him the Spanish-Indian blood amounted to a miserable, worn out, degraded, 
shiftless, and worthless race. Even pure Indian blood supposedly contained more 
promise.47 Even Mexican women were often represented as physically unattractive and 
uninteresting as well as intellectually simple and ignorant. In a region that had very few 
Anglo women until the 1880s, army officers’ refutation of Mexican women shows their 
determination to retain a certain ideal of pure whiteness. Some officers also resorted to 
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applying differentiated scales of attractiveness. Even if a few “senoritas” could be 
considered pretty or sweet, they were not really beautiful as white women were, but 
only so according to the standards “in this part of the world,” like one officer assured.48 
In all, army men and women represented the Mexicans as an example of Euro-
American empire-building gone wrong: Mexicans represented a warning of what could 
happen to officers and wives if they did not remain vigilant in guarding their whiteness. 
When “becoming” Mexicans the Spanish had supposedly compromised their European 
heritage of industriousness, progress, and morality in front of “Indian savages.” What 
made the matter worse was that the Mexicans had seemingly fallen militarily at the 
mercy of “their Apache masters.” Many officers openly declared that the Mexicans 
were no longer any better than the much hated Apaches.49 Some went even further. 
Making his way from one border village to the next army surgeon Leonard Wood was 
certain that it all was “a godforsaken country and godforsaken people live in it…I really 
do not feel any sympathy when I hear that the Indians have killed a half a dozen or more 
of the people. I think the Indians better than the Mexicans.”50 That the area Wood is 
describing was on the Mexican side of the border only proves how little difference the 
border made. Mexicans on either side were classified as cowardly racial foreigners in 
army narratives. If anything, they painted Mexicans south of the border a little more 
ignorant (a result of the absence of Anglo influence), helpless, and subordinate to the 
Apaches.51  
Labeled as vassals of the Apaches, doubts rose in some army minds on whose 
side the “cowardly” Mexicans really were. They could not be trusted and were thought 
to provide protection, food, guns, and ammunition to the Apaches. Once, an officer 
claimed, a group of Apaches entered the town of Cañada Alamosa, New Mexico, in 
broad daylight to trade and obtain information while hundreds of soldiers were chasing 
them. Apaches even had their wounded taken care off while their leader Victorio lived 
with a Mexican for ten days. Although this was widely known nobody reported it to the 
army, this officer bitterly complained.52 
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As officers and their wives generated an imagery of Mexicans as untrustworthy, 
unproductive, and unintelligent people who equaled mixed-blood messiness and 
submission, they not only established their own positional superiority in relation to the 
Mexicans but made the way for the march of white civilization. As longtime residents 
of the region, the Mexicans had had their chance to shape the land and to create 
progress. However, in army eyes they, like the Apaches, had utterly failed. Instead, the 
Mexicans had only managed to contaminate their own racial purity and, what was 
possibly even worse, to subject themselves to Apache rule. Unlike the landscapes (and 
the Apaches), Mexicans were not really threatening or dangerous from the army 
perspective. Rather they were trivial and pitiful; in the end unimportant somewhat like 
the Akimel O’odham. Using dogs as allegory, one officer’s wife explained the 
difference between the white middle-class the officers and their wives represented and 
the Mexicans. Shep, “our darling black and brown collie with a white shirt and a white 
collar” when approaching Mexican houses would attack their “cur dogs” who barked at 
him and “bite right and left, scatter the group, and then walk or trot quietly away.”53 
While the officers and their wives stood for high-status cleanliness of the all-powerful 
yet graceful collie in this example, the Mexicans were nothing but “cur dogs,” who 
could only bark but not really bite, or threaten their pureblood superior. 
The representations of the Mexicans by officers and wives differed little from the 
opinions shared by most white Americans of the era. Since the U.S.-Mexican War 
attacks had escalated against Mexicans as an inferior race that lacked the propensity for 
democracy and did not properly develop land to its full potential. Historian George 
Montgomery writes that many whites regarded Mexicans as people whose natural traits 
justified the advance of the seemingly industrious and progressive Anglo. Anglos, 
Montgomery adds, “conquered ethnic Mexicans by taking their resources while defining 
them as racially inferior and properly marginal to white society.”54 However, where 
officers and their wives differed from many of their contemporaries was in their open 
criticism of white settlers who had made their way to pre-railroad southern Arizona and 
New Mexico. 
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5.2.2 Whites 
In the thinking of most officers and wives, lower class whites represented another 
example of unproductive people wholly unsuited to establish progress and civilization. 
Officers and wives categorized these whites as common and boring, poor people in 
character, culture, and success in life engaged in a foolhardy search for “marvelous 
mines” and gold. Lower class whites, “on their way to find gold at the rainbow’s foot,” 
were supposedly only good for land schemes, busted dreams, and promotions of 
nothing.55 For others they stood for the “unrefined and grotesque,” poorly mannered and 
dressed elements of white civilization who purportedly only introduced venereal 
diseases, indulged in alcohol, and altogether acted “more or less emancipated from the 
restraints of civilization.”56  
Officers and wives felt certain that lower class whiteness differed from the 
whiteness they and other middle-class people represented. In their minds whiteness had 
a class divide which manifested itself in behavior, culture, and character. The lower 
class elements represented a sort of “trash” of whiteness, the underclass of whiteness 
which was not defined by bravery, honesty, or intelligence, but instead by bad manners, 
dishonesty, and stupidity. The “trash” of whiteness purportedly represented the surplus 
of prosperous white communities. Some officers claimed that these whites had arrived 
to the Southwest in search of refuge when unable to make it in the “normal” white 
society in the East. Nothing but “miserable vagabonds who have come here to escape 
from the hands of Justice,” was how one officer described their character. The most 
critical army voices were even ready to claim that the lower class whites were “no less 
barbarous” than the Apaches.57 These lower class whites, like the Mexicans, could only 
endanger the very foundations of white civilization and futures in the Southwest. What 
was all the more worrying for officers and wives was that in their eyes the Mexicans 
and lower class whites played a dominant role in the pre-railroad southern Arizona and 
New Mexico society, setting the standards of respectability that only ensured the border 
communities would remain harsh and altogether uncultured and undeveloped. 
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Interestingly, white ethnicity, a growing concern in the East, was a matter rarely 
voiced in army writings. Being Irish or Jewish did not place one’s whiteness in 
question. For example, one officer when scouting for Apaches passed through “the 
oasis” of Solomonsville where his party was presented with “great meals of meat and 
vegetables.” “All this through the kindness and hospitality of the Solomon Brothers, 
Jews, and two of the fairest and squarest men that I have ever met in my wanderings 
over this earth,” the officer wrote. It is interesting that although this officer felt the need 
to introduce the two brothers by referring to their ethnicity, he did not let that dictate his 
attitude towards them, but wanted to stress how the brothers were “respectable” men 
who helped the army.58 
In general, it was social position, manners, character, and attitude towards the 
army that took the center stage when officers and wives evaluated and categorized 
whiteness outside the army villages. Lower classes were excluded for not acting white, 
whereas being for example a Jew mattered in itself little. The boundaries of social 
acceptability were never rigid, however, but fluid and dynamic, adjusted to meet the 
region’s supply of candidates.  
In major towns like Santa Fe and Prescott officers and wives often preferred to 
gather for strawberry picnics, receptions, banquets, and charity functions with the local 
businessmen and officials. Oftentimes the civilian elite planned festive celebrations in 
honor of high-ranking officers like Generals William T. Sherman, Nelson Miles, and 
George Crook, thus only reinforcing the army elite’s sense of self-importance.59 In these 
jovial situations of mutual respect, the army elite painted their civilian associates as 
“respectable” people. They were “brave, hearty, and generous frontiersmen,” one army 
person wrote, altogether admirable people who built civilization.60 
Officers and wives associated also certain values and characteristics to whites, 
especially families, living outside towns in stage stations and farms. They were often 
seen as welcoming and hospitable common people who faced dangers and lived in 
“unenviable solitude” in “godforsaken small roadside stations.” For one officer, the 
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hospitality of the ranches made it worthwhile to journey over Arizona’s deserts, forests, 
and mountains, whereas for an officer’s wife the proximity of white ranches made the 
country instantly more soothing and pleasant. When coming to a valley with a house, 
some domestic animals and fields, one enlisted soldier wrote that he felt “a great relief 
and delight” on seeing these “signs of civilized life” after experiencing “nothing but 
sand, dust, rocks, cacti, thorns, greasewood, rattlesnakes and the enormous venomous 
lizards, there called Gila monsters.” As these examples demonstrate, officers, their 
wives, and the enlisted men recognized a certain class of ranchers and farmers - usually 
white families - as representing the forces of civilization and carved an image of them 
as hardy pioneers who contributed to the future prospect of the colony and made a better 
future for themselves on the outskirts of the known world.61 These people clearly 
deserved the army’s respect, and, sometimes, pity for living such a risky life on the 
“world’s edge.” Perhaps there existed a sense of shared fates, the army desiring to see 
another group of “respectable” white outsiders taking on the challenge of the 
purportedly inhospitable border area. 
In army usage the label of “respectable persons” was often applied as a fluid 
categorization adjusted to meet the region’s supposedly low standards. In one case, an 
army wife living in the village of Ehrenberg noted that her associates were those “few 
white men there” who “led respectable lives enough for that country.” She added that 
“the standard was not high.” It is unlikely that this woman would have considered these 
men proper associates if encountering them in her home in New England. For her, the 
men’s behavior and character barely sufficed the low standards of the Southwest.62 In 
other instances, the officers as a rule insisted that those people they socialized with held 
status as leading elements of the society, no matter whom the persons actually were or 
what their occupation was. For instance, although one lieutenant dined with a vaquero 
and mingled with a deserter from the Mexican army, he assured the readers of his 
journal that he never lowered his rigid standard concerning his associates’ 
respectability.63 An army surgeon stationed at Fort Yuma often socialized with the 
Sisters of St. Joseph both at the convent and at his home. In his journal he wrote that 
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these women definitely represented refined eastern values, thus being “much superior” 
in education and birth not only to sisters usually located in such remote stations but also 
in comparison to all others in the surrounding community.64 
A further proof of the army elite’s fluid case- and place-specific boundaries of 
respectability is the case of Corydon Cooley, a white rancher, prospector, and 
government scout. Despite the fact that Cooley had married an Apache woman, officers 
described him as an “outstanding figure,” always hospitable and “valuable in that lonely 
land.” In officers’ texts Cooley lived in “baronial splendor” in a “good and comfortable” 
ranch. His company included an Apache wife, who was always referred to in army texts 
by her Anglo name, “Molly.” She was cast much like a proper housewife, described as a 
“quiet, well-mannered” woman and Cooley’s interracial children were portrayed as 
“most attractive.” However, at times some army wives found it difficult to hide their 
disapproval. One officer’s wife, who enjoyed Cooley’s hospitality and spent a night at 
the ranch, was especially troubled by the thought that Cooley might have more than one 
Apache wife. When her husband refused to dwell the matter, she had no choice than to 
sort her prejudices in her own mind.65 The fact that Cooley had worked in alliance with 
the military, proved a valuable asset in dealings with the Apaches, and had been a 
splendid host in a region short on social companions made him an honorable figure in 
army discourses and outweighed his interracial relationship with the “enemy.” Indeed, 
Cooley’s interracial relationship was usually represented as a well-thought strategic 
alliance that only proved his energetic and honest character.  
However, sometimes the classification was not as flexible and the officers judged 
the supposedly “respectable” elements as inferiors who could not be counted as truly 
middle-class. In Tucson, the major center of southern Arizona, “the who’s who” of the 
town and the officers at times mingled. Still, some officers were far from impressed by 
the social scene. For example, in 1872 a “grand baile” of approximately hundred people, 
“half of whom were Mexicans,” was arranged in honor of a military paymaster visiting 
the town. This flattered the paymaster, but when the festivities began he quickly became 
very critical. For him the event and the people lacked refinement and style: “The lovely 
senoritas were generally rather gaudily dressed, delighting in bright and varied colors, 
after window curtain styles.” Only a “few could pass for good-looking,” the older 
women being universally “very ugly,” he continued. For the paymaster the enjoyment 
                                                 
64
 Corson reminiscences, UASP. 
65
 Cruse, Apache Days, 152-153; Bourke, Diaries, 95; Summerhayes, Vanished Arizona, 105-107. 
 141 
seemed too “unrestrained” and the dancing was done with very little grace of person or 
motion. In all the people “I could not discover anything but dullness, and attempts at 
finery which seemed to fit their persons about as tidily as if they had run and jumped 
into them.” This, the paymaster concluded, “represented the elite of Tucson,” a 
miserable and sorry-looking lot of phonies who tried desperately to emulate proper 
middle-class standards. The next day the snobbish paymaster quickly exited Tucson. 
For him, the town’s “respectable” classes had represented a disappointment with whom 
socializing was a distasteful experience.66 
The attitude white civilians were thought to show towards the army was of 
crucial importance in determining the nature of army representations. If whites for any 
reason criticized the military or were even thought to entertain such ideas, officers and 
their wives quickly forgot all notions of solidarity and altered their representational 
strategies. In an aggressive tone the officers called white merchants unsophisticated 
vultures who only preyed the military for lucrative contracts or kept up the hostilities 
with the Indians because it was in the merchants’ economic interest that the territory 
was filled with troops whom they could exploit. Some of the army argued that there was 
no limit to the greed of these civilians.67 Ranchers supposedly lied about Apache 
sightings because they wanted cavalry protection in order to sell forage at exorbitant 
prices, while towns used all methods to induce the soldiers to come in and spend their 
money in gambling, drinking, and shopping.68 At times some officers even went as far 
as to claim that the vast majority of civilians in the Southwest abused the army in every 
way imaginable. The printed press was cast as one the main villains. Many papers, like 
the Tombstone Epitaph, Arizona Daily Star, and Clifton Clarion were represented as 
“the censors of the army” or “the organs of thieves,” as one officer dubbed them. In 
these publications “every officer was a coward and every enlisted man a hoodlum and a 
thief,” the officer wrote.69 Obviously, the press painted images the officers did not 
cherish and felt obligated to respond. Being called a coward was an insult of the worst 
kind that offended the officers’ sense of integrity and manliness which rested on notions 
of bravery and high moral character. 
Officers sought to reinforce their sense of manliness and gallantry by ridiculing 
civilian militia men as inefficient, brutal, and cowardly. In army men’s eyes, civilians 
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were no real soldiers, far from it. It was certain, like on officer stated, that “the citizen 
soldiery of Arizona have not as yet distinguished themselves above the Government 
mercenaries.”70 Often the relationship between the army and the militia was represented 
in terms of rivalry between the gallant, honest, and righteous soldiers and the dishonest 
and disorderly civilians. It is evident that the army did not want the civilians militarized. 
In one instance, when a group of cowboys rode into an army camp, these “would-be 
terrors of the plains,” as one soldier called them, harassed the soldiers and after refusing 
to be arrested commenced firing at them. The soldiers fired back and drove the cowboys 
out of camp “with a shower of lead at their heels.”71 In another case a group who called 
themselves the “Globe Rangers,” but whom one officer referred to as “an organization 
of barroom Indian fighters,” confronted an army troop telling them that Apaches had 
stolen their horses. The “rangers” tried to claim as their own “every good-looking horse 
in the herd” confiscated by the army troop. They proved such unreliable men as to argue 
that a horse belonging to one of the officers was theirs. The officer, “getting madder 
every second at their evident lying,” sent the “Globe Rangers” on their way without any 
horses. They reappeared days afterwards at a battle site seeking to loot some Apache 
corpses. Again the army stopped their efforts, but after the troops left, the “civilian 
warriors,” as one soldier wrote, robbed and looted the dead Apache bodies, whose 
scalps they later bartered at one army village.72 
In the end, officers and their wives’ representations of pre-railroad southern 
Arizona and New Mexico society display a fear that there really existed no good white 
element in the region. They worried over the shortage of honest and hard-working 
middle-class doctors, lawyers, teachers, and other professionals whom they imagined 
would work hard and create civilization and progress. While some felt shocked to 
discover that the region had no white civilian physicians, others noticed an alarming 
shortage of white women.73 Officers and wives believed that “respectable” white 
women would introduce proper domesticity and bring civilization to the region. Officers 
felt that many of those white women who had arrived to the borderlands acted 
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unwomanly. For instance, army narratives tell of a woman in Prescott who “made 
herself notorious by associating with packers and miners. She wore a man’s hat and a 
man’s sack coat. She didn’t swagger, but frequented saloons and drank and gambled 
with the men.”74  
That proper white middle-class associates were in short supply is further 
demonstrated by how highly officers and their wives valued eastern visitors. Family 
members and people with a recognized status in politics, economy, or arts - in other 
words people who could labeled “respectable persons” - were much welcomed. For 
example, one army wife was proud that a dinner held at her home not only included 
high-ranking officers but one Mr. Jerome, “a cousin of Lady Randolph Churchill,” a 
well-known society lady in the United States.75 For another army wife the visit of the 
well-known artist Frederick Remington proved an occasion. She proudly recalled that 
Remington “made many of his watercolors in the shade of our quarters.”76 However, the 
fluid standards of respectability were again linked to behavior and perceptions of 
character, and not all visitors were equally welcomed. When the well-known ethnologist 
Frank H. Cushing arrived at Fort Apache with the Zunis, the officers ignored him. 
Cushing was judged as having “gone native,” living with the Zunis and adopting their 
ways. Even his appearance was too much like the Indians. Eventually Cushing had to 
settle for the hospitality of a non-commissioned officer.77 
 
5.2.3 Settlements 
Officers and their wives used the race and class of the occupants as well as the 
orchestration of public space, including building styles and materials, as vehicles for 
establishing the value of Southwest settlements and to mark and differentiate them. 
They, for example, painted Rio Miembres as a place of “about twenty miserable adobe 
houses all occupied by Mexicans,” while Cañada Almosa amounted to a Mexican 
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hamlet, “a mere collection of adobe huts.”78 In a similar style Florence was represented 
as a town of two streets and approximately twenty adobe huts.79  
However, it was Tucson, the region’s center, that epitomized the dark, foreign, 
and morally corrupt Southwest. It resembled other “unfit” towns in the region both in 
housing and people, being only a little larger. For one thing, Tucson was an adobe town. 
The prevalence of one-story adobe houses, “all the same color as the dirt in the streets,” 
made Tucson an insignificant, degenerating, and crumbling “dirty Mexican pueblo” in 
army minds. One officer called Tucson a “queer, straggling old Spanish town, built with 
the proverbial Spanish disregard of straight lines and right angles.” Tucson’s streets 
appeared far below civilized standards, having no sidewalks, pavement, or lamps. There 
was also no use of addresses and all streets were in filthy condition due to lack of 
organized drainage, the officers complained. The town’s social order appeared as 
decadent as its public space. For officers and wives Tucson was wide-open, all night, 
hurrah town of the Southwest where bars and prostitutes supposedly constituted the 
principal business while Mexicans, and some lower class whites, made up much of the 
populace. The main street, the prime showcase of public space, was filled with bars that 
played “rude music” and had “a motley assemblage of Mexicans, Indians, soldiers, and 
all manner hard-looking men, smoking, betting at monte, and drinking mescal.” Officers 
and wives felt disgusted. They described that the spiritual center of this community, the 
church, was just a crumbling Catholic adobe structure, a wholly inadequate house for 
the serving of the lord. Furthermore, the town lacked the time discipline that 
orchestrated lives in the army villages and in other supposedly civilized sections of the 
world. Church bells set the rhythm of the day and one supposedly rarely heard months, 
days, or weeks mentioned. There was not much use for watches and clocks. After seeing 
the town one officer was certain that Tucson was “as a foreign a town as if it were in 
Haiti instead of within our own boundaries.”80 
That the principal town in the region was so dominantly Mexican obviously 
troubled many officers. In 1872, one officer voiced his concern that only approximately 
300 of the town’s 2,500 inhabitants could be labeled as white. It is not know whether he 
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included in his estimations the soldiers at Fort Lowell, located on the outskirts of 
Tucson. If he did, then he saw only a handful of civilians he could identify as white. Six 
years earlier an enlisted soldier traveling through wrote that with the exception of 
soldiers and teamsters in transit, there was not over a dozen white men in the town, and 
not one white woman. In the end, many of the army wanted to have nothing to do with 
this regional center. Tellingly, one officer’s wife was glad to pass Tucson without 
stopping.81 
Officers and wives displayed a very different take on the Anglo-dominated 
Prescott. They painted it as a delightful and desirable home for middle-class tastes, a 
rapidly growing and improving town that possessed an “excellent” and growing society 
of lawyers, engineers, and other white businessmen and their families. Importantly, the 
town was not controlled by Mexicans and lower class whites. According to an officer’s 
wife, Prescott was such an excellent place because it had “a good element from the 
beginning, and disorderly people were not allowed to remain long.” An officer dubbed 
Prescott as a “thoroughly American town,” an intelligent and bright family society 
which was not “burdened with the same class of loafers who for so long a time held 
high carnival” in many other places. Importantly, and in stark contrast to many other 
places in the region, Prescott was not only seen as “safe,” but also as a well-built place 
of log and brick, not adobe, houses. In short, for officers and their wives Prescott was 
everything Tucson was not; white, not Mexican; built of frame and brick buildings, not 
adobe; and a place where lower class elements did not rule the social scene but were run 
out of town by “decent” people.82 
In New Mexico, Silver City held a status somewhere between Prescott and 
Tucson in army eyes. Officers from the nearby Fort Bayard made many friends at 
neighboring Silver City and often drove there for entertainments. They wrote that the 
town had “every element” represented, from the “most cultivated, from the transplanted 
branches of excellent Eastern families” to the “rudest specimens of frontier life, who 
had never seen anything else, and were devoid of all education.”83 Silver City was 
compactly built, having importantly one or two brick houses which pleased the officers 
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and their wives and symbolized progress and the town’s “American” character. One 
officer declared in 1872 that the brick houses were “said to be the only ones in the 
Territory.”84 
It seems that for officers and wives the prevalence of adobe alone signified an 
inferior cultural order connected to a foreign Mexican/indigenous “tradition.” In this 
they did not much differ from the majority of white Americans in the area, who, 
historian Keith Bryant writes, “rejected the ‘mud towns’ they found in the Southwest.” 
Whites “wanted buildings and homes of wood or stone, glass windows, wooden floors, 
and metal ceilings and roofs.”85 Southwest settlements deviated from officers and 
wives’ standards of normality in many ways. They lacked white residents, middle-class 
social order, and familiar elements of public space, including brick or wood houses, 
sidewalks, parks, green lawns, or straight and orderly streets associated with the “white” 
Protestant cities or small towns and villages in the East. This all made the settlements 
foreign and inferior in the eyes of officers and wives. It also made the places legitimate 
targets for change. For the Southwest to become “civilized” the supposedly unworthy 
towns had to be rebuilt by incoming middle-class whites. In this regard Prescott 
represented a good beginning, a glimpse of the future. 
Most white enlisted men saw things quite differently. For them Prescott never 
was a favorite place, but rather too quiet and boring.86 Many failed to mention the town 
in their writings. Instead, soldiers preferred settlements such as Tucson. While officers 
saw these places as nests of vice and as miserable collections of huts and dirt, for white 
enlisted men they proved sanctuaries from the restrictive codes of middle-class 
propriety so dominant in the army villages. These towns represented such an attraction 
that it was impossible to keep the soldiers away from them.87 In many locations a mixed 
cast of colonizers and colonized interacted and created common grounds around rough 
leisure worlds. In enlisted discourses Tucson was described as a town “bubbling with 
life and motion.” One soldier was thrilled that every other building on the business 
street was a saloon. For him gambling that ran steadily twenty-four hours a day, and the 
fact that the most elegantly dressed men in the town were the faro-dealers and 
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saloonkeepers was perfectly acceptable. He saw that gambling was not only the 
principal business, but “a respectable profession.” The intermediate buildings on 
Tucson’s business street, filled with prostitutes “of every age and every race and color,” 
also represented a welcomed site for the lonely soldiers. That places were packed with a 
crowd of men of many nationalities, teamsters, bull-whackers, black and white soldiers, 
miners, Mexicans, and Indians only “offered a wonderful variety of humans,” a soldier 
wrote. All were “happy-go-lucky people,” another added, enjoying all the activities to 
the fullest. Later in life one soldier felt nostalgic that those “happy days” had passed 
into history as the region had, in his words, “matured.”88  
Obviously enlisted men were able to carve social freedom and opportunities to 
enjoy life in borderlands towns that did not exist inside the military villages. It seems 
that this applied equally to white and black soldiers. In his study of black soldiers in 
west Texas, historian James Leiker has observed that while officers never left their post 
after dark because they regarded the neighboring town of Santa Angelo filled with 
murderers and horse thieves, enlisted men frequented the town, finding suitable 
company and interesting social life. Whereas officers shunned the settlements’ 
standards and social composition, black enlisted men, like white soldiers in Arizona and 
New Mexico, enjoyed what opportunities they could discover.89  
On the other hand, white enlisted men represented a less straightforward story of 
the region’s settlements than the officers did. Like officers, soldiers were outsiders too, 
and not all simply embraced the colonial settlements or viewed the kind of activities 
they offered in a favorable light. Not unlike the officers, some white soldiers were very 
critical of what they saw. For instance, Tucson in 1880 was referred by one enlisted 
man as “a sorry-looking Mexican town” with narrow and crooked streets and countless 
dogs, burros, and chicken fights and Spanish-speaking residents. Like officers, white 
soldiers used race and building styles to differentiate the settlements. According to one 
soldier, although Tucson was the largest place he had seen since leaving San Francisco, 
it was still mere Mexican town made of mud. “I have not seen a house built of wood 
since I left the Pacific coast,” he regretted in a letter home. “The buildings which 
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deserved the name of houses,” another soldier wrote, were of adobe with flat mud or 
dirt floors and roofs. Other structures, the soldier felt, were even worse, being built of 
mesquite poles and the long wands of the candlewood. They had chinks filled with mud 
plaster, doors of rawhide stretched over rough frames, and as windows simply apertures 
in the walls. Tucson’s social order also troubled some enlisted men who felt the place 
was unsuitable for civilized white men. One soldier wrote that though Tucson was a 
source of amazement and amusement, it “was surely no town for a young man whose 
immediate forebears traced straight back to the first Puritans.”90 
 
5.3 “Inhospitable Wasteland”  
Place mattered for officers and their wives. It was just that in their eyes pre-
railroad southern Arizona and New Mexico landscapes and society amounted to a 
dangerously compromised, immoral, underdeveloped, and foreign section of the 
continent. In fact, when the army people claimed that the Southwest differed from 
acceptable standards and represented the area largely unsuitable for white settlement 
and futures in its present condition, they also distanced the region as a whole to the 
fringes of the known world. When one officer termed “that great world” outside the 
Southwest as “God’s Country,” he indicated that in the Southwest he had been forced 
out of God’s orbit.91 Others, opting for more secular discursive strategies, argued that 
the Southwest was cut off from the “busy world” and pointed out that the region was 
plagued by distance and poor linkages to the metropole and the rest of the world. 
Distance made sure, for instance, that the region’s living standards remained inadequate. 
Many army members wrote that the supply of available commodities was weak and the 
price of things available shockingly expensive. They grumbled that, for example, a 
parlor lamp that in San Francisco cost three dollars was twenty-five dollars in Prescott, 
and that the same trend held for soup plates, flour, eggs and many other commodities. 
“The price of some things would make your hair stand on end,” one officer’s wife 
complained in a letter to her relative back home.92  
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Feeling of exclusion from the “real world” was a serious matter, a common and 
painful mentality that contributed to bitter narratives. Army men and women used terms 
such as the “gloomy region,” that “wretched Territory,” “distant and dreary desert,” 
savage “far frontier,” “the extreme frontier” or “that far-away country” to describe the 
Southwest.93 One army wife dubbed the place “an inhospitable wasteland,” while an 
officer termed it a “difficult and dangerous region.”94 Others opted for even more darker 
and sinister imagery of murder, blood, and violence. Statements such as ”this whole 
land is red with murder and massacre,” and “hostility appeared to be the normal 
condition of everybody and everything, animate and inanimate,” represent common 
views amongst the army.95 So does the characterization of the Southwest as a “dark and 
bloody ground.”96 What all these texts testify to is that in army eyes the region as a 
whole was regarded not only as a periphery but a very unpleasant and deeply troubling 
periphery. 
When thinking about southern Arizona and New Mexico as a whole or as a living 
space no army people ever saw it as similar to the regions most of them originated from; 
the eastern United States, Britain, Ireland, Germany, or the Scandinavian countries. The 
only suitable comparison they could come up with in the “old world” was the Middle-
East, for most whites a distant and exotic place. When both the officers and their wives 
and the enlisted men compared the region’s landscapes and peoples to those in the Bible 
it only further cemented the mythic aspects and “otherness” of southern Arizona and 
New Mexico. For instance, army people imagined that Mexican customs “recalled those 
of the Israelites as described in the Bible,” whereas Mexican villages were purportedly 
similar to those in Palestine.97 Tucson “reminded me forcibly of the small hamlets I had 
seen in the Holy Land, the more so as the women, all half-breeds, wore about the same 
dress as the Palestine women and carried upon their heads water-jars of the exact pattern 
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in use in the Orient,” one army man wrote. When he encountered camels, the remnants 
of the army’s pre-Civil War experiment, in the Arizona desert, this man thought they 
looked as natural in the Southwest terrain as those near the pyramids of Egypt.98 
If the eastern United States represented the home, or center, of army men and 
women’s lives, in the Southwest they felt they were as far away from home as 
imaginable. One officer’s wife stationed at Camp McDowell explained her feelings in a 
letter to her family in New York. “We have one great advantage in being here at the end 
of the earth. We cannot be sent a mile east or west, north or south, without coming 
nearer home. That is, from any other point we have more ease of access and can get 
home in a shorter time.”99 Also in a personal letter, an army surgeon vented his feelings. 
“Arizona is a poor place to live - anyone that has ever been here can testify and 
everyone seems to be looking forward a time when they will leave. Tis as out of the 
way and as far from a railroad and civilization a person can get in the United States.” 
Disheartened, he even suggested that there was no “use in the government sending 
troops here to protect so miserable a country at such an enormous expense - better let 
the Indians have it.” For his part, Commanding General Sherman suggested in the 1870s 
that whites should withdraw and either force Mexico to take Arizona back or leave it to 
the indigenous inhabitants.100 
Unsurprisingly, officers and their wives viewed the Southwest as a good place to 
get away from. “The change from Arizona desert to Washington ballroom 
was…delightful,” one officer stated. “We were to enjoy to the utmost the pleasures of 
the society…in the beautiful and gracious city,” he wrote. Relocating to Angel Island 
outside bustling San Francisco, one officer’s wife felt that she and her husband could 
only now “began to live, to truly live; for we felt that the years spent at those desert 
posts under the scorching suns of Arizona had cheated us out of all but a bare existence 
upon earth.”101 Even short breaks, such as detached service and leaves, were welcomed 
enthusiastically. One officer considered recruiting duty a lucky break. After a few days 
rest in San Diego, California, “the long nightmare of three years service in Arizona was 
partially dispelled, if not entirely removed,” he wrote. Some army people even 
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categorized duty in the East as “light duty” while calling time in Arizona as “hard 
duty.“102 
Examining the officers’ personal histories and places of death it comes apparent 
that practically none of them returned to the Southwest permanently when retiring from 
the army. Lieutenant George Eaton counts as a typical case if there ever was one. Born 
in Maine, he was assigned to Arizona in 1873 and spent three years in the region after 
which he left for the Plains. When Eaton finally retired, he did all kinds of things, 
except return to the Southwest. Eaton bought a cattle ranch and worked as a mining 
engineer in Montana before relocating to New York and eventually to Florida where he 
died. Another officer, Major David Perry worked in the Southwest for almost a decade 
in the 1880s but declined to return after retiring. He died in Washington D.C. A random 
sampling demonstrates that officers who served in Arizona passed away in places such 
as New York, Atlantic City, Vancouver, Milwaukee, or even in Los Angeles, but not in 
Arizona or New Mexico. In fact, the vast majority of these officers lived their senior 
years east of the Mississippi River. Of course this sample is far from exhaustive, but it 
nevertheless demonstrates that in relation to the Southwest officers stayed outsiders to 
the end. Exceptions to the rule were temporary, and even those usually forced by 
professional considerations. One of the rare returnees was Captain Mason M. Maxon, 
who took part in the Southwest campaigns of the 1880s. He retired in 1891 and worked 
as a professor of military science at the University of Arizona, Tucson in 1903-04. 
However, he stayed for that one year only. In 1934, Maxon died in Cincinnati, Ohio.103  
It was no wonder that officers never returned. Some of them were concerned that 
a prolonged stay in southern Arizona and New Mexico would expose them to imperial 
contamination, damaging their character and reducing them to the level of their 
surroundings. An especially troubling sign for some officers was that the enlisted men 
had already seemingly degraded themselves by embracing the colony’s relaxed norms 
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and styles. Not only did the soldiers enjoy their time in the supposedly immoral 
activities offered by the region’s settlements, but their appearance was often far from 
what the officers thought acceptable for representatives of a “civilized nation.” To the 
readers of his journal back East Lieutenant John Bigelow explained the situation he was 
forced to confront: ”Our column would be a curious sight for a European officer. Most 
of the men ride in their blue flannel shirts, their blouses strapped to their saddles; one 
big sergeant wears a bright red shirt, and looks not unlike a mounted fireman; some of 
the men take off their blue shirts and ride in their gray knit undershirts. There are all 
sorts of hat worn, of Mexican and American make...Some of the men wear over their 
blue army trousers the brown canvas overalls, intended to be worn only on fatigue; 
some wear civilian overalls. There are few trousers not torn or badly worn...Here is a 
man with a single spur; here one without any. The carbines are variously carried; some 
according to regulations…The men’s feet are some in shoes and some in boots.”104 
If we assume this officer provides an accurate portrayal of most soldiers, then, 
from the officers’ viewpoint, imperial contamination was already taking its toll among 
common soldiers. “It would be most unreasonable to expect of our troops, campaigning 
on the frontier, the trim appearance preserved by European troops on a campaign,” 
Bigelow laconically added as if accepting the inevitable.105 Interestingly, enlisted men 
themselves were more care-free about the effect the Southwest might have upon them. 
They often did not worry excessively about preserving their own “purity” in the 
colonies. “The inner man always comes to the level of his environment,” one soldier 
confidently wrote without any visible concern over the matter.106 There was no need for 
alarm; acting like other people in the region was acceptable. Only rarely did a soldier 
voice his concern. “I don’t know how I should act in the society of ladies now, as I have 
not been seen but one unmarried white woman since I came into the territory nearly 3 
years [ago],” one soldier pondered while waiting for his discharge and return home to 
the East.107 
Obviously, concern over the enlisted men’s standards never was the main issue 
for the officers or their wives. They prioritized their own lives and middle-class 
sensibilities and the enlisted men represented in some ways predictable lower class 
casualties. Still, some worried. Like with the Mexicans, what was imagined to be 
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happening to some enlisted men was a warning of what might result to oneself if not 
vigilant. An underlying danger of falling below acceptable standards, becoming a 
brutish commoner like so many of the region’s whites, was often present in army elite’s 
discourses. For example, when being invited to a dinner after a long campaign, one 
officer was more than little anxious that his “blouse, the back of my blue shirt (the only 
one I had left) was missing, my long hair reached almost to my shoulders, my beard, 
untrimmed for three months, fell on my breast, and I had on my head a soft wool hat, 
the crown of which was missing entirely and the brim had also been torn off.” He felt he 
could not attend a “civilized” dinner in such a state and was determined to refuse the 
invitation. In another case, an officer’s wife returning from New York in the comfort of 
a train broke down and cried at the bearded and dusty appearance of her husband at the 
station. He “looked like a tramp,” the wife wrote. The shameful husband agreed that he 
was in “a disreputable condition.” As in the previous example, the circumstances had 
managed to gain a temporary upper hand, marking the officer almost unrecognizable in 
front of his wife.108  
Worried, some wrote that living in the colony could make one “look like an 
Indian.” In the end, it did not take much to cross the line of propriety. For example, after 
killing a hawk and placing the tail feathers in his hat, one army man “concluded I 
looked too much like an ‘Injun,’ & took them out.”109 However, in the thinking of 
officers and their wives it was always something more than physical appearance alone 
that was at stake; contamination threatened one’s character and would make one unfit to 
return to civilized middle-class life outside the Southwest. One captain wrote that he 
had learned “by experience that residence in New Mexico and Arizona, if too 
prolonged, produces the champion breed of liars.”110 Shortly before his departure back 
home, another officer feared that his stay in Arizona had turned him into an 
unrecognizable “savage.” “You must not disown me if you find me grown part-savage 
with this frontier life. It is not calculated to add much polish to manners,” he wrote to 
his family beforehand. He also worried that the “real world” back home had moved on 
and he, having spent so much time out of touch with civilization, would have 
difficulties fitting in. “Will everybody have changed and the town have forgotten me 
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when I come? It seems a long, long time.”111 After returning from the Southwest one 
officer’s wife acknowledged that “I could not break away from my Arizona habits.” She 
smoked cigarettes, slept all afternoons, and wore only white dresses “partly because I 
had become imbued with a profound indifference to dress.” Her New England aunt who 
regarded all foreigners with contempt worried that everybody would think she had 
become a Mexican. “I was in the bondage of tropical customs, and I had lapsed back 
into a state of what my aunt called semi-barbarism.” Defying her aunt and the 
“whirlpool of advanced civilization” this army wife challenged the rigid ideals of 
middle-class standards and teased her family by exaggerating her “Arizona habits.” In 
private she turned her experiences into manifestations of personal strength, being proud 
that she had endured all the hardships of colonial circumstances and managed, at least in 
her own mind, to keep her middle-class mindset intact.112 
Many white enlisted men agreed with the officers and their wives that southern 
Arizona and New Mexico amounted to a remote periphery. They categorized the place, 
for example, as “wild country” located outside civilization, or as “a miserable place.” 
Some dubbed it “the most godforsaken country that can be made.”113 Still, there existed 
many soldiers who enjoyed their time in the region and felt a strong connection to the 
place in its contemporary state, something the officers never did. Amongst enlisted men 
one is able to find positive comments about the time spent in the borderlands. Looking 
back later in life one soldier was convinced that Arizona was the place “where I spent 
my happiest and most adventurous years” engaged in the “defense of my adopted 
country.” Another soldier equaled his time in Arizona as ”unalloyed happiness.”114  
Whereas officers retired for civilian life outside the Southwest, many enlisted 
men stayed in the region. One officer was almost annoyed when he noted that in 
Arizona “one cannot travel far in uniform without being spoken to by someone who has 
worn the army blue.”115 Following their discharge soldiers ended up trying a great 
variety of occupations. Some ran ranches and provided services for travelers, others 
became stagecoach drivers carrying mail and passengers. After his discharge one man 
carried mail for the government and went into the cattle business, selling most of the 
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beef to the troops. Another private purchased a half interest in a ranch and livestock 
near Camp Crittenden, Arizona, and made a living hauling wood and forage to the 
military post. He stayed in the Southwest for several years.116 In fact, many enlisted 
men made the Southwest more or less their permanent homes. For example, George J. 
Henry from Akron, Ohio, who had worked in the military in the 1880s in Arizona, first 
retired to civilian life in Tombstone. After reenlisting for service in Cuba and the 
Philippines by the end of the century, he again chose to come back to Arizona and to 
remain there. He operated as the caretaker at Fort Apache and was also in charge of a 
fire station at a ranger station before dying in 1940.117 
In sum, while producing a self-imposed fear of decivilization, and building 
representations of a dangerous and distant periphery, officers and their wives made the 
Southwest a region of questionable character, a terrible living space on the fringes of the 
known world, and the most remote place from home where they personally could not 
think of living in. In this way, they again rejected the Southwest. However, the situation 
was different for the enlisted men. Although some considered the Southwest a wild and 
remote place, they did not share the need to distance themselves from the place nor did 
they in general fear any kind of contamination on their characters. Many saw the place 
as a suitable living space and enjoyed their life in the Southwest. 
 
5.4 “Our Great Western Empire” 
In the end, white army people really did not want the Indians or Mexico to retain 
the Southwest, but to establish the backward nature of the region at the time of U.S. 
invasion. While the tendency in army discourses to emphasize the Southwest’s “distant 
location,” “extreme landscapes,” and “inferior society,” plagued by a shortage of proper 
white middle-class inhabitants, did give an impression that the region was too different 
from the true “Anglo-Saxon” United States to have white futures, army people’s 
strategy to represent the region as somehow void of proper society or settlements or as 
“empty of civilization” also meant that the region was readily available for the white 
middle-class who represented progress and civilization. Although officers and their 
wives undoubtedly personally disliked their colonial surroundings, on another level they 
represented the region as dangerous, remote, and decadent to make the U.S. invasion 
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look right and necessary. They made it seem that white middle-class futures of industry 
and progress were needed to save the region. One of the army people’s main points was 
that if the border area was to be truly incorporated into the nation, the threatening and 
repulsive uncolonized present the army had painted had to make way for a prosperous, 
industrious, and civilized colonized future. In army minds southern Arizona and New 
Mexico as a whole became targets for massive change. 
There occurred a noticeable sift in army representations that describe the late 
1870s and early 1880s. Army people increasingly began to interpret and imagine the 
colonial realities in a different manner. They added to the stories of danger, remoteness, 
and decadence images of white middle-class futures of industry and prosperity. 
Somehow the Southwest was really not the “outside” after all, but rather “our outside,” 
a dark ground perhaps, but increasingly penetrated by the light of the United States. The 
army elite wanted to believe, as one officer stated, that the region could be made into a 
valuable part of “our great Western Empire.”118 It must be stressed that this change in 
army representations did not take place overnight nor was it complete. It was gradual 
and only partial, and two parallel stories coexisted: the peripheral, lower class, and 
foreign Southwest and visions of a more middle-class, “modern,” and “progressive” 
American development. 
As seen, officers and their wives did not wish to identify with the borderlands 
landscapes and societies as they were. Instead they sought desperately to change them. 
Officers wrote enthusiastically that the “civilized world” was teeming with “wonderful 
advances” that must penetrate the border area as rapidly and overwhelmingly as 
possible. The railroads represented the key in turning the region around.119 The 
transcontinental railroad would break the harmful grip of distance connecting the 
Southwest and the rest of the nation. While the whole Southwest had no railroads in the 
mid-1870s, by 1882 Arizona alone had 576 miles of track. In a matter of a few years the 
borderlands was efficiently linked to the world economy and subject to the invasion of 
industrial capitalism. Many army members praised the effect of the railroad. “The 
progress in building railroads…has been one of the wonders of this western country,” 
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one officer felt.120 Others added that the railroads would not only be the best, speediest, 
and least costly mode to “protect the inhabitants” from Indians and Mexicans, but 
would allow a total turnaround when bringing in large numbers of “respectable 
citizens,” which would lead to the development of “proper” society and infrastructure, 
lure investments to develop the mines, and allow speedy exportation of the region’s 
riches.121 In short, railroads would enable a massive influx of middle-class whites who 
would, the army imagined, build a thriving and moral society and the development of 
industry - mining, ranching, and farming - that would introduce wealth and prosperity. 
Not all were convinced. Some army members doubted whether the entry of lower 
class elements would cease. With the railroads, they claimed, would come mixed groups 
of white, Mexican, and Indian bandits, who as public enemies “hover like vultures” 
over the advance of transcontinental railroads. These “vultures” would then plunder 
“honest settlers” or worse, keep the “respectable” classes from coming.122 However, in 
general the army answer for future “betterment” was the large-scale colonization of the 
area by middle-class whites and the arrival of machine civilization. Many officers and 
their wives made it seem that wherever white middle-class made its mark, things began 
to improve. For instance, one officer was certain that whereas a region void of the 
American touch was dreary and unpleasant, showing few signs of human occupancy, 
barren and desolate, lacking roads, houses, and settlements, any area where there were 
decent white Americans there already existed signs to suggest “a prosperous and 
growing population.”123 According to another officer, “there can be little doubt that 
when the Territory shall receive an immigration of thrifty farmers, it will become one of 
the most prosperous countries in the Pacific slope.”124 
In army narratives the 1880s was increasingly represented as a time of 
“marvelous developments.” In the early 1870s it was common for an officer to 
acknowledge in his official report that the region “is full of the precious metals,” and 
still write pessimistically that the country was too expensive for military operations and 
that “if the army would be withdrawn, the settlers would quit as well.”125 During the rest 
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of the decade, the tone in annual reports grew increasingly hopeful. High-ranking 
officers felt that a few years of peace and better transportation facilities would make the 
Southwest into one of the most productive regions of precious metals.126 However, it 
was in the 1880s that the previously “neglected” land, in army view, was beginning to 
be used the right way. Finally farming thrived, releasing the “natural bounty” of the 
region and changing the value and appearance of the landscapes for the better. 
“Wonderful growth,” in the words of an army wife, had made the deserts over which 
she used to travel “productive and beautiful.”127  Others added that irrigation made the 
region’s productive soil “blossom.” One officer was enthusiastic that farms near 
Roswell, New Mexico, produced “marvelous crops of melons, alfalfa, fruits, and 
vegetables.” A few army texts celebrated that sheep and cattle raising also “forged 
ahead.”128 Clearly these writings made it seem that whites were finally taking control of 
wilderness, taming and subduing it. 
Although they often valued independent small farmers as the backbone of a 
prosperous society, officers nevertheless usually represented mining as the most 
probable candidate for becoming the engine of economic improvement in the 
Southwest. “The vast growth of the mining interests in the southern part of this 
Territory [Arizona]…can hardly be appreciated without being seen. Towns have sprung 
up as if by magic. The sound of mills is heard all over this section, and the flow of 
bullion is large and increasing every day.” All this brings in large number of settlers 
who live upon the wants of the miner, and large herds of cattle and horses, wrote one 
army man. Many white army people, even some enlisted men, seemed certain: the 
Southwest of the 1880s was booming. Progress and development were remaking the 
region.129  
As seen, the officers or their wives did not regard the Southwest as a place where 
they personally wanted to live after retirement. Many nevertheless showed their faith in 
the white futures of the Southwest by investing into the region’s industries. Officers 
became involved in mining, real estate, and ranching endeavors. Already in the late-
1870s, Arizona’s military commander Colonel August Kautz was certain that “if I stay 
out here a few years longer I shall own so many mines that if they don’t make me rich I 
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shall be very poor.”130 Some men like General Benjamin H. Grierson acquired land just 
for speculation, or invested heavily and suffered setbacks when their schemes failed to 
pay off. However, there were those who made rather lucrative transactions. For 
example, one major sold three lots in El Paso for $2,500, which equaled the annual 
salary of sixteen first-year enlisted soldiers.131 Usually officers failed to strike it rich, 
yet they shared a new sense of optimism. Some openly declared that Arizona had an 
abundance of gold only waiting for discovery by the whites, whereas one junior 
lieutenant who invested his money in town lots during the 1880s acknowledged that he 
did it because he was “so full of faith in the country.”132  
Enlisted men usually had no money to invest. Instead, they tried to strike it rich 
through their own initiative and toil. In the field, soldiers searched for riches with more 
enthusiasm than they did for Indians. Some men carried large horn spoons with which 
they washed the soil here and there, hoping to discover gold.133 In one case, a sergeant 
discovered silver when scouting in the Mogollon Mountains. After his discharge he 
organized mining enterprises, but his efforts were cut short when he lost his life in a 
fight with the Apaches.134 In another instance, soldiers camped near Knight’s Ranch, 
southwest of Silver City, entered the mining game in a peculiar fashion. The men “ran 
over the mountains in search of minerals” or “secretly worked with pick and shovel in 
lonely places, expecting to strike it rich and become millionaires in short time.”135 
These activities not only reveal where the true interest of many enlisted men was during 
the military campaigns, but demonstrates their trust in the region. 
In many texts Southwest landscapes changed from threatening wastelands to 
productive entities, but also to timeless places of escape suitable as destinations for 
affluent eastern visitors. The region would prove ideal for outings; gazing at the other-
worldly wonders of the exotic and “uncivilized” in a subjugated, controlled, and named 
form. By the 1880s, officers and their wives increasingly began to bring relatives for 
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visits to enjoy “the fine weather, the new and interesting scenes and colorful natives.” 
As an example of the nostalgia that quickly took over, one visitor in the early 1880s 
arrived with the intention to discover “exotic western gunmen” before they were 
gone.136 Besides mythic gunfighters, the army found visitor potential in nature, in areas 
such as the White Sands in New Mexico, or the Grand Canyon and the Petrified Forest 
in Arizona.137 Some saw the Southwest as a future health resort and spoke highly of the 
effects of the climate and springs. They felt excited when, for instance, bathhouses and 
a hotel were constructed near Hot Springs, New Mexico.138  
When officers and wives enjoyed leisure trips to indigenous and Spanish ruins, 
they claimed that these sites were just waiting to be discovered by eastern visitors 
seeking monuments of “ancient civilizations.”139 The old towns, missions, cliff 
dwellings, and canals also allowed army men and women to construct a “dim 
prehistoric past” for the region. Although the builders of cities and canals actually 
remained a mystery, the ruins supposedly told one thing: “They possessed a far superior 
civilization to the blood-thirsty races that now occupy their places.” Many imagined that 
“ancient” civilizations had once flourished in the Southwest and that the region had 
succumbed into chaos by the time the Americans “discovered” it. One officer, 
convinced that a wonderful and powerful people had once occupied the region, puzzled 
whether the Apaches had caused the decline.140 In this history the army constructed the 
United States received the role as a civilizing force that brought new hope to a place 
reduced to barbarism.  
In many army minds the region’s settlements had also begun to change. 
Economic development meant “better built” towns and a more sophisticated social 
order. A surgeon’s wife felt relieved that progress had purportedly forced the “old 
timers” to make room for farmers.141 According to another officer’s wife, “the 
melancholy howl of the coyote, aforetime heard in the echoing darkness, and rattle of 
stage coach, with crack of whip and galloping mules as it clattered up with whoops and 
shouts and often a shot fired by a bibulous passenger, are sounds now banished by the 
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chime of church bells, whistle of locomotives and rumble of Pullman coaches over the 
greatest railroads on the continent.”142 The place formerly known as the land of cacti, 
deserts, and implacable Apaches was quickly gaining sovereignty and taking her place 
with “the States of the Nation.” The “whistle of the locomotive,” people, and wealth 
were taking over, an officer concluded.143 
Even such a nest of vice as Tucson was now imagined as more respectable. 
Officers represented that Tucson had changed “the most appreciably of any town in the 
Southwest; American energy and American capital had effected a wonderful 
transformation.” Tucson was no longer an old Spanish place but also an American city, 
with “delightful” Spanish and American society. Civilization was taking over when the 
railroads brought, for instance, theatrical companies to perform in Tucson.144 While 
Silver City still had some Mexican shanties as “an ugly reminder” of old days, it also 
had many more frame houses, of which most were fitted out “in grand style.” 
Somebody had even brought “a piano to these wild regions.” Arguably “the principal 
city of the district,” Silver City was supposedly on its way for prosperous white 
futures.145 Willcox was also transformed. “The lonely adobe stage station and telegraph 
office was gone. In its place I found a wide-awake little city with broad, well-shaded 
streets; comfortable homes, prosperous-looking business blocks, electric lights, city 
water, and other evidences of civilization,” one enlisted soldier wrote. For him, the 
advance of civilization had washed away the rough colonial town.146  
In general, progress was imagined as all powerful in most army minds. General 
Nelson Miles, commanding Arizona from 1886, triumphantly declared that “our 
progress knew no bounds.”147 One army wife stated that the Arizona she had known in 
the early 1870s “had vanished from the face of the earth” after being overwhelmed by 
the forces of progress. In 1891, an officer felt that Arizona had been thoroughly 
transformed in a little over a decade.148  However, some had their doubts. According to 
one wife, Arizona was “an unknown country then [1880s] to the majority of people, as 
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indeed it now [1907] is to many…none knows what the development of this wonderful 
country will be.”149 A few found the commitment and effort of the white populace 
lacking. Whites allegedly arrived only to make their fortunes not their permanent 
homes. This is a paradoxical accusation as virtually none of the army elite wanted to 
stay in the region for good. Nevertheless, they argued that many white settlers exhibited 
a changeful mode of life which led to disregard of permanent improvements. For 
example, one lieutenant criticized the lack of trees planted. He saw it as a neglect due 
foremost to “the failure to appreciate the influence of timber upon climate and 
agriculture” and the “hard utilitarianism of our frontier populations, the lack of aesthetic 
sense and consequent blindness and indifference to the improving effect of timber upon 
the landscape.”150 Interestingly, there were some among the army who regretted that the 
Southwest was becoming more like the rest of the country. They felt that the region was 
losing its exotic qualities. Some also pointed out that all the modern appliances and 
luxuries did not seem to belong to the place.151  
In sum, while the army’s discourses generally painted the Southwest as an 
unattractive and remote wasteland, there happened a noticeable change in army 
representations during the late 1870s and early 1880s. Army people increasingly began 
to tell stories that made the region a more legitimate part of the nation. Their need to see 
change equaled an impulse to avoid recognizing any value in the social and 
environmental diversities of the region as they existed at the time when, in army minds, 
the region was nothing but an inferior wasteland. In other words, the region as the army 
found it was represented as having no value. Only progress could redeem the Southwest 
and make it a suitable living space for whites. 
 
5.5 Representing the Army’s Mission  
When white army men and women produced southern Arizona and New Mexico 
as a distant periphery ripe for regeneration by people representing a superior 
civilization, they reserved a special role for themselves as a group that made progress 
possible. It is notable that when parading the army’s excellence, white officers, their 
wives, and enlisted men wrote in unison. They represented the army as a white 
collective where class disharmony was silenced. White army people imagined 
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themselves as a group of magnificent men and women, the first line of white 
civilization, and the one thing that secured the territories of Arizona and New Mexico. 
They were never too modest, but very anxious to gain national prominence and to make 
themselves historically important.  
One discursive strategy white army people used was to place the army “always in 
the vanguard of civilization” leading its thrust into the “most isolated parts” of the 
world.152 According to an officer’s wife, the Southwest was the most “barbarous 
country where the foot of the white man had never trod” before officers entered it with 
their soldiers. She added that the army not only “made it possible for the great railways 
to be built across the continent,” but the army villages “made it practicable for the 
pioneer and early settler to take up ground, raise cattle and till the soil, for he, too, was 
protected by the soldier.”153 In these self-triumphant texts, the army went to places 
where other whites did not dare. Writing in the early 1900s, one enlisted man felt that 
the soldiers, whom he not too modestly called the “winners of the west,” had made the 
ultimate sacrifice. Many men were “buried in unknown graves” when they “gave up 
their lives at the burning stake, surrounded by yelling savages…in order that the great 
West might be redeemed…all this that the sturdy pioneer might have the chance to 
build a home for those of present generation.” For this enlisted man, and to many others 
like him, it was the “heroic sacrifices,” and “bravery, courage, and determination” of 
soldiers that made possible the settlement of the “vast empire west of the Mississippi 
river.”154  
Army’s identity rested on notions of bravery and heroism. They sought to 
convince everybody that the army always faced discouraging odds, which only made its 
men so much braver. “It was a small Army with large tasks,” was a favorite cry 
amongst army men.155 Army people also liked to claim that when white civilians were 
“terror-stricken,” prone to “state of constant terror,” or “depressed by the raids and the 
wide path of destruction made by the elusive savages,” the army did not falter but 
“encouraged” the civilians and made the Southwest “safe for the incoming pioneers and 
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prospectors.”156 According to one officer, “It is to the credit of the United States army 
that a body of men in the Southwest, so few in number and belonging to races not 
trained to endure such hardships, furnished so much protection to settlers scattered over 
so vast a region. Many a life and ranch, and even hamlet, were saved by the timely 
appearance of a detachment of Uncle Sam’s rough riders.” Displaying their sense of 
racial superiority, one soldier proudly wrote that he and his comrades showed “the 
redskins that the white man was there to stay.”157 
Army men and wives also liked to remind everybody that they not only paved the 
way or protected others, but engaged first-hand in improving the region. The army 
increased its self-importance by emphasizing its role as the builder of roads and 
telegraph lines. It also planted hundreds of trees, and constructed small damns, sewage, 
and irrigation systems in effort to utilize and control the region’s precarious water 
supply. The army did all this for the sake of progress. Some officers, for instance, 
claimed that the telegraph line the army constructed “will facilitate commercial business 
and promote further development of the Territory,” or that the line “has done much to 
ameliorate the conditions of persons in public and private life whose lot has been cast in 
this remote portion of the territory of the United States.”158  
As a group of heroic men (and women), army people never recognized 
themselves as enforcers of violence or invaders on other peoples’ land, but rather 
painted the army’s mission as a defense and the acts of violence committed either 
defensive or retaliatory, and always necessary. They wrote that the army offered “a thin 
line of protection for civilization” along the Southwestern “Indian frontier,” tried to 
settle the “Indian business,” or participated in “the history of Apaches troubles in 
Arizona.”159 They imagined that they were performing a mission of bravery, unceasing 
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and unremitting vigilance, where all actions had been necessary, honorable, and 
justifiable.160 One officer even called the army’ mission “humanitarian work.”161 What 
in reality was conquest and colonialism became a road to peace and progress in army 
texts. Army members made themselves peace-bringers and peacekeepers who allowed 
“the peaceful settlement of the country under military protection,” as one officer wrote. 
“Our duty was to end wars and establish peace,” another declared.162 In this way, army 
people tried to secure moral superiority. Theirs was the righteous cause, their methods 
most humane, and their goal peace and prosperity. Those with the boldest imaginations 
saw that the army was not just any peace-bringer, but the body who succeeded where 
the Spanish had not, in ending centuries of bloodshed. In his pamphlet, one officer 
wrote that the army brought peace into a conflict that had been fought since “the days 
when the lieutenants of Cortez…first penetrated those regions.”163  
White army people did not stop there. They felt justified to complain that they 
should get more recognition and gratitude both at the local and national level. Many 
grew frustrated and bitter over the nationwide reluctance in recognizing Indian war 
veterans as national heroes.164 According to one officer, the nation that had proven so 
appreciative of Civil War soldiers or Spanish War and the Pacific Islands veterans, 
always overlooked the Indian wars. The people in the East would give “but nothing, 
absolutely nothing, for our brave boys” who fought against the Indians in the West. This 
officer felt compelled to ask “Are not our Indian War Veterans worthy of respect?”165 
One officer’s wife insisted that “the army has not been given the credit it deserves.” 
Although the Southwest was now “thickly settled and worth millions of dollars for the 
government, people are still unappreciative, knowing nothing of the great work done by 
the army in securing the West,” she wrote.166 Thinking of themselves as the cornerstone 
of the republic and American democracy, white army people had grown tired of being 
overlooked. In their own minds, they had made progress possible through sacrifices and 
suffering and thus deserved to be recognized as national heroes. 
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Conclusion: Wretched Present, Thriving Future 
Through their discourses army officers and their wives reduced the Southwest 
and its landscapes, peoples, and settlements to an understandable and manageable whole 
and labeled and categorized colonial space in relation to their visions of what a proper 
region and society ideally looked like. Southern Arizona and New Mexico deviated 
from their standards, and officers and wives often felt uncomfortable and disgusted, 
claiming to find little of value in what they saw. This sense of alienation and difference 
structured the discourses. Officers and wives represented the landscapes as desolate and 
empty, offering only a whole variety of obstacles, challenges, and dangers to a civilized 
person. Villages/towns allegedly lacked familiar elements of public space and decent 
society found in the “white” Protestant towns and villages in the East. For officers and 
wives, crooked dirt roads, seemingly primitive adobe housing, the prevalence of bars 
and gambling houses, and the high percentage of Mexicans and lower class whites 
marked the settlements as foreign, unworthy, and immoral. They assigned to the 
Mexicans the role of racial degenerates and backward foreigners who had contaminated 
their own whiteness when associating with the Indians and subjecting themselves to 
Apache rule; and they judged the lower class whites not for their white ethnicity but for 
failing to act white. The small size and questionable quality of the white middle-class 
troubled many. For officers and wives, being categorized as part of the “respectable” 
class was connected to perceptions of manners, attitudes, and character, but also a fluid 
definition adjusted to meet the region’s supply of candidates. Sympathetic towards 
those they regarded as “civilizing forces,” officers and wives could also be highly 
protective of their collective image and usually instantly reduced all civilians thought to 
question the army into greedy exploiters. 
The army represented the Southwest the way it did to make the U.S. invasion 
seem legitimate, right, and necessary. The border area was a dynamic entity in army 
discourses, a region constantly in the making. Its “peripheral location,” “unused 
landscapes,” and “inferior society” made it seem that the region would remain 
permanently different from the true “Anglo-Saxon” United States, but the army elite’s 
strategy to represent the region as having no proper society or civilization also made 
southern Arizona and New Mexico readily available for white middle-class takeover in 
the name of progress and civilization. So did the strategy of constructing a dim 
prehistoric past for the region. Army people claimed that the area had experienced a 
long and constant decline at the time the U.S. forces arrived. In this story the Southwest 
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was practically worthless and in a state of decadence when the army, and the white 
middle-class and machine civilization, whose entrance the army made possible, arrived 
to “save” the region. 
Officers and their wives distanced and labeled the peoples and settlements with 
the region’s reordering and incorporation in mind. They evaluated different peoples and 
settlements by their (un)suitability for white middle-class futures. That the lower 
elements or the Mexicans did not present “respectable” whiteness made them especially 
unwanted in regards to the region’s ideal social makeup and dangerous to any future 
progress. Also, the “empty” landscapes and towns such as pre-railroad Tucson 
symbolized the static, peripheral, and disorderly contemporary state of affairs, whereas 
towns like Prescott signaled the arrival of progress, the remaking of the region to better 
suit the national model. Officers and their wives openly celebrated progress in the form 
of middle-class settlers, industry, and the railroads. Many claimed that a rapid and 
profound change was taking place in the 1880s: the landscapes were becoming 
productive and places like Tucson “respectable” once “civilized forces” took over. In 
this way, army discourses made U.S. colonialism not harmful but a necessity for the 
region’s well-being and survival. 
Officers and their wives secured colonial authority by producing a certain 
relationship towards the place facing colonialism that ultimately manifested their not-
belonging. First, they placed themselves at the top of colonial hierarchies and built their 
identity and authority by setting themselves apart from their colonial surroundings. 
When forced to live in a society they felt was not structured by the legacies and 
preferences of white middle-class Americans, the army elite felt a need to protect and 
distance themselves mentally from the local way of life, seeing the region as an 
unsuitable living space for themselves. Also, by representing the region’s peoples and 
settlements as uncivilized, worthless, and peripheral, army officers and their wives 
expressed that nobody or nothing in the Southwest society was equal or above them. As 
representatives of the refined native-born middle-class, they believed they constituted 
an anomaly in the backward and un-American border society. Second, officers and their 
wives increased their colonial authority and collective importance by claiming that they 
represented a group who saved the region, brought peace, and steered the place towards 
better white futures. They imagined that, if not for them, the region would have 
remained a dark and bloody ground. Army people’s sense of superiority also gave them 
the possibility to imagine that they had constructed the truth about the region’s past, 
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present, and future. All white army people seemingly never questioned what 
qualifications they might have for representing the “truth” about the region. They took 
their expertise for granted, as part of their privileged status as members of a purportedly 
superior culture. 
White enlisted men approached the colonial terrain from a somewhat different 
perspective. Although they, much like the officers and their wives, also saw the 
landscapes in terms of confrontation, thought that the region was wild, peripheral, and 
remote, and imagined themselves as the heroic vanguard of civilization, enlisted 
soldiers did not share a need to distance themselves from the place facing colonialism. 
Their identity did not rest on being set apart from their surroundings. They enjoyed the 
more relaxed social scene found in many of the settlements, and did not fear imperial 
contamination, although many felt that there was ultimately something wrong and odd 
in a society that was so different from what they were used to. When officers and their 
wives rejected the colonial present, white enlisted soldiers negotiated that very present 
as potential living space for themselves, yet believed in civilization too.
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Part III THE COMMUNITY 
Chapter 6 
The Army Village as White Middle-Class Living Space 
 
“My residence [was] a two-roomed adobe hut, with mud walls 
and floor, open to the thatch of brush, and without any article of 
furniture. This was our refuge. For this I had left civilization, 
and comfort, and security!”1-Julia Davis, an officer’s wife  
 
In the summer of 1871, Lieutenant Frederick Phelps arrived to Fort Bayard with 
his wife. The post was located ten miles east of Silver City near the Santa Rita 
Mountains, in the midst of the mining district in southwest New Mexico. Coming from 
an established Ohio family where college level education was the rule, his father and 
grandfather having served as language teachers, lawyers, state supreme court judges, 
and farmers, Phelps initially felt unease adjusting to his new home. Although Phelps 
appreciated the companionship of officers and their wives, and felt that the locality was 
somewhat “picturesque,” the army village itself represented for him “everything 
undesirable,” a “lonely, isolated post six hundred miles” from the nearest symbol of 
civilization, the railroad. Phelps complained there was nothing to eat except meager 
government rations consisting mainly of beef, coffee, bacon, sugar, rice, pepper, salt, 
and vinegar, and a few extra cans of vegetables. Also, if not for a bachelor officer who 
let them have his house, the Phelps’ home would have been a tent. The house, originally 
built as a stable, proved an utter disappointment. It had a most peculiar parlor with one 
wall of stones, one of adobe, one of pine logs set on end, and one of slabs from the 
sawmill, Phelps described. The floor was rough boards, ceiling canvas, roof mud, the 
door of two boards on wooden hinges with a wooden latch, and the only window had 
immovable sash. The smaller room had no window and the floor was of hard smooth 
mud. Phelps’ house also included two tents, one used as a dining-room and the other as 
a kitchen. Although Phelps represented the house as a low, dark, and uncomfortable 
dwelling occupied by a number of dangerous tarantulas and centipedes, he also wanted 
to give an impression of the army elite’s capacity as civilized people to endure and 
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overcome such “hardships.” After improvements, Phelps tried to convince his readers, 
the home became “quite cosy and comfortable.”2 
The army made its occupation of indigenous peoples’ lands known by 
establishing posts on their homelands. Army posts functioned as bastions of U.S. power, 
or, as historian Durwood Ball called them, “armed national islands,” providing aid, 
security, and escorts to settlers, businessmen, and government officials, and offering the 
troops bases from which to conduct their offensive operations. The scale of conquest led 
to a situation that after the Civil War the army was scattered in more than two hundred 
posts from the Mexican border to the Canadian.3 More than anything else army posts 
were villages, living spaces where army men and women were able to put into practice 
their visions of proper life and social order, while simultaneously constructing specific 
identities and status for themselves. Villages functioned as social and cultural sites 
through which the values, norms, and practices of the metropolitan society were 
funneled to the colonized region. Army villages were also contested spaces, where the 
main social division separated the officers and their dependants from the lower class 
civilian servants and enlisted ranks. This chapter places the spotlight on the mentalities 
of officers and their wives, and discusses how their collective identity and position as 
the village upper class, the army elite, was constructed, displayed, and maintained 
through the orchestration and representation of public and domestic space. 
Being always a tiny minority surrounded by large masses of immigrant and 
working-class enlisted men, officers and their wives could hardly rely on numbers when 
constructing their collective identity and importance inside the army villages. For 
example, in 1869 there were fourteen army villages in Arizona, with an average 
garrison of one hundred and fifty men each. Each village usually had only 
approximately two to six officers.4 When Camp Crittenden in 1870 had 143 white 
soldiers, only six officers lived there. One surgeon remembered that Fort Bowie during 
the late 1860s was a two officer post. In 1870, Bowie had six officers amongst 
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approximately 300 soldiers. There were even fewer wives. In 1870, Bowie had four 
wives while at Camp Crittenden there lived none. Two years later Bowie and Crittenden 
had only one officer’s wife at each post. Even Whipple Barracks, the department 
headquarters, had only two wives in 1871.5 Besides soldiers and officers and their 
dependants, other residents in the villages included a highly variable number of 
laundresses, civilian servants, laborers, freighters, and merchants.  
 
6.1 Village Locations and Public Space 
As instruments of conquest, most army villages were temporary establishments, 
seldom intended or designed for long-term use. From time to time the army determined 
which villages were to be abandoned, which should be spared for the time being, and 
which were to be maintained longer. For example, the Annual Report for 1882 handed 
permanent status only to forts Grant and Huachuca in Arizona and forts Marcy and 
Wingate in New Mexico. Forts Thomas, Apache, Lowell, McDowell, and Whipple 
Barracks in Arizona and forts Bayard, Cummings, Union, and Stanton in New Mexico 
the report categorized as temporary and specified that in ten years time they would no 
longer be necessary. Forts Bowie, Mojave, Verde, and Yuma in Arizona and Craig and 
Selden in New Mexico the report judged suitable for immediate abandonment.6 
According to one officer, “the ever-changing location of Indians” determined 
village locations.7 In reality the situation was slightly more complex than that. 
Established near transportation routes, supply centers, reservations, and settlements, 
army villages were meant to enable successful conquest by their mere presence alone. 
For example, while Fort Bowie was placed to guard Apache Pass, a strategic route from 
California to the East, Fort Bayard was to guarantee the successful operation of an 
important mining district in southwest New Mexico. Forts Whipple, Lowell, and Marcy 
were situated in or near the major population centers of Prescott, Tucson, and Santa Fe 
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respectively, whereas Fort Cummings was located near a spring, the only source of 
water for forty-five miles on either side.8 
Army men and women often complained that in determining village locations, 
considerations of human comfort were given little weight. Heat, lack of vegetation and 
game, and the occurrence of diseases were the most common vehicles used to label the 
village sites. According to one army narrative, Fort Thomas, established in 1876, was 
“next to Yuma, the hottest post in the republic and the most sickly, excepting none.” 
Located on a very low and hot valley squeezed in by mountains some six or seven 
thousand feet higher than the valley and only six or eight miles apart, the village 
received very little rain. What rain there was either fell on the mountains or was 
absorbed by the arid atmosphere before it reached the valley. This felt like a bad joke 
amongst the village residents to whom the location resembled an oven. In addition, a 
malignant fever troubled the occupants, causing several deaths among the soldiers. Ice 
would have saved many lives but the War Department was reluctant to issue any 
because of the cost. It is telling of the way the army elite took care of their own that 
when a daughter of one of the officers got the fever, a two hundred pounds supply of ice 
was delivered in twelve hours from another army village.9 
Many a village location was estimated in the same way as Thomas. During late 
1860s and early 1870s the sites of camps Crittenden, Goodwin, Date Creek, and Grant 
were all judged unhealthy and “extremely malarious.” According to one army wife, 
eighty percent of the men at Camp Date Creek suffered from malarial fever, whereas 
another army informant wrote that Camp Goodwin was “cursed” with malaria so that 
not only was everyone regularly sick but it was almost impossible for the soldiers to get 
well there. In 1871 Goodwin was abandoned, Crittenden two years later, and finally 
Date Creek in 1874. Grant was relocated in 1873.10 In New Mexico, a resident dubbed 
Fort Craig as “one of the most desolate posts on the frontier” as the village was situated 
on the edge of an almost perfectly level plain covered only with gravel and scarcely a 
bush. The site of Fort Selden included nothing but “sandy and sterile soil, resting on 
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volcanic rocks.”11 Some described Camp McDowell as being “fearfully hot” for the 
three summer months, and claimed to have measured 116 degrees Fahrenheit in the 
shade, while others called it “the most unhappy post at which we ever served.” It is 
noteworthy that not all agreed. More rarely officers and their wives portrayed the village 
sites in a positive light. One army wife even found the climate at McDowell to be 
pleasant especially during the fall, when the weather was “the most charming 
imaginable.”12 Also, the surroundings of Fort Stanton were represented as pleasant, 
residents enjoying nearby streams alive with fish. Game of almost every kind was also 
found in the vicinity. Also the climate was perfect, not too warm or too cold. “To 
breathe was like drinking new wine,” one army wife at Stanton wrote. At Whipple 
Barracks the army village itself was supposedly far from handsome, but the blue skies, 
the wonderful rugged mountains, and the mystery of the desert made the location 
bearable to some.13 
Before the early 1900s army villages differed in their design and use of building 
materials. Although the Quartermaster General’s office in Washington D.C. suggested 
designs, the officers at the local level usually constructed the villages trusting their own 
preferences and using the materials at hand. Often the villages were set to reflect the 
army elite’s perceptions of what a proper American settlement should look like. The 
villages displayed a hierarchical and segregated layout in housing, combined with 
shared public areas and buildings. Usually, as historian Alison Hoagland writes, the 
army village consisted of a dozen or more buildings “organized around an open space, 
much like a village green; the buildings were a mixture of style and materials, much as 
if they had been built by private citizens over several decades; lesser buildings appeared 
in a disorderly arrangement, away from the center; and trees, porches, sidewalks, and 
gardens contributed to the domestic atmosphere.”14  
The parade ground was the village center, around which the buildings were 
organized. For instance, Fort Bowie in the mid-1870s had three sets of officers’ quarters 
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on the south side of the parade. East side had another set of officers’ quarters adjoining 
the adjutant’s office, and a building containing the post library, schoolroom, the post 
bakery, and a set of company quarters. Another set of company quarters and two large 
storehouses were located on the north side. Behind the company quarters were the 
mess-room, kitchen, a bath-room, and lavatory used by enlisted men. The west side was 
reserved for the post hospital. A short distance in the rear of the south end of the 
hospital was the guardhouse. Quarters for married soldiers were at the old post site, 
while the shops, stables, and corral were to the north. The post garden was a quarter of a 
mile distant from the village proper.15  
The layout, although nowhere identical, was similar in most villages. The parade 
ground divided village space to the officers’ realm, the enlisted section, and the 
common part. Usually at least one side of the parade was reserved for officers’ homes, 
and the soldiers’ “neighborhood” was typically located on the opposite side, away from 
elite eyes. The rest included “shared space” occupied by administrative, commercial, 
and other public buildings. In some places a roadway encircled the parade ground. 
Whipple Barracks, for instance, had the soldier’s quarters, kitchen, and bakery on one 
side, with the officers’ quarters opposite, and the storerooms on the another side, with 
the guard-house, adjutant’s office, and laundresses’ quarters opposite. At Camp Verde 
the west side of the parade ground had enlisted men’s “world” with the company 
quarters and the guard-house, and the east side the officers’ quarters. The south side was 
the domain of “the shared public space,” including an administrative building with 
offices for the adjutant, quartermaster, and commissary, a school-room, and a “lower 
class” section with three sets of laundresses’ quarters and another building used by 
married soldiers. Outside the main circle were the hospital, the magazine, and bakery, 
while the gardens were about a mile and half above the village and the post cemetery 
two miles northeast.16 
A “typical fort,” historian Robert Utley wrote, “looked more like a village than a 
fort” as only a handful displayed stockades or other defenses.17 Officers and wives also 
recognized this. Due to lack of stockades, some officers thought that the forts really did 
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not live up to the meaning of the word.18 Compared to New England village landscape 
the army villages, however, looked somewhat different. Sutler’s buildings acted as 
stores and kitchens, canteens (in the 1880s) and mess rooms imitated bars and 
restaurants. Blacksmiths and sometimes carpenters and other skilled craftsmen provided 
their services somewhat like in the “normal” civilian villages. However, the army posts, 
for one thing, completely lacked meetinghouses and chapels. Religion in general was 
very much downplayed in the army. Also, although some villages had a reading room or 
a library they were often poorly stacked and in shabby condition. Also the school 
houses, the few places that had them, seemed to enjoy only minimal usage.19 
Furthermore, the parade ground sometimes looked less than ideal “village green.” For 
instance, at Camp Date Creek the village center was all rock, without any grass on it, 
while the parade at Fort Yuma was “a stony lawn - the rocky hill roughly dressed and 
made smooth by filling in with fine stone.”20 Moreover, although the army villages had 
no high houses and the buildings were only one or one-and-a-half story structures, 
which increased a village-like feel, the houses, unlike in the east, were not only poorly 
built but made mostly of adobe. In the mid-1870s, forts in New Mexico like McRae and 
Selden were entirely of adobe, Stanton of stone, while Bayard was of adobe, stone, and 
log. In Arizona forts Bowie, Lowell, McDowell were adobe constructions, while 
Apache was built of wood, mostly of rough-hewn pine logs. Seven years later the 
situation was still much the same. Forts Bowie, Craig, Lowell, McDowell, Mojave, 
Stanton, and Verde were made of adobe, Whipple of frame, and Yuma of brick.21 
Army villages were never ready, but objects of constant improvement.22 In order 
to make public space more eastern village-like, the army attempted landscaping. 
According to one officer, Fort Yuma was transformed into a real garden by directing 
water through ditches from the Colorado River. The village gained an ample garden of 
vegetables and rows of planted trees. “Everything is green and beautiful, but only 
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because here water has been brought to land which was once called the American 
desert,” one of the army wrote. It was a joy to see “the green leaves within the 
enclosure, and it gave us all a keen sense of comfort to escape from the intolerable dust 
and heat outside into the spacious quarters of [the] major.” In army minds Yuma had the 
reformed appearance of an oasis in the desert. So did Whipple Barracks, which in 1876 
had “a good stream of water running through the garrison and some small willows and 
cottonwood trees” planted. At Fort Stanton the army placed new trees around the parade 
ground and to facilitate their growth dug a ditch with water constantly running on it that 
kept the trees always moist.23  
Often the projects failed. At Camp McDowell a line of cottonwood saplings were 
planted after 1865 at short intervals along the sides of the parade ground for ornaments 
and shade. Watered “assiduously” for two years, the trees reportedly at first flourished, 
but then showed signs of decline in spite of attention paid to them, and eventually came 
to be neglected. In 1869, one army wife, judging McDowell unsuitable for gardening, 
wrote that there was “not a green thing to be seen” in the village. Although another wife 
felt differently, arguing that “anyone can have a garden here if he chooses to take the 
trouble,” a decade later the attempts to construct a post garden at McDowell, and to 
make the desert bloom, had failed, the garden being neglected and overgrown with 
weeds.24  
Projects turned more ambitious in the 1880s. The army, for instance, ran water to 
Mojave, Apache, and Lowell through elaborate systems of iron pipes, reservoirs, tanks, 
and steam pumps.25 To battle chronic water shortage at Grant the army channeled water 
from the mountains above to a newly built reservoir, from which it was driven onwards 
through a system of pipelines. Grant got a sprinkler system and a sewage system that 
made possible bathrooms inside the houses and water closets outside. Although scarce 
and of poor quality in the past, now water was deemed so plentiful that the army built 
six fountains. Also, water was used to irrigate cottonwood trees every day, and for 
increased gardening. The ultimate monument to progress and to the army’s mastering of 
nature, however, was the large cement-walled pond, named Lake Constance, on the 
parade ground. As this rebuilding at Grant was completed, officers claimed that the 
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precarious uncertainty of water was a hindrance of the past. The post “certainly looked 
at its best, all beautifully green, the lake full of clear water, the fine mountains playing 
and the sun shining through them.” It was not only ironic, but a telling reminder of the 
overconfidence of the army that, according to historian Constance Wynn Altshuler, 
Grant was abandoned because of water shortage in 1905.26  
 
6.2 Domestic Space 
Although officers, their wives, and the enlisted ranks were aliens under the same 
sky and held residence in the same villages, they did not live like a united community of 
equals. Not only were elite houses physically separated from the enlisted buildings, but 
the houses themselves were very different and reflected a clear hierarchy and 
differentiation. Enlisted men lived densely in large barracks where there was no privacy 
and little space for each individual. As a rule two men were forced to share a bunk, 
before in 1871 and 1872 enlisted men began to get their own separate beds.27 Often the 
comforts and furniture were also minimal. For instance, at Camp Grant soldiers lived in 
four large shingle-roofed adobe barracks, 120 by 20 feet, warmed with fire-places and 
stoves. Aside the bunks, there was not much furniture. In Fort Apache soldiers occupied 
overcrowded barracks of rough-hewn logs, chinked with mud and roofed with boards. 
They had neither floors nor ceilings, with only one door in the front and a small window 
in the rear. Two-story bunks and a few benches and tables, all manufactured by the 
soldiers, constituted the furniture. Reportedly the men preferred to sleep in the open air 
during the summers to avoid “the persecutions of the numberless bed-bugs which infest 
the quarters.”28  
Sometimes the enlisted men did not even have any barracks. In the early 1870s 
soldiers at Camp Date Creek had to occupy a storage house.29 However, usually soldiers 
ended up living in tents. For example, in 1869 at Camp McDowell four companies of 
enlisted soldiers slept in tents, while one troop occupied an adobe barracks. Officers, 
however, had houses. In addition, the post included houses for the blacksmith, a 
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hospital, guardhouse, sutler’s store, and commissary/bakehouse. Even the laundresses 
appear to have lived in some sort of houses. By 1874 the situation had improved 
somewhat as apparently all soldiers lived in adobe dormitories.30 Still, it is safe to say 
that the construction of enlisted men’s barracks was never the first priority. Fort Lowell 
was relocated on March 1873, but almost two years later the soldiers still lived in old 
and worn-out tents, two men per tent. The tents offered no protection from the heat of 
the sun in the summer or from the cold of winter. Lowell, however, already had two sets 
of officers’ quarters, a store-house, and “a very fine guard-house.” Under these 
circumstances an enlisted soldier opting for better quality housing had to arrange to 
have himself locked up. When the soldiers eventually received funding to erect barracks 
at Lowell, it was not because the army saw that adobes were better than tent canvas, but 
because they proved cheaper.31 
On the question of their own housing, officers and their wives insisted on the 
necessity of private homes, usually one or two family houses handed out according to 
rank. While colonels were officially supposed to get five rooms, second lieutenants 
were allocated only one. Often the post commanders’ houses were elegant and spacious, 
at least when compared to enlisted men’s barracks. At Fort Grant in 1874 the 
commanding officer lived in a 50 by 90 feet building traversed by a hall from front to 
rear, and by one from side to side, cutting the house into four portions, each containing 
two rooms. In the rear, under the same roof, an extension contained a dining-room and 
kitchen. There were also rooms in the attic for the use of servants and for storage. The 
whole structure was surrounded by a veranda. Other officers lived in semi-detached 
houses, 50 by 68 feet, containing, for each officer, three rooms plus a detached kitchen 
and dining-room as well as attic space and a veranda. The buildings were all constructed 
with stone walls and shingle-roofed. At Fort Bowie, the officers’ quarters were adobe 
constructions, with dirt roofs. The main part contained two rooms, 15 by 15 feet, 
separated by a hall, and a wing in the rear, which had a dining-room and kitchen.32 In 
the mid-1870s Fort Bayard had new quarters under construction for officers to replace 
the “old log huts.” The new adobe houses, with shingle roof, consisted each of a hall, 
bedroom, dining-room, with pantry attached and cellar underneath, and a kitchen. The 
rooms were 16 by 16 feet, and 14 feet high. A yard with adobe or stone walls was 
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attached to each house. The yard had a wood-shed, water-closet, bathroom, chicken-
coop, and a servant’s room. A covered porch was set to extend in front of each building 
to increase the village-like feel.33 
Officers and their wives dreaded the possibility that they would have to reside in 
tents, although when such was the case the tents were much more spacious and 
luxurious than the ones given to enlisted men. Disliking the tents immensely some 
officers and wives felt content with any house. For instance, one couple were pleased 
with their “primitive” log house at Whipple Barracks because they were under the 
impression that in most other places in the region all were housed in tents. Also, even 
though one family was disappointed that their house was not finished when they arrived 
at Fort Selden, they still felt lucky that the rooms already available for occupation 
proved “larger and better than a tent.”34 
Although private houses implied stability and a certain standard of civilization, 
often the quality of the houses available failed to meet the demands and expectations of 
officers and wives. Army wives especially, but also officers, constructed a plethora of 
representations of the housing, judging and valuing their homes by using the building 
materials, orderly appearance, and level of comfort as measurements. For instance, at 
Camp Date Creek, Fanny Corbusier, an army surgeon’s wife, wrote that she was forced 
to occupy a two room adobe house with dirt roofs that had been shingled over and 
ceilings of shelter tents sewed together. In this odd dwelling the roof of the separate 
dining room and kitchen was canvas that leaked badly, and floors were pounded earth 
so that in the wet season pools of water became muddy. The Corbusiers placed bowls to 
catch the water, but still the stove got so wet it was hard to keep the fire going. Much to 
their distress the Corbusiers also found numerous rattlesnakes, Gila monsters, scorpions, 
tarantulas, and centipedes in the ceiling, on the dirt floor, on their furniture, outside their 
front door, and among the piles of rocks near the post; in other words almost 
everywhere.35  
Also describing her life at Camp Date Creek in the 1870s, Frances Boyd, an 
officer’s wife, wrote that the far from adequate adobe house she occupied consisted of 
“one long room, with a door at either end, and two windows on each side.” The room 
had to be divided by a canvas curtain to have a sitting-room and a bedroom. “We felt 
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very happy on account of having a floor other than the ground,” although it was only 
rough planks, which had shrunk so that they had wide spaces between them. The 
adjoining vacant house was used as a dining room, and a separate kitchen stood far 
away in the opposite direction. Being left unfinished the walls of rough brown adobe 
crumbled in the dry atmosphere, and large holes formed, in which vermin, especially 
centipedes, found hiding-places. “I never dared place our bed within at least two feet of” 
of the walls because the centipedes “were so plentiful that I have frequently counted a 
dozen or more crawling in and out of the interstices,” Boyd noted. “Scorpions and 
rattlesnakes also took up their adobe with us, and one snake of a more harmless nature 
used almost daily to thrust his head through a hole in the door. Altogether we had plenty 
of such visitors.” She admitted that they killed so many snakes that to obtain a plentiful 
collection of rattles. In all, Boyd felt that “for surely no one ever lived more queerly.” 36 
She categorized the housing conditions to be far from normal, or acceptable, and below 
the standards of what she felt her class position demanded.  
Army wives’ representations of housing at Camp Date Creek formed rather a 
typical case. The situation was usually just as “queer” in any of the villages, although 
the exact nature of deficiencies, or what some of officers and their wives termed as 
“oddities,” varied from village to village and from house to house. In addition to what 
they thought was utterly incomprehensible and substandard construction, where, for 
instance, floors and windows did not exist and every wall in a room could be of 
different material, one of the most troubling issues for officers and wives seems to have 
been that the houses failed to provide security. Not only snakes and other wildlife, but 
fire and water caused damage and made life uncertain. For instance, in September 1876 
a fire destroyed the stockade building and all officers’ quarters at Camp Mojave, 
Arizona, whereas in 1881 three major fires were reported which ruined the headquarter-
office building at Whipple, a bakery at Apache, and officers’ quarters at Verde. Next 
year another fire destroyed a set of officers’ quarters at Fort Apache.37 If fires seemed 
frequent enough, so did water damage. In 1866, flooding partly destroyed the first 
Camp Grant, while at Camp McDowell before the early 1870s almost all roofs leaked 
and walls cracked and washed away. Another example, this time from Fort Lowell, 
shows that in 1879 the roofs in the officers’ quarters and barracks leaked to such an 
extent that new roofs were immediately needed. The situation at the post hospital was 
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perhaps the worst. The building leaked so badly that it was almost impossible to protect 
patients and property, not to mention to preserve the rooms in proper hospital condition. 
Walls and floors were soaked and stained by water and mud passed through the roof so 
“as scarcely to be recognized or endured as hospital walls.” In 1883, storm damage was 
reported for camps Bowie and Price.38 When she lived in Fort Bayard, Frances Boyd 
felt that it was beneath her status to inhabit a log hut with “no floor,” damaged by dust 
and sudden storms that either washed right through the house from the open doors or, 
alternatively, uprooted the whole structure. Inside the houses, Boyd claimed, the ladies 
were forced to mount chairs or tables to escape mud baths and take refuge under 
umbrellas until after the storms subsided. While some bachelor officers saw their roof 
give in several times, one fresh army bride witnessed a storm pass through her house 
from the open doors. The storm soaked her fancy eastern carpet with mud, streaked and 
discolored her white curtains, and turned her pictures and ornaments unrecognizable. “I 
never saw a more dismayed and discouraged woman,” Boyd wrote of the bride.39  
A number of army people saw the use of adobe - linking it to inferior Mexican 
tradition - as synonymous with lack of comfort and proper sophistication. As in officers 
and wives’ representations of the region’s settlements, abode became a tool in labeling 
the standards of living space, often marking them unfit. For one army wife, Fort Mojave 
in the early 1870s represented a “mere collection of adobe buildings with no special 
pretensions to comfort.”40 Others acknowledged the practical wisdom of adobe 
buildings against outside heat.41 For them the poor quality of housing was not a question 
of adobe alone. Wood and brick could prove equally miserable choices.42 
Army houses often did not provide proper comfort or much valued security, and 
thus they proved poor examples of middle-class living and failed as sanctuaries for 
middle-class privacy. However, officers and their wives held a strong belief in progress 
and wanted to represent themselves as a group who could make civilization happen. 
Their identity called for a proper home and therefore, domestic spaces, much like the 
public spaces, became targets for an endless improvement. The army elite shared a 
strong desire to “beautify” their homes. It seems that many a wife especially approached 
this task with energy and zeal. Reflecting middle-class ideals, in the gender ideology of 
                                                 
38
 Frazer, Forts of the West, 6; Surgeon-General’s Office, Circular no. 8, 545; Fort Lowell records, May 
1, 1879 and July 1, 1879 letters, ASHS; ARSW, 1883, 589. 
39
 Boyd, Cavalry Life, 214-219.  
40
 Boyd, Cavalry Life, 106-108. See also Reeve, “Soldier’s Memoirs,” 44. 
41
 Myres, “Evy Alexander,” 30, 32, 35. 
42
 Biddle, Reminiscences, 164-165. 
 183 
the army elite domestic space was the primary domain of women. Being considered 
mere camp followers with no official position in the eyes of the army irritated some 
wives, but it did not diminish their attempts to portray themselves as a civilizing force 
whose loyalty was to their husbands and the army and who exercised their power 
primarily through the domestic sphere. Army wives displayed “sweet goodness and 
devotion” and “surely in no other life can women be found who are at once so brave and 
true,” one wife wrote.43 Many claimed that the mere presence of officers’ wives made 
the villages instantly more “home-like” and comfortable.44 However, in the end many of 
the wives did not reach their goals, but grew frustrated by their inability to make the 
homes copies of eastern middle-class houses.  
Julia Davis at Camp McDowell was one energetic wife determined to make her 
house a civilized home. “Thankful I was now for all the baggage I had carried. The bed 
was put up; the pretty lace curtains arranged both for it and for the window; and I had 
beautiful linen, part of my wedding out-fit,” she wrote. The walls, she felt, had to be 
improved. “I had no idea of sitting down on a packing-case and gazing on mud walls, if 
I could do better. Happy was I when I succeeded in having those mud walls whitened, 
when I hung up my pictures, arranged my photographs, and placed my books on the 
shelves improvised from a packing-case.” It seems that McDowell lacked lumber to 
make furniture. However, Davis was seemingly untroubled by the lack of materials at 
her disposal. Proud of her resourcefulness and confident that she could overcome all 
obstacles, she improvised: “packing cases made everything-toilet-table, seats, book 
case, sofa, wardrobe, all the necessities of life.” When tables and chairs proved “things 
unknown,” Davis had rough boxes and chests to serve the purpose. Also, “our own 
trunks and boxes covered with gaudy chintz…and with their tops well stuffed with hay, 
supplied as seats and lounges.” Chintz and muslin and “a little skilful arrangement did 
wonders.” In addition, she had a chimney contrived, and the blacksmith made her a pair 
of iron dogs. “When we had a fire it was just as nice as it could be.” In the end she was 
relatively please with the improvements, thinking she had made best of the situation: “it 
was the cunningest little house when it was all fixed up, and the wonder of everybody 
who saw it.”45  
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Another wife shared the optimistic spirit of Julia Davis. She spread curtains to 
hide the adobe walls as much as possible, arranged curtains as festoons over and around 
the front door which was part glass, and covered the hard and dry mud floors with a 
carpet. “How much good a little fixing up does,” she wrote.46 In their house the 
Corbusiers had ample matting to cover the floor, a “comfortable couch” from a rough-
board frame, hospital bed-springs and a mattress covered with cretonne. The also had 
two walnut rockers and two folding carpet chairs, china, lamps, and a few books. One 
resourceful wife made adornments for her house by sewing. She made window curtains 
and upholstered a lounge and two chairs “in pretty light blue cretonne with apple 
blossoms on it.”47 An army surgeon in Fort Bowie had windows made larger, inserted 
glass, and had new writing tables, bookcases, chimneys and fireplaces built. His goal, 
he wrote, was the same as it was with the others: to turn his accommodation into “quite 
a civilized apartment.”48   
 Some were less pleased with the results of their efforts than others. Many a times 
the women felt that they were forced to settle for less than ideal solutions when 
constructing their domestic spaces. Some felt troubled that there was no room for all 
their belongings. Although army wives could arrive with more than a dozen large 
trunks, they were “glad to find simply storage,” while the “pretty contents never saw the 
light,” one wife wrote. Another added that when the time for unpacking all the chests 
and trunks came “there was no closet, there were no hooks on the bare walls, no place to 
hang things or lay things, and what to do I did not know. I was in despair.” She was 
“born and brought up in a spacious house, with plenty of bedrooms, closets, and an 
immense old-time garret.” Thus, she wrote, the “small space of one room and a hall” 
and the “forlorn makeshifts for closets, and the absence of all conveniences, annoyed 
me.”49  
Many who had to resort to makeshift complained that their homes were never 
properly furnished or that they altogether lacked articles that would qualify to be called 
furniture. One couple had a makeshift construction of a chest with cushions on top and 
covered with the carriage blanket “doing duty” as a divan. This divan with two tables 
and three chairs “furnishes (?)” the parlor, they wrote. Resorting to irony, this couple 
added that their bedroom was “being luxuriously” filled with a bedstead and a 
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washstand, and the dining room “amply furnished with one table.”50 An army surgeon 
covered the rough mud ceiling of his roof with unbleached cotton, had his book shelves 
suspended from the rafters by the same material torn into strips. One hanging over the 
fireplace was filled with bottles of all sizes that contained every form of vermin and 
reptile found in that region. One of his visitors felt that “they were not elegant mantel 
ornaments.”51 
 
6.3. Domestic Life 
Furniture was in part migratory like the officers and their dependants as much of 
it was imported to the region. However, when the officers and their wives moved out of 
a village many of their belongings remained and were sold in auctions. These events 
proved not only valued social gatherings but a practical way to get rid of the baggage 
officers and wives did not need or could not carry with them. Many also appreciated the 
money obtained to cover the often expensive moves. Auctions also allowed an 
opportunity for social evaluation. One wife hired a man to scrub their house until 
everything shone, being aware of how articles were examined by other military ladies 
looking for spots and specks. She managed to secure rather lofty sums, selling, for 
instance, eleven white china soup-plates for $22, a cooking stove for $80, and a sewing 
machine and a piano for $100 a piece.52 Some even sold their clothes, because as we 
“had generally been in the Territory some years…the civilian clothes brought in would 
not do very well after getting back to the States.” Ellen Biddle, an officer’s wife, was 
told by her husband not to go to the auctions as they had already so much stuff that they 
would never get rid of it. On the day of their own auction at Whipple Barracks the 
house and grounds were crowded with people and the Biddles made many times more 
money than expected. Still they were left with several wagons filled with furniture, and 
boxes, in addition to dogs and horses and other belongings.53  
These auctions give a glimpse of the relative wealth of officers and their wives, 
which in part made them the upper class in the army villages. They had furniture and 
clothes for sale, and also money enough to buy materials at not so modest prices. When 
enlisted men moved to another village, they usually had nothing to sell and little to 
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carry with them. Their means, with a starting salary of $13 month, were equally limited 
when it came to consumption. Proper domesticity for the officers and their wives 
included a certain standard of living, hard and costly to maintain in the colonial terrain. 
In everyday life, one army surgeon acknowledged, it was expected that an army officer 
“lived well.” “It is wrong” or unbecoming for an officer “to be too economical.”54 Many 
an officer and wife struggled to uphold an acceptable standard, although their pay was 
ten to thirty times that of enlisted soldiers. While more than a few fell in debt, officers 
and their wives remained determined to compensate the shortcomings of colonial life by 
ordering as much as they could from the outside. At one village, a couple sent to San 
Francisco for doors and whitewashed moldings, while one army wife was ready to order 
a $75 pipe for her husband. Several sent east for their wardrobe, ordering pants, suits, 
and other articles which sometimes took as long as fourteen months to reach them.55 
There was also little guarantee of what, if anything, actually arrived. One army wife 
used forty-two dollars for a hat she never actually wore because it was the wrong kind. 
She also wrote that many were annoyed when unable to ease their situation and buy 
luxuries no matter how much they spent. She thought that sending east was bound to 
result in weary waiting and taxing disappointments, whereas local supply was 
nonexistent.56 
Although moderately wealthy, officers and wives in the Southwest could rarely 
purchase the sort of food they wished. To their eastern taste the food supply appeared 
severely limited and the prices of any luxury product exorbitant. The lack of appropriate 
dishes proved a problem especially when visitors arrived and expected to be treated to a 
meal suitable to their class standing. In dire circumstances, one officer’s wife thought 
chocolate, macaroni, prunes, raisins, and currants as almost too much of a luxury. 
Another complained the lack of fresh meat, milk, or eggs. She especially disliked living 
on canned food, declaring that “I have hated canned food ever since” residing in the 
Southwest.57 However, the situation varied somewhat from village to village, when, for 
instance, at Whipple Barracks in the 1870s the commissary was described as 
“excellently supplied,” and the officers managed to obtain almost anything they 
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wanted.58 Also, many tried to solve the problem by raising their own food. They not 
only cultivated small garden patches, but had cows and chickens on their backyards and 
sheds. A few even earned extra income by making butter and raising chickens and 
turkeys. One wife, for example, not only had all the chicken, eggs, and turkey her 
family could consume, but plenty to give away to close friends, and also more than two 
hundred chickens and fourteen turkeys for sale.59   
In the early 1880s, as the railroads made importing various products easier, the 
selection in the army villages grew considerably more diverse. For instance, at Whipple 
Barracks the railroad introduced much-coveted fresh lobsters and oysters. Opening an 
oyster can one army wife wrote that “such a sight had never before been seen there. 
Fine fresh fat oysters brought in ice all the way.” She felt “they were delicious,” even 
with the price of seven dollars apiece.60 The commissary ledgers from Fort Apache 
between 1880-83 show that officers had to opportunity to purchase cigars, tobacco, 
pipes, salmon, lobster, shrimp, clams, oysters, tomatoes, peaches, jam, pears, apples, 
milk, tea, sugar, etc. It was common that officers made purchases for at least $20 to $40 
a month, some spending close to $100.61 Dinners in the 1880s became relatively well-
supplied and more elegant. One, for example, included “soup, fish, claret, meat, 
vegetables, olives, champagne, pudding and coffee, a dish of flowers in the center of the 
table and flowers in the finger bowls.”62  
Proper domestic life for officers and their wives included being connected to the 
world back East, staying in touch with both national events and personal friends. 
Officers had an appetite for letters and eastern papers and magazines and they petitioned 
their acquaintances and relatives to supply them. “Among us here we take nearly all the 
papers and Journals,” one officer announced.63 For instance, one army surgeon wanted 
two local papers from his home region, in addition to five national publications, 
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whereas an army couple received many English and French papers from their friend.64 
Often officers and wives, however, felt that the linkage was arduous to maintain 
because of the slow and irregular mail service. Mail arrived perhaps only once a month 
in the 1860s and it was no wonder that many felt they missed out on what was going in 
the “real” world. “We are so distant from civilization that our papers from San 
Francisco are always a month old and our letters from that to an indefinite time.” 
According to one army surgeon, letters were the “most unreliable things imaginable 
here.” They travel for months and often you still do not get them. Sometimes this 
surgeon had to do without letters and papers for several weeks, which severely saddened 
his spirits.65 Mail service improved over the years but still varied significantly from 
village to village. While in 1874 some locations received mail once a week if lucky, 
forts Bowie and Lowell, having post-offices, got mail six and five days a week 
respectively. The same year it took approximately three to four weeks for a letter from 
Washington D.C. to reach Camp Apache, fourteen days to Fort Bayard, and only seven 
to nine days to Fort Union.66 Mail always remained an eagerly anticipated event, a 
lifeline to the East. It was common that the road over which the mail rider arrived was 
closely watched by all. “If overdue, nothing else could be thought or talked of until he 
[the mail carrier] arrived, and we received our news from beyond the border,” one 
officer’s wife wrote.67 
Eastern letters and papers not only played an important function as sources of 
news, or as symbols of civilization, breaking the feeling of isolation, but were an 
integral part of daily life. One army surgeon felt that time passes on extremely slowly 
while being chronically short on papers, but when news came the hours seemed much 
more pleasant.68 Letters and papers were read over and over again, sometimes out loud, 
often in privacy. Some resorted to rationing the meager news supply. One wife gave her 
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husband a paper at a time, placing it on the breakfast table so that the husband could 
imagine he was reading the news.69  
Elite households had to run smoothly and efficiently to serve the needs of their 
resident families and visitors and to reach the army elite’s norms of proper domesticity. 
For all this, civilian servants, as well as soldier laborers, were needed. Servants formed 
a racially diverse group. In addition to soldiers, they included enlisted men’s white 
wives, Mexican and African-American women, indigenous men as house servants and 
women as wet nurses, and Chinese men.70 Elite women ideally chose the role of 
household manager and supervisor, not doer but planner, observer, and matron. These 
“ladies,” as the officers’ wives were categorized, did not cherish domestic work. Many 
came from backgrounds that they expected lower class people to perform those tasks 
they deemed too exhausting, uninteresting, or trivial for themselves. They believed it 
was improper for a “lady” to get her hands dirty. The category “lady” in itself was a 
claim for privilege, refined character, and social importance. It was also a handy device 
in making clear the difference between the officers’ families and other women in the 
army villages. No servant, laundress, or enlisted man’s wife ever truly qualified as a 
“lady.” For instance, when Eveline Alexander, a major’s wife, wrote that in 1868 Camp 
McDowell had “about half a dozen soldiers wives,” but only one lady besides herself, 
she marked the class boundary between ladies and others. Similarly, Julia Davis 
remarked upon arrival at Camp McDowell that “there was…one other lady in the camp, 
and now the female society would be doubled.” Like Davis, oftentimes officers’ wives 
remained silent on other women. When defining “female society” Julia Davis omitted 
her own female nurse and the several soldiers’ wives and laundresses residing in the 
village where close to 400 men were stationed. Another lady living in a small army 
village even overlooked all other women in the area when she noted that “I was the only 
woman within at least fifty miles.”71 
Many officers and wives discovered that it was difficult to build refined middle-
class domesticity when one had to constantly worry over the servants. For one thing, 
simply getting any help in the “peripheral” Southwest was frequently represented as an 
                                                 
69
 Lane, I Married A Soldier, 64. 
70
 Reeve, “Soldier’s Memoirs,” 187-188; Summerhayes, Vanished Arizona, 98-100; Corbusier, 
Recollections, 23; Myres, “Evy Alexander;” George Crook, His Autobiography, Martin F. Schmitt ed. 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1960), 266; Grierson, Colonel’s Lady, 165; Boyd, Cavalry Life. 
For soldiers as domestic laborers, see next chapter. 
71
 Myres, “Evy Alexander,” 31; Schreier, “For This I Had Left Civilization,” 192, 197; Boyd, Cavalry 
Life, 123. 
 190 
almost impossible task by the ”ladies.” One wife wrote that “I have no one to help me 
but a little girl, 12 years old. The company going out deprived me of a cook. You can 
imagine my hands are full with cooking & sewing & all.” Some tried to recruit servants 
while on the road to the Southwest. One couple, for instance, found a twelve year old 
Chinese boy as no woman could be induced to go to Arizona. As the boy heard wild 
stories of Indians, he had to be locked up in Los Angeles to prevent his escape. At 
Camp Date Creek, the boy was released and “proved a treasure” as he knew how to 
wash and iron, thus freeing the officer’s wife from such unpleasant tasks.72  
Many also represented that the available servants proved expensive, difficult to 
control, and of inferior quality. They complained that a cook could not be gotten for 
under $50 per month, and for a housemaid one had to pay $25, while when sending to 
San Francisco for a nurse for an infant the price asked was $100 a month. One army 
lady, who was ready to pay fifty dollars a week to anyone who would care for herself 
and her newborn child, found no help.73 Some servants changed their minds en route, 
wishing to avoid living in a place so remote, whereas white servant women often 
quickly married enlisted men. According to one officer’s wife, “women were so scarce, 
and men so plenty, that no matter how old or ugly, a woman was not neglected,” but 
“had scores of suitors for her hand.”74 Eveline Alexander brought her maid from the 
East. Initially the maid seemed very content and happy, having plenty of attention from 
the enlisted ranks. Less than a year later she had grown so homesick that she left for 
back East. “I think she felt weary of life in Arizona,” Alexander wrote.75 While some 
painted their servants as reliable, or devoted to their masters, others represented their 
help as a less than perfect workforce: incompetent, untrustworthy, and ignorant. For 
example, one woman wrote that her Mexican servant girl was a “very ignorant and 
stupid creature” with an “impervious brain.” Another had hired two lovers she 
categorized as “worthless.” The man had been discharged for theft and the woman, 
although “amicable,” was also supposedly violating “more than one of the 
commandments.”76 
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Occasionally some wives, much to their displeasure, were forced to cope without 
any help. Pampered and frivolous, many were utterly ignorant of household duties. 
Some expressed that they did not know what to do because of the “utter absence of so 
much that is considered indispensable in ordinary homes.” Many failed in their efforts. 
One army wife, for instance, tried washing her own clothes, but after washing, drying, 
and starching had “clothes so stiff” that she could not get them off the lines. She cried 
as she carried water from the kitchen to loose them. Unable to wash her family’s clothes 
she had to have her husband to appeal to a superior officer so that the army laundresses 
would do their laundry as well.77 Several officers’ wives gave birth to their children in 
the army villages instead of traveling back home for the occasion. Many also 
complained of the hardships they had to endure and of the difficulty of caring for the 
newborns. For many, childcare was another unfamiliar task. Ideally nurses took care of 
the babies, whereas schooling after a certain age was done in the east. Sent away to 
boarding schools, parents stationed in the Southwest did not sometimes see their 
children for many years.78 
 
Conclusion: Imperfect Islands of Civilization 
In general, officers and their wives liked to imagine the army villages as islands 
of civilization, as places of refugee in a peripheral colony. One army surgeon, for 
example, categorized Whipple Barracks as a civilized place in the midst of wilderness. 
An officer entering another army post wrote that he had come upon a pretty village: “It 
was always like coming into civilization for a campaigner to find and visit an army 
post.” He continued that “here again we met brotherly greetings, generous hospitality, 
and home comforts…quarters appeared elegant, the grass plot greener than ever, and 
even the deep-cut river close at hand seemed to murmur sounds of peace and good 
will.”79 As living environments, army villages represented experiments in modernity 
where eastern middle-class ideas and ideals of public space and domesticity as 
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envisioned and transplanted by the officers and their wives were played out. The army 
post, its village-like layout, imagined mastery over nature - exemplified by the urge for 
landscaping and other improvements - and hierarchical housing, where the masses lived 
in inferior dwellings and the elite in individual homes of refinement and taste, was 
meant to offer an example of what a respectable American settlement looked like. 
In reality, however, many grew to a painful realization that no matter how much 
they tried the villages remained far from perfect as living spaces and that their homes 
would never live up to expectations. In short, frustrated army personnel give an 
impression that the villages at least partially failed as showcases of civilization and 
middle-class lifestyles. The unbearable locations, odd building styles, improvised 
furniture, and the vulnerability of domestic space to natural forces damaged attempts of 
proper domesticity. So did the difficulties in maintaining certain lifestyles and 
consumption patters. Lack of selection in foodstuffs and other luxury items, irregular 
contacts with the “real world” in the East, and the difficulties in getting good servants 
made the kind of life officers and their wives envisioned difficult to reach. Even money 
did not solve all the problems. Luxury foods, “respectable” furniture, and good servants, 
for instance, were hard to come by no matter how much one spent. Overall, officers and 
their wives made it seem as if the lowly and peripheral colony prevented them from 
building more comfortable villages, from matching their households to their ambitions. 
That there often existed a wide gap between desirable level of refinement and reality 
resulted in stress and frustration when one tried to bridge the gap. Still some maintained 
that no matter how bad the situation supposedly was they as a “civilizing force” of 
resourceful and energetic people could make things better. They did not let the less than 
perfect living spaces bring them down or reduce their sense of self-worth. Others 
became convinced that in the army villages “ordinary modes” of domestic life would 
fail to prevail. They represented life as something of a shared misery. None could envy 
the other, as all lived “with no comforts whatever” in villages where “disappointments 
were well nigh endless,” one wife claimed. Misery, on the flip side, built cohesion. 
“One reason that made our army life endurable was the constant exchange of 
grievances, and our real sympathy one for the other,” the wife wrote.80
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Chapter 7 
Manual Labor, Leisure, and the Construction of Social Order in the Army Villages 
  
“Practically the posts, and especially the small posts, are 
garrisoned by enlisted laborers rather than soldiers…the larger 
part of the actual labor, as well as the building required at the 
posts, must now be done by enlisted men...”1 -John Pope, 
General, U.S. Army 
 
“I never got drunk, though I…saw [drunk] men [soldiers] deadly 
sick and rolling around and doing most unseemly and idiotic 
things and descending to the lowest level a human being is 
capable of.”2 -William Bladen Jett, Corporal, U.S. Army 
 
“This morning at breakfast Col. Stacey asked me, if I would go to Graham 
Mountain, which is 10,500 feet above the sea,” one officer’s wife at Fort Thomas wrote. 
The trip upon which she was about to embark in 1879 was actually a work detail, a six-
day outing for nine soldiers ordered to cut timber for building construction. For the 
officer in charge, May Stacey, it was an opportunity for a refreshing leisure trip with his 
family. Stacey, his wife, and their three children took with them their servants and 
refreshments that included watermelons, Rhine wine, whiskey, turtle soup, pickles, 
oysters, peaches, and pears, and other fineries. To guarantee the family’s comfort, an 
additional soldier cook and driver accompanied the party.  
While the soldiers struggled forward in the August heat, Mrs. Stacey traveled 
under a sheltering canvas in the army ambulance. Yet she thought it appropriate to 
complain of the circumstances: “Nothing I hate worse than bumping in an Ambulance, 
excepting riding in a hot car, or a rocking ship. What kind of vehicle I would like I cant 
tell, might like a balloon.” At camp, her “rough” trip was compensated. “Our tents up, 
carpeted with canvas, my cot with a good hair mattress, clean white sheets and pillows 
with heavy white mission blankets bordered with blue, looked very inviting. Brussells 
[Brussels] carpet, camp chairs, trunk, and a dressing case with hanging glass looked 
quite like living and very cosy,” she wrote. It is safe to say that the enlisted men 
prepared all this and that their camp life was significantly different, having perhaps no 
tents to sleep in and only a simple ration of hardtack, beans, and coffee, which they 
cooked themselves. To ensure that he had time for leisure, May Stacey placed a sergeant 
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in charge of the work detail, which freed him from their supervision. Staceys made 
social calls at Fort Grant, located near the combined leisure/work site, hiked the 
mountains to enjoy the scenery, marveled at beautiful flowers, practiced some target 
shooting, and studied. When writing and studying French, Mrs. Stacey used to sit in the 
ambulance watching her children, who were looked after by their nanny, play. The 
children, “as busy as bees,” had their camp located some distance away so not to disturb 
adult recreation. When returning to Camp Thomas, Mrs. Stacey and the children were 
too tired, and sick, to attend a fine dinner prepared for their arrival by the wife of 
another officer. After a bath, they went to bed while May Stacey gathered his energy to 
dine with the other officer and his wife. The army elite’s social etiquette demanded that 
he accept the invitation. No fine meal, or even a bath, awaited the enlisted men. 
Probably they dragged themselves straight to bed and back to work next morning as 
construction workers using the very timber they had hauled in.3 
This chapter continues to investigate army village life. Manual labor and leisure 
function as the lenses through which to approach the construction of social order and 
identity and the meanings of whiteness and class among white army people. The 
principal aim is not to describe or list all types of labor and leisure activities, nor to 
count their prevalence, but rather to understand how labor and leisure structured the 
army community and to describe what kind of culture, identity, and social order 
emerged among white army people.  
 
7.1 Labor 
7.1.1 The Army Elite and Labor 
In the army villages the division between management and labor was clear. 
Officers did not do manual work and they and their wives preferred to avoid most 
domestic chores if possible.4 Although the demands for labor were abundant in the army 
villages, it is practically impossible to find references from their personal writings or 
from the official records of officers participating. Many probably felt that manual work 
was something that ill suited their status. Their identity as middle-class people partly 
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rested on personal avoidance of manual labor and on the power to get others to work for 
them. 
Usually officers did not discuss how they spent their days in the army villages. A 
rare individual admitted that officers often did not have enough to do, or that writing 
consumed most of their time. “Thinking” and “supervision of general things” was what 
some gave as the answer. What it meant exactly is difficult to ascertain. One officer’s 
wife wrote that “my husband was the busiest man imaginable. He had not only to 
command his company, but was also in charge of all stores and buildings.”5 This rather 
evasive statement does not tell how much effort or time this all actually demanded. One 
officer, also “commanding a company,” admitted that his chores included inspecting the 
troops once a week. This took fifteen minutes of his time.6 It was not uncommon that 
officers delegated, like May Stacey did at Mount Graham, the supervision of labor 
parties, military training, and inspections to the non-commissioned officers. It was also 
not rare that most administrative duties, the task of “being in charge of buildings,” fell 
to a junior officer or clerks (civilians or enlisted men). One young officer, assisted by 
two clerks, felt overwhelmed, and wronged, when he had to make reports and papers 
from daylight till dark as temporary quartermaster, commissary, treasurer, signal officer, 
and ordnance officer.7 
Still, in the minds of officers and wives manual labor was far from insignificant. 
The labor of others was what kept the army villages going and made public spaces and 
elite households more closely resemble much-coveted eastern middle-class standards. In 
elite minds, white enlisted men represented a suitable workforce. Hiring large numbers 
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of civilians was often impossible due to shortage of funds and poor availability of 
workers. Thus the enlisted men proved a logical choice. One officer, for instance, 
admitted that work is what is required of soldiers.8 Indeed, officers and their wives 
treated white enlisted men predominantly as a class of manual workers unfit for self-
government. This perception of soldiers as a lower class workforce was so dominant 
that it overshadowed the question of white ethnicity. 
During the post-Civil War years many native-born whites in the United States felt 
the need to differentiate themselves from the large immigrant element, to construct 
boundaries against a threatening Irish, German, and East-European presence. It was as if 
the native-born needed to reassure themselves that only they were thoroughly 
American.9 One would imagine that the mostly native-born officers and their wives 
certainly had an immediate reason to share this fear when approximately half or more of 
the residents in any army village occupied by white troops were immigrants. For 
instance, the 1870 Federal Census shows that Fort Bowie, Arizona, housed altogether 
340 white males, of whom 192 were foreign-born. During the same time Camp 
Crittenden had a total of 196 white males and 105 of them were foreign-born. At Camp 
Goodwin the numbers stood at 175 and 102, and at Camp Grant at 313 and 177.10 Each 
village had a foreign-born majority and the entire immigrant element was also 
predominantly lower class. Of the twenty-one officers living in these four posts only 
four were foreign-born.11  
Although the army was clearly divided into immigrant-heavy enlisted ranks and 
mostly native-born officers, officers and wives did not target the immigrant issue in 
their discourses. They did not fear that “immigrant hordes” would overpower them in 
the army villages or that the few immigrant officers would contaminate the officers 
corps. Instead officers and their wives usually remained silent on white ethnicity. It was 
very unusual that an officer in the Southwest would go so far, as one army surgeon did, 
as to argue that “thoroughbred” Americans with unmixed blood of many generations - 
not the melting pot kind - were the hope of the country. It was equally rare for an officer 
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to write that one of his comrades was “a typical Irishman, had come into the regulars 
from the volunteers, and as an officer was absolutely worthless.”12  
The lack of anti-immigrant discourses resulted in part from the fact that officers 
were able to control as subordinates in the army hierarchy most immigrants they had to 
meet on daily basis. White soldiers did not represent competition or a threat in elite 
eyes, but instead a group of social and intellectual inferiors suitable to serve them. For 
officers and their wives the difference between them and the enlisted men was not a 
question of white ethnicity, or even military rank in itself, but of human character 
resulting from difference in class status. Those officers who wrote about the issue saw 
that white soldiers were often of questionable intelligence and competence.13 Some 
sought to represent the elite-enlisted men relationship as a form of patriarchal devotion 
between two classes widely set apart. In these texts the enlisted men represented a 
simple and intellectually shallow class of common people who understood to respect 
their superiors, whereas the officers and their wives displayed a caring (bordering on 
arrogant) compassion for the men much like parents had towards their children.14 
Officers and their wives came to see white soldiers not as immigrants first but as lower 
class people also because white ethnicities never formed an overwhelming majority 
among white enlisted men, but the enlisted balance in any village was approximately 
even between native-born and foreigners. For instance, Camp Crittenden had 65 native-
born and 78 foreign-born white enlisted men in the 1870 census.15 Thus, labeling white 
soldiers simply, or foremost, as immigrants would have been inaccurate, especially 
when white soldiers themselves did not construct their collective identity around their 
immigrant backgrounds. 
On one level the fact that officers did not make much noise of white soldiers’ 
ethnicity is a sign of a larger silencing of white enlisted men. Compared to, for instance, 
how much they had to say about the Apaches, officers were practically silent on the 
character of white soldiers. Often officers and wives had nothing to say about the white 
soldiers or even acknowledged their presence. Perhaps they considered white soldiers as 
too common, uninteresting, and trivial to merit discussion. One symptom of this 
                                                 
12
 William Henry Corbusier, Soldier, Surgeon, Scholar: The Memoirs of William Henry Corbusier, 1844-
1930, Robert Wooster ed. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2003), 67; Reeve, “Soldier’s 
Memoirs,” 306.   
13
 Reeve, “Soldier’s Memoirs,” 127. See also Bigelow, On the Bloody Trail, 22-24. 
14
 Anson Mills, My Story (Washington D.C.: Published by the author, 1918), 135; Jim Schreier, ed., “For 
This I Had Left Civilization: Julia Davis at Camp McDowell, 1869-1870,” Journal of Arizona History 29 
(Summer 1988), 193; Reeve, “Soldier’s Memoirs,” 193-195. 
15
 Federal Census, 1870 , 133-151. 
 198 
silencing is that officers and wives often failed to acknowledge the identity of laborers, 
or to discuss actual labor processes and their significances. Only a few army wives 
referred to some of their soldier servants by name. But in most cases things just got 
done somehow. In army texts it is very common to find remarks like “new quarters 
were to be erected as hastily as possible” or that “much was accomplished towards the 
erection of quarters in brief time.”16 This narrative strategy made the laborers invisible 
drudges and not only showed the contempt the army elite felt towards work and 
workers, but insinuated that everything was done for them, not by them. 
 
7.1.2 Enlisted Men’s Labor Tasks 
Enlisted men did basically three kinds of labor: work in army villages, work 
outside the villages, and domestic work/personal service for officers and their families. 
As a rule, the army removed the locations of its military villages when unhealthy 
position or operational strategy required it. Altogether, between 1866 and 1886 there 
were, in addition to several ephemeral temporary camp sites, at least sixteen 
“permanent” posts in Arizona and fourteen in New Mexico. In 1886 only four army 
villages in Arizona and one in New Mexico remained at the sites where originally 
established without never being temporarily abandoned or relocated.17 However, labor 
resulted not only from the abandonment of old posts and the building construction of 
new ones, but from the never-ending rebuilding and improvement of existing ones. The 
numerous demands of the officers and their wives on public and domestic space to reach 
the standards of “civilization,” their desire to make the post more comfortable by 
rebuilding the world they had left behind in the East, combined with the poor quality of 
construction doomed army villages to a chronic cycle of repairs and rebuilding. For 
example, a report published in 1875 by the Surgeon General’s Office stated that 
although Fort Selden was established in 1865 it was “not yet completed.” It would seem 
that the villages were made anew every few years. For example, the 1875 report 
indicates that all present buildings except the guardhouse at Whipple Barracks were 
constructed during or since 1872, although the post had been at its current location since 
1864. Also, according to the same report, many of the buildings at Fort McRae, New 
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Mexico, were new, even though the post dated back to 1863. Camp McDowell was 
established in 1865 and had the “first set” of principal buildings finished in 1866. 
However, the roofs leaked almost from their first exposure, and the walls cracked and 
washed away, until, in spite of constant repairs, many of the houses became almost 
untenable. In the early 1870s McDowell was rebuilt; adobe dormitories for soldiers, 
officers quarters in 1872 and 1873, three storehouses and a new bakery in 1872, and the 
hospital in 1874.18  
The overall need for rebuilding and repairs seemingly declined little over the 
years. In 1879 there were seven sets of officers quarters at Fort Lowell and all needed 
new roofs, as did the four sets of enlisted barracks, the adjutant’s office, the 
quartermaster’s and commissary, the store rooms, the guardhouse, the bake house, as 
well as the post hospital. The leakage in the existing roofs was estimated as “far greater 
than with ordinary private houses in this vicinity.” Apparently the dirt roofs had been 
filled with the wrong kind of dirt. So much dirt had also been placed on the roof that it 
was already considered dangerous for the safety of the occupants. Some of the adobe 
walls were also damaged by leakage, while doors and windows were warped and rickety 
owing to the dryness of the climate. In addition, all the officers’ kitchens and some 
rooms, and all the enlisted quarters needed flooring, and many places could use a good 
coat of paint.19 One officer wrote in 1881 that the posts in New Mexico are of the 
“frailest and least substantial character, and require constant repairs…In a few years 
hardly a remnant of the original materials is left, and still the buildings are as worthless 
as ever.”20 
In these circumstances the enlisted men had their hands full when officers as a 
rule trusted “the labor of troops” for the construction work in the army villages.21 For 
example, Fort Apache was constructed entirely by enlisted labor, as was apparently Fort 
Thomas. Two years after the selection of a permanent site, many men still lived in tents 
at Thomas and were kept busy constructing quarters for themselves and their officers. 
Even then, enlisted men, like the party led by May Stacey, had to haul logs from the 
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mountains or get adobe from the ruins of old Camp Goodwin for building materials.22 
One soldier stationed at Fort Craig wrote that men of the Fourth Cavalry were kept busy 
building new quarters all summer, fall, and winter in 1882. They made adobe and 
brought pine timber for the rafters to the quarters by mules and wagons from the San 
Mateo Mountains.23 After the Sixth Cavalry replaced the Fourth in New Mexico in 
1883, it also immediately assumed the task of “building quarters, putting in water-
works, and improving the posts generally.” Troopers continued slaving until spring of 
1885, when increased warfare with the Chiricahua Apaches forced these enlisted 
laborers to abandon their shovels and axes temporarily and take the field as soldiers.24 
It seems that often soldiers moved like migrant workers, traversing from one 
building project to the next. After doing repairs to old post buildings at Camp Bowie a 
troop of soldiers was sent to establish Camp Wallen. According to one of the men, the 
new military village came into existence through “all this unpaid labor, carried from day 
to day, from month to month, by men enlisted for military service.” Dissatisfaction 
created by this work detail resulted in several desertions. Those who stayed, however, 
continued laboring at a new location, Camp Lowell, the following year.25  
Free men before enlisting, many enlisted soldiers found that in the army their lot 
was hard manual labor under tight surveillance. Constant labor made one soldier 
cognizant of his fate: “The man who enters the United States Army…will find that he 
works as hard as any day laborer who ever lived, and often harder.”26 Army villages 
were in fact nothing less than “government workhouses,” and as such they were 
commonly known by the enlisted ranks, “constantly employed as laborers in building 
and repairing,” as one soldier wrote.27 An officer felt that soldiers had to act as “brevet 
architects, carrying a hod and doing odd jobs of plastering and kalsomining.” Usually 
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every available enlisted soldier was “from morning till night employed as an adobe 
maker, an adobe turner, an adobe layer, a plasterer, carpenter, or builder of some sort,” 
another man remarked.28 If not working in construction others discovered that their lives 
consisted of hauling water and wood or keeping the villages clean and tidy. An officer 
forced one soldier to act, in the soldier’s own words, “as a sprinkling wagon.” He was 
ordered to carry water from a nearby ditch and water the camino in front of the officers’ 
quarters to reduce the amount of dust that rose into the air.29  
Gardening or farm work formed a part of the enlisted men’s labor complex. It 
was common to appoint one man from each company as gardener, and others were 
ordered to dig irrigation ditches, hoe weeds, cultivate crops, and assist in planting and 
harvesting.30 In places such as forts Bayard, Union, Verde, and Whipple men raised 
“large quantities of vegetables” including pumpkins, peas, peppers, onions, and carrots. 
At Union the soldiers even constructed a hothouse to ensure production during the 
coldest winter months.31 Sometimes men avoided gardening simply because local 
circumstances did not permit any planting. For instance, Camp Mojave did not even 
have a garden, whereas, according to one officer, the men at Fort Craig never succeeded 
raising anything.32 However, it happened that the lack of success in raising crops did not 
prevent the officers from ordering the continuation of attempts. Once, following the 
initiative of the regional commander stationed in San Francisco, four companies 
constructed a farm in the excessive summer heat at Camp McDowell. The farm was 
designed to produce grain as forage for the army animals, but nothing for the men. 
Exhausted and half-famished, the soldiers slaved eleven hours a day tending the farm, 
first digging an irrigation ditch several miles in length, and clearing the land of dense 
growth of mesquite trees, bull brush, and cactus. By the time the officer who initiated 
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the project realized that no success would result from this farming endeavor, several of 
the soldiers had already died.33 
It was not rare that men had to work whatever the weather. Sweating in a terrible 
heat of over 100 degrees, they suffered from sunburns and exhaustion to the point of 
fainting. If one refused to go on he was sent to the guardhouse or subjected to some 
other form of punishment. For instance, one man was tied up by his wrists so that he 
could not touch the ground. He passed out as a result.34 Work was also used as 
punishment. For example, some prisoners had to cut wood for officers all day under the 
hot sun. On another occasion approximately sixty military prisoners were sent to Fort 
Bayard to quarry stone for the new buildings when the post was rebuilt. Of all the 
miserable chores he had done the most disagreeable for one man was guarding fellow 
enlisted men when they were subjected to this kind of punishment. Discipline was 
meant to keep the men in line and make them obedient workers fearful of their 
superiors. Discipline was obviously hard when, for example, almost all men at one 
village had spent some time in the guardhouse during their enlistment or when one-third 
of a company could be in confinement at the same time.35  
In addition to construction, repair, maintenance, and farm work, soldiers also 
performed various extra duty labors in the quartermaster service with meager extra 
compensation. The Annual Report for 1878 shows that Arizona posts had 227 enlisted 
men on extra duty, ranging from fifty-one at Camp Apache to nine at Camp Mojave and 
Whipple Barracks, and none at Camp Lowell. Most often soldiers functioned as 
laborers, teamsters, and carpenters, but also as herders, packers, tinsmiths, saddlers, 
painters, messengers, and blacksmiths. Work as ferry operators, butchers, packers, and 
mail-carriers appeared in the records more rarely. Several men - ten in 1878 and thirteen 
in 1881 - were also detailed as clerks responsible for administrative duties at the army 
villages.36  
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The soldiers’ extra duty pay was usually approximately 20-25 cents a day. The 
sum did not even cover expenses caused by the work details such as worn out clothing. 
Furthermore, the soldiers’ pay in general compared poorly with salaries of civilians on 
the army payroll. For instance, teamsters received $35 to $45 per month. Even the 
lowest-paid civilian positions, usually occupied by Hispanics, at Fort Union and Union 
Depot in New Mexico earned $30 per month in the 1860s. When the monthly pay for 
first-year enlisted man was only $16, before reduced to $13 in 1871, the exploited 
position of enlisted soldiers becomes obvious.37 In fact, in the whole Southwest almost 
any worker earned more money than the common soldier. For example, the members of 
the Texas Rangers, a state-run police force heavily involved in colonial conquest, 
reportedly got thirty-three dollars a month, whereas ordinary cowboys received from 
twenty-five to forty dollars a month. Even Chinese laborers who built the Southern 
Pacific Railroad made much more than the soldiers, receiving a dollar a day, fifty cents 
less than white workers demanded, while miners at Tombstone silver mines earned four 
dollars a day. In Santa Fe, male day laborers in 1870 got $1.60 a day if white and $1.10 
if Hispanic. Even white female domestics in Santa Fe made more than the soldiers, 
earning $1.75 a day. Hispanic female domestics, however, got only 55 cents a day, and 
if working six days a week and twenty-four days a month, they equaled the salary of a 
first-year private.38 
Outside the posts soldiers improved transportation networks and guarded 
government property. Roads held an obvious significance, allowing more rapid and 
increasingly massive penetration of colonial spaces. The U.S. needed an effective 
system to link the colonies with each other and with the imperial center in the east. 
While soldiers often guarded railroad construction crews, road building and 
maintenance were enterprises that required hard manual labor from the enlisted men. 
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For example, one labor detachment replaced an old route from Camp Verde to the 
territorial capital Prescott with a fine graded road, while another built a road from Camp 
Apache to the Zuni villages in New Mexico, a distance of approximately 100 miles. The 
latter allowed communication with Fort Wingate, Santa Fe, and beyond.39 When the 
military ordered Camp Reno established about 85 miles northeast of Camp McDowell, 
the new site proved inaccessible to wagons and soldiers had to construct a trail and 
improve it into a wagon road as quickly as possible.40 
The most extensive military telegraph system in the nation was in the Southwest. 
By 1872 the army in Arizona had no telegraphic communication, but the following year 
a line reached from California to Prescott and Tucson via Fort Yuma and Maricopa 
Wells. Not surprisingly, a great part of the work was done by enlisted men, who 
constructed 540 miles of telegraph line in ninety-seven days.41 But that was just the 
beginning. In Texas the army completed 1,218 miles of wire. Extending lines to 
different military villages and maintenance of the existing lines, which immediately 
followed the initial construction, kept men busy from California to Texas. “A number of 
men were killed in the performance of this lonely and thankless duty,” one officer 
observed. “The magnitude of this work can only be appreciated by an examination of 
the map and a knowledge of the country over which the material had to be shipped,” he 
added.42 
During 1875 the Arizona lines were extended to camps Lowell and Verde, and 
troops were still in the process of building them to camps Grant, San Carlos, Apache, 
and towards the New Mexico border. Meanwhile, on the New Mexico side telegraph 
communications descended from Santa Fe, where telegraph from the states had reached 
in 1868, down the Rio Grande River and on to Arizona.43 Although in 1876 no line 
reached camps Apache or Bowie, or had connection with New Mexico, the next year 
lines went to both Bowie and New Mexico. Still in 1877, the workload of soldiers, if 
anything, just increased. Troops not only extended lines, now nearing completion at 
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camps Apache and Thomas, but executed extensive reconstructions and repairs on the 
original line. The telegraph needed constant attention much like the army villages. Also 
like in the army villages the quality of work proved a disaster, and lines were down as 
often as they were up. The poles were also less than fitting. According to one Signal 
Corps private, “one pole out of fifty, perhaps, could be called straight. The rest were as 
crooked as a ram’s horn.” In 1882, seemingly little had changed. The lines had been 
extended to San Carlos, presumably in the making since 1875, and to forts McDowell 
and Huachuca, with recurring repairs by enlisted laborers continuing.44  
As civilian servants were often expensive and difficult to hire and keep in service, 
officers and their wives regularly used enlisted men as domestic laborers. It was 
customary to make soldiers perform household tasks that officers deemed too trivial, 
common, or difficult for themselves. This included about everything, and enlisted men 
functioned as all-around repairmen who fixed verandas, floors, and ceilings, and laid 
down carpet and moved furniture at the officers’ quarters. They also substituted as 
foragers of supplies, personal aides, and babysitters. While some had to tame wild 
horses for the use of officers or tend to officers’ horses, others found themselves 
milking cows to satisfy the army elite’s craving for fresh milk.45 In addition, soldiers 
functioned as personal security guards. For example, one officer’s wife demanded that 
three soldiers guard her house; all were stationed just under her bedroom window. This 
was in addition to a soldier cook and his husband’s orderly, who slept in a tent by the 
kitchen near the rear of the house.46 
One common domestic duty for soldiers was cooking, even though their products 
seldom managed to live up to expectations. Indeed, as happened with building and 
telegraph construction, a fundamental gap existed between elite desires and the quality 
of enlisted work. According to one officer’s wife, “We had a soldier, an ex-French 
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soldier named Blot, to cook for us. He was an indifferent cook and very erratic, so we 
didn’t keep him long. Our next incumbent was a big Swede named Sorensen, who 
prided himself on having cooked at the sailor’s home in San Francisco. He treated us to 
raisin soup and other strange dishes.”47 What was perplexing in the practice of using 
enlisted soldiers as personal servants was its illegality. From 1870 military regulations, 
or “hateful laws,” as one officer’s wife named them, forbid the practice. The officers 
and wives’ strong opposition sparked by concern for their own comfort, however, made 
sure that the law was oftentimes ignored. That officers and their wives would have to 
regularly perform their own domestic work was a much dreaded scenario, avoided if 
possible.48 
While soldiers had received a taste of the army’s class hierarchy during their 
journeys, in the army villages the grim reality really hit them. The soldiers’ main 
occupation was to function as fulltime multitask servants and laborers who were under 
the unchallenged control of officers and their wives, fulfilling all their whims and 
wishes. The enlisted man has to “quietly accept the fact that no matter what he thinks 
about an order, he must unquestionably, unhesitatingly, and promptly obey it,” one 
officer wrote.49 Another added that the soldier’s life “consists almost wholly” of guard 
duty and manual labor. “It would seem that every pleasant and attractive feature of a 
soldier’s life had been purposely effaced and excluded from that of the American 
soldiers.” Importantly, manual labor deprived the soldier of military training. For 
example, one officer wrote that his personal soldier cook was excused from most 
military activities, while the cook of another officer was freed from all other duties. 
Target practice, riding lessons, or drills, in other words, actual military training, was 
often unavailable, and many officers considering that drilling men was highly 
unnecessary.50 As soldiers were forced to learn the life of manual laborers all day and 
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every day, this not only left no time for training but also nurtured no skills suitable for a 
soldier. The Annual Report reads that “it is an incontrovertible fact that when soldiers 
are required to work as common laborers eight hours a day they are in great measure 
unfitted for their proper duties.”51 
 
7.2 Resistance and Leisure in the Enlisted Ranks 
Although the evidence is thin, some enlisted men evidently substituted their 
soldier identity and saw themselves primarily as servants. For instance, Andrew Peisen 
was an army man who reenlisted seven times, but did little actual soldiering. Instead, he 
worked as a personal servant for General George Crook for twenty years until the end of 
Crook’s life. Peisen’s willingness to reenlist time after time testifies to his acceptance of 
his status as a servant.52 However, the average white soldier disliked his life. Whatever 
the pragmatic reasons behind their enlistments, enlisted men had expected to land an 
honorable vocation, something which would nourish their self-esteem as brave men in 
service of the nation.53 When building barracks, constructing roads, or serving officers 
and their wives, the soldiers found themselves performing something for which they had 
not signed on. Commanded by officers and their wives alike was probably an insult and 
an embarrassment to the white soldiers’ masculine pride. It seems that many army 
wives cherished their power over soldier servants and used it willingly.54 Many had a 
hard time recognizing any status or honor in lives defined by manual labor. Due to 
“unsoldierliness of our garrison service…our men have not the pride in their uniform of 
soldiers engaged in regular civilized war,” one officer noted.55 An enlisted man who had 
first thought “what a fine thing it would be to go west at Uncle Sam’s expense” and be 
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“settled in employment for five years,” soon found his distaste: “I was a slave in Uncle 
Sam’s service.”56 
The army seemingly questioned the white soldiers’ racial privilege by placing 
them in a position where they worked side by side doing similar tasks with men and 
women of color. Those white soldiers who served with black troops soon found out that 
they were treated much the same. Not only did they get equal pay but for the army it 
seemed to matter little whether a soldier was white or black, he was always a potential 
laborer first. When black infantry men served in New Mexico from 1866 to 1869 and 
black cavalry from 1875 to 1881, the men spent many of their days laboring in the army 
villages. Labor tasks were much the same as they were with white soldiers; rebuilding, 
repairs, road work, gardening, etc.57 Furthermore, in the households of officers, white 
soldiers had to compete and work on equal standing with white women, black, 
Hispanic, and indigenous men and women, and with Chinese men. However, they had 
no competition from white civilian men. Few self-respecting independent white men in 
the Southwest wanted to become domestic laborers, a job regarded more suited for 
women and people of color. As we have seen, the civilian domestic workers, regardless 
of their race, received, as a rule, better wages than the white soldiers. What made white 
soldiers furious was that the army did not even compensate them for the abundance of 
menial and unmanly work tasks with good wages or enjoyable working conditions. 
Quite the opposite. Pay was far below civilian standards and work was performed with 
little regard for personal comfort and accompanied by fear of punishment. 
Many white enlisted men felt trapped. Uprooted from their home regions enlisted 
soldiers had been displaced in the Southwest doing hard labor tasks that seemed 
substandard for free white men. No longer were they capable of self-government and 
their position in the army as laborers placed their identity as free white men in question. 
Soldiers became aggravated and began to envision different methods of resistance. 
Their resistance was manifested at work, through desertion, and in leisure.  
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7.2.1 Resistance at Work 
There existed many ways to show disapproval during the working hours. For one 
thing, as the new work day began many resorted to feigning sickness. Even if after 
inspection the military doctor refused admittance to the sick list and marked a man fit 
for duty, soldiers managed to delay work, which alone made the effort worthwhile.58 
Some men hid to keep out of work, while others resorted to expressing their grievances 
in local newspapers. However, freedom of opinion in the military was in short supply, 
and writing in civilian papers was a risky endeavor, which could lead to 
imprisonment.59 There were also those who protested their lot by selling government 
property they had stolen during their work details.60  
Working slowly was a widespread form of resistance. One private admitted that 
“it usually took four or five soldiers to do what one good citizen would have done. They 
[soldiers] worked as slowly as possible.” Another man wrote that when at work soldiers 
“would contemplate how to work without doing anything.”61 Officers and their wives 
often regarded soldiers as an unskilled and incompetent labor force that produced poor 
quality work.62 However, perhaps the terrible cooking and the questionable quality of 
construction in the army villages and on the telegraph line was not purely a result of 
enlisted incompetence, or tight budgets, cheap materials, and unfamiliarity with local 
weather and building materials, but of enlisted resistance, men doing their work as 
badly as they could without getting caught. If poor quality of work was indeed 
deliberate and a conscious act, then it functioned as a powerful signal of working class 
resistance against the army’s social order, demonstrating the determination and the 
resourcefulness of the enlisted men. The army elite never discovered this form of 
resistance. Desertion, however, they did see and compare to a “plague.” 
 
7.2.2 Desertion 
Desertion functioned as the most radical act of resistance. It also represented the 
most selfish act of resistance because it meant the abandonment not only of manual 
labor, but the comradeship of fellow enlisted men. Yet just because it functioned as a 
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major expression of free will against the officers, desertion also was an important 
representation of enlisted empowerment. Desertion, if successful, allowed the soldier to 
regain his freedom and capacity for self-government. Although a radical act, desertion 
was still also limited, because the soldiers never deserted to join the enemy, just to leave 
the army. 
Some did not even make it to the Southwest before realizing that they had 
enough. One troop transferring from the east by ship experienced its first desertion 
during the trip across the Isthmus of Panama. Upon reaching San Francisco, the whole 
regiment, which started with 90 men per company, was thinned to an average of 50 
through desertion.63 These men possibly had joined the military to get free passage to 
California, but on the other hand some of them might have grown frustrated with the 
army’s harsh social order and decided to get away as soon as possible. Because of better 
transportation connections, larger white populace, and multifaceted economic 
opportunities, California was an easier place than Arizona in which to run away for 
anyone who soon after enlistment became fed up with the army.  
Throughout the years desertion proved a very popular choice. Some army villages 
almost emptied as so many men left. For instance, at one time a post in the Southwest 
reported that 54 of its 86 men had recently deserted. The Department of California, to 
which Arizona then belonged, lost 694 men in 1868 and 163 during the first nine 
months in 1869. The pay cut in 1871 caused a mass exodus from the army as desertion 
rates jumped from 9,4 percent of the enlisted strength to 32,6 percent, which meant 
approximately 10,000 men. The desertion rates gradually declined, being 4,606 men in 
1874 and usually less than 2,000 at the second half of the decade. Still, in the 1880s 
over 3,000 men or close to 15 percent deserted every year. For instance, in Arizona 204 
men fled in 1883, which was pretty close to the army average.64 The highest number of 
desertions took place during the first year of service. Probably this was due to the shock 
of facing the realities of military life. Those who adjusted observed the situation around 
them. “Men came, enlisted and deserted, and still I was there, apparently to stay,” one 
                                                 
63
 Gustafson, John Spring’s, 27-28.  
64
 For Arizona, see ARSW, 1869, 125; 1883, 50. After the peak in 1871 desertion rates for the whole army 
declined so that (by fiscal years, ending June 30) there were in 1873: 7,271; 1874: 4,606; 1875: 2,521; 
1876: 1,844; 1877: 2,516; 1878: 1,678; 1879: 1,965; 1880: 2,043; 1881: 2,361; 1882: 3,741; 1883: 3,578; 
1884: 3,672; 1885: 2,927; and 1886: 2,090 desertions. For desertion figures, see ARSW, 1873, 222; 1875, 
330; 1876, 72; 1877, 49; 1878, 26; 1879, 35; 1880, 33; 1881, 72; 1882, 52; 1883, 80; 1885, 74, 100; 
1886, 104; Coffman, Old Army, 346. 
 211 
soldier wrote.65 However, those who stayed did not necessarily enjoy their position. For 
instance, one enlisted man who had worked in the army for years wrote that he had 
“twenty years of the bitterness of the service at his tongue’s end.”66 The army generally 
had rather modest reenlistment figures, which indicate that the majority of men had 
little enthusiasm to make it their career. For example, during the fiscal year ending June 
30, 1874, only 699 men re-enlisted, although the next year the figure climbed to 1,986. 
Not counting desertion, approximately 5,000 to 6,000 soldiers were to be discharged in 
a normal year in the early 1870s.67  
To compensate for the exploitation of their labor, men often fled with a good 
horse, rifle, and other government property, which they sold to civilians. One officer 
wrote that nowhere had he seen more military materials on civilians than in Arizona. 
Many hoped to strike it rich in California, reach Salt Lake, Mexico, or simply vanish 
from the vision of the federal government to live their lives in the West. Some men 
supposedly joined the many cattle rustlers’ gangs throughout the Southwest. One 
corporal, who fled to Mexico, ended up in the Mexican army as a captain fighting 
French-backed troops. During leave from Mexico, however, he was caught in San 
Francisco and sentenced to three years imprisonment in Alcatraz for deserting the U.S. 
Army.68  
To ensure that not all white enlisted men left the army, the army held a portion of 
the soldiers salary “in trust” until they were discharged, organized pursuits and 
ambushes, and paid a bounty for captured deserters. Officers made enlisted men hunt 
down their deserted comrades. In the late 1860s the reward for bringing back a deserter 
stood at $30 and rose to $50 during the next decade. Some officers proposed that $100 
was not too much.69 As a first-year private earned only $13 a month, the army proved 
willing to pay many times that amount to get the man back. The goal was to punish as 
many as possible and to make them examples for others planning to desert. One soldier 
was sentenced to hard labor clearing the parade ground for a full year, while others 
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received prison sentences for 3-5 years. Desertion had other risks as well. While some 
perished in the desert, others were presumably killed by the Indians.70 Regardless of the 
risks and the army officers’ strategies of punishment, desertion did not stop during the 
period under investigation. 
The bounties, energy placed on pursuing deserters, and the harsh punishments 
indicate that the officers saw desertion as a major problem. The basic reason for 
desertion was the enlisted men’s sense of individual freedom and stubborn refusal to 
yield to class rule and manipulation. However, only a few officers publicly 
acknowledged this. A rare exception recognized that excessive manual labor had 
something to do with desertion, but thought that nothing could be done to amend the 
amount of work.71 Some officers contemplated that better-paying civilian jobs or poor 
living conditions in the army villages played a role in desertion. For many, however, the 
poor quality of enlisted men was the main cause for desertion. Some thought that 
soldiers only wanted free transportation to the West, while others dismissed soldiers’ 
complaints of harsh treatment and rigid work routine as unjustified grumbling of 
intellectually handicapped, untrustworthy, and inherently lazy men. “I firmly believe 
that harsh treatment of soldiers by officers…is at this time a very rare exception to the 
general rule, and the error, if there be any, is in the opposite direction” a general 
wrote.72  
As a solution some officers suggested that soldiers should be enlisted from the 
states and territories west of the Mississippi to assure supposedly better quality of 
recruits, thus getting rid of the bad elements: urban laborers and recent immigrants.73 
For others the remedy was more hard work, tighter discipline, and harsher punishments. 
Work was supposed to make the soldiers obedient, industrious, and content. Curiously, 
officers themselves were vigilant and energetic, and overall maintained good character 
without any manual labor. The logic went that common soldiers were naturally inclined 
to complain and idle their time away. Free time posed a danger as it allowed soldiers to 
think for themselves. Some officers were convinced that the enlisted men had too much 
free time on their hands or that their life was too monotonous and boring.74 If there just 
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was enough work then there would be no time for soldiers to stop and reflect on their 
situation and thus less chance of desertions. 
In a curious manner historians have taken up on this idea. Many have claimed 
that monotony and boredom characterized the lives of soldiers, and that men had 
nothing to do.75 In reality the average enlisted soldier was usually too busy working as a 
manual laborer to have any time for monotony. Work details were numerous and 
contained a wide variety of tasks. Also like the officers, some scholars have found the 
reason for desertion in enlisted men’s character and in the supposed monotony of army 
life. Historians have viewed desertion as a major problem that compromised the army’s 
efficiency, but rarely as an acceptable avenue of escape for the oppressed enlisted 
soldiers.76 
 
7.2.3 Leisure and Class Consciousness 
Historian William Dobak writes that enlisted men pursued amusements “to 
maintain relative emotional and psychological equilibrium” in the face unpleasant and 
often dangerous life.77 Dobak is partly correct in that many soldiers saw leisure 
important and as a balance to rest of army life. However, leisure was more than just a 
diversion. Enlisted ranks created leisure as a refuge that contested the prevalent elite-
dictated social order. Leisure worlds formed the base of enlisted resistance, an isolated 
sphere from which officers were excluded. For better or worse, those who stayed in 
service faced life in the army villages, far away from their friends, relatives, and homes 
in eastern cities or in Europe. For many, the army village was their only home, and there 
was nothing to look back to, nowhere special to go, and nobody to miss. When military 
life included plenty of backbreaking labor and small pay, leisure became an avenue for 
enlisted men’s self-expression and freedom. Leisure was a less radical expression of 
freedom than desertion, but it was the only time the enlisted men had control of 
themselves and their lives when in service. 
Enlisted men’s leisure world was almost exclusively male as an overwhelming 
majority of soldiers had no families. This and the army’s arduous labor routine, in 
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addition to the men’s working class backgrounds and the frustrations of colonial 
warfare in the Southwest, explain why partying and drinking had such an important role 
and why leisure was rough. Leisure signified a time to let go, escape everyday burdens 
to enjoy life to the fullest, and to be spontaneous and reckless, sometimes regardless of 
consequences. Soldiers bought alcohol from civilians camped outside the army villages, 
visited bars in nearby towns, went to the post sutler, or manufactured some themselves. 
Often just outside the post boundaries lay a set of more or less movable saloons and 
brothels, tempting the soldiers to pass their free time. Sometimes these establishments 
even followed the troops to temporary camps in the field.78 When their money ran out 
men resorted to other methods. One soldier remembered that men short on money made 
something they called “Indian fire water” from mescal. A soldier who drank it once 
“was tied up for two days and never drank again.” Not all men drank but most did. One 
soldier, who tried to avoid too much alcohol himself, knew but two other enlisted men 
who did not drink. A soldier could drink for joy or frustration, and at times he drank a 
lot when his finances allowed that, but he never drank in the company of officers. Come 
payday - usually only once in two months - and the soldiers would release their energies 
and get “blazingly, gloriously drunk,” like one officer recalled.79 “Payday was one of 
the greatest events in a soldier’s life,” one historian writes. It was a feast surrounded by 
days of famine. Men would often spend all they got, usually on alcohol or gambling. 
Some men built up debts (either to other soldiers, the post sutler, or to the owners of 
nearby saloons and brothels) so that large percentage of their pay was already spent 
when the paymaster arrived. On payday these men often paid their debts and 
immediately started making new ones.80   
Closely linked to drinking were games and gambling. At one time a detachment 
found a billiard table in the saloon of a deserted town. They shook off their exhaustion 
from a day’s march by playing billiards all night. One reporter who visited an army 
camp wrote that soldiers gambled recklessly, considering their narrow means. Bets of 
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ten, twenty, or even fifty dollars were made in the games following pay day. Finding 
opportunities for gambling was easy enough in the Southwest, provided one had the 
money. Many towns had flourishing collections of gambling houses. Enlisted men’s 
weakness for gambling was so well known that small town gamblers sent telegrams of 
imaginary “Indian troubles” to lure in detachments of soldiers into their town to 
gamble.81 
Certain that drinking, gambling, and visiting prostitutes represented a danger to 
the prevalent social order inside the army communities, endangering the soldiers’ 
efficiency not only in military campaigns but as workers, officers tried to control the 
soldiers’ access to leisure. One way was to drive off whiskey peddlers and prostitutes 
from the proximity of army villages. Another was to make sure that the post sutler kept 
the price of alcohol high, so that poorly paid enlisted men could not afford but a few 
drinks. For example, when in one army village the products of Anhauser-Busch were 
valued at one dollar a bottle, a soldier could spend his whole monthly salary on just 
thirteen beers.82 Also, officers again believed in the power of work: work would keep 
the men away from improper leisure. Even in a temporary field camp one officer was 
determined to make sure that his men had plenty to do. He made the men build floors 
for tents and an adobe oven for baking fresh bred. Men also had to execute dozens of 
other camp chores designed to make sure they would not have the time to engage in 
leisure. Still the men found the time to visit the saloons and brothels located in the 
proximity of their camp.83  
As was the case with desertion or refusal to work, the officers were not shy at 
punishing the men for being drunk. After payday, many soldiers, close to 15% in one 
garrison, faced court-martial charges. These proceedings became commonplace, and the 
sentences were directed at disciplining enlisted lives. Fines that could surpass a month’s 
pay took away the enlisted men’s drinking money, whereas several days in the 
guardhouse were supposed to make men fearful and obedient.84  
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 Again the success of these control measures remained incomplete. Enlisted men 
faced the possible punishments rather than submit under pressure. Drinking and 
partying continued. Elite control and enlisted resistance led to occasional excess and 
even to confrontations. In their defiance troops could get drunk during army campaigns 
or when visiting towns and army villages. On one occasion a column of troops made a 
stop in the midst of a scouting expedition at Fort Bowie to obtain rations and other 
supplies. The paymaster happened to be at the post and the men received two months 
pay. Ignoring the presence of officers, “practically all the detachment tanked up,” wrote 
one observer. The men engaged in such a “joyous spree” that they got expelled from 
Bowie. During their eight mile ride to Hay Camp, one officer gathered stragglers and 
took care of loose horses, while many men grumbled, fell off their horses, and insisted 
on taking a nap “for a few minutes.” As things progressed an officer confronted a 
drunken soldier who refused to obey orders and drew a carbine on him. “Then reason 
seemed inferior to force,” the officer wrote, “so I whipped out my revolver and jammed 
it against his breast. I told him that if he moved in the slightest I would kill him at once 
and without compunction, adding that I was entirely sober and knew exactly what I was 
talking about.” The soldier, seemingly sobering up quickly, lowered his weapon and 
cried out his apology.85 
As seen, behind the sometimes extravagant joy of drinking was despair. Some 
soldiers reached such a state that they could lie, or steal and sell anything to get a drink. 
In order that he could satisfy his desires secretly, one inventive soldier hid four quarts of 
beer in a brook that ran near the army village where he lived.86 Another soldier stole the 
shoes of a sleeping comrade, while another sold ten packages of cartridges, which were 
government property, to obtain six bottles of beer.87 The threat of random violence was 
also present. One soldier woke up when the enlisted man he was sharing a tent with 
grabbed him and “wanted to know what I was doing in the bed with him anyway, and 
threatened to shoot me if I did not get out.” This bed-fellow, known to be fond of drink, 
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obviously had become somewhat paranoid.88 Another enlisted man was named “Booze” 
by his comrades because “he spent all his money for drink and drank all any other 
would give him,” a soldier wrote. One day while being designated as room orderly, 
“Booze” went up and down the bunks sniffing and searching for hidden liquor. He 
apparently found plenty, drinking till he “not only could not walk but until he could 
hardly sniff.” This “Booze” also “drew a pistol on me once because I refused his offered 
drink,” the soldier continued.89 
Often enlisted men’s leisure showed little variation from post to post. According 
to one soldier, there was not much entertainment for the men except card playing and 
drinking. Men spent their time before paydays discussing how much money they would 
have to gamble with, buy liquor, and spend on the “demi-monde.”90 It seems that 
military campaigns and constant laboring to improve the posts reduced opportunities for 
those leisure activities which required extensive planning and organization. However, if 
time, finances, and circumstances allowed, enlisted men occasionally engaged in sports 
and organized theater activities or dances. Reading was also practiced by some, 
although often library facilities were poor. Fourth Cavalry headquarters at Fort 
Huachuca had a good regimental library, but it was boxed up, and, according to one 
officer, there were “no indications of impatience on the part of the garrison to get at 
it.”91  
The enlisted men’s leisure world was orchestrated to distinguish them as a group 
from the officers and to construct common identity. Soldiers bonded through leisure, 
they established their own difference from the arrogant elite, and constructed boundaries 
towards army control. While limited time and finances directed enlisted leisure, so did 
desires to avoid copycatting the styles and patterns of officers and wives, or to limit 
activities to those they saw as appropriate. For example, drinking or gambling 
represented not only activities officers and wives often disapproved, but where men 
created communal ties and a sense of group identity while also fulfilling personal 
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ambitions. In regards to nationality and white ethnicity the white enlisted man was a 
cosmopolite, recognizing difference, but thinking it secondary to class solidarity. “In no 
other army were members of so many countries together as in that of the United States. 
In a single post, or in a single company, the nations of the civilized world were 
represented.”92 Still, no ethnic pecking order existed either in leisure or labor. As with 
the officers and their wives, white ethnicity mattered little as a segregating factor among 
white enlisted men. In all, white enlisted men were surprisingly egalitarian and 
communal, according to one historian.93 On the other hand, participation in enlisted 
men’s leisure world was close to a social necessity. If a man refused the company of his 
peers on a regular basis he could find himself isolated, driven out of their social sphere. 
Ostracized by the majority of their fellows, some men deserted, while one soldier 
attempted to make the unbearable situation bearable by avoiding fights with his fellow 
enlisted men even when they provoked him and by joining them in their parties, 
offering drinks when it was his turn to do so, all the time being nominally present as 
“one of the boys” while remaining in fact a critical outsider.94  
 
7.3 Leisure as Middle-Class Privilege 
For officers and their wives, leisure represented a cherished and preferred 
lifestyle towards which they concentrated much of their energies. As with the enlisted 
men, elite leisure was an important field where class identity and cohesion was 
constructed and displayed. Inside the army villages leisure was set to funnel social 
power towards the officers and their wives to such a degree that they would think they 
had acquired a superior monopoly because of it. Proper leisure life in part enabled 
officers and wives to imagine their superiority in relation to others and to set themselves 
as the army village upper class and also as the cream of white civilization in the 
Southwest. When enlisted men constructed leisure as opposition to an oppressive class-
based labor regime, elite leisure, much like elite housing and domesticity, was set to 
function as a showcase of transplanted eastern white middle-class practices and 
standards. Leisure also codified acceptable elite behavior and social companions. All 
the time elite cohesion was enforced by strict social control. What mattered for officers 
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and their wives was the company with whom one associated, the type of activities one 
indulged in, and how one represented oneself. 
 
7.3.1 Life of Leisure 
Those officers and their wives who arrived and those who already lived in the 
army villages were expected to show an understanding of the leisure regime from the 
moment of contact. As soon as possible, the new arrival was to call on the commanding 
officer, and officers of lower rank were to make a call on him as well. Also, if an 
officer’s wife arrived at the post unaccompanied it was expected that other officers and 
their wives call on her within forty-eight hours. The exact timetable or the order of 
whom called on whom might have variations, but when the whole business of calling 
got underway there ideally was no end in sight. One officer’s wife remembered her 
initiation at Whipple Barracks: “Such a welcome as we had! I had hardly gotten the dust 
from my face and hands when General and Mrs. Kautz were announced, and soon after 
all of the staff officers and their wives and many others.” Right away “champagne was 
opened and our health and hearty welcome drunk.”95  
Even when an officer and/or his family temporarily visited a post, the resident 
officers and wives were expected to entertain the new arrivals.96 This act built cohesion 
and guaranteed suitable comfort and luxury for those moving about. While the hosts 
offered food, shelter, and entertainments, the visitors were expected to show proper 
gratitude. Sometimes the hosts felt very uncertain and stressed. Some were afraid that 
their standards were not high enough and the visitors would feel unsatisfied. One wife 
wrote that she never objected to entertaining men, but had reservations about the wives 
due to her own “plain” living.97 When a high-ranking general arrived hours earlier than 
expected, an officer’s family went into panic mode. They hurried the house, dressed, 
sped up the food preparation, and also acquired new grocery articles in perfect 
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pandemonium. Luckily, they managed to pull it off and the visiting general seemed 
pleased, commending his hosts.98 
Sometimes the arrivals received nothing, a potential social catastrophe for the 
hosts who risked losing face. When one traveling party had to sleep on a dirt floor with 
nothing but army blankets and sheepskins, officers and wives at the post offered 
numerous apologies for not being alert enough to provide a suitable reception. With 
almost tears in his eyes, the post surgeon later tried to convince the visitors that if he 
had known of people coming he would have at least sent over hospital cots to provide 
better sleeping arrangements.99 
On the other hand, officers and their wives valued their social protocols so highly 
that it was an insult and close to an impossibility to turn down offers of hospitality even 
if one wished to do so. When in 1871 Colonel George Stoneman, the military 
commander of Arizona, was removed from his position as an inefficient failure, and his 
replacement, Lieutenant-Colonel George Crook, arrived, a mandatory dinner was 
arranged. “I had to accept out of politeness, but never passed through such an ordeal,” 
Crook wrote. His hostess “while trying to be polite, could not help showing in every 
action that she would like to tear me to pieces, and there I had to sit and sit, and if she 
only knew how I hated to go to Arizona, she might feel differently.”100 One’s travel 
condition also did not make a difference. When one officer tried to decline an invitation 
for a dinner, feeling that he was too ragged and dirty following his travels, the couple 
welcoming him proved persistent and there was little this officer could do but to 
accept.101 Also, after a fatiguing journey with a sick infant one army wife arrived at 
their “resting” stop, Camp Verde. However, “there was not much rest,” she wrote, “for 
we had to sort and rearrange our things and dress ourselves properly…Jack [her 
lieutenant husband] put on his best uniform, and there was no end of visiting.” Tired 
and worried, she had to endure it all. In the end, she was still not bitter, obviously 
accepting the social rules. “The day would have been pleasant enough but for my 
wretched condition,” she remembered.102 
In the army villages leisure ideally surrounded the officers and especially their 
wives. The wives had no official duties, and their lives revolved around the domestic 
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sphere. However, they preferred to leave domestic chores to servants if possible and 
concentrated on supervising their households, managing and planning the constant 
improvements the domestic spaces were subjected to. They gave much of their attention 
to leisure, both in and out of their households. For one officer’s wife a typical day 
included riding or driving in the morning, sewing part of the day, and preferably visits 
and socializing.103 Overall, officers and wives indulged in a wide range of activities. 
Many enjoyed reading and ordered a wide selection of periodicals and newspapers. 
Some studied foreign languages and literature, while others practiced genealogy, 
mineralogy, botany, history, and constitutional and international law.104 Officers also 
enjoyed good whiskey and cigars, and some liked to gamble. While enlisted men drank 
without any control, the officers liked to give the image that they always behaved like 
gentlemen, never becoming too intoxicated or brawly. In truth, heavy losses and heavy 
drinking did sometimes occur. For instance, one lieutenant lost six hundred dollars at 
cards one night and an additional twenty dollars to whiskey and tobacco. Among the 
elite, gambling divided opinions. While some officers gambled openly, others could 
barely confess that they enjoyed the atmosphere, and had to quickly assure that they had 
no inclination to participate. Many apparently favored a total ban on gambling in the 
army and at some army villages in the Southwest gambling was considered off limits.105  
Riding, short leisure trips, and hunting proved popular leisure activities. The 
sense of freedom and the thrill of riding drew many officers and their wives for an 
afternoon of excitement. For one army wife rides on horseback composed “the chief 
charm of army life.”106 On their leisure trips outside the army villages the elite ascended 
mountains, engaged in nature-watching and sightseeing, and enjoyed many picnics. 
Some displayed a desire to study and collect local wildlife, whether it was birds, lizards, 
snakes, or other reptiles.107 Many more had an interest in old indigenous cliff dwellings 
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and town sites, performing as part-time historians, archeologists, and curious tourists 
making notes, sketches, and collecting materials. Officers and wives found a plethora of 
“interesting ruins of buildings and walled-up caves,” great “white mounds, the ruins of 
temples and cities of the Aztecs,” and elaborate canals, “large as the Erie canal.”108 One 
officer remarked that ”we felt all the excitement of explorers of an unknown land and 
enjoyed in anticipation the surprises in store for us whenever we moved from one place 
to another.” Another enthusiastically told that “We collected at least a wagon load of 
stone implements…and many pieces of pottery, from which could have been almost the 
complete vessels.”109 It would appear that army men and women in general were 
fascinated by Indian artifacts, including clothing, arrow points, pottery, and other 
remnants, and that they obtained these artifacts either by buying them from Indians, 
confiscating some from battle-sites, by personally searching the old dwellings, or 
digging from the ground.110 In addition to indigenous sites, officers and their wives 
found some monuments from the Spanish era suitable sites for leisure visits. Especially 
San Xavier de Bac - a Spanish mission church outside Tucson - was the destination of 
frequent visits. One of army wife called the place a “splendid monument of 
civilization,” officers and their wives enjoyed the scenery and atmosphere. Some were 
so inspired that they spent hours painting at the mission.111 The army elite had the 
financial capability and available time to seek these entertainments. But more than that, 
all these activities were linked to the social necessity of displaying certain class-based 
notions of refined taste in leisure. They were also showcases of one’s manliness. 
Climbing mountains, for example, was represented as a symbolic act of conquest and a 
victory claim for civilization. 
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While some army wives found tennis to their liking, hunting represented the most 
important leisure sport for the officers to showcase their sense of manliness.112 Officers 
included many enthusiasts who would go hunting anytime, anywhere, no matter what 
the military situation. Some did not even leave their quarters, but engaged in shooting 
game from their verandas. Others organized hunting trips that lasted several days. 
Ideally, a supply of horses and hunting dogs were used to go after foxes and wolves, 
copying European aristocratic practices.113 In some families hunting seemingly 
functioned as a sort of rite of manhood. Claude Corbusier, son of army surgeon William 
Corbusier, shot his first deer at Fort Grant during the winter of 1887-88. His mother 
wrote of the event: “Father arose from his bed, and awakening Claude, he pointed to a 
grove of black oaks on a slope near the foot of the mountains and told him that probably 
a fine fat buck was feeding there, to go afoot and keep a good lookout…In less than two 
hours the other boys, who were watching, shouted, ‘Claude has shot a deer,’ as they saw 
him on a great boulder waving his hat…It was a large black-tailed buck, and Claude 
was pronounced a skilled hunter.”114  
Behaving right and hunting “honorably” was very important when building an 
image of masculine gentlemen. For instance, when some officers used dynamite to catch 
fish they were heavily criticized, not so much for wasting government explosives, but 
for the use of such an ungentlemanly hunting method. The hunt allowed officers to 
imagine that they mastered nature. They canceled the hunt when it was “too easy,” the 
thrill of the chase was missing. The perceived value of the animal hunted often mattered 
more than the necessity of bringing food to the table. Officers desired to hunt deer, 
turkey, and even bears. One officer wrote that “I did not see a deer or anything else that 
a sportsman would fire at, unless it were a cotton-tail rabbit. Most sportsmen disdain 
such game.” He continued that “I cannot call it a hunt, having seen nothing worthy of a 
shot.” Officers could complain that game was scarce around a post, although only the 
more valued big game could not be found, but when there was still an abundance of 
ducks and the occasional wild turkey and sage hen.115 As hunting was seen by some as a 
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test of one’s manliness, unsuccessful hunts often brought painful ridicule from fellow 
officers. For example, when Lieutenant Vroom, “a good shot and fond of hunting,” 
returned to the post one day wet and “duckless” he was heavily ridiculed. The spring he 
had fallen into was thereafter known widely in the army as “Vroom’s folly.”116 
Although officers sometimes took enlisted men along on their hunts, the latter 
functioned in subaltern positions as servants, trackers, and helpers. Still, if an 
opportunity presented itself many enlisted men also liked the thrill of the hunt, 
preferably without any officers. Although the soldiers recognized aspects of honor and 
masculinity involved, a need to fulfill more basic needs - they badly needed food to 
supplement their meager diet - drove them.117 
Elite leisure was often very couple-oriented as many of the most common 
activities such as riding, social calls, picnics, trips to ruin sites, concerts, dances, 
dinners, and parties included both men and women. Only hunting and gambling were 
predominantly male endeavors. Often officers and their wives had to rely on their own 
imagination and energy in coming up with leisure activities. Only rarely was it possible 
to visit shows offered, for instance, by circuses or theatrical companies, which began to 
tour the Southwest.118 Both officers and wives participated in organizing leisure. While 
men concentrated on their club rooms, if they had one, and on hunting excursions, the 
wives often took the lead in arranging more elaborate events. They usually bore the 
responsibility for decorations and costumes needed for the parties and planned the 
transfer of barren rooms and hallways into elaborate ballrooms, decorated with canvases 
and flags, and stacked with bayonets and swords.119  
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Typical elaborate activities in the army villages included masquerades and special 
costume balls. At one calico-themed masquerade officers and their wives appeared, for 
example, in black mask and domino, in dark blue bicycle suit with red calico sash over 
one shoulder and around the waist and decorated with a number of stars, crescents, and 
bows. Some came as colored women - acting the part in black face. The commanding 
officer’s wife, who joined in as Mother Goose, later thought it was “a swell hop, swell 
dress, and swell supper.”120 While “Indian-costume” balls were popular in some places, 
at Fort Apache the dance parties had Apache leaders on the guest list. One such dance 
took place in an officer’s quarters decorated with evergreen boughs and musicians from 
the enlisted ranks playing the banjo and guitar. A quadrille was formed with the officers 
on the opposite side of the Apache leaders. “To meet the savage Apache on a basis of 
social equality, in an officer’s quarters, and to dance in a quadrille with him! Well, the 
limit of all things had been reached!,” one of the participants remembered. Despite 
reservations, officers accepted the invitation to participate in dances arranged at the 
Apache camps.121 
Christmas and other holidays were special events where eastern “home” 
surroundings and traditions were imitated. The traditional Christmas hunt at Fort 
Apache was a necessity much like evergreen decorations. In 1879, a five-day outing 
produced twenty-five deer and close to fifty turkeys. These, added to the eggnog, 
champagne, and “other trimmings” made the holidays an expansive celebration, 
isolating the elite from colonial realities and nourishing their ideas of self-importance. 
Also, on the Fourth of July the military ideally feasted “in grand style,” with music, 
games, horse races, and athletic contests.122  
Music symbolized refinement and high-status and served as a link to home and as 
a symbol of western civilization. Officers and their wives enjoyed assembling together 
to listen to music whether it was playing the piano and other instruments at somebody’s 
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home or listening to bands in concerts. Their ears, one officer wrote, were desperate for 
music when the only thing in the colony resembling a melody was the howl of the 
coyotes.123 The presence of a regimental band improved the entertainment at any 
military village, but most villages spent most of their time without one because the 
regimental band was usually stationed at the regimental headquarters. Therefore, the 
arrival of a band became a much expected occasion. This was true at Fort Apache in 
1881, when one moved in after an absence of ten years. At Fort Grant, a band was 
equally well received and it did not disappoint, but “gave frequent open-air concerts” 
and serenaded an officer and family when they arrived at the post. When the band 
departed, life became “a little dull,” as one officer’s wife remarked.124 
Although everywhere officers and their wives tried to arrange proper leisure 
activities, in reality leisure life varied from village to village. The size and location of 
the army village had a great effect in determining the nature of leisure. In some isolated 
villages, outside society for officers was virtually nonexistent.125 If the number of 
officers and wives was also minimal, leisure life inevitably shrunk. However, even in 
these locations most tried to create activities that would reach high standards, although 
some were content to complain about the lack of social functions and companions. For 
an army surgeon, who had only one officer as his company, studying and books helped 
to render his time endurable.126 There existed another side to the lack of regular social 
life. When some visitors finally arrived, expecting to be entertained according to social 
norms, hosts in the smallest posts dreaded this because they had to push their 
imagination to its limits in order to arrange suitable offerings and activities.127 
The number of ladies was important in determining the nature and frequency of 
activities. No wives cut down the number of dances and parties. Still other activities 
could be arranged. An officer remembered that although he and his wife were mainly 
dependent on each other and the few bachelor officers for society, they still managed to 
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arrange trips into surrounding countryside, to its hills, rivers, and Indian camps, where 
they found plenty of interest.128 Furthermore, it did not take many wives to arrange 
more refined events. For example, at Camp McDowell in 1869 an army wife 
demonstrated that with just one other lady present she could still hold a “respectable” 
wedding anniversary party.129  
On the other hand, in some small army villages officers and their wives were 
forced to maintain frequent social activities. Usually these places were located in the 
proximity of busy travel routes. At Camp Date Creek, which was on a well-traveled 
Prescott road, there were only one or two army wives in the early 1870s to organize 
what they remembered as “constant parties.” According to their memoirs, the effort was 
fatiguing, but they apparently had little choice. The situation was similar at Fort Yuma 
on the Colorado River through which many army people heading to Arizona 
traversed.130 
At large posts located near towns the activities were at their most numerous and 
varied. As department headquarters, Whipple Barracks had a large contingency of 
officers and many more traveled through, keeping social life active. For instance, when 
army surgeon William Corbusier and his family visited the post on September 1873, all 
the officers and their wives called upon them. This almost overwhelmed the Corbusiers 
as close to twenty people crowded into the quarters.131 At Whipple “there was a 
continual round of gayety,” dances, luncheons, dinners, play rehearsals and shows at the 
officers’ Dramatic Society. Entertainment of some kind was offered almost every day 
and evening. One officer’s wife remembered that officers at Whipple Barracks also used 
to meet at each others houses to smoke and discuss various matters, most often the Civil 
War or Reconstruction. If for some reason there was nothing happening, they could 
make visits to nearby Camp Verde for dinners and dances.132 Near large towns the 
leisure scene of the army village and the town often mixed. This happened between 
Whipple Barracks and Prescott, whereas Fort Lowell, located on the outskirts of 
Tucson, was linked to Tucson by a special coach line to benefit the movement of 
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officers. Also in Santa Fe and Fort Marcy ample entertainment with dances, theater, 
social calls, and other social intermixing was commonplace.133 
The most elaborate series of parties took place when General George Crook 
relinquished his command of the Department of Arizona and departed on March 1875. 
Crook was the guest of honor in no less than three high-volume and high-class send-
offs. First, the people of Prescott held a complimentary reception for him in the town’s 
new brick building. The building in itself was a valuable symbol of whiteness and 
progress and stood in contrast to Hispanic adobes so prevalent in the region. Thus the 
location was more than suitable for white middle-class gatherings. Captain John G. 
Bourke, Crook’s aide, wrote that when all the invited quests arrived “for a short time the 
hum and rattle of wheels bore a faint resemblance to Broadway.” After Crook had 
recovered from this congregation of speeches, feasting, music, and dancing, he took part 
in the farewell ball organized at Whipple Barracks the next evening. Tens of guests 
invited from the notables of the garrison, town, and from beyond flocked to Whipple 
and the club room was decorated with evergreens hanging from the walls, ceilings 
adorned with stars and wreaths of the same material. Over each window “hang guidons 
and sabers and the regimental standards…bearing the fecund record of noble service, 
occupy the corners.” Preparations and guests made it “one of the finest affairs ever 
known on the Pacific Coast,” Bourke added, again judging the event in relation to 
outside standards. The supper was supreme, the band played marvelously, champagne 
flowed, and good order dances whirled. In Bourke’s estimate it was an affair “beyond 
criticism and beyond description.” Next morning after breakfast a final grand farewell 
was organized at a rendezvous on the road to Fort Mojave. Ladies, officers, and citizens 
gathered for a few more glasses of champagne and a few more speeches. Over 125 
people were present. After this last display of class elegance and refinement, Crook and 
his entourage were on their way.134 
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Crook’s farewell parties perhaps more than any other single episode reveals the 
kind of leisure life officers and their wives wished for themselves in the Southwest 
borderlands. In contrast to all the small army villages where one or two officers strived 
to construct a respectable leisure life, or to the endless social calls with the same few 
faces, Crook’s sending off set the level of elegance and style achievable even in the 
colonies. At best, leisure could be almost comparable to Broadway and eastern 
festivities, at least it was the best on the western half of the continent, as Bourke wrote. 
Crook’s massive farewells also demonstrated what the officers and their wives thought 
they as a class stood for. The parties made them feel important, almost like royalty and 
offered a vision of a social order where officers and their wives were privileged and 
celebrated as the highest element in the society. 
 
7.3.2 Social Control and Disharmony  
As their leisure life demonstrates, officers and wives often sought to construct an 
image of themselves as a cohesive and united group. Reaffirming their collective ethos 
many were prone to praise each other in their private writings and official reports. One 
wife, for example, described the officers and wives at Whipple Barracks as “delightful,” 
“interesting,” “congenial,” “beautiful,” and “most agreeable.”135 It was not uncommon 
that in an official report a colonel applauded the “prompt, cordial, and intelligent 
action,” and bravery and energy of his subordinates. While this colonel did not mention 
any enlisted man by name, he did list the names of no less than 32 officers, some of 
whom he mentioned more than once.136 The elite also celebrated its members in death, 
painting images of heroic sacrifice and high moral standards. For instance, when two 
officers in Arizona drowned in a swift torrent, one army wife wrote that “there was 
universal sorrow throughout the whole Territory, where they were known and loved.” 
One officer represented that the loss of these officers of “the highest order” was 
“sincerely mourned, not only by the regiment, but by all the frontier community from 
Kansas to Arizona.”137 Usually only dead officers, not soldiers, were mentioned by 
name in the Annual Report. For example, in one such case an officer was cast as “a 
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sterling young officer,” and another “a signally brave, energetic, and skillful Indian 
fighter.”138 
Undoubtedly officers and wives in general formed a closely connected group and 
felt a strong sense of common destiny, which was only increased by frequent marriages 
of officers to close female relatives of another officer. For instance, when Lieutenant 
Leighton Finley chose to marry the niece of his company commander his choice was 
typical. Intermarriage was the rule and examples are near endless. This tradition also 
continued from one generation to the next.139 Nevertheless, officers and wives also often 
formed a less than harmonious hierarchical collective in which social control clashed 
with highly individualistic and ambitious people.  
Although rank brought status and certain privileges, rank in itself was still 
secondary if a person did not manage his or her everyday life appropriately. The right 
kind of behavior and level of sophistication were essential in determining the standing 
of officers and their wives, their worth in their own eyes and in the eyes of their peers. 
There were many ways a person could be criticized by his/her peers. Some did not even 
have to do anything but still were judged by their snobbish peers as intellectually 
shallow. According to one officer’s wife, “the only lady besides myself at the post is…a 
very plain woman but perfectly unobjectionable. We exchange visits occasionally in 
which we talk of chickens (not to take too high a flight for her).”140 
Others got judged for supposedly misusing their rank. One officer, according to 
his subordinate, was “jealous of his rank” and bullied his subordinates. This officer took 
even a slight variation or exceeding of an order, or doing anything without first 
consulting him, as an insult to his authority. He did not behave properly but turned 
“savage in a moment” and hid behind his rank. Thus his subordinate officer strongly 
disliked him and labeled him “a hard man to get along with.”141 Others saw that rank 
allowed some to gain unjust privilege. Disharmony often resulted from the allocation of 
living space in the villages as the number of rooms assigned to each officer varied 
according to rank. A matter that irritated many was how a superior officer arriving to a 
post could automatically out-rank his inferiors, and expel them from their quarters. No 
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matter how much effort was placed in fixing one’s quarters, when the order came that a 
superior officer wanted to move in, one had to go. “Up come the carpets. And down 
come the curtains. You must obey orders. And must not complain; But while you are 
moving, You take an oath, mental, Never to have so much Trouble again.” Subordinates 
were forced to move to whatever was available, which sometimes was not much. 
Following a move one wife found herself in a deserted kitchen used as a storage room 
for miscellaneous debris.142 
Often there was no excuse for improper behavior. Perceived ingratitude infuriated 
one army wife, insulted that people whom she had cared for when sick and given 
wardrobe when in need did not appear appreciative.143 In a personal letter a colonel’s 
wife at Fort Grant complained that she felt “so tired” of the family of a subordinate 
lieutenant: “They annoy me till I feel desperate sometimes.” She claimed that the girls 
of this family had company every night and made such a racket “that it is impossible to 
sleep, it even wakes the children. I wish the whole of them would be ordered to San 
Carlos or some other place where they will not be a torment.”144 In another incident, a 
colonel bullied a junior lieutenant for disobeying an order to report at Santa Fe although 
the lieutenant had received more recent orders from a higher authority to proceed to 
Texas. The real reason for the colonel’s anger was that the lieutenant’s wife had earlier 
refused to meet him. “He informed me that if I would apologize to him personally for 
my wife’s refusal to meet him he would overlook the matter.” When the lieutenant 
refused he was threatened by a court-martial and told to remain in Santa Fe. According 
to the lieutenant, the colonel was a distinguished soldier, but overbearing and arbitrary, 
a foul-mouthed brute in conversation and a hard drinker utterly despised by all, so that 
many of the ladies wanted to avoid his company altogether.145 
If one was a suspected drunk, or judged to act in unruly manner, others often 
represented him/her as a worthless person who deserved to be socially ostracized or 
dismissed from service due to his incompetence. Dismissal was often a matter of 
personal disgrace, a falling out of class. For example, Lieutenant Pendleton Hunter was 
categorized by his subordinate officer Frederick Phelps as a pleasant, jovial man with a 
good reputation as a Indian fighter, but unfortunately a drunk. When the army was 
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reduced in January 1871, and “an order was issued to get rid of worthless officers,” 
Hunter was dismissed. Four years later, Phelps encountered Hunter as a barkeeper at 
Las Animas, Colorado. “I spoke to him, but he looked me straight in the eye and told 
me that I was mistaken.” Phelps was certain that he recognized Hunter. “He was 
evidently ‘down at the heel,’ but still had pride enough not to wish to be recognized, so 
I said nothing, and have never seen or heard of him since.”146 
Among the elite, gender roles were tightly defined and any failure to act 
accordingly led to social confrontations. If a man did not take proper care of his family 
and, for instance, gambled his money away, he was heavily criticized. Also, although 
officers valued their women highly, they were quick to point out if anyone behaved out 
of her role. One officer supposedly was a plain, blunt, and a good soldier, but 
completely under his wife’s thumb, who always addressed him as “Commanding 
Officer,” and never by name. The man was judged weak while the wife’s behavior, 
which ridiculed the husband, was unacceptable.147 
Like one historian has noted, “jealous officers often magnified petty quarrels into 
major controversies.”148 Things could get so bad in some villages that all elite members 
were on “unfriendly terms” with each other. For example, at Camp McDowell in 1871 
one army wife held that the commander of the post was overbearing, tyrannical, and 
addicted to drink. She wrote that there were many quarrels between him and the 
officers, “so that in the garrison of five companies, there were few friendships.”149 The 
poor promotion opportunities inside the army escalated the individualistic drive and 
made people competitive and oftentimes bitter. Many were so hungry for high rank that 
they spent their lives striving for the top rung. In their search for honor and 
advancement, officers and their wives turned clannish, forming cliques around high-
ranking generals. In the time of Geronimo’s surrender in 1886, certain officers were 
devoted supporters of General George Crook, the commander of the Department of 
Arizona between 1882 and 1886, while others favored his successor General Nelson 
Miles. Crook and Miles fought for the honors of bringing an end to U.S.-Apache wars, 
both claiming that it was their methods and their work that caused the collapse of 
Apache military power. Crook’s devotees, men like Captain John Bourke, painted 
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Crook as a man of exceptional status, a great hero of the republic, and as a man who 
possessed great firmness of character and was genial, modest, and unassuming. Miles 
constructed an image of himself as the savior of the Southwest and a man of national 
importance. It was said that Miles even had presidential ambitions.150 
 
Conclusion: Two Worlds 
In the mid-1880s, officers from Fort Grant had a retreat built for themselves up in 
the nearby Mount Graham for use during the hot summer period. To this “favorite 
resort,” as one of them named it, officers, their families, and visitors, with the necessary 
servants, went to enjoy the “beautiful grassy flat bordering a small stream of cold water 
and surrounded by pines, aspen, and other trees.” Not surprisingly, enlisted men were 
ordered to cut trees and construct log cabins for elite use. Much as had happened on 
Colonel Stacey’s combined leisure outing and wood cutting expedition from Camp 
Thomas almost a decade earlier, here again enlisted men worked while officers and their 
wives relaxed. Naturally, living spaces were also segregated. Soldiers tents were located 
lower down the creek on the opposite side of the brook from the officers. When the 
soldiers labored, officers and their guests often ascended the summit of Mount Graham 
to catch the grand views of mountain ranges and long broad valleys that reached 
Mexico. The evenings they spent around campfires talking and singing, two soldier 
cooks preparing lofty meals. The cooks were “very necessary adjuncts when one 
considers the numerous and healthy appetites,” one army wife wrote. A special pack 
train operated between the camp and Fort Grant, keeping the camp supplied with 
“whatever was necessary to make us comfortable.”151  
As this leisure/labor camp in the Graham Mountains affirms, the social order in 
the army villages was constructed on a fundamental divide between the army elite of 
officers and their wives and the enlisted men. A fixed hierarchical boundary kept up by 
both groups segregated the two classes from the 1860s to the 1880s and they failed to 
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meet in the realm of labor or leisure. Officers and their wives preferred not to work, but 
enlisted men were forced to act as poorly paid plasterers, carpenters, and even servants. 
Subjected to tight discipline they performed unmanly and menial tasks and had to 
compete with people of color and women, who, to make matters worse, usually received 
higher wages. It was the officers and their wives’ ideas of proper village space that in 
part called for a sufficient laboring population. In their eyes, use of enlisted labor did 
not mean exploitation but was only good for the character of lower class men. Indeed, 
officers often represented labor as a necessity for the enlisted ranks, whom they 
categorized as unsuitable for self-government.  
In leisure, both groups sought to construct their own separate worlds with 
differing ideas of acceptable leisure practices and behavior. Officers and their wives 
directed their ample means and energies for accomplishing a rich and complex leisure 
life, copying eastern middle-class standards. Their social world was set to construct and 
display their imagined superior status as a congregation of magnificent and refined men 
and women. They formed a cohesive group, who shared a strong sense of unity. 
However, on the flip side, they could be highly competitive and prone to many petty 
quarrels. Their social order did not tolerate improper behavior, but instead emphasized 
conformity. Many white enlisted men worked with little motivation, producing often 
questionable quality of work. Some felt like slaves. Soldiers focused their energies on 
creating their own separate leisure world as a form of resistance. Leisure, which often 
revolved around drinking and gambling, was an escape from the drudgery of everyday 
existence, a manifestation of joy, loneliness, and despair. The most radical form of 
resistance was desertion, a total abandonment of the army community, a negotiation of 
radically new identities motivated by desire for economic and personal independence in 
place of servitude.  
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Chapter 8  
Colonized Labor: Apaches as Army Workers 
 
“Ours was a race of fighting men-war was our occupation. A 
rifle was our most cherished possession…there was not a man 
who did not envy the scout his rifle.”1-James Kaywaykla, 
Chihenne (Chiricahua) Apache 
 
”I had no confidence in the Indian scouts. If they were true to 
the military they were false to their own people....no use for men 
who would hire at the rate of $13 per month to trail their friends 
and relatives for delivery to their enemy.”2 –Nelson A. Miles, 
General, U.S. Army 
 
“A whole bunch of us went…to San Carlos to try to enlist,” Tlodilhil (“black 
rope,” also known as John Rope) said as he remembered his journey in the mid-1870s. 
As part of a large gathering of Yavapais, Tonto Apaches, San Carlos Apaches, and 
White Mountain Apaches, Rope and his brother rode double on the only horse they 
managed to obtain to reach the agency on the White Mountain Reservation. In his early 
twenties, Rope did not hurry for any social celebration, or to join a raiding or war party, 
but, tired of reservation poverty, he came to find work in the United States Army. At 
San Carlos, Rope lined up with the rest of the men. Following a physical examination, 
white officers, who acted as employment agents, hired forty men. Many hopefuls were 
left out, but Rope proved lucky. Leaving the reservation the next day as part of the 
multiracial army workforce marked the beginning of a decade of periodic employment 
as colonized labor for Rope.3  
As discussed in chapter 4 “Apaches in White Army Minds,” white army people 
as a rule represented Apaches as cruel murderers and barbarous enemies of civilization 
in order to undermine the Apaches power in the region and to justify army actions and 
the U.S. takeover. This chapter describes what it meant when the Apaches worked in the 
U.S. Army as soldiers alongside white and black troops and under the command of 
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white officers during the U.S.-Apache wars; how the colonized temporarily occupied 
the ranks of the colonizers. While discussing how the army sought to manipulate the 
Apaches and what kind of discourses white army personnel produced of the Apache 
workforce, this piece is also interested in the workers story; how Apaches caught in the 
margins of empire actively sought ways to influence and counter the reshuffling of 
power in their world by working in the army.  
Like so many indigenous peoples in the Dutch, British, and French empires, 
Apaches were hired as soldiers because the colonial power needed their expertise to 
gain the monopoly of violence and secure control over the colonial terrain.4 Labeled 
“scouts” in army discourses, Apaches worked as soldiers although they were never 
institutionally incorporated nor accepted by white army personnel as full members of 
the army community. Apaches performed much the same labor tasks as white or black 
soldiers, but were also used for special labor roles. They received equal wages, but as a 
second-rate racialized workforce, their job security was uncertain at best. Their only 
alternatives for army work were reservation captivity or war with the U.S. regime. Yet, 
Apaches proved able to use the fluid and even paradoxical labor system for negotiating 
the impacts of colonialism on their lives. Army work brought economic security and 
temporary freedom, a certain latitude to pursue goals that would have otherwise been 
impossible because of colonizer control. Some managed to build considerable army 
careers, others disliked permanent employment outside their indigenous communities. 
Work could also create strife and divisions within the indigenous communities. This 
complex web where there was constant tension and negotiation between integration and 
exclusion, between valuing and othering, and between indigenous freedom and colonial 
control was the colonized labor system. Men from many indigenous groups worked in 
the army during the post-Civil War U.S.-indigenous conflicts. However, the diversity of 
labor tasks, the length of the labor experiment, and army’s dependence on indigenous 
laborers’ performance makes the Apaches the most comprehensive example of this kind 
of labor recruiting.  
Scholars like Colleen O’Neill and Brian Hosmer have ably demonstrated that 
rather than being simply a disruptive process, indigenous participation in the American 
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labor market was an actively sought way for negotiating the changes brought upon by 
U.S. conquest.5 Despite the surging interest, indigenous workers, as O’Neill points out, 
still remain on the margins of broader questions of economic development, labor, and 
working-class histories of the U.S. West. Scholars remain more likely to discuss the 
experiences of white, Asian, African-American, and Mexican workers.6 Arguably, by 
allowing colonial stereotypes regarding indigenous “avoidance” of labor the 
explanatory power they do not deserve, historians continue to keep indigenous labor 
peripheral in the larger story of continental conquest and U.S. colonialism. This is 
especially true for the post-Civil War decades, where the general image of indigenous 
role is to offer military resistance to the whites or to passively experience cultural 
disintegration on the reservations, and little else.7 Studies on Native American labor 
have mostly failed to integrate indigenous soldiers into their narratives, thus missing 
one opportunity to tackle this prevalent image.8 In many cases, as an option to armed 
resistance and reservation captivity, the army introduced indigenous men to wage labor 
and the operations of the American labor market.  
For their part, standard army histories have generally placed indigenous soldiers 
on the fringes of the military worlds. Studies that examine the lives of the common 
soldier have ignored indigenous presence, while histories of army campaigns often 
notice indigenous contributions only in passing, merely reminding readers that 
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indigenous men participated in the action.9 Although they have focused explicitly on 
indigenous soldiers, historians like Thomas Dunlay and David Smits have treated 
indigenous men as the army’s sidekicks, categorized usually as “allies,” “auxiliaries,” 
“friendlies,” or, most often, as “scouts,” using the term widely circulated in the 
discourses of white nineteenth-century army personnel. Indicating that indigenous duty 
was mainly reconnaissance, the term “scout” poorly describes what Apache men 
actually did in the army. Furthermore, Dunlay, Smits, and others have concentrated in 
their rather uncritical descriptions on how indigenous soldiers performed during various 
operations, how valuable they were for the army’s cause, how the Indians were able to 
fight their “own people,” or what white officers thought about the “scouts” and their 
motivations to enlist. Unlike the present study, historians in the past have failed to 
connect indigenous army experiences to the frameworks of colonialism and resistance. 
They have, by and large, failed to investigate the workers’ story or see army writings as 
subjective colonial discourses through which the power of the colonizers was 
constructed. Neither have they discussed the patterns of inclusion and exclusion evident 
in the army’s indigenous labor utilization. Importantly, never have these scholars 
approached indigenous men as members of the army community or as real soldiers.10  
In all, the discussion of indigenous soldiers as a colonized workforce not only 
helps in breaking unnecessary mental barriers that isolate indigenous peoples or treat 
them as passive bystanders of history, but establishes the multiracial, instead of biracial, 
character of the army, and complicates the understanding of labor in the U.S. West. It 
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also offers a warning against any simple models of colonialism that claim 
generalizations that are too abstract or always see whites and indigenous peoples as 
opposites. Recognizing that, like black and white troops, indigenous men deserve to be 
discussed as members of the army proper and as workers does not mean claiming that 
indigenous work experience or status was identical with black or white soldiers. It was 
the very difference that made the indigenous workforce colonized labor. 
 
8.1 Army Work as Colonial Resistance 
Like whites and blacks, Apaches became soldiers voluntarily. If others joined to 
find secure employment, meaningful careers, adventure, or, in the case of immigrants, 
to familiarize themselves with the new country and language, indigenous men were 
compelled to enlist by circumstances born from colonial competition. Apache men were 
active participants and choice-makers to whom military work was an attempt to take 
charge of their own lives, a way to resist the crushing impacts colonial intrusion had 
brought on their lives. Work functioned as a potential way to protect themselves, their 
families, their homes, identity, land, and life-ways in the face of violence and 
aggression and to advance their own geopolitical and cultural interests in a time when 
the Apaches self-government was severely threatened.  
In the mid-1870s the federal government thought it would gain a better control of 
Chiricahua and Western Apaches by moving all of them to one reservation. The 
government chose San Carlos as the designated place. Many Apaches grew to dislike 
the overcrowded and barren area immensely. One Apache, for instance, thought San 
Carlos was “the worst place in all great territory stolen from the Apaches.”11 Apache 
life in San Carlos was often marked by poverty, disease, and quarrels. Groups who 
detested each other had to live in close proximity and the often corrupt reservation 
agents also made Apache life more difficult by embezzling rations and funds and by 
subjecting the Apaches to government’s modernization policies. The agents, for 
example, blocked most hunting and all raiding and warfare and sought to turn Apache 
men into poor clones of white people following the yeoman farmer ideal. From the start, 
however, sedentary farming was hampered by an inferior supply of arable land and 
inadequate seeds and tools. Apaches were also reluctant to recognize farming as a man’s 
avocation. Jason Betzinez, a Chiricahua Apache, was certain that if the Apaches on the 
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reservation “had been set at some activity in which they were interested or experienced 
they would have been happy and would have exhibited great exertion. This is shown by 
the zeal in which some of our Apaches enlisted…they were as happy as bird dogs 
turned loose in a field full of quail.”12 Another Apache confirmed that army work “was 
a relief from the dreary, monotonous existence on the reservation. To Apaches a 
reservation is a prison.”13 These statements show how Apaches not only preferred to 
work as soldiers rather than full-time farmers, but recognized army work as a way to 
escape the hated colonial control on the reservation. 
When the federal government treated all Apaches living outside U.S. control as 
“outlaws” or “hostiles,” Apaches quickly realized that their options were threefold: life 
as free men in war against the Americans (and also Mexico), captivity and farming on 
the reservations, or military work. The latter held the most potential not only for 
increased self-rule and freedom, but for a safe and more prosperous life. Many chose to 
work. For instance, the son of one Chiricahua soldier explained that the famous leader 
and shaman Geronimo had asked his father to go against the U.S., but his father refused, 
preferring to make friends with whites and work for the army, thinking that it was the 
best option he had.14 Most army documents also support the conclusion that many 
Apaches opted for army work. For example, one officer responsible for recruiting wrote 
that ”It was difficult to tell which ones to take when all were so eager to go...a body of 
fine men was selected as could well be secured in any country. They repeatedly told me 
they meant to fight; that they intended to do [the] best they could.” In 1886, the agent of 
the Mescalero Apaches reported that the Mescaleros had responded cheerfully to the 
request for army service, with half of their men already enlisted.15 
Apaches used army work for fulfilling a variety of personal ambitions and group 
objectives. For instance, when the reservation Western Apaches were struck by 
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Chiricahua raiders who came in search of ammunition and women, many did not trust 
that white soldiers would protect them or advance their interests. Western Apaches 
wanted to fight back and retrieve captured relatives themselves. However, if they were 
to act on their own, Western Apaches would risk being labeled “hostiles” by the whites. 
The only way open was to join the army and the Apaches knew this. Even when formal 
enlistment was unavailable, sometimes Apaches nevertheless sought to join army troops 
in the field as “volunteers.” Many Apaches also understood army work as a way to end 
warfare, which, they hoped, would take the federal government off their backs and 
make normal life possible. For some, army work represented a possibility to make 
friends with the whites. John Rope stated that he worked in the military “in order to help 
the whites against the Chiricahuas because they had killed a lot of people.”16 Others, 
also recognizing the futility of war, used army work to enable their relatives to 
surrender unharmed. “The scouts saw that the outlaws didn’t have any show, so they 
tried to save as many of them as possible,” one Apache later confessed.17 
On the other hand, Apaches made the choice to work partly because they were 
born into a world where competition with indigenous enemies and Euro-Americans had 
contributed to a strong military culture. The army offered the kind of work Apaches 
could recognize and respect, and use to suit their own cultural notions of manliness. 
Apaches were trained from childhood to be responsible for hunting, defensive and 
offensive warfare, and manufacture, or acquisition, of weapons.18 Hunting, raiding, and 
warfare formed the nucleus of Apache male identity; these activities constituted the 
primary avenues for men to gain status and wealth. Defense of their own people and 
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offensive against their enemies was how men were measured. “Ours was a race of 
fighting men-war was our occupation,” one Apache man declared.19  
The army drew both youngsters and adults. For young men army work 
represented an avenue on which they could to continue their training to respectable 
manhood. For instance, when John Rope worked his first enlistment, he acted as an 
“apprentice” to his older relative, as was the custom for Apache youngsters learning 
their way. “You have done lots of work for me, getting wood, water, building fires, and 
cooking. You have done the right way,” the cousin told Rope. Rope himself explained 
that “when we young men joined up as scouts, our old male relatives would tell us to do 
whatever the older scouts wanted us to do. If we didn’t work hard as we should that 
would be no good.”20 For older men, army work provided an opportunity to cement 
their position within their own communities. According to one Chiricahua Apache, 
“being chosen as scouts was a recognition of a warrior’s ability to fight…Scouts were 
admired and envied by other men.”21 
Army work was all the more attractive because it offered a source of income for 
the worker and his family in times of chronic poverty and starvation. Historian Eve Ball 
wrote: “I’ve learned that Apache scouts knew which side of their bread was buttered 
and acted accordingly.”22 The army gave Apache soldiers the same pay as white and 
black enlisted cavalry men, at least $13 per month. Like white and black soldiers, 
indigenous workers also received food, clothing, horses, guns, ammunition, and other 
equipment such as blankets and canteens. They even got additional compensation if 
they provided their own horses or they did not need uniforms. Also, at least some 
Apache soldiers were successful in drawing military pensions, thus proving that 
economic benefits were not necessarily limited to the period of employment itself. Most 
spent their earnings immediately on necessities like food, clothing, utensils, and stock 
for their families. Some sent for sheep and horses all the way from California. “We 
could never save our pay because we had our families to care for,” Rope acknowledged. 
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Part of their earnings was also used for leisure, most notably gambling. It seems that the 
army realized that it was the welfare of people close to them that motivated Apache 
workers and distributed extra rations of food, blankets, or other equipment to the 
soldiers’ families. Furthermore, Apache soldiers often had the opportunity to confiscate 
enemy property in the field. This included hundreds of horses and proved an important 
addition to their earnings. Horses especially were valued and useful commodities. 
Enemy property proved such an attraction that Apache men occasionally volunteered 
without pay if they could just obtain the plunder.23  
Still, the quality and quantity of materials obtainable from the military were not 
always superior to those that could be gained through raiding or trading. For example, 
the army issued plenty of single-shot Springfield rifles, considered inferior to 
Winchester repeaters, often favored by those Apaches living outside white control in the 
1880s. Also, Apache enlistees received only limited amounts of ammunition, not only 
because the army was very cost-conscious but because ammunition was such a valuable 
commodity, especially for free Apaches, that the army feared Apache soldiers would 
trade or gamble the supply.24 
Although their life and options were such that many Apaches were more than 
willing to work for the army, it has to be recognized that if the Apaches for some reason 
proved reluctant when the army wanted their services, the officers, at least occasionally, 
were not shy at pressuring them. During a meeting in October 1882, General George 
Crook cornered a congregation of Western Apache leaders on the reservation and 
represented that they had no alternative but to work. He told them that “You can’t have 
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any rest here until those Chiricahuas are brought in, and you must bring them in. You 
must do this at once.” Apaches argued that the Chiricahuas “never belonged to us. They 
are Mexican Indians, and have always raised trouble.” Crook bluntly responded: “That 
makes no difference, you get the credit of it, and you’ve now got to go work and bring 
them in here as I tell you. They are intermarried with you, and you will get the blame of 
all the mischief they do. It depends on yourselves whether or not you shall go to your 
own lands to plant.” Crook warned that the Western Apaches would be held at the San 
Carlos Agency and counted every day until the Chiricahuas were brought back. There 
was little the Apaches could do. When they attempted to convince Crook that the 
Chiricahuas were not their friends any more than they were friends of the whites, Crook 
would hear none of it. All he wanted was to get the Apaches to work. In a peculiar 
fashion the army not only held all Apaches jointly responsible for the actions of those 
resisting the U.S. regime, but indicated that ending the U.S.-Apache wars was a job for 
those Apaches who did not resist the Americans. Following the meeting, many Western 
Apaches became military workers. The army rewarded them for their obedience as 
almost two-hundred Western Apaches received permission to relocate from the hated 
San Carlos to their homes in the Cibecue and Carrizo Creek area near Fort Apache.25 
In sum, despite the army’s occasional pressure, army work represented perhaps 
the best chance many Apaches had for taking control of their own destinies. For many, 
army work offered an attractive option when compared to life in reservation captivity or 
war with the U.S. Work offered the Apaches economic inducements, a chance to 
advance their own interests, and an opening to prove their manliness in a manner they 
knew and cherished. Army work held much promise in a world terribly short on any. It 
is easy to see why so many Apaches volunteered. 
 
8.2 Apaches at Work 
The army in the Southwest employed some indigenous soldiers during and 
immediately after the Civil War. Most came from the Pimas, Maricopas, or Papagos, 
although some were “Manso” Apaches, a group who had largely integrated themselves 
into the Mexican society, and whom the whites in general did not consider “true” 
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Apaches.26 In 1869, first Western Apaches promised to enlist when Cibecue Apache 
chief Miguel offered men from his group to the service.27 However, it was not until 
1871 that Crook, as the commander of Arizona, initiated a more systematic hiring of 
Apache workers that culminated in 1886. Usually anywhere from 100 to 200 Apaches 
were employed at any given time, but during crisis the numbers peaked at four hundred 
men.28 Apaches were stationed at various military villages, or at the army camps and 
agencies on reservations. For instance, in 1878 Arizona’s four indigenous companies 
were stationed respectively at forts Apache, Verde, Thomas, and in a temporary camp 
near old Camp Wallen close to the Mexican border. Like white troops, Apache 
companies changed stations. Between June 1879 and June 1880, Company A was still at 
Fort Apache, but Company B now operated from McDowell, C from Bowie, and D 
from both Huachuca and Thomas.29  
Apache units patrolled reservation boundaries and the international border, 
apprehending trespassers or chasing small groups. They also played significant roles in 
most major military campaigns. For instance, the Tonto Basin offensives against 
Western Apaches and Yavapais in 1872-74 had small company size units of white 
cavalry accompanied by detachments of indigenous soldiers. Although the idea at first 
was that Apache soldiers would lead white soldiers to the enemy, they in fact both 
located the enemy and did much of the actual fighting, proving indispensable for the 
success of the army.30 When in 1879-80 the military launched its manhunt for the group 
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led by Victorio, Apache companies from Arizona took part in full combat role in the 
campaign that traversed New Mexico, Texas, and Mexico.31  
In the 1880s, as the army went after small and highly mobile units of Chiricahua 
Apaches, the importance of Apache soldiers only increased. A pool of laborers from 
different Western Apache and Chiricahua Apache groups often handled the army’s main 
offensive responsibilities, while white and black troops took defensive roles guarding 
ranches, waterholes, trails, and roads. When, in 1883, the army invaded the Sierra 
Madre Mountains in search of Chiricahua Apaches, the expedition was composed of 
193 Apache soldiers and only 42 white enlisted men.32 During the 1885-86 “Geronimo 
campaign,” almost every column included a detachment of Apache soldiers and the 
main offensive thrust against the Chiricahuas consisted of two separate groups of 
approximately 100 Apache soldiers and a troop of white cavalry each. Designed to serve 
as a rallying point for Apache soldiers, white cavalry was eventually abandoned 
entirely, as it only retarded the mobility of the Apache workforce and, as in previous 
years, was often unable to engage the enemy. According to some estimates, the 
“Geronimo campaign” saw over 500 Apaches in the army.33 
Besides field operations, Apache soldiers worked on a plethora of tasks, some 
similar to the work white and black soldiers performed. Because of their skills, officers 
assigned Apaches as hunters whose work was to provide game for white army men. 
This might explain why John Rope claimed that he “just hunted deer” when staying at a 
military village. Also, when white soldiers tended post gardens, Apaches herded cattle, 
cultivated the soil, and arranged and weighed hay sold to the military by reservation 
Indians.34 Furthermore, if reservations were under army supervision, Apache soldiers, 
together or without white troops, often took on the duties of the police. Acting, like one 
officer noted, as “home guards,” their tasks included upholding the general order and 
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the apprehension of “outlaws.” At one time, for instance, a large dance was organized 
on a reservation to lure in one Apache man who had escaped after killing several 
people. A company of Apache soldiers concealed themselves near the dancing ground 
while special spies mingled with the crowds. When the wanted man made his 
appearance, Apache soldiers quickly seized him.35 Rope preferred campaigning in the 
field and disliked work in the Apache communities. There were many killings among 
the Apaches and it was the Apache soldiers who had to go after the suspects and sort out 
matters under the double pressure of white officers and Apache kin and family.36 
It seems that Apache soldiers rarely performed manual labor that occupied much 
of white soldiers time. Still, Apaches gained experience as strikers, or body-servants, 
for officers. For this some got $5 extra pay per month. At least one officer felt that work 
as a servant did not include any exhausting physical labor. He wrote that the hardest 
work his Apache servant did “was saddling my mule, smoking my cigarettes, and 
loafing around” the cook tent. At times, like when indigenous troops represented the 
sole garrison force at Fort Huachuca, they had to perform at least guard duty and other 
necessities, or to attend regular inspections and musters.37 Military training proved as 
uncommon among Apache soldiers as it did among white and black troops. Only 
occasionally did Apache soldiers practice shooting, for example.38 
Apaches also worked in assignments not common among other troops. They 
proved a valuable diplomatic asset when opening contacts, participating in public 
discussions, and circling amidst camps during negotiations with free Apaches. In 
addition, some Apaches went on reconnaissance missions across the international 
border. Others acted as special military spies. One officer explained that ”the duty of 
these scouts was to report to us every indication of discontent or hostility that might 
arise among the Indians on the reservation. They took no part in campaigns, but were 
employed solely to keep us posted on symptoms of unrest or agitations that might lead 
to serious difficulties in or between the various tribes, or even outbreaks.” For this 
purpose, women were also recruited. These Apache spies worked in secret, their identity 
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hidden even from each other. They communicated with the officers individually and at 
night using middlemen as interpreters and contacts.39 
For leisure, Apache soldiers arranged social dances, gambled or played games 
like hoop and poles in their own company or with the Apaches they had captured. 
Usually white soldiers had the role of onlookers, but at times they participated in 
hunting, shooting contests, horse races, and gambling. Apache soldiers often enjoyed 
various social, victory, and war dances. Although many white army men regarded 
Apache dances as barbarous and uncivilized, sometimes the army encouraged these 
dances and made officers join in. For example, before departing to the Sierra Madre in 
1883, the commanding officer asked the Chiricahua soldiers to perform their war dance, 
which would bring protection and power to their upcoming endeavors.40 Like white 
soldiers, some Apache soldiers used alcohol for leisure. Of course not all drank, but 
minor incidents when Apache soldiers “tanked up” in some village or trading post and 
became temporarily unable to perform their duties were relatively frequent. Sometimes 
alcohol consumption led to potentially explosive scenes. Once, for instance, a whiskey-
drinking Tonto Apache soldier shouted, shot in the air, and cursed the Chiricahuas of 
his company, daring them to send their best man to fight him. The white officer in 
command disarmed him and had him tied to a tree to sober up.41   
Like white and black soldiers, Apaches usually worked in racially segregated 
company size units, and were commanded by white regular army officers. The 
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composition of Apache units varied from those where the workers came from one 
particular local group or band to multi-band or -tribal outfits. For example, one Apache 
soldier recalled that his company included eight White Mountain, twelve San Carlos, 
and five Chiricahua Apaches, whereas another unit had not only San Carlos, White 
Mountain, and Chiricahua Apaches but also some Yumas and Mohaves.42  
When it came to methods of pursuit and fighting in the field, Apaches did not 
have to perform like other soldiers. While whites and blacks progressed in formations 
and conducted themselves in a regularized manner like the officers ordered, the army 
never bothered to regularize the behavior of Apache soldiers and turn them into copies 
of white soldiers. Not only was the army only superfluously interested in integrating its 
Apache workforce, but leading officers in the region felt that better short-term results 
were gained by letting the Apaches perform their work as they wished. Orders from 
Arizona headquarters to officers in command of Apache soldiers dated August 14, 
1885, asserted that Apache soldiers “understand thoroughly what is expected of them, 
and know best how to do their work. They understand this business better than we 
do...only directions that can be given to them is to explain what you expect of them, and 
let them to do their work in their own way. We cannot expect them to act automatically 
as drilled soldiers do. Their best quality is their individuality, and as soon as this is 
destroyed or impaired their efficiency goes with it.” The orders also stated that officers 
should never direct Apaches in details, because they will not like it and will only 
become loafing time-servers.43  This way the army sought to take full advantage of 
Apaches abilities as independent warriors. At times even the officers stayed behind and 
allowed Apaches total independence.44 
The Apaches were not expected to dress like other soldiers. They could draw 
uniforms, but did not have to. Officers characterized Apache soldiers as “a motley 
load,” with “almost naked forms.” The usual costume included the soldier’s blouse, a 
pair of cotton drawers, a waist cloth, moccasins, and a red headband. The latter 
“resembling [an] oriental turban,” was the only piece of clothing even close to 
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mandatory issue.45 Being allowed to perform field service or to dress as they pleased 
were arguably markers of difference in a workplace that held regularity in high value. 
While Apache soldiers engaged in wide variety of work duties and enjoyed 
unquestionable freedom of action and appearance, the army retained certain privileges 
for white and black soldiers. Unlike to many other minorities or immigrants in U.S. 
history, army work did not bring the Apaches any rights in American society. Whereas 
white and black soldiers were free men before and after their work periods, white 
authorities saw Apaches as dependant tribal subjects and made them return to the 
reservation after the work terms expired. Furthermore, Apache soldiers were cut off 
from lines of mobility beyond the non-commissioned ranks, whereas white soldiers had 
the opportunity to get promoted from the ranks. White and black soldiers also had a 
reliable job for five years at a time, after which it was possible to reenlist. Apache work 
contracts, on the other hand, often only ran up to six months, but had no fixed length.46 
Reenlistment, in general, was possible only if white officers came hiring again.  
Treating Apache soldiers much like ”hired men for cause,” the army tried to 
exercise full control over worker selection, deciding when indigenous soldiers were 
hired, where they worked, and in what capacity. Also, officers had the power to punish 
or fire Apache soldiers for such minor reasons as refusing to give the game they had 
hunted for themselves to the white soldiers. When in service the Apache soldiers’ 
choices were limited. They could work poorly or threaten to quit if one of them was too 
severely punished.47 However, this usually did not prevent the officers from disciplining 
their subordinates. For instance, one Apache soldier who refused to fight a close relative 
was placed in irons, sent away to a post, and placed in the guardhouse. His charge was 
mutiny. After some time in confinement, officers opted to release and reenlist him.48  
In an army that could claim job stability as one of its rare merits when compared 
to civilian working class life, Apache job security in general was a joke. Still, the 
Apaches were in a privileged position because the army preferred them over men from 
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other tribes. After all, most of the potential indigenous labor force in the Southwest 
remained unemployed most of the time. Although, for instance, some Navajos and 
Yavapais worked in the army, the officers frequently questioned their trailing and 
fighting abilities, courage to engage the enemy, and motivation to stay in service.49 The 
Hualapais, a mountain people from northern Arizona, enlisted in the early 1870s after 
suffering devastating defeats in the hands of the colonizers. After the Apaches began to 
provide a steady supply of workers, the army no longer needed the Hualapais, and they 
faced almost continuous unemployment, poverty, as well as relocation to a Colorado 
River reservation.50 Some Pimas, Maricopas, and Papagos were also frequently hired 
because whites considered them the enemies of Apaches. Still, officers almost 
universally regarded their impact in the field inferior compared to Apache soldiers.51 
Although small numbers of non-Apaches continued to find army employment 
throughout the 1880s, they were often nothing more than second-tier replacements 
filling the companies. Like one officer explained, the “Indians of other tribes…were not 
believed to possess the skill and endurance necessary to surprise the vigilant 
Chiricahuas.”52  
It seems that most Apaches did not even desire permanent employment outside 
their indigenous communities, and that shorter work periods suited them perfectly. John 
Rope, for instance, was able to establish the kind of army career that suited his wishes. 
Rope did not avoid work because of fear, although he must have recognized the strife 
army work caused among many Apache groups. He simply did not want to work all the 
time, but opted to stay at home, fulfilling his domestic duties, for months between 
enlistments.53 Lieutenant John Bigelow observed that many Apaches were willing to 
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join the army, but not to stay for long periods. Bigelow wrote that many Apache 
soldiers did not re-enlist right away, but took a break to spend time at home because of 
their strong ”domestic instincts.”54  Although work was periodic, some managed to 
build rather extensive careers. One Chiricahua man for instance first worked in the 
military in the 1860s in and around the Bosque Redondo reservation in New Mexico. 
He had also joined the army against the Comanches on the Southern Plains and worked 
for a spell with some Navajo soldiers. After marrying and starting a family he again 
worked in the army several terms during the “Geronimo campaign.” His work periods 
in the army proved random, but in all extended over three decades.55 Others worked 
even longer. For instance, Apache private DeKlay first enlisted on June 14, 1885 and 
his final discharge was dated May 31, 1929, whereas Askeldelinny (Little Major), a 
sergeant, first came to service on June 2, 1879 and quit for the last time on May 1, 
1925.56 
In sum, when the Apache workers performed a multitude of tasks ranging from 
active offensive operations to spy duty and guard work on military posts, they did the 
work tasks of regular soldiers but also performed special labor roles unavailable to other 
troops. Although privileged over other indigenous candidates and enjoying some 
freedoms in dress and conduct, Apache soldiers were also denied certain rights granted 
to black and white soldiers. Ultimately, as colonized labor Apache soldiers were a 
special workforce who had to balance between the white army world and the indigenous 
communities. 
 
8.3 A Precarious Labor System 
The army engaged in war against Apaches and thus Apache soldiers fought 
against other Apaches. The Apaches did not imagine that they formed one community, a 
nation, or people. In the mid-1800s the main Apache divisions included the Mescalero, 
Chiricahua, and Western Apaches. Anthropologist Morris Opler divided the Chiricahuas 
into three major bands, the Chihenne, the Chokonen, and the Nednhi, while 
ethnographer Grenville Goodwin counted five Western Apache groups (San Carlos, 
Cibecue, White Mountain, and Northern Tonto, and Southern Tonto), which he further 
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portioned into twenty bands and numerous local groups. Identification has caused much 
difficulties for outsiders as Apaches remained mostly outside Euro-American control 
until the reservation era in the 1870s and because Apaches moved and regrouped. 
Adding to the confusion many of the groups had variable names given by their 
indigenous and Euro-American neighbors. At the bottom of Apache organization were 
extended families towards which a person felt most obligations, responsibilities, and 
loyalty. Beyond this a common bond usually also existed between people who belonged 
to the same local group, band, or clan, but it was only the occasional large war parties, 
trading events, and ceremonial celebrations that drew distant people together. Bands 
sometimes joined together, but not often, and there existed no obligation to do so. 
According to Opler, the bands of the Chiricahua Apache tribe usually lived in peace 
with each other, recognizing a common bond. There was no common name for the tribe 
however or any kind of political organization. The band achieved the political 
consciousness that the tribe lacked. Band referred to a certain geographic location, had a 
specific name, meant increased opportunities for interaction among its people, and did 
contain a recognized leader or leaders assisted by subordinates. The range and 
complexity of interactions between various Apache bands and tribes varied considerably 
from intermarriage, trade, and alliances to avoidance and animosity. Any Apache unity 
was a constructed fantasy, a reality only in the minds of some American colonizers.57 
Thus, when, for instance, Chiricahuas disrupted Western Apache lives through 
attacks, horse thefts, and kidnapping of young women, some Western Apaches did not 
hesitate to join the army to exact revenge or retrieve captured relatives. Still, army work 
divided some Apache groups and raised bitter feelings. One Apache who had enlisted at 
least six times felt that he had to stop as “there were too many Indians about who 
wanted to kill me.” Apparently he had gained so many enemies because working in the 
army.58 The situation was especially heated among the Chiricahuas, the last to fight the 
U.S. In 1885 an estimated forty-three Chiricahua men left San Carlos to fight the U.S., 
and more than fifty enlisted in the army, while another eighty stayed on the reservation. 
Of the latter approximately half also worked in the army during the campaign that 
followed. Some Chiricahuas considered the Chiricahua soldiers as traitors and cowards 
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who in a time of crisis abandoned their own kinsmen. They even identified the red 
headband Apache soldiers wore as a symbol of servitude.59 For others, Apache soldiers 
were worthy of admiration and envy, whereas those warring against the U.S. 
represented a nuisance. One Apache told that “I remember how it was at Fort Apache. 
Most of the Indians were peaceful. They were attending to business. They were raising 
crops. They had their sheep and cattle and were getting along very well. Then somebody 
would say, ‘Geronimo is out again,’ and there he would be with a small band of about 
forty men up in the mountains. Pretty soon he would raid a settlement here, or kill a 
person, and the whole tribe [Chiricahuas] would be blamed for it. Instead of coming and 
getting his rations and settling down and trying to be civilized, he would be out there 
like a wild animal, killing and raiding. Then they would organize the Chiricahua scouts 
and send them out after Geronimo’s men. In this way he caused Apache to fight Apache 
and all sorts of trouble to break among our people.”60 
Colonial control was partial at best and the line between “us” and “them,” 
colonizer and colonized, was not just blurred, but changing and perilous. As semi-
incorporated workers, the Apaches found room for “changing sides” between the army, 
the reservation, and the Apache groups that fought the U.S. The army actively 
contributed to this situation by hiring Apaches who just had surrendered and by 
ignoring suspicions of past offences if Apaches showed a willingness to work. For 
example, when, in 1883-84, a company of indigenous soldiers was reorganized, the 
long-serving Western Apaches had to make room for the recently surrendered 
Chiricahuas. The army cast off the Western Apache workers while rewarding the 
Chiricahuas for surrendering. The army was not aiming to create a permanent 
workforce, or to build long-term loyalty and careers, but provided only short-term 
employment.61 The army’s policy led to a situation where, as one officer wrote, “the 
scouts of one year would be turning the Territory topsy-turvy the next, & the officer 
commanding a company of scouts would be pursuing a party of ex-scouts with an 
assortment of ex-hostiles.”62 
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The actions of Massai, a Chiricahua, illustrate this fluid space Apaches operated 
in. Massai enlisted into the army in 1880, but two years later he deserted and joined 
Geronimo’s group, which had taken Massai’s family from the reservation to the Sierra 
Madre. His family secured, Massai returned to San Carlos, only to break out with 
Geronimo and others in 1885. Weary of war, Massai went back to the reservation. The 
army did not arrest him, but allowed him to reenlist. In 1886, when the army made all 
Chiricahuas prisoners and sent them to Florida, Massai jumped off the train en route, 
found his way back to his home region, and continued to live outside American and 
Mexican control. He captured a Mescalero Apache wife and had several children. While 
his family later returned to the reservation, Massai never did. He was apparently killed. 
The well-being of his family combined with bitterness towards U.S. control and 
realization of the destructive futility of war drove Massai. Although Massai enjoyed 
considerable leverage in negotiating his position between the Apache and white worlds, 
in the end his options narrowed and he was forced to live in personal exile as a 
“dangerous outlaw.”63 
Chan-deisi provides another kind of example of how an ex-soldier could become 
a hated enemy of the U.S. On May 27, 1873 at San Carlos, Chan-deisi, who by then was 
a discharged soldier from the army, sought ration tickets. Being denied them, he 
protested and supposedly shot and killed an army lieutenant trying to arrest him. 
Whether Chan-deisi did the killing is not entirely clear, but he was declared an outlaw 
nonetheless. Chased by white and indigenous troops, Chan-deisi was killed in June 
1874. Thereafter his head adorned the post at Camp Apache. The killing cemented 
Chan-deisi’s reputation as an “Apache villain.” This label has shown some remarkable 
persistency in historical scholarship. For instance, in Dan Thrapp’s words Chan-deisi 
was as “vicious renegade” leader “as ever ravaged the countryside.”64  
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Over time Apaches learned that the army cared for the indigenous workforce only 
when it suited the interests of the army. For instance, already in the late 1860s two 
Cibecue Apache groups led by Miguel and Pedro wanted to live in cooperation with the 
whites and encouraged their men to join the army. These groups contributed a steady 
supply of men who worked with success against White Mountain and Tonto Apaches. 
According to one historian, Miguel firmly believed that a close alliance with the whites 
was necessary for his group to remain on their own land.65 He proved wrong. Although 
a special relationship between these groups and the army had developed as soldiers 
from Camp Apache visited Apache camps for hunting, dancing, and feasting, and vice 
versa, it took only a few questionable reports of stolen cattle for the distrustful army to 
order the two groups to relocate near Fort Apache. Shortly thereafter, in 1875, when the 
army had seemingly won the U.S.-Apache wars, the federal government envisioned a 
policy of concentration. The Interior Department orchestrated the removal, this time to 
San Carlos. The first move had caused dissatisfaction as it forced Miguel and Pedro’s 
groups to abandon their homes and relocate into areas where the very people they had 
fought against in the army resided. But it was the second relocation that demonstrates 
the nature of colonized labor.  
Although Pedro’s group was luckily saved at the last moment because the local 
army commander argued that some indigenous soldiers were needed near Fort Apache, 
Miguel’s group had to go. Miguel himself had been killed after the first move in a 
quarrel that had grown frequent. Now Diablo, Miguel’s successor and a sergeant in the 
army, pleaded their case. He promised that his group would not need any help from the 
whites, but could provide men for the army if just left alone. Diablo was bluntly 
discharged two months prior to the expiration of his term of service and ordered to 
move his people. Years of laboring in the military got his group nowhere. Frustrated 
and bitter, Diablo raised trouble against Fort Apache and Pedro’s group. Some officers 
even claimed that he was instigating a revolt among the Apache soldiers. But there was 
nothing he really could do and his group had to go into San Carlos as betrayed people. 
Soon, however, some of them started to escape back to their home areas. Then the 
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government used Apache soldiers from Pedro’s group to prevent Diablo’s Apaches 
from returning.66   
The Cibecue clash in 1881 and the fate of Cibecue Apache shaman Noch-ay-del-
klinne further demonstrate the uncertain position of Apaches soldiers. Noch-ay-del-
klinne had in fact been one of those Apaches from Pedro’s and Miguel’s group who 
were the first to enlist in the early 1870s. Later he faced the bitter removals, but when at 
work his record had been good. One officer described him as an honest, generous, and 
sober man in a report made during the mid-1870s.67 However, this was quickly 
forgotten when in 1881 Noch-ay-del-klinne preached a controversial Ghost Dance 
doctrine, which worried white officials and caused them to act. Noch-ay-del-klinne’s 
arrest in his village at Cibecue Creek ended in armed confrontation during which not 
only was the shaman and some white soldiers were killed, but Apache soldiers present 
were blamed for mutiny. In a later interview, Apache soldiers expressed their loyalty to 
the army and their desire to avoid fighting the white soldiers whom they regarded as 
their friends. They claimed that the clash had been unexpected and that they had run 
away when the shooting started to get out of the range of fire. To contradict this Apache 
version, white participants argued that it was Apache soldiers who had planned the 
whole affair and opened fire against the whites.68 
During the weeks that followed, some Apache soldiers surrendered as the army, 
fearing a general war, poured troops into Arizona. Army reported that some Apache 
soldiers were killed by the San Carlos police and by the troops, while many remained 
out of the military’s reach. Eventually two Apache soldiers received prison terms while 
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three were sentenced to death by hanging. Mutiny, as the colonizers saw had happened 
at Cibecue, was a strike from within, making it a terrible showcase for colonizer 
vulnerability and an insult thrown at the face of white power and prestige. However, 
this is not the whole story. What is interesting is that one of the Apaches hanged had 
actually been reemployed by the army when he had surrendered after the Cibecue clash, 
but then again arrested and sentenced. Also, one of the men sent to Alcatraz worked in 
the army a few years later, while several others were never punished, but were instead 
hired back by the army because Arizona’s military commander considered them too 
valuable as soldiers to be brought to trial.69 
All these examples demonstrate the unstable space in which Apache soldiers 
functioned. Their position between inclusion and exclusion was very uncertain and 
potentially precarious. On the flip side, colonized labor system could sometimes prove 
risky also for white officers who were too open and vocal in their faith for indigenous 
troops. Many high-ranking generals and policymakers saw the employment of 
indigenous soldiers, especially in some sort of visible combat role, as a direct insult to 
their racial pride and esprit de corps.70 Commanding Arizona from 1871 to 1875 and 
again from 1882 to 1886, General Crook was an eccentric in his own army because he 
continually advocated a bigger role and more responsibility for the indigenous 
workforce. He argued that ”in operating against them [Apaches] the only hope of 
success lies in using their own methods, and their own people,” and that  ”there never 
has been any success in operations against these Indians, unless Indian scouts were 
used...regular troops have always failed on our side of the boundary line.”71 Although 
good results, amicable relations with many superiors, and an understanding of the value 
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of good publicity kept an officer with so unorthodox views in an active leadership 
position, his dismissal from the Arizona command was only a matter of time.   
After failed negotiations with Geronimo’s Chiricahuas in March 1886, 
Commanding General Phil Sheridan directly attacked Crook’s use of Apache soldiers, 
questioning the Apaches loyalty, and demanding a change. Trusting and valuing the 
Apache soldiers, Crook tested his mandate by asking to be relieved of his command.72 
His request was swiftly approved, and his replacement General Nelson Miles received 
orders of “the necessity of making active and prominent use of the regular troops of 
your command.” In other words, the army command in Washington ordered Miles to 
place white soldiers in a more prominent role and displace the Apache soldiers. 
Thereafter the contributions of Apache soldiers were increasingly belittled and omitted 
in official statements and reports. Their numbers dropped although the importance of 
those who stayed remained crucial for the army’s success.73 Never being comfortable 
with the kind of role they had been given by Crook, army command wanted clearer 
borders between white and Apache soldiers. It was evident that Apache men could be 
hired and used, but must be employed as assistants to white troops with little or no 
publicity, never compromising the honor of whites. Still, what triggered censure of 
Crook was not only his heavy reliance on Apaches soldiers and the placing of thousands 
of white and black soldiers he had at his disposal in secondary roles, but also the lack of 
effective results. In the 1870s, when his military victories in the Southwest were more 
decisive, Crook got an almost unprecedented two-grade promotion, but in 1886 he was 
pushed aside. 
In the end, Crook paid a small price. His career was not considerably damaged by 
his trust in Apache soldiers. Shortly after departing Arizona he was enjoying pleasant 
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times in the form of receptions, dinner parties, theater, poker, and extended hunting trips 
in his new command in peaceful Nebraska. Two years later, he even went on to gain a 
coveted promotion to the rank of a major-general, and a move to the bustling Chicago. 
While Crook enjoyed “retirement” from active combat command, the real human cost 
of colonized labor system fell to the Apache soldiers.  
In September 1886, Chiricahua Apache soldiers witnessed an abrupt end to their 
army work. Martine, a Nednhi (Chiricahua) Apache, who was said only to want a quiet 
life at San Carlos so that his family would be spared from the trials of war, joined the 
army when asked by General Nelson Miles to locate a group of Chiricahua Apaches 
under Geronimo and persuade them to surrender. “We got relatives up there…We want 
to take our people back so they won’t suffer. We tell Geronimo we came to help him 
and his people. If he kills us that’s alright. We got to do something to help our people,” 
Martine explained. For his success, Martine was promised money and a new home on 
the reservation, but, after accomplishing his mission, was instead made a prisoner of 
war and sent to Florida with Geronimo.74 At the same time, the army lured the 
reservation Chiricahuas into the agency and lined them up. Surrounded by white 
soldiers, they were disarmed, transported to the railroad, and sent also to Florida. 
Among the Chiricahuas were many who worked or had recently worked in the army. 
Some soldiers were even refused their pay when made prisoners. Chiricahua lives fell 
apart “when they thought they were all at home at Fort Apache,” as one of them later 
recollected. All the while white soldiers guarded them, the very men they had worked 
with just shortly before. “After these Indians had gone through all these hardships for 
the good of the people of these two states, they did this to them…Many of these scouts 
and most of the other Indians were farming…Some of them had sheep, some had goats, 
some had mule teams, wagons, harnesses; some of them had horses and fine 
saddles…We didn’t know where we were to be taken…Some thought we were going to 
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be taken to the ocean and thrown in. Some thought we were going to be killed in some 
other way,” one Chiricahua expressed the confusion.75  
The majority of Chiricahua men had worked in the army several terms over the 
years, yet the colonial power rewarded them with imprisonment and removal when no 
longer needing them. The army had in fact entertained the idea of removing all 
Chiricahuas several times. During the winter of 1885-86 the plan had been abandoned 
because fears of what it might do to those Apache soldiers then scattered throughout the 
region in active service.76 The army command believed that the only way to end the 
U.S.-Apache wars was to remove all Chiricahuas as far away from Arizona as possible. 
The logic went that the reservations could not contain the Chiricahuas, as frequent 
breakouts throughout the 1880s demonstrated. Also, if reservation Chiricahuas were 
sent away then those resisting the U.S. would have no place to go back to and no 
linkage left that would tie them to the Southwest. Then they would want to surrender 
more easily and follow their kin. In a way, the reasons for removal were the same as the 
reasons why the army hired Apache workers: their military skills in the Southwest 
environment. By sending the Chiricahuas into a totally alien environment, the army 
made sure that the Apaches’ military power ceased to trouble the U.S.77  
It is sad and somewhat ironic that when the Chiricahuas were sent away, large 
numbers of the only group in the army community who were born and raised in the 
Southwest ended up deported. In Florida, the Chiricahuas died in alarming numbers. 
Eventually, they had to endure as prisoners of war for twenty-seven years, only 
gradually relocating westward, first to Alabama and then to Oklahoma, but never to 
Arizona. Even when they were released in 1913, their options included staying in 
Oklahoma or moving to the Mescalero reservation in New Mexico. No Chiricahua 
Apache reservation exists in Arizona even today. In fact, the repatriation of the remains 
of Geronimo to Arizona has yet to occur.78 
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8.4 White Army Personnel and the Search for Authority over the Colonized 
Workforce 
The fluid, yet uncertain and dangerous space Apache soldiers occupied as 
colonized labor is further illustrated by investigating how Apache workers were valued 
and othered in white army personnel’s discourses. As already shortly discussed, Apache 
soldiers were often highly regarded by army commanders such as General Crook who 
were responsible for hiring them. Still, in the end, Apache soldiers were often 
marginalized and excluded by whites who felt racially threatened by the efficient 
indigenous workforce.  
It was white shortcomings in colonial war that opened the way for Apaches to 
join the army payroll. Indigenous recruits brought much needed local expertise to an 
army that otherwise represented a congregation of outsiders in the Southwest terrain. 
When the Apaches were trained to military work in the Southwest environment from 
childhood and felt comfortable and at home in the terrain, most white army people, like 
previous chapters of this dissertation have shown, cursed the land and wanted nothing to 
do with it. As Apaches pursued, located, fought, killed, and captured resisting 
indigenous peoples seemingly with ease, other troops were often unable to engage the 
enemy. They could not always even keep up with the indigenous soldiers. Although 
testimony is scarce, some Apache soldiers also realized the helplessness of the whites.79 
Crook was not alone in thinking that Apache soldiers were needed to secure the 
Southwest for the U.S. According to one officer, “it was the opinion of those most 
experienced in Apache warfare, that, if the government had failed to take advantage of 
tribal animosities, Arizona would have remained as undeveloped to-day as it was when 
acquired by the United States.”80 These officers, however, were always in the minority.  
While Apache soldiers took over offensive tasks, most white and black troops 
were forced to occupy defensive roles guarding mines, ranches, and waterholes. Many 
probably never saw any military action and disliked every minute of their monotonous 
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days.81 In an army that equated offensive action with military glory, it looked from the 
white soldiers’ perspective that Apache soldiers were in danger of stealing what little 
military prestige and honor there was in this colonial war. Racial hatred and jealousy led 
to a reaction in which white officers and enlisted men, using varying representational 
strategies, sought to push Apache soldiers to the margins of the military world.  
One strategy white army men, officers and soldiers alike, used to distance the 
Apaches was to talk of them as “scouts,” not as soldiers. “Scouts” was the term under 
which indigenous troops were officially hired and therefore its use was in some ways 
natural. On another level, being called “scouts” in everyday interactions and in private 
unofficial correspondence meant that the Apaches were in fact set apart from the army 
in a very concrete manner. “Scout” was not a soldier, but something else entirely. At 
best it indicated adjunct membership but more often meant being cast as the “other.” 
Many officers and their wives used terms like “Indian scouts” or, usually, plain “scouts” 
to hide the individuality of Apache soldiers and to reduce them to an anonymous and 
irrelevant mass. To a certain extent this practice was not only about racial difference but 
also a question of class. Often only members of the army elite, prominent civilians, and 
Apache leaders were referred by their name in officers and their wives’ writings. While 
army stories helped to make Apache men like Cochise, Geronimo, and Victorio 
household names in the western world, they did not bother to identify most of the 
“scouts” or even the white or black soldiers. In one way, it seemed to make little 
difference whether the soldiers were white, black, or red. In the eyes of the officers and 
their wives they all represented an anonymous mass.82  
Probably disliking the idea of having to acknowledge Apaches as members of the 
army, some white army men and women chose simply to forget Apache presence 
altogether. They remained silent, thus making Apache soldiers invisible. Silence was 
not accidental, but a useful strategy. By not writing of Apache soldiers these army 
people undoubtedly contributed to the Apaches insignificant and peripheral status in the 
army community.83 Those army personnel who discussed Apache soldiers in more 
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detail often distanced them to the lowest rungs in the colonial hierarchies. Many army 
men advocated a more prominent role for white troops by attacking the character of 
Apache soldiers. For example, one Apache soldier, called “Dutchy” by the officers, was 
supposedly a “most incorrigible and vicious scoundrel” and “a drunkard, a thief, and a 
murderer.”84 Others white army men categorized as either unworthy, poorly motivated 
liars who would not “fight for real,” or as horrible savages. According to one officer, 
“the Apache is a savage of the lowest type…He can be bought for a small figure to kill 
his father or mother or any of his relations.”85 Still others, men like General Sheridan 
writing to Crook in 1886, questioned the loyalty of Apache soldiers. One white soldier, 
for instance, was uncertain as to whether the army ”had any use for these Apache 
scouts, as they are treacherous and could not be depended on in a emergency.”86 Wild 
tales sometimes circulated that Apache soldiers had turned on their white comrades, 
especially following the Cibecue incident in 1881. Lieutenant John Bigelow caught one 
of those rumors with the arrival of the army paymaster to his camp in the field on 
January 1886. According to Bigelow, the paymaster told that ”a detachment of Indian 
scouts out with soldiers... [had] killed two of the soldiers and made off, undoubtedly to 
join the hostiles.” No such thing had taken place, but that Bigelow did not discredit the 
story right away tells something of the army mentality where the loyalty of Apache 
soldiers was constantly doubted.87 
Besides Cibecue, Apache disloyalty proved a persistent and distressing myth, 
nothing more. In an army plagued by the desertion of white soldiers, desertion rates for 
Apache soldiers were never near as high. John Rope’s narrative gives the impression 
that desertion was rare. Also, one officer claimed that only three Chiricahua soldiers 
deserted during the 1885-86 campaigns. During the Battle of Big Dry Wash in 1882 
only one Apache soldier of the entire company deserted. Still, some contradictory 
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evidence also exists. According to Lieutenant James Parker, most of the forty White 
Mountain Apache soldiers serving with his column in 1885-86 deserted.88 
The army also included many who “admired” Apache military skills. However, 
even when they were impressed by the Apaches physical endurance, knowledge of 
terrain, individual skills in concealment and use of weapons, and the suitability all of 
these for warfare in the Southwest, white army men could not admit Apaches as equals 
or superiors as such. They had to construct an alternate story where the skills of Apache 
soldiers were derived from their perceivably non-civilized attributes, and where Apache 
soldiers were represented as inhuman animal-like war-beasts. In these discourses, the 
Apache soldiers required no rest or even water. “The constitution of these people 
[Apache soldiers] and the amount of hardship they were capable of enduring was 
extraordinary. They could travel on foot for forty or fifty miles in a day without taking 
nourishment, rest, or indulging in a drink of water…this made them, as soldiers, 
superior to the white,” one soldier wrote.89 An officer voiced that the Apache soldiers 
”carry almost nothing but arms and ammunition; they can live on cactus, they can go 
more than forty-eight hours without water...;they have incredible powers of endurance.” 
He added that the Apache troops supposedly “moved with no semblance of regularity, 
individual fancy alone governed...with vision as keen as a hawk’s, tread as untiring and 
as stealthy as the panther’s.” This officer was convinced that “the Apache was the 
perfect, the ideal, scout of the whole world.”90 Even in these “more positive” army 
writings Apache soldiers were still very much the “other,” dubbed by their white 
comrades as “beings from another world,” “greyhounds,” “bloodhounds,” or “tigers of 
human species.”91 
When Apaches were excluded in army discourses, one could expect that social 
relations between white army people and Apache soldiers were full of animosity. 
However, that does not seem to have been the case. Apart from Cibecue there is very 
little evidence of any major clashes or disturbances between white and Apache soldiers 
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either in the field or in the army villages. For instance, John Rope lists only few minor 
quarrels. Usually disagreements concerning who got to eat the game the Apaches had 
hunted.92 Some evidence even exists of common leisure between white and Apache 
soldiers. Also, in a peculiar practice white army men sometimes renamed Apache 
soldiers. Alteration of names was not yet permanent as it was in boarding schools and 
did not mark any upward rise in status. Names did not resemble proper Christian names, 
but were rather loosely devised structures. Nicknames whites gave to indigenous 
soldiers included Nosey, Washington Charlie, Indian Chicken, Slim Jim, Rowdy, Yuma 
Bill, Jacko, Popcorn, Whiskey, Dutchy, Peaches, and Deadshot.93 Although renaming 
can be seen to indicate good-humored and informal social relations between white and 
indigenous soldiers, the practice had multiple significances. Being a practical necessity 
for daily identification, new names relocated Apache soldiers to a sphere of 
understandability. According to one officer, “any American who would attempt to 
burden himself or his memory with a number of Indian names would soon be hopelessly 
lost.”94 Also, much like when naming landscapes, in renaming Apache soldiers whites 
took possession of Apaches and asserted their own superiority. One soldier wrote that 
when giving names whites “made pets” of the Apache troopers, thus effectively 
reducing Apaches in the colonial hierarchies and also questioning the Apaches 
manliness. From the Apache standpoint, new names given by the military might have 
marked sifting subjectivities, or overlapping identities, but more likely they proved a 
necessary evil, perhaps even an insult, or at best harmless fun. In Apache society, 
person’s own name was something very important and often additional names were 
invented and used to protect the real one, to save it from too much exposure or possibly 
embarrassing usage by other people. It would be interesting to know what kind of 
names Apache soldiers used to describe white army men. Some evidence, although 
undoubtedly romanticized by patriarchal white officers, does exist. These names include 
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“Long Nose,” “Big Foot,” and “Tall Captain.“ One lieutenant, however, the Apache 
soldiers dubbed as “Nantan Greenhorn” for his ignorance of Apaches.95 
In sum, for the vast majority of white army people Apache soldiers were never 
equals or real soldiers. To establish the Apaches difference, white army discourses 
silenced the Apaches, cast them as anonymous “scouts,” or described them as unreliable 
barbarians and uncivilized predators. Even in the more “admiring” army texts, Apache 
soldiers were represented more as instruments at the officers’ disposal than as real 
humans. In fact, it seems safe to conclude that soldiers or not, being an Apache often 
meant being seen as the opposite of whites, and it certainly meant being excluded from 
the army community. The army’s othering of the Apaches was a question of military 
honor and racial hierarchy, designated to secure the privilege of whiteness. It was only 
logical that white army people sought to draw attention away from their own poor 
performance in the U.S.-Apache wars. By ignoring, distancing, and downgrading 
Apache soldiers, white army people sought to establish their own superiority and 
colonial authority over the indigenous workforce. In white army minds, giving Apache 
soldiers too much praise or admitting them as full members of the army community 
would have been dangerous, as it had meant placing the fragile covers of whiteness in 
jeopardy, questioning the privilege and power of the whites, and undermining the 
purported superiority of their culture. 
 
Conclusion: A Race-Based Labor System 
After the armed conflict in the Southwest ended in September 1886, it came 
apparent that large numbers of Apache workers were no longer needed by the U.S. 
regime. Still, a handful of “scouts” found work until the 1940s, and the army did 
experiment with “full” formal integration of indigenous soldiers in the 1890s. Four 
Apache companies were then hired into white regiments, but, according to Michael 
Tate, the enterprise collapsed within six years because of white prejudice and lack of 
indigenous interest in permanent employment outside their own communities.96 
Frederick Cooper, historian of colonialism, has noted that when the need for 
colonial soldiers rose empires needed to soften differentiation and enhance 
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incorporation.97 Colonial power was never total and to strengthen their position, empires 
needed to partially incorporate the colonized by opening the door for participation in 
colonial institutions. This inclusion, often temporary and dangerous, allowed for 
opportunities for the colonized. The Apache case reveals how an uncertain, even 
perilous, but also liberating and interdependent, labor system was created when this 
partial integration was resorted to in the Southwest.  
From the workers perspective, army work was about taking charge of one’s own 
destinies when being threatened by colonialism. Whereas reservation life meant 
captivity, cultural onslaught, and poverty, and warfare against the U.S. signified 
destruction and suffering, army work offered a promise of security, a chance to end war, 
save relatives, retrieve captives, exact revenge, confirm ideas of manhood, achieve 
status, and avoid poverty and starvation. In other words, wage labor in the army allowed 
Apaches to survive amidst the chronic warfare, poverty, and cultural onslaught brought 
upon them by colonial intrusions. As colonized labor, freedom was still temporary, 
restricted, and potentially dangerous. Work for the colonizers brought no rights in the 
colonial society, nor did it save from forced exile. When labor ended, workers went 
right back to reservations. They could not actively pursue army careers, but had to wait 
for officers to come calling again. Colonized labor system was both rigid but also fluid. 
The army tried to control the Apache workforce by giving Apaches certain privileges, 
but retaining others for the white and black soldiers. The army made the rules, but 
Apaches not only used the work for their own aims, but created space for movement 
unintended by colonizers. Individual Apaches were able to move from the army to the 
reservation and to the factions fighting the U.S., but this was dangerous and Apaches 
could end up in personal exile or hanged. 
The experiences of Apache soldiers show how the U.S. used the labor of 
colonized peoples. Colonized labor also demonstrates how the U.S. conquest of the 
Southwest was carried on the shoulders of the indigenous inhabitants; how the U.S. 
regime achieved its power by involving the colonized peoples in building the systems 
that oppressed them. It shows how the colonial drawing of boundaries, learning of place 
and establishment of colonial relations of reciprocity were managed in the West. The 
position of Apaches on the margins of the new colonial order was reinforced and 
maintained through their labor experiences. Work made Apaches members of an 
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organization and community that did not really want them, but still needed their 
expertise to cement the organization’s own power. The army was as willing to favor 
Apache workers over candidates from other indigenous tribes, and to offer them a wide 
range of important work tasks and equal compensation as it was to controlling and 
limiting their work periods and mobility. The army offered a semi-incorporated status 
for the Apache workers, but nothing permanent or stable. By denying full institutional 
integration, and by othering them in discourses, the army made its Apache soldiers 
inferior and thus their exclusion logical, even inevitable. Valued by some but othered by 
many, partially included, but mostly excluded, the Apaches were always kept on the 
margins of the army community as a subaltern workforce; randomly employed, socially 
excluded, and easily exploitable and expendable. The army had the power to treat 
indigenous workers as unequals because in the last half of the nineteenth-century 
Apaches were a falling power with rapidly disappearing geopolitical influence, whereas 
the U.S. presented a rising force, a continental and global superpower in the making. 
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Conclusion: An Empire of Denial, Difference, and Frustration  
 
“In the American view of the past, the United States was not a 
classical imperial power, but a righter of wrongs around the 
world, in pursuit of tyranny, in defense of freedom no matter the 
place or cost.”1 -Edward W. Said 
 
Empire is central to United States history. Conquest and control of other people, 
their lands and resources are among the nation’s defining factors from pre-independence 
to the War on Terror. The nineteenth-century conquest of the trans-Mississippi West 
represented a stage in the making of a global power. Those scholars who acknowledge 
that the United States is and has been an empire, and not all do, have tried to understand 
what specific characteristics define it. Some of them, like the historian Niall Ferguson, 
argue that the United States is an empire in denial.2 A widely-accepted belief holds that 
the United States has never been an aggressor, writes historian Marilyn B. Young, 
because, supposedly, it does not commit aggression. Also, the hostility of others 
purportedly cannot be a response to American actions, because the United States does 
not invite hostility but only reacts to it.3 Often empire is camouflaged in special rhetoric 
designed to justify U.S. actions and to gain moral authority for its cause. The prevalent 
story has the United States restoring order and spreading or securing freedom and 
democracy. It also seems that the U.S. always confronts “evil states” or “menaces,” 
whether they be the Soviets, Islamic fundamentalists, or Apaches. According to 
historian Thomas Bender, Americans have shown a constant incapacity to see 
themselves as the enemy, or to recognize their cause as unjust or their actions as cruel 
and unnecessary, but have instead made American ideals and interests into universal 
human ideals for all peoples and cultures. Still, the United States is also an empire of 
difference. “An essential part of American national identity is based on difference,” on a 
desire to define America as distinct from Europe (exceptionalism) or those peoples the 
Americans have called “uncivilized” or “savage,” Bender writes. Americans have 
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systematically presumed a position of superiority to those people whose land they 
coveted or whose trade they sought.4  
When looking at the U.S. empire through the lens provided by the U.S. Army in 
post-Civil War southern Arizona and New Mexico we can see an empire in denial 
constructed on the rule of difference and marked by frustration. All white army people 
produced difference and otherness in discourse and in everyday life in order to make 
themselves powerful and important and to legitimize U.S. conquest. The construction 
and maintenance of officers and their wives’ identity and power rested on notions of 
difference. Wanting to distinguish themselves from the colony and its peoples, they 
represented themselves in opposition to, or in struggle against, the colonial landscapes 
and peoples. Feeling superior and powerful, officers and their wives claimed that 
nobody or nothing in the region was their equal or able to beat them, and represented 
themselves as saviors of the Southwest and leaders in the process to civilize the region. 
Officers and wives rejected southern Arizona and New Mexico as it was before 
forces (railroads, capitalism, and the white middle-class) from the imperial center 
(eastern United States) changed it. They disliked the place and distanced it by 
constructing images and representations of an inferior wasteland located outside the 
realm of civilization and characterized by dangerous environment and harsh society. 
Many approached the landscapes in terms of struggle, as obstacles that tested their 
character and strength. In this way they could claim control and superiority by 
mastering the landscapes, by surviving “hostile nature” and “Indian danger.”  
“Civilized,” “honorable,” “brave,” “refined,” and “respectable” were the 
foundational concepts on which the officers and their wives constructed their sense of 
self, their faith in their superiority, and their justification to rule the West. In this 
thinking white privilege was crucial but white ethnicity, so troublesome a question in 
the eastern United States, mattered less. The mostly native-born officers and their wives 
did not single out the immigrant element as a threat, and although the boundaries of 
“respectable persons” was often a fluid concept adjusted to meet the purportedly low 
standard of candidates in southern Arizona and New Mexico, being an acceptable social 
companion was never a question of white ethnicity. Being Irish or a Jew was secondary 
to character, intelligence, manners, and behavior - in other words class. Most civilians, 
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officers and their wives felt, had difficulties acting like whites. They supposedly lacked 
respectable character, being the surplus of civilized society. Mexicans did not qualify as 
white in army eyes, but were categorized as backward racial degenerates who 
symbolized European empire-building gone wrong. Racial otherness defined not only 
the Mexicans but also the indigenous groups. All white army people painted the 
Apaches, whom they saw as competition, as a vicious warrior race, the quintessential 
evil and the enemy of mankind. Army prejudice towards the Apaches was a racism of 
contempt, it minimized the humanity of what it hated and saw as a threat. 
In the army whiteness was fractured by class. Although they displayed a united 
front when it came to the Apaches or to the nature of the army’s mission, inside the 
army villages and during journeys officers and their wives and the white enlisted 
soldiers were divided by a class barrier. Officers and wives wanted to lead the 
regeneration of the colonial periphery by example, transplanting and replicating eastern 
middle-class lifestyles and culture. They sought to display their status, class 
sensibilities, and level of refinement in leisure and domestic life and during army 
journeys. Ideally army villages were set to function as islands of civilization. This called 
for a sufficient labor force. Treated as unfit for self-government, white (and black) 
soldiers functioned as an underclass, a socially inferior working class the officers and 
their wives often remained silent about. White soldiers were suitable for manual labor 
and for serving the officers and their wives in the villages and during journeys. As 
workers they were subject to harsh punishments, meager pay, unmanly domestic work 
chores, work with women and people of color, poor living conditions, and unchecked 
power of the officers and their wives. Some white soldiers felt like slaves. They 
organized resistance by working inefficiently, by deserting, and by creating a rough 
leisure life segregated from the officers and wives. White enlisted men did not distance 
themselves from the colony but enjoyed its freedoms. Many made southern Arizona and 
New Mexico their homes after retiring. Still, many also cursed the land and approached 
it in terms of struggle, in no small part because of their poor own performance in 
colonial warfare. Many also were critical of the character of the settlements and 
peoples, eventually welcoming “civilization” and progress full-heartedly. White enlisted 
men were outsiders too and believed in their own racial superiority and in the privilege 
of whiteness, especially in relation to the Apaches. 
Uncomfortable with the presence of racial strangers and feeling threatened by 
their performance, officers and their wives and the white enlisted men often distanced 
 273 
and silenced the Apache troops, forcing them to the margins of the army world. When 
Apaches chose to work in the army to combat the impacts colonialism had on their 
lives, they became a special racialized labor force, colonized labor. This labor system 
was characterized by constant tension between integration and exclusion and between 
indigenous freedom and colonial control. Apache soldiers, valued over other indigenous 
workers, performed a wide range of important work tasks and received equal 
compensation. Yet, they were not granted full institutional integration but discharged 
when the army no longer needed their special expertise. 
Officers, their wives, and the white enlisted men in general make it seem that 
they were in complete denial over the nature of their actions as invaders. Their 
representations not only made the marginalization of Apache soldiers and Mexicans 
appear normal, but also made colonial aggression against the Apaches (and Yavapais) 
seem justifiable and intelligible, and less racist and violent than it in reality was. White 
army people did not question their right to operate on other peoples’ land. They never 
saw their own actions as excessively violent or harmful although they were engaged in 
offensive war and eager to use violence against any people thought to be free Apaches. 
Furthermore, in army logic violence was represented as the fault of the Apaches. The 
army claimed it only reacted to violence and sought to establish peace and save the 
region from its contemporary state of decadence. In all, the army personnel displayed a 
refusal and incapacity to understand others. They did not bother to ask what the 
Apaches, or anyone else in the region, thought. Proving their good intentions in their 
own eyes, officers and wives invited “the sub-human” Apaches to become human 
through reservation regeneration and the adoption of Apache children.  
White army people turned colonialism into liberation. They not only made the 
Apaches the colonial villains to justify U.S. conquest but fabricated a history for the 
region where the U.S. was represented as a savior that brought an end to centuries of 
chaos. On one level army narratives had claimed that southern Arizona and New 
Mexico was a no man’s land in order to change it. By making the Southwest backward 
and unused, army narratives tried to give an impression that the region was ripe for U.S. 
takeover and that the U.S. invasion was right and even necessary: only the arrival of 
machine civilization, industry, and the white middle-class could save the region and 
make it a worthy part of the nation. In this process white army men and women reserved 
for themselves a heroic role as nation-builders and liberators who made southern 
Arizona and New Mexico safe for prosperous white futures. Unwanted and irrelevant in 
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the East, army people sought to make themselves important by penetrating “hostile” 
regions, subduing “dangerous” colonial villains, and opening “peripheral” places to 
“civilization” and “progress.” 
White army experience and representations also reveal an empire of frustration. 
All did not go as the colonizers planned and they had to learn that their power was 
limited. Frustration, and insecurity and bitterness, was the result of white army people 
feeling that they did not achieve their goals or that they had to struggle too much. Inside 
the army villages living spaces seldom managed to reach ambitious standards and 
proper leisure proved difficult to organize. Furthermore, from the army viewpoint the 
colony and its peoples seemed to be against them. Apaches stubbornly resisted and did 
not welcome “liberation” and “regeneration” in the reservations. Neither did the 
Apaches fight right, but questioned the manliness of white soldiers with their 
“unorthodox” ways. A growing doubt over one’s superiority made colonial warfare a 
distasteful matter for many soldiers and officers. Many also feared the Apaches. An 
additional insult to the racial pride of white soldiers was that it seemed that the Apache 
soldiers were in danger of stealing what honor there was left in colonial warfare. 
Furthermore, the supposedly inferior, inhospitable, and odd landscapes, in addition to 
dangerous wildlife, made movement a nightmare filled with frustration and 
disappointments. Many also felt troubled by the character of the colonial society, 
doubting whether the region had any prosperous white futures. This made them question 
what they were doing in such a place that was perhaps not worth “liberating.” Some 
officers and wives even feared that a prolonged stay in southern Arizona and New 
Mexico would contaminate their characters. What was worse was that the nation 
seemed ungrateful and unaware of the army’s contributions in spreading civilization and 
prosperity.  
Disgusted and disappointed, cursing the purportedly inhospitable colony and the 
ungrateful nation, many officers and wives wanted out of the colony as soon as possible 
and they could not conceive living in the region permanently. It never occurred to 
officers and wives to place the blame on themselves. They insisted that other peoples, or 
the colony and the nation had let them down and prevented them from fulfilling their 
“good intentions.” The promotion of national prestige and an intense desire to advance 
their own position and their vision of America motivated the white army colonizers to 
such an extent that they had no inclination to understand or acknowledge any other 
“truths” than their own.
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